Europeanization beyond Europe

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Abstract
This article reviews the literature on Europeanization beyond the group of EU member, “quasi-member” and applicant states. It uses the analysis of Europeanization in the applicant states for membership as a theoretical starting point to ask if, how and under which conditions we can expect domestic effects of European integration beyond Europe. Focusing on Europeanization effects in the areas of regionalism, democracy and human rights, the article collects findings on the strategies and instruments as well as the impact and effectiveness of the EU. The general conclusion to be drawn from the theoretical as well empirical literature is one of low consistency and impact.
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1 Introduction

At first sight, “Europeanization beyond Europe” seems like an improbable candidate for a literature review. First, the sceptical reader may ask: “Is there a literature on Europeanization beyond Europe?” Obviously, the study of Europeanization is largely confined to the impact of European integration and governance on the member states of the European Union (EU). In addition, a few studies have expanded the scope of Europeanization analysis to the “quasi-member states”, above all Norway and Switzerland (e.g. Fischer et al. 2002; Lægreid et al. 2004; Mach et al. 2003; Sciarini et al. 2004; Sverdrup and Kux 2000). Even more recently, the study of Europeanization has begun to include the candidate states for EU membership (see the Living Review by Sedelmeier 2006). But is there any “literature” on “Europeanization beyond Europe”, that is, countries that are not eligible for membership in the foreseeable future? The editors of a recent compilation of Europeanization research, while positing that the scope of Europeanization is not conceptually limited to the impact of the EU on its member states, admit that their own handbook is no exception from this focus (Vink and Graziano 2007: 9, 12). None of its 25 chapters deals with Europeanization beyond the accession countries. In addition, a title search in any major literature database combining the keyword of “Europeanization” with the names of major countries or continents will produce very little output, and the output it produces is likely to be full of “noise” – articles and books that are really about the member and candidate states and those that use “Europeanization” in a very loose and metaphorical sense and with little if any references to the Europeanization literature in political science studies of the EU.

Second, and more fundamentally, the sceptical reader may argue that the literature fails to mention “Europeanization” for a good reason and ask: “Is there Europeanization beyond Europe?” It is certainly plausible to assume that EU organizations, policies, and decisions have a relevant domestic impact in the member states, in the quasi-member states that participate in the internal market and in a significant number of other EU policies, and in the candidate states that need to adopt the acquis communautaire in order to qualify for membership. But can the EU also have a systematic and distinctive influence beyond Europe?

This is a legitimate question and it has triggered my interest for doing this review. What does the literature tell us about the EU’s goals and instruments in this area? What are the “mechanisms” of Europeanization beyond the group of actual and would-be members? To what extent and under which conditions has the EU been effective in Europeanizing countries beyond its membership region? A useful comparative starting point for answering these questions is the state of the art in the neighboring field of the Europeanization of candidate and accession countries (Sedelmeier 2006).

(1) In the case of quasi-members and candidate countries it is obvious that the transfer of the acquis communautaire is at the core of Europeanization. Participation in the highly regulated single market requires the adoption of its rules; and EU enlargement has always been based on the principle that new members need to transpose the entire acquis, albeit with certain transition periods. Beyond the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA), and the candidate countries, the content appears less predetermined. So, what is the substance of Europeanization beyond Europe? Which ideas, norms, rules, organizational structures and procedures, behavioral patterns etc. spread intentionally or unintentionally beyond the integrated Europe?

(2) Whereas the EU uses the incentive of membership as the main – and overall effective – lever to make applicant countries adopt its rules (at least formally), this instrument is not available beyond Europe. Which other instruments and strategies do the EU then have at its disposal? And can these instruments and strategies be successful in the absence of the membership incentive and the accession conditionality that often comes with it?

(3) Finally, then, has the EU been able to transfer its rules and practices beyond the confines of its member and candidate countries? Whereas there is no doubt that a massive transfer of EU
rules and practices is taking place during the accession phase in countries aspiring to become EU members, it is far from obvious that countries outside the group of potential member states should be subject to Europeanization in a similarly pervasive way.

To be sure, there is a growing literature on those EU external policies that are directed towards or likely to affect the domestic political systems, politics and policies of states beyond Europe. But “Europeanization” is rarely mentioned in this literature, let alone featured in the titles of books and articles. Rather, this literature talks about the EU as an international or global actor, as a civilian or normative power, the EU’s foreign or external policy or policies, or its relations with various regions of the world. In addition, this literature focuses on what the EU is in the international system (“actor”, “presence”, or “system”; “civilian”, “trade”, or “normative power”, to name some of the favorite concepts) and what it does in its external relations (policy decisions, content, instruments, and strategies) rather than whether and how it affects third countries. What is more, to the extent that the literature does study the impact of the EU, it concentrates on the impact of the EU on the international system (e.g. its balance of power) or on specific international regimes (such as international climate or trade policy). This leaves just a very small part of the literature studying the domestic impact of the EU beyond Europe – which is the core of the Europeanization research agenda. This review will therefore be based on a second reading of the relevant portion of the EU external relations literature, focusing on what we can learn from it for the study of Europeanization.

