Veronique Dudouet

From War To Politics:
Resistance/Liberation Movements
in Transition
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Introduction

Recent experience around the world has demonstrated that resistance and liberation movements have become a defining feature of contemporary political conflicts, and that in the end, reaching political settlements needs their active involvement and cooperative engagement. The great majority of the past decade’s major armed conflicts (30 out of 33) have been fought within the borders of single states, between the government and one or several non-state insurgency movements, engaging in an armed struggle over issues of territory (9) or governmental power (21) (Harbom and Wallensteen 2008: 73).\(^1\) If political violence is a tool of both state and non-state actors, replacing it with peaceful methods of conflict management is essential in building sustainable peace, and resistance/liberation movements have become central stakeholders in processes of war termination and peace implementation. Since the end of the cold war, an increasing number of conflicts have been resolved through negotiated settlement, rather than military victory,\(^2\) and have been followed by a series of post-war peacebuilding programmes aimed at demilitarising, democratising, developing and reconciling the country. Despite these peace consolidation programmes, often accompanied by heavy-handed international assistance, many recent peace agreements have not been fully implemented, and in fact more than one third of armed conflicts ended by negotiated agreement since 1990 have relapsed into some degree of violent warfare within the following 5 years (Human Security Center 2008).

These various statistics have prompted political scientists and conflict resolution analysts to focus recent studies on the role played by so-called “non-state armed groups” in peace processes and post-war peacebuilding, exploring their organisational and strategic shifts from armed insurgency in underground movements towards an engagement in peace negotiations, post-war conventional politics and the acquisition of (shared) state power (e.g. Ricigliano 2005, Söderberg ...\(^3\)

\(^{1}\) The criteria used for listing “major armed conflicts” are described by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as “a contested incompatibility concerning government and/or territory over which the use of armed forces between the military forces of 2 parties – of which at least one is the government of a state – has resulted in at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a single calendar year” (Harbom and Wallensteen 2008: 72).

\(^{2}\) According to the Human Security Brief 2007, 58 armed conflicts were terminated through a negotiated settlement in the period 1990-2005, in comparison with 28 conflicts ended by the military victory of one party (Human Security Center 2008: 35).
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Kovacs 2007, Sriram 2008, De Zeeuw 2008, Dayton and Kriesberg 2009). Although these studies provide key insights gathered by thematic and area experts, very few actually engage directly with insurgency groups themselves to hear their points of view, rationales, and self-understanding of their environment and courses of action.

Against this backdrop, the ongoing Berghof action research project “Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transitions to Politics”\(^3\) has brought out some unique and innovative insights on these themes by inviting leaders members or “advisors” of six resistance and liberation movements to engage in internal self-reflection and analysis on their respective organisations’ formation, development and experience in conflict transformation, as well as the strategic, organisational and structural shifts entailed by such transitions. In 2008, we published six individual case studies on African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) in Colombia, Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) in Nepal, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Aceh, Indonesia and Sinn Fein in Ireland. Depending on the particular case, each study makes a strong argument for the necessary inclusion of the movement in any future conflict settlement, or documents clearly how such a role was executed. Each case study has been produced by, or in close cooperation with, leading members of the movements concerned. This study compiles some important comparative findings which have emerged from the six country studies (see Berghof Transitions Series 1-6, 2008).

The report is organised in four sections. *Section one* clarifies the overall objectives, methodology and conceptual framework underlying the Berghof research project “Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transitions to Politics”. *Section two* explores the dynamics of transitions through the evolution of goals and means of political struggle adopted by the six movements under scrutiny. *Section three* analyses the internal and external factors which influenced their strategic choices towards conflict transformation. Finally, *section four turns* to the outcomes of the past or ongoing transitions towards peace and democracy, and the challenges of post-war political engagement as experienced by the six movements in question.

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\(^3\) The project is managed jointly by the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management and Berghof Foundation for Peace Support in Berlin (Germany). Funding has come from the International Development Research Center (Canada), and the Ford Foundation (USA). Besides its research component, the project is also practice-orientated, (a) by building a network of people with relevant experience of transitions, who engage in information-exchange and peer-advice; (b) by making that experience and advice directly available to others now contemplating or engaged in the same transition; and (c) by disseminating the results of that engagement in the form of policy advice to international, governmental and non-governmental organisations.
SECTION 1:
Background and research framework

1.1 Terminology and definitions

It takes (at least) two parties to wage an armed conflict (apart from cases of one-sided violence, e.g. state repression of nonviolent dissent, or genocide), and it also takes two to transform it towards lasting peace and democracy. This paper, like the project on which it is based, deals with one side of the equation – the role of resistance and liberation movements in conflict escalation and transformation.

The terminology used in the literature to qualify such movements revolves around the notions of “non-state armed groups”, “rebel movements”, “insurgencies” – seen as relatively neutral labels which avoid the partiality and moral judgement inherent in ambiguous terms like “terrorist organisations” or “freedom fighters”. From the Berghof project’s onset, its participants have noted the inadequacy of some of the above terms, and rejected their use. For instance, the label “non-state” neglects the aspiration of some movements to form separate states, as well as, at times, their quasi-governmental features as a ‘state within a state’. The label “armed groups” was found not to be appropriate either, since it fails to account for a complex set of means of political action, armed and unarmed, which evolve constantly according to circumstances and strategic calculations. We therefore decided to name such movements after their primary objectives, and opted for the inclusive terminology of “resistance/liberation movements” (RLMs).

When it comes to identifying these movements, the literature has produced a list of criteria ranging from very extensive to more narrow definitions, according to their goals, structure and geopolitical environment. The most classic definitions include groups which possess a hierarchical organisation (or a basic command structure), use violence for political ends, are independent from state control and have some degree of territorial control over a geographic area (Bruderlein 2000). More minimalist definitions characterise RLMs as “challengers to the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercive force” (Policzer 2005). Recognising the complexity of intra-national conflicts and the necessity of adopting an inclusive understanding of conflict actors, this paper adopts the broad definition used by Conciliation Resources in its Accord publication on Choosing to engage: Armed Groups and Peace Processes (Ricigliano 2005), which is concerned with groups “operating
primarily within state borders engaged in violent attempts to challenge or reform the balance and structure of political and economic power, to avenge past injustices and/or to defend or control resources, territory or institutions for the benefit of a particular ethnic or social group”. Such a definition is also helpful in delimiting the scope of enquiry: it excludes groups which are primarily pursuing a private agenda rather than political, economic or social objectives (such as criminal organisations, drug cartels or private security agencies), groups which are state-sponsored (such as paramilitary organisations), or transnational actors and networks which operate across borders and do not claim control over a particular piece of land (e.g. Al Qaida).

The key terms *transition* and *transformation* should be defined as well, since they have also been challenged and debated by the project participants. Whereas the literature tends to adopt a rather linear and unidirectional understanding of the shifts incurred by RLMs “from rebellion to politics” (Söderberg Kovacs 2007), this project assumes that these groups have a long-standing and well-developed political vision for their country, which has at various times led to a variety of strategies (violent, non-violent or a combination of both) to implement the vision. We are therefore concerned primarily with the shifts and interplay *between* military and political strategies (rather than *from*...*to*) which such movements adopt during the periods of active conflict and peace process, until they are able to (re-)convert their military structures and adopt exclusively “conventional” means of political engagement. Our understanding of conventional politics is not solely restricted to the electoral arena; it might include other forms of non-violent activities, operating as a political party, social movement or civil society organisation.

Intra-state armed conflicts have ended in various manners: in some cases, states have successfully used force to defeat their armed challengers (e.g. Argentina in the 1970s). In other cases armed challengers have successfully defeated the incumbent state by force, and become the new rulers themselves (e.g. MPLA in Angola, PFD in Eritrea, FSLN in Nicaragua). But this study is concerned with contexts where the government and RLMs have agreed to end their conflict through negotiations, usually after a long and protracted struggle. The dynamics of such conflicts can be pictured as a conflict transformation cycle with eight main stages: peaceful social change, latent conflict (structural violence), nonviolent confrontation, violent confrontation, conflict mitigation, conflict settlement, peace implementation, and peace consolidation (Dudouet 2006: 21). This approach acknowledges that war-to-peace trajectories are often complex, multidirectional and erratic, as conflicts might move back as well as forward along the conflict
transformation cycle, “jump” stages or exhibit properties of several escalation or de-
estasis of conflict mitigation and conflict settlement, characterised by a series of unilateral, bilateral
and third-party mediated initiatives such as ceasefire declarations, low-key unofficial dialogue encounters or high-profile negotiation between the main political players, leading up to the signature of provisional or comprehensive peace agreements. With the exception of the LTTE (who officially suspended the 2002 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement in 2006 without succeeding in reaching a peaceful compromise with the government), all RLMs investigated here have signed a peace accord with the state: the 1990 Political Accord in Colombia, the 1991 National Peace Accord in South Africa, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in Belfast, the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding in Aceh and the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Nepal.

