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Imprint:

Published by
Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation
Liberal Institute
Truman-Haus
Karl-Marx-Straße 2
D-14482 Potsdam

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Production
COMDOK GmbH
Büro Berlin
Reinhardtstraße 16
D-10117 Berlin

Printed by
ESM Satz und Grafik GmbH
Zossener Straße 55
D-10961 Berlin

2007
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This paper will briefly present an argument regarding the transformation of the dominant orientation of Israeli Jewish society from relatively congruent collectivist-statism to an incongruent and unstable state of mind, which combines strong collectivistic tendencies on one hand and disillusionment with the state and the political system as a whole on the other, resulting in excessive individualism and political escapism. It will also make the argument that against the background of the severe challenges facing Israeli Jewish society, this prevailing state of mind is extremely dysfunctional. It may lead to far-reaching depolitization and „exit,” to an extent that may reduce Israeli Jewish society’s viability or – alternately – to the rise to power of a „strong” leader, who, while he may deal effectively with the fears and realities of this progressing societal disintegration, but on the way, he may well take actions which will result in the erosion of Israel’s democratic nature.

The origins of Israeli collectivism

One of the most notable characteristics of Israeli Jewish society was its collectivist orientation. Much has been written about this highly mobilized society coping with the well-known consequences of long-standing national mobilization. These included pressures for far-reaching conformism, resentment toward individualism and neglect of societal realms, such as health, welfare and education, which, under the prolonged state of emergency and the ever-present security threat, were perceived by opinion leaders, politicians and the public as less critical to the maintenance of the national collective. Metaphorically then, the Israeli-Jewish individual was perceived and self-perceived as a single fiber woven into a large ethno-national fabric, which provides self-identity as well as spiritual and physical protection. The whole was viewed as far beyond the sum of its components, therefore individuals were expected to think not in terms of their own good but in terms of the collective interest. Individual success, or alternately, individual misfortune, were widely considered as being much less significant than collective achievements or troubles – a kind of „one for all and all for one” cognition. Thus, for example, the grief of a bereaved Israeli parent whose son was killed during his military service, much as it was highly acknowledged and respected, was also „justified” by the fact that the dead soldier scarified his life for the noble cause of defending the nation. At the same time, parents who did not act along the lines of „conventional” mourning and challenged the policies or persons at the top who, in these parents’ view, caused their personal loss, received much less sympathy and social support. On a different level, Israelis who left Israel with no „national” excuse, but in order
to make a better life for themselves outside the country, were widely denounced as „deserters”.

This collectivistic orientation, which strongly characterized Israeli Jewish society up to the late 1970s and even afterwards in certain circles, deeply affected the societal operational mode. It had various ancient and more recent sources: to start with, Judaism has always encouraged the notion of a religious community with strong mutual responsibility. This responsibility is indicated by the Halachic pillar notion of „every Jewish person is responsible for the well being of his or her co-religionists“ (kol Yisrael arevim ze laze). This principle has many manifestations; for instance, according to Jewish orthodoxy, on most occasions prayers must be recited in the presence of at least ten men (minyan). Individual prayer is limited to times of day and occasions when having ten others around is unlikely. By the same line of religious reasoning, according to mainstream Judaism, sins committed by individuals or small groups are not only „their problem,” because the punishment is often collective. Therefore, the responsibility for these individual sins and repenting them rests on the shoulders of the entire community. This religious tradition of mutual responsibility was also expressed in the importance of giving to others within the community, as a religious command. In fact, Jewish traditional sources argued that charity (tzdaka) might save one from death. The relevant recipients, it should be mentioned here, are only Jewish, and not necessarily the most needy people around. In other words, from the religious vantage point, the relevant „collective“ is well defined and limited, not universal.