As a consequence, this review cannot be organized around seminal books or articles on “Europeanization beyond Europe” but needs to start from substantive questions and theoretical perspectives to assemble answers that are scattered across the literature. The main body of the review has four parts. The first introduces theoretical perspectives for studying Europeanization beyond Europe. The subsequent parts follow the three questions arising from comparing Europeanization beyond Europe with Europeanization in the accession states: goals and contents; instruments and strategies; effectiveness and impact. In the final section, I draw a few general conclusions on the findings of the literature and the future research agenda.

This version of the review will focus on general principles of political order promoted by the EU (regionalism, democracy, and human rights) and on comparative analyses of Europeanization beyond Europe. Future updates and revisions of this review will include studies focusing on specific regions and countries as well as specific EU policies.
2 Theoretical perspectives

In general, the study of Europeanization beyond Europe could benefit from the entire range of theoretical approaches that have been developed and put forward for analyzing Europeanization in the member states (for a brief overview, see Bulmer 2007). Here, however, I will limit myself to three theoretical perspectives that have been used recently to analyze Europeanization beyond the borders of the EU – but mainly with regard to accession countries. All of them specify mechanisms of EU impact, and the conditions under which they operate and are effective, as building blocks for a theory of Europeanization.

(1) In their analysis of Europeanization in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005a) distinguish mechanisms of Europeanization according to two dimensions. On the one hand, Europeanization can be EU-driven or domestically driven. On the other hand, it can be driven by different institutional logics, the “logic of consequences” and the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989: 160-162). First, then, Europeanization can be driven by the EU according to the logic of consequences, that is by EU sanctions and rewards that change the cost-benefit calculations of the target state (external incentives model). The impact of external incentives increases with the size of net benefits and the clarity and credibility of EU conditionality. Second, Europeanization may be induced by social learning. Target states are persuaded to adopt EU rules if they consider these rules legitimate and if they identify themselves with the EU. Both mechanisms can either work through intergovernmental interactions (bargaining or persuasion) or through transnational processes via societal actors in the target state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 11-12, 18).

Finally, according to the lesson-drawing model, states turn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo and adopt EU rules if they perceive them as solutions to their domestic problems (either based on instrumental calculations or based on the appropriateness of the EU solutions).

(2) In their study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert (Diez et al. 2006) also construct a two-by-two table to conceptualize four “pathways of EU impact”. On the one hand, they distinguish pathways according to “whether the impact is generated by concrete EU measures or an effect of integration processes that are not directly influenced by EU actors” (Diez et al. 2006: 571). On the other hand, the impact can be on concrete policies or have wider social implications. The first pathway is “compulsory impact”, working through concrete measures, namely carrots and sticks, on concrete policies. The “connective impact” is established through concrete (mainly financial) measures establishing and supporting contact between the conflict parties. The other pathways work indirectly. According to the “enabling impact”, conflict actors strengthen their influence by linking their political agendas and positions to the EU. Finally, the “constructive impact” results in a fundamental reconstruction of identities as a result of exposure to European integration (Diez et al. 2006: 572-574).

(3) In a recent paper, Michael Bauer, Christoph Knill, and Diana Pitschel (Bauer et al. 2007) use the trichotomy of EU governance modes in regulatory policy – compliance, competition, and communication (Knill and Lenschow 2005) – to analyze domestic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Compliance is a coercive mechanism triggered by legally binding EU rules, which national administrations must implement in order to avoid sanctions. Whereas compliance is linked to “positive integration” and the formal harmonization of national rules, competition is related to “negative integration”, the abolition of national barriers distorting the common market. In this mode, the impact of the EU is less direct and works through market pressures rather than institutional sanctions. “Institutional change is stimulated by the need to improve the functional effectiveness of member states’ institutional arrangements in comparison to those of other participants within the common market.” (Bauer et al. 2007, in press) Finally, communication is defined as a governance mode that brings about change as a result of voluntary information exchange and
mutual learning between national policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks. Rather than the direct sanctions of the EU or the indirect sanctions of the market, it is the legitimacy of policy models that drives Europeanization.

Obviously, there is considerable overlap between these conceptualizations. The classifications by Diez et al. and Bauer et al. implicitly distinguish between logics of action as well; in contrast to Bauer et al., Diez et al. and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier distinguish between direct, EU-driven and indirect pathways of Europeanization; finally, all classifications emphasize that Europeanization may work through intergovernmental as well as transnational channels. Table 1 presents an attempt to map this conceptual overlap. It also shows the empty fields in the three categorizations, for which I suggest additional concepts.