The next two stages of the conflict transformation cycle, namely peace implementation and peace consolidation, are often bundled together by scholars and practitioners as “post-war (or post-settlement) peacebuilding”. As demonstrated by Hampson (1996), Stedman et al (2002) and others, peace does not emanate automatically from the signing of peace agreements, and what follows on the ground and in the political and diplomatic arenas is at least as important in determining the sustainability of peace processes, especially as most post-war situations are still highly volatile and prone to violent disruptions. Likewise, the Berghof project assumes that conflict transformation extends far beyond the dynamics of negotiations, and defines peacebuilding as a long-term, multi-dimensional process which involves a combination of military and security shifts, political integration and democratisation, economic and social reconstruction and development, and psycho-social reconciliation and justice.

1.2 Literature overview: resistance/liberation movements and political transitions

Given the multi-sectoral definition of conflict transformation and peacebuilding described above, this brief literature review is also multidisciplinary: it highlights recent scholarly-based enquiries about the role of resistance/liberation movements in peace processes, and the strategic, ideological and organisational transformations which they undertake in the course of complex and non-linear transitions between armed struggle and democratic politics. Against the backdrop of
existing research, this short overview will help to identify the originality and added-value of this report’s findings and the overall Berghof project.

One type of academic studies dealing with the role and dynamics of RLMs is situated in the humanitarian, juridical, human rights and development fields. Starting from the limits imposed by international law, which only recognises the legality and accountability of states, authors address the engagement dilemmas faced by the international community (e.g. UN, NGOs and relief agencies) when dealing with acts of violence committed by non-state actors. They seek ways to encourage these groups to comply with international human rights and humanitarian norms (Bruderlein 2000, Hoffmann 2006, Grävingholt et al 2007), for example through the work of Geneva Call and other NGOs on issues such as landmines or child soldiers.

The fields of international relations, security and strategic studies have also progressively come to recognise that states are no longer exclusive players on the international scene, as their sovereignty has become eroded both from “above” (international organisations, transnational actors) and from “below” (non-state actors). In this context, various scholars have published studies on contemporary insurgency movements in the context of US foreign policy in its “war on terror” (Shultz et al 2004), or with regards to changing patterns of conflicts in the post-cold war era (Reno 1998, Rotberg 2004, Mehler 2004), and war economies (Berdal and Malone 2000, Francois and Rufin 2003). These studies mainly focus on issues related to the formation, mobilisation and internal working of insurgency movements, either from a micro-level perspective (e.g. Weinstein 2007), or in relation to the broader geopolitical environment in which they operate (cross-border linkages, diasporas, “failing states”, the “privatisation of violence”, etc.). The dynamics of peacemaking and negotiation are not really scrutinised in this strand of literature, and post-war processes are mostly approached from the angle of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) or security sector reform (SSR), most often analysed in isolation from the other areas of peacebuilding.

The purpose of most studies in the field of international relations and security is to inform policy engagement with RLMs (i.e. control and/or dialogue), both by

4 See also the University of Calgary’s armed groups project (www.armedgroups.org) led by Dr. Pablo Policzer.
5 See for instance Geneva Call (www.genevacall.org), Non State Actors Working Group at the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (www.icbl.org), Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (www.child-soldiers.org), or the International Committee of the Red Cross (www.icrc.org).
states and international actors. For instance, Heiberg et al. (2007) undertook a comprehensive and comparative review of eleven violent insurgency groups by examining the impact of various governmental policies on their behavioural patterns and evolution over time. Based on their findings, they suggest a set of national and international policy guidelines to help generate conditions required to move militants towards non-violent strategies.

For their part, scholars in political science and democratisation studies relate conflict transformation to the process of emergence of multi-party democracy, which leads them to focus on the organisational transformation of insurgencies, from underground guerrilla movements to conventional political parties (Zahar 1999, Manning 2004, Garibay 2005, Nissen and Schlichte 2006, Deonandan et al. 2007, Söderberg Kovacs 2007). Through comparative studies of successful and failed transitions, or illustrative single case studies, they analyse the challenges of institutionalisation and operational adjustment “from bullets to ballots” (e.g. from clandestinity to openness, coercion to persuasion, ideological rigidity to pragmatism, vertical to horizontal structures). They also seek to identify the factors which affect their democratic performance in post-war politics, and try to explain why some movements manage to take power following power-sharing agreements or in a system of majoritarian democracy (e.g. ZANU in Zimbabwe, ANC in South Africa), while others remain in marginal positions, or worse, fail to transform into viable political parties (e.g. RUF in Sierra Leone, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia). Söderberg Kovacs (2007) provides the most comprehensive explanatory framework organised along three levels of analysis: inter-party (degree of internal cohesion during the peace process); party-population (level of popular support among the population at large); and party-international (degree of international legitimacy throughout the transition period).

Finally, the field of conflict transformation acknowledges the central role played by RLMs in peace processes, but it places more emphasis on the processes of external (third-party) engagement with such groups rather than their internal dynamics and direct contribution to social and political change. Traditionally, researchers and practitioners also primarily tend to focus their attention on the “moderates” within a conflict system – those seen as having the capacity to generate and implement peaceful change. Berghof is one of few institutions in this
field\(^6\) acknowledging the need to engage with a broader range of influential stakeholders, including armed movements, whose capacities to lead and/or block macro-political change make them key players in conflict transformation.

Three recent publications are worth mentioning because of their close linkages with this project; they all adopt a comparative multi-case analysis to the dynamics of RLMs during and after peace processes. The Accord series referred to above (Ricigliano 2005) mostly focuses on external engagement with various armed groups, but also contains several articles which analyse past peacemaking experiences by such groups. In particular, McCartney's contribution “From armed struggle to political negotiations: Why? When? How?” presents an interesting exploration of the various elements which favour militancy (such as a lack of alternative options, commitment to the campaign, avoidance of compromise and splits, etc.) against those which favour a conflict transformation strategy (e.g. real opportunities for change and tangible benefits, inherent weaknesses of the military option, legitimacy and recognition, guarantees and mutual dependence, third-party intermediaries).

Secondly, a recent study by the Clingendael Institute (De Zeeuw 2008) compares eight cases of “rebel-to-party” transformations, which are analysed along structural dynamics (i.e. demilitarising of organisational structures and development of party organisation) and attitudinal changes (i.e. democratisation of decision-making and adaptation of strategies and goals). Their main focus is to explain full, partial or failed transitions through multiple internal and external causal factors, and provide policy advice to the international community on how to better support the demilitarisation and political transformation of these movements.

Finally, another recent collective research project (Dayton and Kriesberg 2009) examines the processes that lead groups that are challenging existing power structures to engage in violent struggles, processes that contribute to de-escalation and participation of challengers in peaceful political activities, and processes that sustain and nurture this transformation. The book offers a combination of thematic chapters and case studies on Brazil, Guatemala, Mozambique, Nepal, Palestine, the Basque Country, South Africa and Sri Lanka.

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\(^6\) NGOs which conduct such engagement with RLMs for peacemaking and peacebuilding purposes include the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, Crisis Management Initiatives in Helsinki, the Berghof Foundation for Peace Support in Berlin, or Conflicts Forum in the Middle East.
Whereas the studies reviewed in this section provide some interesting academic insights based on external analysis of the dynamics of RLMs, the purpose of this research project has been to prioritise self-analysis by those inside the movements, in the hope of producing more focused, specific and substantial first-hand findings. We believe that this unique approach is of great value both to the participating groups as an exercise in comparative self-reflection, and to the international research and policy-making communities in giving them an accurate, realistic and much more nuanced view of the whole subject matter.

Before turning to the key insights which have emerged from this self-reflection exercise, the remainder of this section briefly presents the methodological approach and research framework which were adopted for this project.