This religious collectivist orientation coincided well with the second source of the Israeli Jewish collectivistic orientation – the troublesome history of the Jewish people, which involved an incomparable amount of persecution, dislocation and hostility. Under such troubled circumstances, without the support of their own community and of Jewish communities elsewhere, the chances of individual Jews surviving in the Diaspora were often quite minimal. In fact, the manifest aim of a number of Jewish institutions, such as the Joint, was to cater to the urgent needs of Jewish communities and groups all over the world, based on the fundamental principle of a shared destiny. Lacking means of self-defense, Diaspora Jewish communities could not physically protect their members; however, they could, through various means (often including extensive financial transfers) lobby to get such pro-

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1 The Hebrew term for someone who leaves Israel voluntarily to live elsewhere is „yored“ – someone who descends from a higher to a lower place, while someone who lives abroad in the service of an Israeli institution is referred to in Hebrew with a different term – „Shaliach“ (emissary).
tection from local landlords or war lords, or from state authorities. Individual Jews who, for whatever reason, lived outside the community were much more exposed to physical harm and other kinds of persecution on the part of the hostile gentile society. Therefore, the mainstream preference was for living together. This correspondence between religious principles and historical circumstances sustained the Jewish collectivistic foundation even in historical and social contexts where the protection of the community was less – or not at all – necessary, and even where individualism was the prevalent ethos. Thus, it is a well-known fact that in the last century, the hold of American Jewish congregations on their members has been significantly stronger than that of other immigrant communities in the US.

The third source of Israeli Jewish collectivism was the socialist ideology held by the stronger stream in the Zionist national revival movement of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, and which perfectly fit this traditional collectivist trait. Thus, although secular Zionists challenged orthodoxy and aspired to „normalize“ what in their view was an abnormal way of life of exilic Jewry, on the matter discussed here, the gap between old and new was fairly small. The expanded social-responsibility notion fostered by socialist ideology went hand-in-hand with the Jewish perceptions described above – caring for the needy and the poor, sharing available resources and the principled undermining of individual material assets and achievements, certainly as proof of one's moral performance (in contrast, for example, to the Protestant ethic). Indeed, not all currents in modern Zionism embraced socialism; however, none of them advocated unmitigated capitalism or individualism. Even the non-socialists opted for much „softer“ versions of the free market ideology, and in all cases, emphasized, one way or another, the centrality of the communal aspect and the importance of collective responsibility.

Collectivism was strengthened in Israeli-Jewish cognition by a fourth factor – the sobering realization that the regathering of the Jews in the land of their forefathers in the context of the Zionist enterprise solved neither personal nor national security problems (some would argue that the security problems facing Israelis is considerably greater today than those facing Jewish communities in any other country). It is a well-known fact that severe external threats, let alone involvement in protracted national conflicts, usually encourage collectivist thinking. Thus the clash between Zionist immigrants and the Arab population in pre-state Palestine, and, after 1948, the violent struggle between the state of Israel and her Arab neighbors, maintained and even strengthened the collectivist legacies described above. The ongoing Middle East conflict necessitated the continuing mobilization of Israeli Jewish society. The state of Israel, established by UN resolution in 1948 with the termination of the British Mandate, and following a bloody war of inde-
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pendence, became, for most of its Jewish citizens, both the epitome of the collective identity and the object of high hopes and aspirations. This, in its turn, invested the traditional collectivist orientation with a statist flavor. The establishment of the state and the acute external threat further strengthened the dichotomous sense of „us” as opposed to „them.”

For all these reasons, Israeli Jews viewed the idea of a strong state in a positive light. The state, which replaced the Diaspora community, was expected to cater simultaneously to a wide variety of needs of the individual and of the national collective. Security first, and then policing, health, education, market regulation, construction of infrastructures, employment, environmental conservation, religious services, welfare, foreign relations and more, were all to be dealt with effectively and clean-handedly by the state and the leaders. Particularly in the state formation era, Israeli decision-makers were quite satisfied with the wide room for maneuvering given them by the citizens and did their best to encourage the „strong state” concept. Thus, statism (mamlachtiut in Hebrew – TH), was strongly fostered by the founders of the state of Israel, mainly by its first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion. In practice, this meant a large civil service and deep involvement of the state in almost every realm.