Table 1: Mechanisms of EU impact beyond the member-states

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<td>Logic of</td>
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<td>appropriateness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Constructive impact</td>
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The first mechanism of EU impact (1) is based on the direct, sanctioning impact of the EU on the target government and subsumes the intergovernmental channel of external incentives, the compulsory impact, and the compliance mode of governance. In EU relations with non-member states, this mechanism underlies the EU’s strategy of conditionality. In this field, the conceptual overlap among the three classifications is clearest so that it can serve as a starting point for discussing the other mechanisms.

The other mechanisms depart in various ways from the reference point of conditionality. Thus, at a general level, conditionality can be contrasted with lesson-drawing, domestic empowerment, and socialization. Lesson-drawing (2) is also based on the logic of consequences and on the impact of the EU on governments. But the impact is indirect, driven by external governments rather than the EU itself. Under the mode of governance of “communication”, however, lesson-drawing can also be encouraged by the EU (Bauer et al. 2007).

The mechanism of domestic empowerment (3) works directly but via societal actors or the anonymous market. The EU provides incentives for societal actors, or triggers processes of competition, which then change the cost-benefit assessments of the target government in the direction of Europeanization. In addition, societal actors can also draw lessons from the EU (4).

Finally, all of these mechanisms can work through a logic of appropriateness rather than consequences. “Communication” and “social learning” are conceived of as directly sponsored by the EU in order to trigger processes of persuasion and learning in governments beyond the EU (5).
Conditionality is often contrasted with socialization along this dimension (Coppieters et al. 2004; Kelley 2004). Such processes can also be directed at societal actors (7) or driven by external governments (6) or societal actors (8). Broadly conceived, “communication” as a mode of governance, the EU’s “constructive impact”, and “social learning” cover the entire range of mechanisms based on the logic of appropriateness. The enabling impact more specifically describes the use of the EU and its policies and solutions by governmental and societal actors to add external legitimacy to their own political agenda (Diez et al. 2006: 573).

I suggest that these mechanisms could also be used fruitfully to theorize “Europeanization beyond the EU”. The question then is, under which conditions these mechanisms operate and are effective beyond the EU’s member and candidate states. None of the three studies generates high expectations of impact in this regard. According to the analyses in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b), the impact of the EU in the candidate countries has mainly resulted from the external incentives of accession conditionality rather than social learning or lesson-drawing. Democratic conditionality ahead of the accession negotiations has worked best when countries had a credible promise of eventual membership and when the domestic power costs of adopting democratic and human rights norms were low, i.e. did not threaten regime survival. Acquis conditionality regarding the specific rules of the EU began to have major effects only during the accession negotiations.

Diez et al. (2006) find that the “transformative power of integration” in border conflicts is strongest when all parties to the conflict are EU members, much weaker when they are only associated to the EU, and even negative when the outer border of the EU coincides with the contested border. According to Diez et al., this is not only because of conditionality. Membership, and association to a lesser extent, also increase the legitimacy of EU positions (enabling impact), support for common activities (connective impact), and exposure to the constructive impact (Diez et al. 2006: 573-574, 588).

Finally, Bauer et al. (2007), too, generally expect the potential impact of the EU to be higher in states with good prospects for membership than in “unlikely members”. Again, this not only applies to the governance mode of compliance (conditionality). Whereas, however, the compliance mode is expected to have no effect in non-candidate countries, both competition and communication are hypothesized to have at least a limited effect in the long term to the extent that non-candidate countries are subject to market pressures generated in the EU and take part in EU-sponsored policy networks.
3 Goals and contents

What is the substantive content of Europeanization beyond Europe? Which kinds of domestic impact does the EU produce either intentionally or unintentionally? In general, Europeanization covers a broad domain of political impacts across the triad of polity, politics, and policy.

Probably the readiest general characterization of the content of Europeanization beyond Europe follows from the thesis of “domestic analogy”. According to this thesis, polities prefer to have an international environment that is ordered according to their own principles and procedures. The substantive goals – as well as the instruments – thus mirror the fundamental principles of the EU and European integration (Peters and Wagner 2005: 215-216); Europeanization consists of “the external projection of internal solutions” (Lavenex 2004: 695).

This general characterization entails various more specific claims regarding the goals that the EU pursues in the world.

• First, the EU promotes its model of regionalism to other regions. It proposes regional economic and market integration and the establishment of supranational organizations as a pathway to peace and welfare in other parts of the world as well (Bicchi 2006; Farrell 2007). The regionalist model is also seen in the tendency of the EU to design its policies for, and conclude agreements with, regional groupings of countries rather than with individual states.

• Second, and often in a more critical perspective, the EU is often seen to disseminate a “neoliberal” economic model, which reflects the EU’s internal commitment to market-building and economic liberalization (see, e.g., Hurt 2003, 2004). Others point out, however, that the EU does not stand for free market policies as such but for a multilaterally managed “regulatory framework for liberal markets” according to its own model (Grugel 2004: 616; Woolcock 2005: 396).