1.3 Methodology

A comparative case study approach was selected as the best way to gain access to a wide range of experiences and transition trajectories. The following criteria were used to select the participating groups: first, they have a long experience of militant violent struggle against the state or sub-national structures of authority. Second, they have achieved differing degrees of effectiveness in political development, and their transition processes have not been uniform. Some have embarked on a peace process over some years, participated in the post-settlement reconstruction of their society and engaged in conventional politics, while others are currently undergoing transition processes, with all the organisational, political, resource and reskilling challenges and sensitivities which such transformations entail. Third, they are geographically spread across distinct continents, to enable an exploration of the cultural and geopolitical factors affecting the transformation of protracted conflicts around the globe. Fourth, the selection of case studies was also partly subject to practical and institutional contingencies, as some groups, once contacted, declined our invitation to participate in the project, while others were selected due to direct relations previously established between their leadership and our institute through other Berghof projects.
Bearing in mind these considerations, the following six organisations were selected:

- ANC (South Africa): has made the full transition from long-term banned group to third-term sole party of government;
- M-19 (Colombia): has moved decisively from being an armed group into politics, initially with great success but subsequently with more moderate political gain over a prolonged period, with no return to violence;
- Sinn Fein (Northern Ireland): has many years’ experience of parallel military and political strategies, and is currently in a power-sharing government at the end-phase of a prolonged transition;
- GAM (Aceh/Indonesia): waged a protracted national liberation war, negotiated a peaceful conflict outcome in 2005 and surrendered its separatist intentions, dissolved its armed wing, and is now engaged in the autonomous administration of the Province;
- CPN-M (Nepal): returned to the political arena after a decade-long armed insurrection, won the 2008 constituent assembly elections and currently leads a power-sharing government;
- LTTE (Sri Lanka): has been involved in a succession of armed liberation campaigns and negotiations with the government for the past two decades, with renewed bilateral violence since 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>RLM</th>
<th>Type of conflict</th>
<th>Start of armed conflict</th>
<th>Peace agreement</th>
<th>Current political status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>M-19</td>
<td>Pro-democracy</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Marginal opposition party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Pro-democracy</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Heads government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>In power-sharing local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Heads Province governorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>CPN-M</td>
<td>Pro-democracy</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Heads government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a: ongoing armed conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Comparison of the six cases under study
This project also fits within Berghof’s general focus on practice-orientated and outcome-generating research, which aims to understand and support the practical processes of constructive social change. To support this overall goal, we use the methodological tool of **participatory action research**, which results from the conjunction of three principles: research (production of valid social knowledge), action (contribution to processes of conflict transformation) and participation (inclusion of stakeholders as co-researchers).

In keeping with these principles, the research methods and process for this project were defined, implemented and assessed co-operatively by local teams comprised, in each setting, of one or two researchers (recognised academics from that context, or RLM members with high academic credentials) and one or more official RLM representatives. All movements formally approved their members’ active participation in the project, whose involvement ensured their full ownership of the research process and outcomes. In the information-gathering phase, Berghof’s staff limited their involvement to a coordination, facilitation, editing and quality control role, to enable cross-fertilisation and continued learning between the local research teams.

Once the teams were selected, a preliminary research seminar was held in March 2007 in Berlin, during which the project convenors and the researchers for each of the six confirmed groups discussed and agreed on a common research framework, including a list of research themes and questions to be addressed in the case studies. During the period from March to July 2007, the local researchers gathered information on their movement’s history, selecting the most appropriate methods of data collection for each context (e.g. personal recollections and memoirs, interviews with the group representatives, wider communication with other group members using questionnaires, group discussions and focus groups, consultation of archival material, etc.). In August 2007, a roundtable meeting was organised in Cape Town, where all network members (project convenors, researchers and group representatives) collectively shared and discussed their comparative findings, based on the first case study drafts. The six research teams subsequently finalised their studies, which were then published separately in 2008, in the form of Berghof Transition Reports 1-6. In March 2008, a second roundtable meeting was organised in Berlin, which focused more specifically on the challenges of inter-party negotiation to reach peace agreements and implement their

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7 In the case of the LTTE, its proscription in Canada, the USA and the EU prevented us from working directly with members of the organisation; it was represented instead by a Tamil politician and a legal advisor of the liberation movement.
provisions. Its main insights have been presented in a separate publication (Dudouet 2008), and will therefore only be briefly mentioned in this report.

1.4 Research framework

This project does not see its participants as “converts to peace,” but as pragmatists who have at some stage chosen to expand political strategies to achieve their goals, and who have in the course of the conflict made the transition from opposing a state regime to participating in the construction of a new, more democratic system. Our main purpose is to understand more fully how choices between violent and non-violent strategies are made to achieve certain political ends, which factors impact on these decisions, and conversely, how these choices affect conflict transformation and post-war reconstruction.

In addition to considerations on how such shifts in roles and strategies were achieved – the obstacles, challenges, and successes derived from this collective experience – the project is also interested in exploring questions about when. Of course, given that the participating groups have evolved in complex and heterogeneous conflict areas, and reached very different stages of development and transformation, the purpose is not to define a uniform and linear process or timeframe. But we believe that the participants’ interpretation of a history which they have helped to shape through their actions might enable the identification of “ripe times,” key moments and turning points during the various conflict transformation phases.

Five basic research questions were collectively formulated by the project convenors and participants:

1. What is/was the objective of the movement?
2. How was the movement drawn into armed struggle?
3. What internal and external factors persuaded the movement to pursue or consider a non-violent political strategy?
4. How does/did the movement mobilise itself and its constituencies towards pursuing a political strategy?
5. What is the nature of any resulting/potential transformation?

In addition, a more detailed analytical framework was provided to the participants in order to guide them in their research process. It suggested possible dynamics and “drivers of change” (Dudouet 2006) which might help them to explore both the various arenas of transition which their movement and country had been
through, and the various factors influencing such transformations. This involved looking back at the following:

**Internal shifts**

- **Shifts in goals and ideology**: What values and goals drove the struggle, and did strategic shifts between violent and non-violent politics reflect a larger goal transformation, or were they simply motivated by a new belief in the capacity of political reform to achieve the original objectives?
- **Organisational dynamics**: How did the group leadership and the hierarchical structure of command evolve over the different phases of conflict transformation? Did the balance shift between certain sub-groups during periods of transition? Were there issues around maintaining internal cohesion and unity within the movement? How did the group deal with the challenge of integrating multiple internal voices across gender or generational diversity, etc. and avoiding the marginalisation of certain segments in the decision-making and internal transformation processes?
- **Political development**: What was the movement’s experience of party formulation, consolidation and evolution? How did its members come to assume political functions in constitutionally-recognised bodies (i.e. local, regional and national assemblies and governments), or become integrated in a state security apparatus (i.e. police, army)?
- **Funding shifts**: What resources enabled the groups to sustain their activities during the struggle, and how did they manage their “business” interests after embarking on political transition (i.e. shift from private to public funding)? Did their members benefit from the “peace dividends” and wealth redistribution processes which accompany post-war reconstruction and development?
- **Shifts in the constituent base**: What political, economic and security functions did the movement fulfil in the community? Did it carry out its struggle on behalf of a specific social or identity group, and if yes, what relations and level of support did/does it have with this larger constituency? Was there a strong grassroots and civil society mobilisation in favour of dialogue and negotiations, and if yes, did this have an impact on the movement leadership’s calculations and course of action? Inversely, what efforts were made by the movement to convince their constituency to support strategic shifts?
**Inter-party dynamics**

- **Structural change:** Given that all intra-state or ethno-political conflicts are rooted in economic, social and/or political asymmetry between power-seekers and power-holders, how did structural transformations affect the group’s formulation of goals and strategies? Conversely, did armed struggle help to alter power asymmetry, and was it instrumental in forcing pro-status quo forces to recognise the movement first as a legitimate negotiation partner, and later as a part of government? When/if a peace accord was signed, was it jointly agreed or imposed by one part, and did it address the movement’s main grievances? In the post-agreement phase, does the state abide by its commitment to grant greater economic, political and social rights and dismantle structures of oppression or inequality?

- **Perceptual shifts:** What factors enabled both the government and opposition movement to overcome their distrust of “the other side”, recognise each other as legitimate negotiation partners, agree to joint ceasefires, engage in political dialogue, and later agree to collaborate in power-sharing institutions?

- **Relations with other non-state actors:** Did the movement form alliances with other like-minded groups, or did they compete with other groups claiming allegiance from the same community or social base? In the post-agreement phase, were there some dissident groups which continued their armed activities, and if yes, what influence did such factors have on the movement’s post-war political engagement?

**International factors**

- **Regional and international dynamics:** What was the impact of major events in the international arena on the movement's strategic choices and course of action?