Statism and collectivism do not go hand in hand with individualism and privatization. In fact, the latter were and still are negatively perceived by most Israelis as highly disintegrative and as encouraging internal inequality. In the eyes of the majority, the „private market” is tantamount to a dangerous jungle, in which the average „man in the street” has no chance of surviving. Thus, political parties and streams that adhered to liberal ideology remained, for many years, at the margins of political public discourse with low electoral potential, and the voice of free market proponents was barely heard in the public sphere.

This of course does not mean that at any point in time the Israeli state had full control of either the society or the economic market, as Israel has never been a fully socialist state or a people's republic a la Soviet Bloc countries. However, as mentioned, its involvement in many activities was significantly greater and much

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2 Apart from the ultra-orthodox communities who religiously tabooed the secular Zionist state as a doomed-to-failure human effort to rush the coming of the Messiah.

3 This dichotomy has created a deep and, some would argue, unbridgeable gap between the Israeli Jewish public and the Israeli Arab one. This is because the „us” or the „we” of the Jewish majority, by definition, excluded the Arab minority, which was commonly perceived as part of the enemy collective – the Palestinians – and thus as a fifth column.
more acceptable than in most liberal Western states, which Israelis, and many people from outside, tend to consider as Israel’s relevant reference group.

The transformative era

Since the late 1970s and during the 1980s, several processes developed and converged that limited the state's practical involvement in society and in the economic market, and also eroded the public's overall support for such involvement. However, this did not happen in a day or even in a year. First, in 1977, the social-democratic Labour party lost the elections to the Likud party, which entertained liberal ideas. Although the new party in power turned its back on socialist ideology, as its main electorate was the working and the lower middle classes, cutting down the state’s resources for welfare, health and the like was politically impossible. Thus, for example, when the Israeli banking system practically collapsed in 1983 due to scandalous malpractice by the major banks’ governors, the prevalent expectation was that the state would step in, like a knight in shining armor, and save the public whose savings were deposited in these banks. Indeed, the state did come to the aid of the public by buying the banks’ debts, thereby nationalizing five of them. And yet, by and large, the collectivist/statist modus operandi and cognition slowly eroded. Several sources of this decline, beyond the change in government, can be identified:

First, the 1980s witnessed the growing affluence of Israel's middle class. This, together with their greater exposure – through the media as well as longer and more frequent trips abroad – to the high standard of living and diversified services offered in liberal Western democracies, increased their dissatisfaction with the uniform and, in many respects, very basic services that the Israeli state provided. These services no longer appealed to significant segments of Israeli society and no longer addressed their needs. Demands for better quality and more diversified, “tailor-made,” services encouraged the development of private medical clinics, privately-owned commercial media, and even private schools, and parental in-

4 Sometimes private care was given in public hospitals, a rather disturbing phenomenon that originated from the desire of private entrepreneurs at the time to compete with the public hospitals, not so much in terms of money but of expertise, because in Israel only public hospitals are university hospitals.

5 Previously, the media were mostly owned by either the state or party organs.

6 These schools were not called „private,“ but subject-oriented, in order to conceal the fact that they mainly served the better-off classes. It should also be noted that they always operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, which monitors all schools in Israel except for the education system of the ultra-orthodox sector.
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Involvement in the curricula of state schools. In the first stage, with the state still hoping to maintain its monopoly and with the statist orientation still prevailing, the authorities strongly opposed these new private or semi-private alternative service-providing systems. The authorities tried to shut them down completely or to limit their scope by direct and indirect means – from legislation to cooptation. However, life is stronger in such situations, and later the main strategy of the establishment was to find ways to whitewash the alternative services, particularly as their existence “liberated” the state from the need to respond to the growing demands of more “high maintenance” social segments. Needless to say, the weaker social groups had less access to these alternative services and continued to make do with the state-provided, perhaps reasonably good but certainly less customer-oriented, services.