• Third, the EU promotes its constitutional norms such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy in its external relations (e.g. Manners 2002: 240-241). Mirroring the debate on the economic model promoted by the EU, Gordon Crawford asserts, however, that the EU promotes a rather limited democracy assistance agenda “oriented at challenging state power and sustaining economic liberalisation rather than extending popular participation and control” and thus “consistent with the maintenance of neo-liberal hegemony” (Crawford 2005: 594, 596).

In sum, for the EU as a regionally integrated system of liberal democracies, regionalism, regulated transnational markets, and democratic constitutionalism define the essence of being “European”. “Europeanization” then consists in promoting regionally integrated liberal democracies beyond its borders. In an instrumentally rational perspective, an international environment that mirrors the EU is likely to be in the interest of the EU and its member states. It is an environment that they know – and know to use to their benefit. This reduces adaptation and information costs and gives them an advantage over non-EU actors that are not as familiar with such an environment (Peters and Wagner 2005: 216). Others, however, emphasize shared values and norms as well as established routines and templates of the EU as the source of these goals. Federica Bicchi, for instance, suggests that EU external policy can “be seen as unreflexive behaviour mirroring the deeply engrained belief that Europe’s history is a lesson for everybody. Put briefly, [it] is informed, at least partially, by the idea that ‘our size fits all’” (Bicchi 2006: 287). Regional economic integration and liberal democracy thus represent strong beliefs and universally valid ideas about the good political order that are promoted regardless of calculations of benefit and feasibility.

The focus on rather general principles of political order in “Europeanization beyond Europe” may be an artifact of the literature, which has shown a strong interest in the normative content of EU external policies and the EU as a value-driven actor and “normative power” (e.g. Manners 2002;
But it also reflects the EU’s official external relations doctrine. In addition, it is in line with the findings on Europeanization in the candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b): prior to the accession process proper, the focus on and impact of the EU’s specific *acquis* rules has been generally weak. Rather, the EU’s constitutive political norms feature prominently.

Yet the focus on regional integration and liberal democracy also raises some questions. First of all, what is distinctly “European” in “Europeanization” understood in this way? Whereas it may be granted that regionalism is a unique feature of EU external relations, democracy, human rights, and market economy are Western principles that are propagated by non-EU Western countries (such as the United States) and other international organizations (e.g., the Council of Europe or the OECD) as well. More than that, the EU itself may have been influenced by broader tendencies and patterns in the international system. Take, for instance, the “neoliberal” economic order the EU propagates in its external relations. In this case, the EU is not only part of a larger tendency represented by most other international economic organizations (Hurt 2004) but its own, internal economic governance has changed under the impact of “neoliberalism” as well. By the same token, researchers must be extremely careful in attributing liberal democratic domestic change in third countries to “Europeanization”. The general problem of Europeanization research – that EU influences have to be analytically separated from non-EU international and from domestic societal and political influences – is the more pressing, the less EU-specific the rules under study and the less dense the institutional relationship between the EU and a third country are.

Second, the arguments about the “domestic analogy” (Peters and Wagner 2005) or the “ontological quality” of the EU as a “changer of norms” (Manners 2002: 252) obviously do not sufficiently take into account the evolution and changes of the EU’s “Europeanization” goals and strategies over time. Both arguments suggest that, having been a regional organization of liberal democratic countries from its very beginnings, the EU should also have engaged in promoting its model right from the start. Yet the promotion of regionalism, economic liberalism, human rights and democracy has only become prominent since the early 1990s (see below). Rather, the global political changes of the time (the end of the Cold War, the wave of democratization) and the concomitant institutional enhancement of the EU as an international actor (the Common Foreign Security Policy – CFSP agreed in the Maastricht Treaty) seem to have spurred the explicit definition and promotion of the EU model beyond Europe (Farrell 2007: 304). Third, the focus on “nice” and general goals that are officially propagated and intentionally pursued by the EU may come at the expense of studying the more policy-specific, unintended and even “nasty” domestic consequences of the EU’s presence in the world. As an effect of the EU’s market power, for instance, producers and legislators in third countries will often be forced to unilaterally adopt EU product standards. Consequently, we can observe policy- or issue-specific Europeanization. Moreover, the effects of the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy on the welfare as well as societal and political development of less developed countries have arguably been “nasty” as well as unintended.

In the remainder of the review, I will, however, focus on the general political principles proactively propagated and pursued by the EU. In the next section, the question is how they have been pursued. Which instruments, strategies, and mechanisms does the literature identify?
4 Instruments and strategies

The literature is in broad agreement that the 1990s have witnessed a major change in EU external policies: the establishment of conditionality, in particular political conditionality, as a core instrument. Before the 1990s, EU external relations had been notable for their apolitical content and for the principle not to interfere with the domestic systems of third countries. Since the beginnings of the 1990s, however, democracy, human rights and the rule of law have become “essential elements” in almost all EU agreements with third countries, as both an objective and a condition of the institutionalized relationship. In case of violation, the EU may suspend or terminate the agreement (Horng 2003). These goals were complemented later by “good governance”.