- **Third-party intervention:** Did the movement rely on external support bases (e.g. diaspora communities, foreign allies)? What degree of international legitimacy and recognition did the movement enjoy, and what strategies were employed to harness international assistance? What forms of intervention did external actors employ in their attempts to influence the movement’s behaviour, and what impact did they have? Was third-party intervention by foreign state or non-state actors a crucial dimension of the peace process, and what degree of financial, human, or logistical support was offered by foreign agencies for post-war peacebuilding?
All the research questions raised above can be summarised in a table for easier reference:

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Table 2: Comparative research framework

Having clarified the analytical framework which links together the six case studies, it is now possible to review the main findings, common traits and singularities which emerged from the studies themselves, as well as from the three project meetings.  

8 Insights and extracts from the roundtable meetings will be identified in the next sections with the annotation meeting minutes in brackets, in order to distinguish them from the content of the case study reports.
SECTION 2:
Dynamics of transition: the ends and means of insurgency movements

The evolution of resistance and liberation movements between armed struggle and nonviolent political action is primarily directed by their decisions to shift and reconsider their overarching goals, ideology, strategies and tactics. This section attempts to examine the means and ends of revolutionary struggle and their dynamics, based on the findings of the six case study reports.

2.1 Objectives of the struggle: continuity or adaptation?

Role of the state as the main source of grievances

All six authors identify the emergence of RLMs as a political response to a complex set of historical circumstances, dating back to a distant past (e.g. colonialism and its legacy) or more recent political events (e.g. the legalisation of inequality, fraudulent elections, etc.), primarily centred around the role of the state. Although most of the six movements emerged in a context of formal democracy (with a constitution and a competitive electoral system of government), they argue that there was only a pretence of democracy, and that the closed nature of the political system or highly unequal power structures had prompted the formation of opposition movements representing an oppressed constituency.

In South Africa the origins of the ANC liberation struggle, which started off in the early 20th century, are located in the colonisation of the area by white settlers, the institutionalisation of racial discrimination, and the political subordination of the black majority by the white minority. Similarly, in Sri Lanka the LTTE was formed in 1972 in response to institutionalised racism and discrimination by a Sinhala-dominated state. The study mentions the British colonial legacy as a factor exacerbating ethnic divisions and tensions, and also argues that ethnicity was not in itself the cause of the conflict, but the primary identity around which political tensions were mobilised. In Nepal, the main root causes of the Maoist rebellion in 1995 were the inability of the Monarchic regime to bring about social and political change, and the continued oppression of the peasant and working class, low castes, minority ethnic groups and women. In Colombia, the M-19 movement emerged in
1973 in a context of political exclusion of opposition parties, acute agrarian conflict and accelerated urbanisation, and a legacy of accumulated experience of guerrilla warfare in the country and the region. In Northern Ireland, the structural causes of the conflict are situated in the history of colonisation by British settlers, and the Sinn Fein party, formed in 1905, represents the descendents of indigenous populations who were disenfranchised and forced to live as second-class citizens. Finally, the GAM movement in the Aceh Province of Indonesia was born in 1976 out of protest against the centralistic tendencies of the post-colonial state and the rise of a repressive military regime under General Soeharto.

**Articulation of objectives and political claims**

When it comes to defining the overarching goal of their movement, all authors insist (either explicitly or by inference) that the label “from violence to politics” is inadequate to characterise the transitions of RLMs, as they have been waging a political struggle from their inception, independently of the various (violent or nonviolent) means employed to conduct it. In fact, they all had very clearly defined political objectives from the start, rooted in a combination of class-based and/or identity-based revolutionary ideology, and aiming to replace incumbent governments or gain local self-determination.

Three movements can be defined as Marxist-influenced pro-democracy movements (CPN-M, ANC, M-19), launched by members of the elite (M-19) or the underclass (ANC, CPN-M) experiencing blocked social mobility. The objectives of the ANC were spelt out in the 1955 Freedom Charter, and mainly revolved around the struggle to overthrow white minority rule in South Africa and establish a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa based on “one person, one vote”. The M-19 was an urban movement of middle class university-educated people which started out with a socialist, nationalist ideology. It was less doctrine-orientated and externally-inspired than the other guerrilla groups operating in the country (e.g. FARC, ELN), and more interested in strengthening democracy and (re-)building a national identity based on Colombian traditions and past history (such as the revered revolutionary leader Bolivar). The CPN-M’s initial objectives, inspired by the Chinese Maoist legacy, were to fight poverty and social discrimination by capturing state power,
abolishing feudal monarchy, and bringing about a democratic revolution of peasants through socio-economic change and radical land reform.

The other three RLMs represented in this project all launched national liberation struggles against a repressive central government, regarded as foreign or hostile to the community which they were striving to represent; their historical goal has either been secessionist (GAM, LTTE) or irredentist – seeking to reunify a partitioned homeland (Sinn Fein). The LTTE is struggling for self-governance for the Tamil people in their traditional homeland, under any constitutional arrangement that would guarantee the recognition and protection of their identity and an equitable distribution of power and resources (meeting minutes). Sinn Fein’s historical goal has been to resist English/British interference in Ireland, and after 1921 in the six northern counties which remained under UK sovereignty. Its main demands included the recognition of the right to self-determination for the Irish people in all 32 counties, British disengagement from the island, and the setting up of a constitutional conference where Irish people would decide their future and lay the basis for a new society where all would be treated equally. Finally, GAM’s founder, Hassan Di Tiro, officially launched the movement by declaring the independence of Aceh, which he saw as the only way to claim justice and the right to identity for the Acehnese people.

Openness to flexibility and ideological shifts

An interesting finding arising from several of the studies, which contradicts some commonly held beliefs regarding the ideological rigidity and stubbornness of insurgency movements, relates to the readiness of RLM leaderships to reassess the purpose of their struggle, their original objectives and discursive frame in the light of an evolving environment.

In Colombia and Nepal, a redefinition of primary goals by the M-19 and CPN-M was a clear precondition for a change of means and strategy from armed rebellion to negotiation, and paved the way for successful peace processes. Around 1979, the M-19 leaders shifted the main political objective of their struggle from socialism to democracy. Similarly, around 2001, the Nepali Maoists made a major ideological shift from seeking a communist one-party system to embracing competitive multi-party democracy. From then on their political programme focused on introducing a new constitution, electing a constituent assembly, and establishing a Republic. These important shifts enabled them to form an alliance and join forces with their former enemies, the legal opposition parties, against the autocratic regime of King Gyanendra.
For secessionist movements, the elements of flexibility mainly revolve around the definition and content of self-determination. The GAM movement argues that their decision to settle for less than outright independence did not represent a compromise on their original goals. Instead the decision, voiced in the 2002 Stavanger Declaration, to give up their claim to an independent Islamic state of Aceh and settle for self-government in a decentralised democratic system, resulted from a pragmatic decision that the meaning of independence was more important than the term itself (meeting minutes). In this sense, they did reach their historical goals. The Sinn Fein study, for its part, mentions a radicalisation of the discourse within the nationalist community in the aftermath of the 1972 Bloody Sunday massacre, from a demand for civil rights to talks of “a united Ireland – or nothing”. Later on, and in particular through its publicly-released documents A Scenario for Peace (1987) and Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland (1992), Sinn Fein maintained its claim to a united Ireland, but simultaneously sought to reclaim the word ‘peace’ which had so far been interpreted by one camp as ‘surrender’, and by the other one as the defeat of the IRA. For the first time, it invited its constituency as well as its opponents to “[establish] conditions which will ensure a lasting peace” (p12); and for the sake of peace it later agreed on a transitional framework to work peacefully for reunification and independence through the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. In Sri Lanka finally, many commentators have argued that the failure of the successive rounds of negotiation is partly due to the LTTE’s inflexibility, as their insistence on Tamil self-administration as a non-negotiable bottom line is still deemed unacceptable by the Singhalese state. However, the study seeks to demonstrate that the LTTE’s overall goal is “equitable distribution of power and resources, articulated in political demands varying from federalism and confederalism to consociationalism and outright independence” (p13). In other words, the terms of their autonomous rule are not given, and during the 2002-6 peace process, the movement formally agreed to explore federalism as a permanent solution to the conflict.

2.2 Means of struggle: shifts between armed and non-violent political strategies

The use of violence is described by the six RLMs as a legitimate form of self-defence in the face of human rights abuses and denial of democracy, as one form of (not the opposite of) political intervention, and as a carefully-considered means to an end. The authors also present guerrilla warfare as one among various means of struggle which were employed simultaneously or consecutively, and they argue that
these strategies were selected, and interchanged, in response to a constantly evolving political environment. Most movements followed comparable trajectories from non-violent opposition to armed struggle to conventional politics, once their goals were attained or a compromised solution had been negotiated with the state.