Second, parallel to the improving economic situation of certain classes, the 1980s also saw the expansion of lower income groups, mainly the ultra-orthodox and the Arabs. The number of poor Israelis increased even more following the vast waves of immigration to Israel in those years (in the early 1990s about one million immigrants – almost one fifth of the overall Israeli population – came to Israel from the republics of the former Soviet Union). The state’s ability to continue to provide the level of services it had offered in the past lessened considerably and so did the quality of the services provided. The state welfare, health, education, policing and other service agencies became incapable of meeting the growing needs on a satisfactory level. Therefore, the authorities had no option but to acknowledge the existence of the private service-providing organizations. In fact, the state became quite willing to grant these agencies the right to provide services and even helped them financially in some cases in order to somewhat reduce the pressure on its own institutions. The gap between the services purchased privately by the middle and upper-middle classes and the state services given to low-income public sectors widened drastically in these years and with it the support of the better-off sectors for free market ideas grew. The weaker sectors understandably cried out against what they considered the unraveling of the collective bonding and responsibilities. Yet their voice was barely heard and their political power was too small to stop the train from leaving the station.

7 In a way, this wave of immigration and the vast resources needed to cater to their needs led to the Israeli agreement to take part in the Madrid Conference of 1991, which in its turn opened the way for the Oslo peace process. This is because the American administration made it clear that it would not give Israel the necessary financial guarantees to get the loans it supposedly needed in order to absorb this huge wave of immigration. Therefore Prime Minister Shamir, who basically opposed the Madrid idea, had no choice but to go there and take part in the process, although, as he said a year later, he was convinced that “the Arabs were the same Arabs and the sea [into which the Arabs wanted the Jews to go and drown – TH] was the same sea”. 
Third, globalization accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s and with it the Israeli high-tech and other internationally oriented industries. In fact, Israel turned into a high-tech seventh heaven – at certain points in time the number of Israeli high-tech companies registered in NASDAQ was third only to American and Canadian ones. In order to expand their activities and increase their profits, owners of these companies and other successful Israeli entrepreneurs needed less regulation and looser control by the state market economy. Thus, organized lobbies and individual industrialists put strong pressure on the government, and even more so on individual decision-makers, encouraging them to ease the various means of state control and regulation so that they could successfully compete in international markets.

Again, however, it should be emphasized that even in the heyday of the high-tech industry, before the bubble burst in the early 2000s, privatization as an ideology was not openly professed. The few politicians, like Benjamin Netanyahu, who fostered it in words or deeds when in office, faced severe criticism for allegedly turning their back on the noble ideals of equality and the Jewish tradition of support for the needy and the less well-to-do. As Minister of Finance in the early 2000s, Netanyahu endorsed a free market ideology. In spite of his objective economic achievements, he paid a very high price for this unpopular policy – in the eyes of many in Israel, it made him, for several years at least, „public enemy number one,” or the epitome of economic brutality.

Fourth, with the growth in the number of young adults who had not been involved in traumas such as the holocaust and struggles such as the War of Independence, and who were highly exposed to the youth culture of the West, the 1980s and 1990s also saw a significant growth in the legitimacy of individualism. It was no longer „not done“ to openly aspire to personal financial success, to express non-conformist views, to opt for an individualistic style of life and expression, and even to seek one’s fortune outside of the country, which in the past had been considered almost „desertion under fire.“ The younger people often mocked the older generation’s nostalgia for the days when Israeli Jewish society was small and intimate, and when the idea of equality, even if never fully implemented, was cherished. Particularly in urban, secular sectors, though much less so in orthodox and certainly in ultra-orthodox circles, collectivism was considered very much passé.