How did this policy change come about? It would certainly be insufficient to simply attribute political conditionality via domestic analogy to the constitutional values and norms of the EU, which had existed before and did not change at the beginning of the 1990s. Outside the EU, the changed external political environment after the wave of democratization in 1989/90 was the major influence. The wave of democratization not only strengthened the international legitimacy of liberal democracy but also increased the need to support new and fledgling democracies. This was complemented by the increasing acceptance, in development policy circles, that economic aid and conditionality were insufficient in the absence of political reforms and good governance. Inside the EU, the European Parliament was the major driving force. It could use the assent procedure for treaties with third countries, which had been introduced by the Single European Act (SEA), to press for political conditionality (Holland 2002: 120; Smith 2001).

EU conditionality is generally described as “positive”. It uses “carrots” rather than “sticks” and is based on rewards rather than punishment or assistance (Holland 2002: 132; Schimmelfennig 2005; Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 192). On the one hand, and in spite of the “essential elements” clause, no agreement with a third country has ever been suspended or terminated. According to Youngs, “in practice European policy was in no significant way based on the use of coercive measures”; the EU has shown “no notable propensity to impose punitive action directly in relation to democratic shortfalls”. “European policy-makers saw a more positive, incentives-based form of conditionality as more legitimate and potentially more effective” than the use of sticks (Youngs 2001a: 192). Below the level of treaty relationships, however, the EU did use the “stick”. Financial aid was withheld, reduced or suspended, and negotiations were delayed, in several cases (e.g. Nwobike 2005). On the other hand, “there is scant evidence of additional assistance to countries where things are improving” (Smith 2001: 190).

Conditionality is not the only mechanism of Europeanization observed – not even in the field of democracy and human rights promotion. In his study of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and East Asia, Richard Youngs finds evidence for two rather different strategies: civil society support and socialization. On the one hand, the “profile of EU democracy assistance funding in the two regions suggested a bottom-up approach, oriented overwhelmingly to civil society support, and in particular human rights NGOs” (Youngs 2001a: 192; Youngs 2001b: 362). This is also true for Latin America where the EU has little leverage for using political conditionality and has sought to develop direct links with civil society actors (Grugel 2004: 612).

On the other hand, “in light of the limits to positive and negative material measures, EU strategy was characterized by an aim to develop deeply institutionalized patterns of dialogue and co-operation as means of socializing political elites into a positive and consensual adherence to democratic norms”. The EU used “generally accepted cooperation over technical governance issues” in order to promote good governance and democracy indirectly (Youngs 2001a: 193, 195; 2001b: 363). According to Youngs, the socialization approach is designed to create opportunities for “imitation and demonstration effects” and starts with very modest expectations of introducing the vocabulary of democracy into domestic discourse and inducing elites to at least pay lip service to democracy (Youngs 2001b: 359). It is these strategies rather than political conditionality that
bear evidence of a distinctive and innovative “European approach” to democracy promotion and have been “unduly overlooked” (Youngs 2001a: 192, 195). By contrast, the US approach to democracy promotion has been characterized by more “concrete intervention” and a “more top-down, politicized . . . assistance” focusing on the “formal procedural elements of democracy” (Youngs 2001b: 360, 363-364).

In sum, the Europeanization strategies identified by Youngs in the area of human rights and democracy competition match the most important mechanisms identified in the theoretical literature (see section 2 above): conditionality, (intergovernmental) socialization, and direct EU-society links (via transnational socialization and domestic empowerment). The next question is whether the literature on Europeanization beyond Europe also confirms the expectation of weak impact.
5 Impact and Effectiveness

What impact has EU external governance beyond the European member and candidate states? How and to what extent has it been able to Europeanize non-European countries and regions? In reviewing the literature, I will again focus on regionalism and democracy/human rights. The two criteria for evaluating EU policy that are found most often in the literature are consistency and effectiveness.

5.1 Regionalism

According to Federica Bicchi, the EU has consistently promoted regionalism and followed a regional approach in its agreements and relations with non-European third countries all over the globe – with the exception of EU-US bilateral relations (Bicchi 2006: 287-288). This rather consistent policy across time and space and in spite of regional divergences strongly indicates that it follows an organizational norm rather than functional considerations. This is particularly evident with regard to regional policies addressing “regions” that have few objective regional characteristics (such as high density of transactions) and do not conceive of themselves as regional communities – such as the “Mediterranean” or the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. Rather, they are constituted as “regions” mainly by EU policy (Bicchi 2006: 288).

As Jean Grugel argues in a comparative analysis of EU and US policy vis-à-vis Latin America, this regionalism is also distinctively European. First, relations are discursively constructed as “inter-regional partnerships”, “based around notions of equity and cooperation that ignores or transcends the underlying power inequalities” (Grugel 2004: 607-608). Second, the EU “has developed a conscious political leg to its new regionalism”, absent from US-sponsored free-trade associations, built around “the promotion of its own model of democracy, social welfare, and regional integration”, understood as subregional integration within Latin America (Grugel 2004: 616).