**Justification of armed struggle: the “right to revolt”**

When explaining the reasons behind the movements’ recourse to violent strategies, the role of the state comes once more to the forefront. All six case study reports support the classical thesis that armed action was adopted as a last resort (“the only alternative”), in response to violent repression of nonviolent protest by the state. Negotiation and conventional politics were never ruled out as a matter of principle, but simply deemed impossible or ineffective under given circumstances.

The ANC adhered to nonviolent forms of struggle until the end of the 1950s, and established its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in 1961, following a campaign of violent repression (e.g. the 1960 Sharpeville massacre) and the banning of the organisation in 1960 which prevented it from operating peacefully or even legally existing. There was also a sense of inevitability of violence and the need to channel and lead social anger: “violence would begin whether we initiated it or not. If we did not take the lead now, we would soon be latecomers and followers in a movement we did not control” (p10). The authors of the LTTE study engage in a lengthy discussion on the Tamils’ inability to channel their grievances through a democratic system which was giving way to majoritarianism and ethnic politics. They explain the move from parliamentary participation and peaceful agitation to armed opposition in 1983 with the failure of democratic procedures to address Tamil grievances, and the concomitant escalation of state repression. They further note that “the enemy decides what happens – whether we fight or whether we talk” (*meeting minutes*). Likewise, the CPN-Maoists also entered parliamentary politics at first, but started preparing for a “protracted people’s war” in 1995 after party members became victims of police repression, “fake trials” and mass arrests. The study on the M-19 draws a similar picture of the movement’s emergence in the aftermath of rigged elections, and also mentions its members’ conviction that their struggle would only be respected by the oligarchy if backed by the power of arms. In Aceh, the decision by GAM founders to resort to “reactive rebellion” is described as “the only language that Jakarta understood”, and as a defensive posture “to counterbalance the language of the enemy” (p6) after the government retaliated violently and brutally to their declaration of independence. Finally, in Northern Ireland, the violent repression of the civil rights movement in the 1960s and the
introduction of internment without trial in 1971 convinced Sinn Fein members that only armed struggle could accomplish the end of British rule on the Irish island.

**Internal structure and organisation: arms at the service of politics**

As indicated above, most of the six RLMs started as a political party or organisation, before putting in place military or guerrilla structures. As they developed and intensified their activities, some movements maintained very distinct dual structures, which, in some cases (e.g. Sinn Fein/IRA, ANC/MK), allowed for the simultaneity of armed and unarmed forms of struggle. The ANC’s military branch MK was kept largely autonomous, in order to allow the political front to continue waging nonviolent campaigns, but its actions were always guided and assessed by the political leadership of the national liberation movement. Other groups had more unified structures, such as the M-19, which defined itself as a “political-military organisation” with a combined structure of command. The GAM movement had a united central command in the person of Di Tiro, but its political and military leaderships grew distinctly separate as the former became primarily based in exile (i.e. in Sweden) while the latter was operating on the ground. The 2002 Stavanger Declaration renamed both structures the “State of Aceh government in exile” and the “State army”. In Sri Lanka during the late 1990s, the LTTE also transformed itself into a de facto state by extending its civilian administrative apparatus in the “liberated zones”, including a police force, judiciary, central bank, welfare system, etc.

**Emphasis on self-limiting armed insurrection: violence as a means to an end**

Another issue worth mentioning regarding the strategy of asymmetric warfare is that despite the huge variety in the violent tactics adopted by the six groups (e.g. urban or rural operations such as sabotage, robberies, sieges, army or police ambushes, kidnappings, assassination of class enemies, suicide attacks), several RLMs shared a common emphasis on self-limiting armed insurrection, by deliberately choosing not to become a fully-fledged guerrilla group or by keeping certain moral standards of conduct.

The ANC study makes recurrent allusions to the selection of “legitimate targets”, and mentions several instances when the movement made a deliberate choice not to cross the threshold from defensive resistance against state repression to outright attacks against the regime, in order to retain the moral superiority over
their enemies, avoid provoking brutal retaliation, and keep the door open to a negotiated solution. MK targeted places symbolising white rule but carefully tried to avoid taking human lives, and even signed the Geneva Convention Protocol relating to irregular warfare in 1980, emphasising its commitment to avoid attacking civilians and to the ‘humanitarian’ conduct of war. The M-19 study mentions the movement’s refusal to engage in drug trafficking, its public condemnation of the violent retaliation of other guerrilla groups against civilians or their own troops, and its decision not to use its weapons to create terror regimes or to subdue the population. Such policies were justified by the leaders’ search for popular support, and their insistence on goal orientation rather than simply waging war for its own sake.

The other four studies do not really delve into such discussions around the ethics and boundaries of warfare, and in fact, the LTTE and the Maoist “People’s Liberation Army” (PLA) progressively developed into fully-fledged armies which bore more similarities with conventional armies than rural or urban guerrilla forces. The PLA occupied up to 80% of the Nepalese land and, by following the consecutive steps of strategic defence, stalemate and offence, it quickly grew from being a very small group of 100 members to a sophisticated movement capable of high-scale military action. For its part, the LTTE has been engaged in recent months in quasi-conventional warfare between two standing armies, using heavy weapons such as navy and aircraft.

A continuum of complementary armed/unarmed strategies

According to several authors, RLMs never endorsed guerrilla action as an exclusive strategy in isolation from other forms of resistance. Instead, they pursued both armed and unarmed modes of action simultaneously, with one or the other at the fore, depending on the ongoing context and leaders’ strategic considerations. This was the case for the ANC, which defined armed activities as one of four “pillars of struggle”, alongside nonviolent mass mobilisation, the political underground movement and the international campaign to isolate the apartheid regime. In Ireland, the Republican movement went through various phases of political struggle over the course of more than 800 years, which have included “passive resistance, agrarian unrest, armed uprising, mass movements and political agitation, language and cultural struggles, constitutional and parliamentary engagement” (p6). Armed actions came to the fore whenever political engagement broke down. And simultaneously to their armed activities during the 1970s and 1980s, activists also resorted to nonviolent resistance, especially in prisons, through hunger strikes or “blanket” protests to demand recognition of their status as political prisoners. They
even started engaging in electoral activities in parallel to guerrilla warfare, a dual ("armalite and ballot box") strategy which enabled them to make electoral gains to “win the hearts and minds” of the wider nationalist community, while pursuing the armed struggle to put pressure on the British government to open up negotiations.

**A strategic reassessment of means: shift towards non-violent politics**

The six studies define the adoption of violent strategies as an instrumental rather than ideological choice, and describe the movements’ decision to enter a peace process as proceeding from a rational calculation of the possibilities and limitations inherent in non-violent politics (e.g. negotiations, electoral and other forms of conventional politics) as opposed to continuing the armed conflict.

In South Africa, the ANC took a proactive decision around 1990 to embrace negotiations as “a new terrain of struggle” and “primary site of contestation” (p23), and unilaterally suspended its armed struggle in order to force the regime into formal peace talks. In Colombia, the M-19 leadership also started to realise during the 1980s that war had become an obstacle to change, as the oligarchy was seeking to exploit violence for the perpetuation of the status quo. In search of alternatives, they reformulated their strategy of “weapons at the service of politics” to “peace at the service of politics”, and from “change for peace” to “peace for change” (*meeting minutes*). In other words, they appropriated the notion of peace as a transformative strategy of action in itself, rather than a distant absolute end. By adopting this perspective, they were able to take on a political role. In Northern Ireland the adoption of an electoral strategy in 1981 when Bobby Sands and other political prisoners were elected to Westminster, resulted from intense internal debate on the means and ends of the struggle, and its effectiveness served to demonstrate the practical use of political action. The CPN-M study, finally, presents the movement’s shifts in military and political strategies as an illustration of their motto “firm with principles and flexible with tactics”. After 2006, they gave up armed activities to continue their struggle simultaneously through peaceful street protest and negotiations.

The dynamics, settings, forms and content of peace negotiations between states and RLMs are not directly addressed in this paper, as they have already been dealt with in a separate publication (Dudouet 2008). Instead, the purpose of the remaining two sections is first to highlight the various internal and external factors influencing the decision by RLMs to adopt non-violent political strategies, and then to explore the outcomes of such transitions in the six case studies.
SECTION 3:
Internal and external factors of political transition

This section reviews the multiple factors affecting the course of political transitions from non-state entities to power-holding institutions through conflict transformation. Four types of factors are addressed in the case studies: internal dynamics and leadership within the movements, inter-party dynamics (i.e. relations with the state), the RLMs’ relations with their community (both their constituency and other social and political forces), and finally the international arena.