Fifth, the hopes that prevailed in Israel in the early 1990s, with the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles (1993), for „a New Middle East,” with free movement and open borders and the end of the occupation, also called for some relaxation of the tensions which had „justified,” and even necessitated, a strong state and strong collective bonding. The New Middle East, foreseen by the architects of the Oslo process, mainly Shimon Peres but also, although to a lesser extent, Yitzhak Rabin,
was highly attractive to industrialists and the investor community, who expected it to lead to the opening of large Arab markets as well as those of countries like China that in the past had not been eager – or outright refused – to deal with Israel because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation. Obviously, those who expected to benefit from the opening of the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries, almost exclusively from the upper-middle and upper classes, exerted all their influence on decision-makers to move in a free-market, minimum-state-intervention direction. However, those who feared that they would lose from such „high politics,” for example, manual workers in development towns who suspected – quite rightly – that if peace agreements were signed, the factories in which they worked would be relocated to surrounding Arab states where labor costs were considerably lower, wanted the state to stay in the picture and in control. For these workers, peace was more costly than to other Israeli Jews – beyond giving up territories and other symbolic and material assets in return for an agreement with the Palestinians, they were about to lose their jobs and perhaps even the state’s protection if the industrialists had their way. It is not surprising, then, that together, the free market and peace came to be (negatively) identified by a number of Israelis with the class interests of the better-off societal sectors.

The watershed

As described above, a fairly clear course of development could be observed in the transformative era: the collectivist/statist orientation of the Israeli Jewish population slowly eroded, bringing Israeli Jewish society closer in this respect to other liberal Western societies in which individualism is respected and the state limits its involvement in the economy and in other societal functions. This clarity was shattered from 2000 onwards with the collapse of the peace process, the dramatic increase in regional and global violence, the bursting of the high-tech bubble and the subsequent economic crisis. The exposure of a series of corruption cases in which top politicians and civil servants were involved, or suspected of being involved, was no less traumatic and shocking from the public’s point of view than the regional crisis. These shocks brought in their wake conflicting cognitive and emotional developments that in combination have created a contradictory and admittedly hectic state of mind in the realm discussed here. On one hand, mainly under the growing security threat and the deteriorating economic situation, Israeli society was pulled back to its collectivistic „state of nature“ with a reemerging demand for a strong state. On the other hand, the overload of stress, the painful disillusionment with the state’s leaders and functioning encouraged societal disintegration and „exit,” with a strong individualistic flavor.
The collapse of the Oslo peace process in the year 2000 – causing the shattering of the new Middle East vision – and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, with the sky-rocketing number of deadly terrorist attacks and the practical re-occupation of the Palestinian territories by the Israeli army, encouraged the „comeback“ of collectivism. The flames of the „tribal fire“ again pulled in many Israelis who were attracted to it by the sharp decrease in personal security and the prevailing need for togetherness under a life-threatening external attack. It was no longer the Israeli-Palestinian pro-Oslo alliance against the Israeli and Palestinian anti-Oslo camps that mattered, but Israeli Jews against the Palestinians, and in certain respects, also against Israeli Arabs. Thus the deep cleavages created by the heated domestic controversy amongst Israeli Jews over the Oslo process and the price tag attached to it seem to have healed considerably with the reappearance of the „Palestinian enemy“ and the, at least temporary, moratorium on the issue of territorial concessions.

The economic crisis caused by the halting of the peace talks and the increase of regional violence that made Israel much less appealing to external investors, accompanied by increased security-related state expenditures which brought in their wake successive budget cuts, mainly in the areas of welfare, health and education, together with the bursting of the global high-tech bubble, caused severe deterioration in economic opportunities in Israel. This resulted in a parallel sharp increase in the number of those laid off work. And as the free market failed to meet the expectations of the public, eyes rested again on the state as the savior. The number of those requiring unemployment benefits and welfare allowances from the government dramatically increased. Furthermore, the negative stigma attached in the past to those who lived on welfare vastly lessened because many of those who had no choice but to claim benefits were now middle-class people – professionals and former high-tech workers, not the typical underachievers or „losers.“ Privatization was now identified by the mainstream as the cause of the trouble and many were now attracted to views demanding that the state make a „comeback,“ and even take over areas that had been privatized in previous years.