If the EU’s promotion of regionalism has been consistent and distinctive, has it been isomorphic as well? That is, have regional arrangements created and supported by the EU been modeled on the EU example and have they been similar to each other? First, the great variety of interregional cooperation arrangements seems to contradict the expectation of isomorphism (for an overview, see Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). Second, there seems to be disagreement with regard to the assessment of specific arrangements. For instance, whereas Bicchi argues that the institutional settings and governance regimes of the EU and its Mediterranean policy (EMP) are highly similar to international governance with regard to its multilateral institutional framework, the emphasis on “economic matters but with a social flavour”, and the “eurocentric” transfer of the Justice and Home Affairs agenda to the EMP (Bicchi 2006: 295-298), Joffé (2001) and Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger (2005: 323) point to the fact that the Barcelona process has been modeled on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) rather than on the EU’s own set-up.

The region that the EU seems to regard as most promising with regard to isomorphic regionalism is Latin America (in particular its Southern Cone), which is the culturally most similar world region and one which has a common market project (Mercosur) that might develop along European lines (Grugel 2004: 616). Here, the EU seeks to spread its ideas of regional integration and good governance through “research funding, seminar programmes, and the creation of a fund to provide for the regular exchange of ideas within Latin America, in imitation of its own policies” (Grugel 2004: 612).

Interestingly, however, it is the African Union (AU – designed in 2000) that mirrors the EU most closely in institutional terms – with its Parliament, Commission, Executive Council of Ministers, Court of Justice, and plans for a common currency. The use of the EU template in this case seems to have been a case of lesson-drawing or imitation rather than EU conditionality or socialization. However, the apparently supranational set-up of the AU is not matched by supranational...
competences for these institutions (Farrell 2007: 312).

Unintended effects of the EU’s presence rather than the impact of the intentional promotion of regionalism seem to have occurred in other regions or sub-regions as well. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith point out that “the need to deal with a rich and powerful EU draws other states into cooperative ventures, especially in their international relations” (Hill and Smith 2005: 396, their italics) and list the South African Development Committee as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as examples. Whereas, however, the EU might have unintentionally triggered regional cooperation in these cases, the cooperation schemes did not follow the EU model of regionalism.

Both Thomas Christiansen et al. (2000) and Anne Myrjord (2003) point out the ambivalent effects of the EU on regional institutions and region-building in the adjacent regions. On the one hand, EU neighborhood policies have reduced the divisive effects of enlargement and “minimized the importance of the institutional boundary between the Union and its environment”. They represent “a turn towards an inclusive form of conducting EU external policy” and give non-member countries a say in EU policy-making (Myrjord 2003: 251; see also Christiansen et al. 2000: 412). On the other hand, however, the often bilateral framework of negotiations between the EU and third states tends to undermine the model of multilateral regional integration that the EU seeks to promote, and external governance arrangements can only partially offset the disruptive effects of the EU’s differentiation between members, candidates, and non-candidates in its neighboring regions (Christiansen et al. 2000: 407, 412). This finding is supported in the study by Diez et al. (2006), which claims that EU borders that coincide with existing border conflicts exacerbate rather than mitigate these conflicts.

In addition, “an emerging dependence on relatively strong EU financial instruments carries the potential of crowding out existing regional initiatives” (Myrjord 2003: 252). This effect will, of course, depend on the existence and strength of endogenous region-building developments. Whereas in the Baltic and Nordic regions, where such region-building efforts seem to have been relatively well developed, the EU may have had an overall disruptive effect, in the Mediterranean, “even the limited efforts of the EU to generate multilateralism constitute the main driving force in an externally directed region-building effort” (Christiansen et al. 2000: 412).

With regard to Africa, Hurt is equally sceptical: “The history of regional integration projects within the ACP group, especially in Africa, is one of consistent failure to achieve meaningful integration and development.” Moreover, the six new regions defined in the Cotonou Agreement of 2002 are “externally imposed and do not in most cases correspond to existing regional organizations” (Hurt 2003: 173).

In sum, the promotion of regionalism has indeed been a consistent and distinctive feature of EU external relations. In addition, the presence of the EU, its success in regional integration, and its importance as an economic actor have served as a model and triggered regional cooperation schemes in other parts of the world. Both conditionality and lesson-drawing/imitation seem to have been at work in these processes. Yet the scope and design of these schemes are extremely diverse and bear at best superficial resemblance to the EU. In addition, the actual policy of the EU toward and in these regional arrangements seems at times to undermine rather than strengthening regionalism beyond the EU.