3.1 Role of the leadership and organisational dynamics

A proactive sense of initiative

Regarding the internal processes which allow a strategic shift from rebellion to negotiation, all six studies stress the crucial role played by the movements’ respective leaders, and especially their ability to assess and react swiftly to arising windows of opportunity.

“Sometimes leaders have to act now, explain later”, argued ANC leader Nelson Mandela (meeting minutes). This was the case, for instance, with the letter he wrote to President Botha from jail in 1989, where he set out the principle of majority rule while addressing the fears and concerns of the white minority. This unilateral action, taken without internal consultation with his colleagues and advisors, played a very important pre-emptive role for the future negotiations by securing a central role for the ANC in the peace process. Meanwhile, ANC President Oliver Tambo, also recognising the urgent need to capture the initiative internationally, set out a blueprint for negotiations (the “Harare document”) and gained its endorsement by the Organisation of African Unity and the UN. The ANC’s unilateral suspension of armed struggle in August 1990 was yet another tactical move intended to “enable the ANC to take the high ground, to step up the pace and force the regime into formal negotiations" (p23).

The other cases also mention the significance of charismatic leaders with a strong personal authority, such as the LTTE’s emblematic figure Prabakharan, or the GAM founder Hassan Di Tiro. The fact that GAM’s peace negotiations in Helsinki were led by the exiled leadership also made it possible for them to take rational decisions without being directly affected by the political dynamics in Aceh and
Indonesia. The M-19 study also highlights the quasi-religious nature of hierarchical structures ("the commander is never wrong", p27), and the decisive role played by the movement’s successive leaders. For instance, commander Bateman’s first overture in favour of dialogue, truce and amnesty in 1980 resulted from his shrewd assessment of the peaceful outcome of M-19’s siege of the Dominican Embassy as a scale model of what could be a negotiated solution to the armed conflict in Colombia. Later, his successor Pizarro also showed his ability to convert himself from a military to a political leader when he initiated a peace process with the Colombian government in 1989. His audacious offer of disarmament was made without any prior consultation within his own movement or with other guerrillas, but was later internally approved by a democratic vote in favour of ending the armed rebellion. In the case of the CPN-M in Nepal, the leadership’s ability to seize bold initiatives was expressed in its unexpected declaration of a unilateral ceasefire in August 2005, a proactive move which forced the King to react, and provided opportunities for the Maoists to resolve intra-party divisions and form a new alliance with mainstream political parties against the monarchy. Finally, the Sinn Fein study also mentions several instances when its pre-emptive actions and its ability to make the right decision at the right time (e.g. ending the boycott on the Dublin Parliament and releasing A Scenario for Peace in 1987, or announcing a unilateral ceasefire in 1994) helped the movement to break the cycle of repression/resistance and encourage political progress.

**Intra-party consultation and power dynamics**

Successful negotiations require strong and decisive leaders, but also strong and cohesive movements. The studies highlight the process of intense internal consultation and debate which preceded, accompanied or followed back-channel and formal negotiations, in order to ensure a high degree of accountability and unity among members and supporters. The role of political prisoners is mentioned in the ANC, Sinn Fein and M-19 studies; jails are described as a space for encounters and political discussions and as a bridge or transmission belt between the leadership and its support base during peace processes. Sinn Fein also engaged in intense negotiation with the Republican activist base (including IRA volunteers), which was “kept abreast of developments as they unfolded and as much as possible knew about developments before they heard about them in the media” (p15). In the case of the CPN-M, the lines of communication were primarily top-down, in the form of political training for Maoist cadres to explain the strategic shift made during the peace process. The LTTE study also mentions the fact that the Tamil organisation is
not a monolithic entity and that the initial stages of the Norwegian-sponsored peace process generated considerable internal debate between political ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’.

In the conflict resolution literature, peace processes are often said to be particularly vulnerable to “spoiler violence” (Stedman 1997, Zahar 2003) by splinter groups seeking to derail or prevent peace agreements. Under such conditions, the leaders of the six RLMs in question stood out by their ability to secure a commitment from party hardliners to try a negotiated solution, and/or to avoid being undermined by dissident violence and stay on the path of dialogue. The issue of factionalism is mentioned especially in the studies on Northern Ireland and South Africa, where peace processes were accompanied by an upsurge in violence generated by former allies or components of the insurgency movement who were opposed to a peace deal or protesting against their alleged marginalisation. However, both leaderships succeeded in sustaining their commitment to the negotiation process, and keeping the majority of their movement united behind a common position. The CPN-M study also mentions the occurrence of intra-party confrontation in 2004, over questions of internal democracy and the definition of the movement’s primary target enemy (i.e. India or the monarchy). Internal unity was restored after the King’s coup d’état in early 2005, which helped to resolve the dispute over strategic priorities.

Another sub-topic which would have merited far more analysis in the studies is the phenomenon of sidelining some segments of RLMs during peace negotiations, such as women fighters, whose needs and interests may vary from those of their male counterparts and are often marginalised in decision-making (Mazurana 2004). Although the authors were encouraged to address the role of women in their movement’s transition history, only the M-19 and CPN-M studies explicitly mention the role of female combatants and the importance of gender equality in the movement’s agenda for a fair and representative society; but they do not specifically address the role played by female members in the transition process.
3.2 Inter-party dynamics and the role of the state

The decision-making process within RLMs, and intra-party debates on strategy shifts to initiate political transitions, are strongly influenced by external events taking place in the societal, national and regional environment in which these movements operate. The dynamics of relations with the state represent a particularly important factor influencing insurgency movements’ decisions to opt for a negotiated conflict settlement.

Shifts in state leadership and policies

Several case studies attribute the shift from retaliation to accommodation strategies on the part of power-holders to a change of actors in government. These new leaders were induced to try out different approaches because of realising the conflict’s impact on the economy (domestic instability and external losses in investments or the effect of foreign boycott and sanctions), aggravated elite insecurity, international diplomatic isolation, or a genuine interest in initiating democratic reforms or addressing the root causes of civil warfare.

One of the major turning points in the South African political environment was the change of leadership within the ruling National Party in 1989, as the new President F.W. de Klerk shifted decisively towards a policy of negotiations: he immediately began to end segregation, lifted the ban on the ANC, and released its leader Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990. In Indonesia, the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1998 opened new possibilities for dialogue with nationalists in Aceh, and the new President played a decisive role in initiating negotiations by sending a representative to meet with GAM’s military leader. After the demise of the first peace process, a new change in government in 2003 was conducive to renewed peace talks. In Sri Lanka as well, the victory of a centre-right coalition in the 2001 parliamentary elections prompted a rapid shift from hostilities to the signature of a mutual ceasefire agreement within two months. The M-19 study also lists various ceasefire and peace agreements negotiated under three successive presidencies from 1982 to 1994, and notes the particularly proactive role of President Barco (1986-1990), who shifted his attention towards the fight against drug trafficking and thus saw negotiations with the guerrillas in a more favourable light. The Sinn Fein study, finally, cites the 1989 statement by the new British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter Brook that “it would be difficult to envisage a military defeat of the IRA” and that he saw “no selfish, strategic or economic interest” in Northern Ireland (p12) as a clear signal for Republicans that the government was open to
alternative forms of engagement. However, only after the Labour Party’s victory under Tony Blair in 1997 did the government finally launch official peace negotiations, as the previous Conservative government had been forced to rely on unionist votes for its political survival.

**Alteration of power relations**

According to the conflict resolution literature, peace processes most often occur when structural and perceptual (military, political, social, economic, symbolic, legal, etc.) asymmetry between the government and its armed contender shifts, so that both adversaries recognise the other’s ability to frustrate their chances of success. This has been described as a “mutually hurting stalemate” (Zartman 1996), allied to the concept of “ripe moment”: that brief moment when the playing field is acceptably level for both sides and talks become possible (Miall et al 1999: 162-3). In itself, the governments’ acceptance to negotiate with RLMs represents a strong power shift in favour of the non-state actors, as it represents recognition of the validity of their claim to legitimacy.

