Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context

Alter, Karen J.


pdf-Format: Dokument 1.pdf (518 KB)

Dokumentart: Bericht / Forschungsbericht / Abhandlung
Institut: SFB 597 Staatlichkeit im Wandel
Schriftenreihe: TranState working papers
Bandnummer: 8
Sprache: Englisch
Erstellungsjahr: 2004
Publikationsdatum: 06.12.2012
Originalveröffentlichung: (2004)
SWD-Schlagwörter: Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit , Internationales Recht , Politischer Prozess
DDC-Sachgruppe: Politik
BK - Basisklassifikation: 89.50 (Politische Prozesse: Allgemeines), 85.02 (), 86.95 (Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit)
Sondersammelgebiete: 3.6 Politik und Friedensforschung

Kurzfassung auf Englisch:

Principal-Agent (P-A) theory sees the fact of delegation as defining a relationship between states (collective Principals) and international organizations (Agents) with recontracting threats being the predominate way states influence IOs. Developing a category of Trustee-Agents, I argue that recontracting tools will be both harder to use and less effective at influencing the Trustee-Agents. Trustee-Agents are 1) selected because of their personal reputation or professional norms, 2) given independent authority to make decisions according to their best judgement or professional criteria, and 3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary. Focusing on state-International Courts (IC) relations, the article develops an alternative explanation that highlights the need for international judges to balance legal fidelity with the significant international challenge of endeavouring compliance. The arguments are explored through three case studies of IC decision-making that call into question the “rational expectations” claim that ICs are tailoring their decisions to reflect the wishes of powerful states and avoid adverse recontracting

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