As mentioned, the reemerging security and economic needs for greater intervention by the state were accompanied by growing empirical evidence, and hence awareness, that the authorities and decision-makers were incapable of dealing effectively and clean-handedly with their national missions. Thus, reality clashed with the expectation that the state would be able to deal with the needs. Furthermore, as mentioned, public discourse in Israel had not been welcoming over the years to liberal ideas and free-market ideologies. However, few voices pointed to the fact that perhaps the state could not deliver in the first place and that it might make sense to look for solutions elsewhere – for example, on the communitarian level.
In fact, the state’s difficulties in meeting the demands led to the emergence of an active and multi-faceted Third Sector. Thousands of NGOs were established and acted to respond to the needs of groups and individuals not sufficiently catered to by state agencies. The fact that the efficacy of these NGOs was not necessarily much better than that of the state and that, in many cases, the services they provided were neither universal not ongoing was scarcely noticed by many.

What has indeed become very visible – and upsetting – to the Israeli public were the many cases of corruption, some of which matured into court cases and some that did not, that contributed to the deteriorating trust of the Israeli public in the political system. The financial corruption allegations against former Prime Minister Barak and much more severe ones against Prime Minister Sharon and members of his family, against incumbent Prime Minister Olmert, and the sex harassment scandals in which President Katzav and former Minister of Justice Ramon are involved, are but a few examples of the sort of misconduct that made Israelis highly skeptical and cynical about politics and about the state. This in turn led to accelerating „exit“ – not necessarily in terms of emigration but in terms of people getting less and less involved in collective matters, as was clearly exemplified by the unprecedentedly low turnout in the 2006 elections. The number of those who stopped reading the daily newspapers is another indication, particularly as Israel was always known for the high interest of its citizens in news and political matters. When the state and its leaders fail to meet public expectations, it is hardly surprising that people turn to „self-maintenance“ and far-reaching individualism as a means of survival. In other words, Israelis have not given up on their principle expectation for a strong state that will function as the collective caregiver, nor do most of them, certainly not the religiously observant, admire individualism per se. However, they act individualistically; some would even term it egotistically, in order to minimize their frustration and personal damage because of the inefficacy of state agencies and accelerating social disintegration. And yet, although individualism per se is not a problem for many libertarians and free market proponents, under the circumstances in which Israel operates, which call for a strong collective effort to meet the external threats, a low level of involvement by the state, the „exit“ of its citizens, and excessive individualism are quite risky, as they may well lead to social disintegration which may jeopardize the ability of the national collective to meet existential challenges. What may be acceptable, perhaps even welcome, to societies within the European-American „peace zone,“ is not necessarily suitable in other parts of the world in which different rules of the game apply. The need to deal with existential threats may lead to an even more problematic development than individualistic escapism: the emergence of a powerful desire for a strong leader who may not be concerned with democratic procedures or va-
values. One case in point is the significant electoral achievement of the right-wing *Israel Betenu* (Israel – Our home) party, led by Avigdor Lieberman. Lieberman, who calls for a transition from what he views as a weak parliamentary system to a strong presidential system, is not only an advocate of the swap program aimed at annexing the Arab populated areas to the Palestinian Authority (thereby stripping them of their Israeli citizenship) in return for the annexation to Israel of the settlement blocs in the West Bank, but he also favors limiting the citizen rights, including free speech, of the Arab minority, widening the police authority in its struggle against organized crime, and a much tougher foreign and security policy. Lieberman’s rising popularity can be attributed largely to the prevailing desire for a „father figure“ who will bring the collective back together. Instead of an individual struggle to survive, the leader, who is allowed very wide space for maneuver by his voters, even at the expense of certain democratic values and procedures, is expected to head a collective effort for national rehabilitation. Based on other countries’ past and present experience, the dangers of such a state of mind in times of crisis cannot be overstated.

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8 The party participated in this format for the first time in the 2006 elections, and won 11 of the 120 seats in the Knesset (Israeli parliament).
Bibliography


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