Several case study authors indeed agree that power shifts represent a crucial dimension of conflict transformation. This was certainly the case for the LTTE at the time of the 2002 Norwegian-mediated peace process. It had succeeded in establishing relative strategic parity vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan state, having captured a substantial tract of territory in which it had established a civil administration, and had also defeated the offensive capability of the state armed forces. Later on, asymmetry was altered again in the state’s favour through international partisan intervention (see below). The study on GAM also mentions how power shifts were achieved through the guerrilla’s armed strategy, which opened the possibility for bargaining on a more favourable political solution. The movement’s core strategy was indeed not to defeat the state militarily, but to demonstrate that they could not be defeated either, by provoking, humiliating and weakening the Indonesian troops. Similar assessments are implicitly made in the other studies, which seems to indicate that RLMs are reluctant to engage in negotiations with state representatives when they do not feel in a position of strength, but once power shifts in their favour, they become eager to transfer these gains to the negotiation table.
3.3 Societal factors: relations between RLMs, their community and other socio-political forces

Besides the direct relations between RLMs and the state, two types of societal factors are recorded as significant dynamics influencing the course of peace processes: on the one hand, insurgency groups’ use of their support base and alliances with other social and political actors as a powerful form of leverage; on the other hand, the role of social “war fatigue” and public pressure for peace as enhancing negotiation “ripeness”.

Mobilising a constituency

RLMs claim to represent a defined constituency, with which they maintain a complex web of relationships. In South Africa and Nepal, a massive popular mobilisation in favour of democracy, during the 1980s and 2006 respectively, represented powerful support for the ANC and Maoists, and against the regime. The South African liberation movement took the opportunity of the growing social movement against apartheid to form alliances with like-minded civil society networks (e.g. the United Democratic Front formed in 1983), other smaller armed resistance factions, the churches, trade unions, the media and elements of the white community. In Nepal, the closing of ranks between the Maoists and the seven-party alliance in 2005 accounts for the success of the third round of peace negotiations, where the previous two had failed: this strategic alliance was a crucial factor in reducing the power of the monarchy and creating the momentum for political change. The GAM movement in Aceh also took the opportunity of the “Humanitarian Pause” in 2000 to widen its bases of support, recruit, expand and consolidate its political wing in areas previously outside its reach (especially rural zones), and ended up controlling 60 to 80% of the Acehnese territory and population in 2003. It also strengthened its connections with the civil society protest movement emerging in Aceh after 1998, and with human rights organisations which mobilised throughout Indonesia in the wake of the independence of East Timor. In Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein increased its popularity in poor nationalist areas by looking after the welfare of their constituency: opening advice centres, representing people in their legal battles, etc. In its 1987 Scenario for Peace, the movement also started engaging constructively with the unionist community, arguing that conflict resolution would free them from their “laager mentality” and “offer them equality” (p19).
In most cases, RLMs had the monopoly of armed struggle within their constituency (CPN-M, GAM), or were the vanguard insurgent organisation (ANC, IRA, LTTE). By contrast, the M-19 in Colombia represented only one among multiple guerrilla groups, and this factor played a crucial role in its decision-making process. Its attempts to promote unity among the various guerrillas were hampered by profound ideological divergences, as well as the other movements’ mistrust towards its peace strategy. However, it was able to engage in constant dialogue with opposition political parties and social organisations across the country. This forging of alliances and coalitions was instrumental in empowering the M-19, and the other five RLMs, ahead of negotiations.

Social fatigue

A common feature in many societies suffering from armed conflict is a popular desire for peace: the extent of civil society mobilisation is a factor influencing the pace and outcome of a peace process.

In Colombia, an increase in civilian deaths during the 1980s and a parallel growth in peace mobilisation led M-19 leaders to start questioning the use of violence to achieve social transformation. As they claimed to represent the voice of the nation, they did not want to lose the moral high ground in their struggle by continuing to fuel a confrontation that was chiefly affecting the civilian population; “if the revolution [was] going against the people, it [was] not worth it” (meeting minutes). For instance, the siege of the Palace of Justice in 1985, which resulted in an enormous tragedy and was perceived by the population as a terrorist attack rather than a political action, forced the movement to reassess its means and ends and adopt a peace strategy in order to “reconnect with the country”. The study on GAM also presents the increasing human costs of the conflict and the Acehnese public’s general desire to move forward politically as conducive factors for the 2000-3 negotiations.

Finally, although it does not appear in the studies, the instrumental role of diasporas was also touched upon by the GAM, Sinn Fein and LTTE participants/researchers during roundtable meetings. Irish Americans played a crucial supporting role for the Republican struggle, until they began to see the IRA as a liability, and pressured the US government to intervene in favour of peace negotiations. With one in four Sri Lankan Tamils now living abroad, the diaspora communities have, and continue to, influence the peace and conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka. While they are mainly known to have financed and fuelled the conflict, less is known about their constructive role, in supporting rehabilitation and development
measures and serving as pressure blocs to co-shape policy decisions in their ‘host’ as well as ‘home’ countries. The Tamil diaspora co-authored the first and only constitutional proposal submitted thus far by the LTTE, the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). These dynamics illustrate the impact of international linkages on intra-state conflicts and conflict resolution processes.

### 3.4 International dimension

Although the vast majority of RLMs operate within the confines of national borders, they usually entertain cross-border relations with other armed groups or state sponsors (e.g. Libya, Cuba or formerly the USSR) in their regional or international surroundings. Most case studies cite other insurrection movements which were used as models or sources of inspiration during the conflict: the Cuban revolution in Colombia, the Peruvian Shining Path or the Chinese People’s War in Nepal, Che Guevara’s revolutionary theory in South Africa, or the May 1968 revolts and anti-Vietnam war movement for the civil rights struggle in Northern Ireland.

The rest of this sub-section deals with the complex - constructive or disruptive - roles performed by Western governments and non-state actors (often bundled under the encompassing notion of the “international community”), and the broader regional or global geopolitical environment, in impeding or facilitating conflict transformation.

**Search for international legitimacy**

In South Africa and Indonesia, Western powers initially bolstered the regime which they considered as an ally in their fight against communism and liberation struggles in southern Africa and South East Asia. However, the RLMs mounted successful lobbying campaigns which resulted in a shifting of international positions towards favouring regime change and peaceful conflict management. The ANC’s fourth “pillar of struggle” (isolating the apartheid forces in the international arena) was boosted by the campaign of foreign sanctions launched against the South African government during the 1980s, and the international endorsement of the movement’s “Harare document” in 1989 (see above). For its part, the GAM movement intensified its international advocacy work during the 2000-3 peace process and built a transnational solidarity network relayed by civil society groups. In its search for international legitimacy to balance its asymmetrical position with
Jakarta, the exiled leadership advanced its political cause by shifting from anti-capitalist and anti-Western discourses to appeals for human rights and democracy. When they went for negotiations, both the LTTE and CPN-M found themselves in a strong strategic position but with weak international credentials, and they hoped that their conciliatory move would be “rewarded” with their recognition as legitimate political actors on the international stage. However, most Western and neighbouring states (especially India) maintained a partial, pro-state position throughout the peace process, and are thus treated in both studies as “spoilers” who impeded conflict resolution. In the case of Nepal, the 9/11 attacks in the US and the subsequent “war on terror” were unfavourable to the Maoists. They became classified as a terrorist organisation by both the Indian and US governments, who became overt supporters of the monarchy, providing military assistance to the counter-offensive operation and pressuring the king, and later the mainstream parties, into refusing to negotiate with the insurgency until its combatants had disarmed. While recognising the positive role played by key international actors in the peace process 2002-2006 in general, the study on the LTTE also draws attention to some key strategic and tactical mistakes made by many Western governments during the negotiation process by refusing to recognise and work with the movement’s governance structures in the territory it controlled, by constraining the LTTE into a rigid path towards disarmament and demobilisation, and by mistrusting its motives for negotiations and its readiness to transform itself into a fully-fledged political actor. The proscription of the movement by the EU and other Western governments in 2006 further altered the strategic power equilibrium in favour of the state, and encouraged a hard-line Sri Lankan government to step up its military efforts.

**Foreign peacemaking facilitation**

If they do not intervene to support either side of the bargaining table, many foreign governments attempt to play an even-handed facilitating role during peace negotiations between state and non-state armed actors. However, it should be noted that at least three of the six peace processes under scrutiny (South Africa, Colombia, Nepal) were primarily indigenous and locally-owned, as no foreign (state, non-state or inter-state) actors played any substantive intermediary role. In Northern Ireland, international facilitation in the late 1990s took various forms, from the backstage contributions of the Clinton administration, to EU funding of a programme for peace and reconciliation, and private diplomacy by the three foreign co-chairs of the peace talks, led by former US senator Chris Mitchell. In Aceh, the two successive
series of negotiation rounds were facilitated respectively by the INGOs Henry Dunant Center (which later became the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue) and Crisis Management Initiatives. A similar role was played by the Norwegian government during the 2002-6 talks in Sri Lanka.