5.2 Human rights and democracy

Just as Bicchi (2006) for the case of regionalism, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse argue in a recent paper that “the instruments used by the EU to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and ‘good governance’ look surprisingly similar across the globe”, indicating that “the EU follows quite clearly a specific cultural script” (Börzel and Risse 2004: 2). The use of political

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1 The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lomé Convention as the general treaty framework between the EU and the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. Its focus is on development policy.
conditionality, political dialogue and capacity-building mechanisms in all world regions demonstrate movement “towards a coherent approach”, which did not follow a grand design, however, but “incremental ‘learning by doing’” (Börzel and Risse 2004: 28-29). Yet, Börzel and Risse avowedly do not analyze the implementation of the EU’s approach nor its effectiveness on the ground. When these are taken into account, the picture of consistency quickly becomes blurred.

The consistency of EU political conditionality is one of the central issues addressed in the literature and the general finding is “not consistent”. Inconsistency starts with the fact that “essential-elements” clauses are not included in agreements with China and the ASEAN countries as well as with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Whereas in the latter cases, this may be attributed to stable democracy, this excuse clearly does not apply to the Asian countries.

Authors generally observe that the EU treats countries differently even though their human rights record is similar (or the other way around). Despite the pervasive political and legal rhetoric of democracy and human rights promotion, actual policy seems to match rhetoric only when consistency is “cheap”; otherwise, it is driven by a host of other – geopolitical, economic or security – interests. According to Karen Smith, “poor, marginal states (often in Africa) of little importance to the EU or one of its member states tend to be subjected to negative conditionality; these are the cases where it is easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights” (Smith 2001: 193). In other cases, member states block suspension or termination because this would harm their commercial interests, because the country is strategically or politically too important, or because they have doubts about the effectiveness of negative measures (Smith 2001: 196). Overriding interest in cooperation on energy and the war on terror is also cited as the main reason why democracy promotion was not prioritized in Central Asia despite the dismal political record of the region (Warkotsch 2006). Martin Holland reports that suspensions have mainly hit participants in the Lomé Convention and countries that were economically relatively unimportant to the EU; on the other hand, the EU spared Asian and economically more relevant countries (Holland 2002: 133). In conclusion, he argues that, whereas the “link between development and democratic principles of good government has become the accepted and inevitable face of North-South relations; the degree to which this conditionality is supervised and sanctioned remains variable, almost idiosyncratic” (Holland 2002: 135).

Richard Youngs also generally finds that the “the overall distribution of EU trade and aid provisions did not to any significant extent correlate with democratic criteria” and punishment as well as rewards “were adopted on an ad hoc basis and not pursued with any coherence or vigour” (Youngs 2001b: 357). He also observes that the EU has reacted more to massive human rights abuses and “dramatic interruptions of the democratic process” than to persistently autocratic governments. “Democratic conditionality has not been systematic.” (Youngs 2001b: 356)

In a statistical analysis of the suspension of development cooperation in reaction to human rights violations, Hadewych Hazelzet comes to more nuanced results. On the one hand, her findings that “the level of respect for human rights or regime type was not significant for the granting of EU development cooperation” and that the EU was less likely “to impose sanctions on countries with which it has institutionalised cooperation” confirm the general picture of inconsistency (Hazelzet 2005: 9-10). She also finds that former French or British colonies were sanctioned less severely than former colonies of other EU member states, indicating the protective influence of these member states (Hazelzet 2005: 10). On the whole, however, her multivariate regression analysis “indicates that, in the 1990s, overall the level of human rights violations was a more important determinant for EU sanctions than the level of economic or strategic importance of a country” (Hazelzet 2005: 11). However, Hazelzet’s findings refer to ACP countries only. As other authors have pointed out (see above), this group of countries was of relatively minor economic and strategic importance to the EU and was thus more likely to be treated consistently than the Asian countries.

The inconsistency differs markedly from the fairly consistent and meritocratic use of political conditionality vis-à-vis the accession countries (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig 2003: 99-108; Vachudová
The variation in institutional set-up may be one cause for this difference in consistency. In the accession cases, political assessments and decisions are prepared by the Commission in a centralized way; beyond the applicant countries, member state governments and the different pillars of the EU are more strongly involved (Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 28-46). Alternatively, the difference can be explained by a “community effect: when constitutional questions such as membership are at stake, the pressure to act in line with the constitutive community rules increases. Rule adoption is expedient for outside cooperation partners but indispensable for future members. Whereas interest-based considerations are permitted to take the upper hand in relations with external states, the constitutive community rules will prevail in relations with future insiders” (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 46).

Beyond Europe, the move toward intergovernmental political conditionality thus seems to have been declaratory rather than practical policy. If the EU’s political conditionality has been inconsistent beyond Europe, what about its policies of domestic empowerment and socialization? According to Richard Youngs, the EU did not pursue these strategies consistently either. As to civil society assistance, “the EU did not push hard to gain access for political aid work” and was “unwilling to risk tension with recipient governments”; and in its dialogue and cooperation, “the EU often deliberately sought ways of circumventing its own formal preconditions, offering concrete sectoral cooperation without the need for a formalization of new democracy-based discourse” (Youngs 2001a: 193; see also Youngs 2001b: 365). Thus, it seems to be a general feature of EU democracy promotion that it has been, as several authors have put it, “high on rhetoric and low on policy” (Crawford 2005 on Ghana; Warkotsch 2006 on Central Asia).

Elsewhere, Richard Youngs (2004) uses the case of EU human rights promotion in order to make a general point about the interaction of norms and strategic interests in EU external relations. He argues that “instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings” and, in particular, that “security-driven choices [have] been selected within the overarching human rights framework” (Youngs 2004: 431). In his analysis, EU human rights policy has been attuned to the general promotion of international stability and exhibited a “state-oriented capacity-building bias” (Youngs 2004: 424).

There is broad agreement in the literature not only on the overall inconsistency of EU strategy but also on the overall low impact of the EU on democracy and human rights in non-candidate third countries. This finding holds regardless of the region under study and the strategy used. The causes of ineffectiveness appear rather overdetermined for political conditionality. First, vis-à-vis non-candidate countries the EU cannot use its most important incentive for compliance: the prospect of membership. Second, inconsistency hampers effectiveness: the “seemingly variable application of conditionality . . . detracts from the EU’s international credibility and influence” (Holland 2002: 135). Third, for the mostly authoritarian or autocratic governments in the EU’s neighboring regions, compliance with the EU’s democratic or human rights standards is politically costly. It involves the risks of losing political power that, in the perception of the third-country governments are not offset by whatever economic or diplomatic rewards the EU has on offer. The indirect strategies were confronted with the same obstacle when the ruling elites in the target states “perceived that the good governance agenda was elaborated with increasingly political intent” (Youngs 2001a: 195; see also Tanner 2004: 140-141).

In sum, EU democracy promotion and human rights policy beyond Europe has used the three mechanisms of conditionality, socialization, and domestic empowerment. In all of these cases, however, it is characterized by low consistency and effectiveness.
6 Conclusions

In the introductory sections of the review, I proposed to use the literature on Europeanization in the candidate states for membership as a benchmark for the analysis of “Europeanization beyond Europe”. In general, the findings reported here suggest that the dividing line between the candidate states for EU membership and other third countries also constitutes a categorical difference for the analysis of Europeanization effects.

First, whereas in the case of “quasi-members” and candidate countries, the acquis communautaire is at the core of Europeanization, the goals and contents of Europeanization beyond Europe, at least those analyzed in most of the literature, are of a more general character. Whereas “regionalism” may still count as an EU-specific goal, which – if effectively pursued – would result in a distinctive “Europeanization” beyond Europe, other core goals such as stability and security or democracy and human rights are clearly less related to the EU’s acquis and less specific to the external relations of the EU.

Second, whereas positive political conditionality has become a general feature of EU relations with third countries in the 1990s, it has been used less consistently than in EU relations with potential future member states. Moreover, other instruments for promoting EU core values and norms – such as domestic empowerment of civil society or socialization through transgovernmental cooperation – while described as unique EU strategies, do not appear to have been consistent and effective substitutes for political accession conditionality.

Third, the Europeanizing impact of these strategies has been weak beyond the group of credible candidates for EU membership. The causes for the weak impact are probably manifold: low incentives and low consistency of policy on the part of the EU and serious domestic obstacles to Europeanization on the part of third countries. In sum, membership or the prospect of membership appears to be a crucial condition of Europeanization. With regard to its specific normative and regulatory content, its instruments and its impact, Europeanization beyond Europe is substantially weaker than Europeanization in Europe. This need not be the last word on the issue, though.

1) Whereas the literature conveys the picture that Europeanization efforts beyond Europe are inconsistent and ineffective overall, this does not mean that there are no cases of consistent policy and effective impact. Searching for such cases and studying their conditions in comparison with similar cases may generate better knowledge on the differential effects and the conditions of Europeanization in non-candidate countries. In general, we would need carefully designed and theory-guided comparative studies, which directly address and assess the causality question between EU policies and domestic change.

2) Whereas the general Europeanization literature focuses very much on policies, policy-making processes and administrative structures, the literature reviewed here was about polity: regional integration and constitutional structure. Maybe this is the wrong place to look for Europeanization effects beyond Europe. Studies mirroring the general focus on policy and politics (related to policy-making) might find a stronger impact of “Europe” on third countries.

Such a research agenda would require, however, that the literature on EU external policies make “Europeanization” an explicit focus of its work, which it has not done so far. This includes importing theories and hypotheses as well as mechanisms and conditions from the general Europeanization literature. It would also require coping with the problems of establishing causality that haunt the study of Europeanization in general. Finally, since Europeanization ultimately needs to be studied in the target countries, analyzing “Europeanization beyond Europe” requires researchers to go “beyond Europe” as well, acquire local expertise, and do research far away from Brussels.
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