A very different type of third-party peacemaking assistance is also mentioned in the Sinn Fein study, namely, the hosting of private confidence-building talks between Sinn Fein and Unionist leaders in South Africa by President Nelson Mandela, owing to his direct experience with peace negotiations. The study also concludes by stating that in turn, Sinn Fein is now ready to offer its experience in conflict resolution as an example to others, and in fact its leaders have played the role of external “consultants” in various peace processes. In Colombia, the model of negotiation developed by M-19 was later copied by smaller guerrilla groups who followed the same transition path. This type of peer-advice intervention, which also forms an important part of the Berghof project on “RLMs and Transitions to Politics”, offers an interesting alternative to professional mediation by NGOs or diplomats, which would merit further comparative research and analysis.

**Impact of external events and geopolitical factors**

Besides the direct intervention of foreign actors in intra-state conflicts and national liberation struggles, other external variables come into play during political transitions. For instance, the disintegration of the communist bloc and the end of the cold war was an enabling factor for war termination in South Africa and later on in Aceh, by depriving the regimes or RLMs of their external sources of political or financial support, and enticing them to shift their discourses and strategies in a new geopolitical environment. In Latin America, the regional wave of democratic transitions had an impact on the M-19’s strategic shift towards a pro-democracy struggle, and also encouraged the Colombian government to join regional diplomatic peace efforts in Central America and distance itself from the United States.

More recently, the 9/11 attacks and the so-called “global war on terror” created a new major international shift towards enforcing existing state boundaries and looking less sympathetically at Muslim-based national liberation movements. This also partly explains GAM’s redefinition of its future state from an Islamic Sultanate to an Acehnese democracy.

Finally, the influence of environmental factors such as natural disasters on the course of armed conflicts is illustrated by the effects of the tsunami which struck Aceh in December 2004. This brought the province into the international spotlight
through intense media coverage and massive relief operations, and created an incentive for the government and the insurgents to end the conflict and facilitate reconstruction efforts.
SECTION 4:
Transition outcomes: review of post-war peacebuilding processes from the perspective of insurgency movements

Sections 2 and 3 have delved into the tactical, strategic and ideological shifts which drive RLMs' transition from armed struggle to peace negotiations and non-violent political engagement. This remaining section outlines the peacebuilding challenges which accompany and follow such transformations, mostly during the transitional period between ceasefires and the first post-conflict elections, but also in longer-term peace and democracy consolidation processes. The multiple arenas of post-war engagement addressed in five of the case studies\textsuperscript{10} include: building democratic institutions to resolve the conflict's root causes, organisational change from underground to electoral politics, security shifts, the provision of mechanisms for transitional justice and dealing with the past, and the challenges of maintaining internal cohesion.

4.1 Structural reform and democratisation

The political transformation of underground resistance/liberation movements into legal bodies (most often political parties) is a central analytical theme in this project. A necessary prelude to this shift is a democratic transition opening up the political system to groups who have previously been denied representation. This usually takes the form of multilateral consultative mechanisms and joint decision-making bodies, interim power-sharing governments (in Northern Ireland, South Africa, Nepal), the election of a constitutional assembly (in Colombia and Nepal), the establishment of a new constitution and bill of rights introducing institutional and electoral reforms (in Colombia, South Africa, Nepal), or the introduction of decentralised democratic institutions in the peace accord (in Northern Ireland and Aceh).

\textsuperscript{10} The Sri Lankan case does not apply here as no peace accord has been signed between the LTTE and the government.
The efficiency of the post-settlement transition is highly dependent upon the extent and success of such reforms. However, besides Colombia and South Africa, the other countries are still undergoing democratisation and state-building transitions and therefore the studies cannot provide retrospective analyses of such achievements, besides describing recent or unfolding processes and events.

In some cases, the peace agreement signed between RLMs and the state contained very broad provisions, leaving out detailed arrangements to be worked out in the future constitutional framework: this was the case, to various extents, in Colombia, South Africa and Nepal. In the Irish context, the Good Friday Agreement is described as comprehensive, addressing issues of constitutional reform, institutional restructuring, equality and human rights, reparations for victims of the conflict, the release of political prisoners, arms management, policing and justice. And in Aceh, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) equally spelt out wide-ranging power devolution arrangements in the arenas of governance, economy and human rights, and contained various clauses on decommissioning, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform, justice and accountability, and implementation monitoring. In the absence of constitutional reform, the peace accord was legalised in 2006 in the form of a new Law on the Governing of Aceh, although the case study authors argue that this failed to include some of the original MoU provisions.

The distribution of power and resources among the signatory parties to a peace accord also strongly influences the effectiveness of its implementation, as illustrated by the contrasting cases of Nepal and Colombia: the Nepali Maoists, who dominate the constituent assembly, have successfully enforced radical regime change from a centralist monarchy to a federal republic, whereas the M-19 were unable to prevent the constitutional reform process from collapsing barely a few months after it had started.

4.2 From guerrilla to government

One of the most challenging areas of post-war transformation for insurgency movements is establishing themselves as a legal entity after decades of illegal existence, exile or underground operations. The transition from armed resistance to conventional politics requires adopting a new political culture, formulating a new programme, installing party organisational structures, recruiting party cadres, and building their capacity to govern. Of course, movements which had a pre-war history as a political party or retained a civilian command structure and a political branch
throughout the conflict can more easily build on this experience in the post-war environment (De Zeeuw 2008: 13).

This was the case in Northern Ireland, where Sinn Fein, one of Ireland’s oldest political parties, has been engaged in electoral activities since the early 1980s, and is currently the second largest party in the Northern Irish Assembly. In South Africa, the ANC and its armed branch have also kept distinct identities at all times, which might partly explain the movement’s swift transition from underground activities to electoral politics and its outstanding success in the first post-war elections: it gained 63% of the votes in 1994, and has been confirmed in power in all subsequent elections. However, the case study author argues that his movement should have dedicated more efforts, prior to the peace process, into preparing a team ready to govern and build up its capacity to deliver (meeting minutes). The Nepali study mentions the first public appearances of CPN-M’s underground leadership shortly prior to the signature of the peace agreement, and the movement’s organisational shift “from a war time to a peace time system” (p41), by restructuring their civilian apparatus to conform with the state administration divisions, and training their cadres for political action and “peaceful revolutionary change”, ahead of the April 2008 constituent assembly elections. Its electoral victory enabled the party to take up more than one third of seats in the assembly and the most important governmental portfolios, including the post of Prime Minister, currently occupied by the Maoist central leader Prachanda. In Aceh, GAM was able to expand and strengthen its political wing during the peace process, and established parallel state structures at all levels of administration. Its newly-formed political party won the 2006 provincial elections, as well as many district-level elections. The study mentions its current challenge to prove that it can run the Aceh province better than the Jakarta government did, and the need for the party to increase its political skills and capacities ahead of the 2009 parliamentary election, when it will have to compete for the first time with other local political formations and more experienced national parties.

All the movements described above have achieved remarkable long-term or recent success in their post-war political trajectories, and been able to show some concrete peace dividends to their members, born out of their strategic and organisational transformation. However, if former guerrilla leaders are unable to participate in decision-making and remain confined to working in opposition in a system of majoritarian “winner-takes-all” democracy, this might create internal discontent and discourage other armed factions from following the same path for only meagre benefits. In Colombia, the new party Democratic Alliance-M19, formed by a coalition of M-19 and other demobilised forces, failed to consolidate its initial
electoral success and has remained a minor political force ever since. The reasons given for this failure include the loss of internal cohesion and political dispersion entailed by the demobilisation process (see below), the new party’s inability to consolidate its social foundations, or its lack of experience in the electoral process and institutional arena. At other levels, this political force has played an important role in social projects, departmental and municipal bureaus, women’s groups and work with victims.

For its part, the LTTE is still engaged in armed activities and has so far refused to take the path of electoral politics without prior structural change towards democratisation of the island. However, the case study report mentions the extension of its political wing during the peace process. It also draws an interesting picture of the movement’s shift in recent years from “armed struggle to governance” or from “resistance to self-rule”, focusing on the state-building elements of its activities in the north-east Tamil Eelam (e.g. self-administration, provision of law and order, judiciary structure, social welfare, health and education services) which could serve as a precursor to future federal or power-sharing arrangements.

4.3 Security-related mechanisms

In the security area, the most sensitive transitional challenges from the point of view of RLMs concern the release of prisoners, weapons decommissioning, cantonment and demobilisation of their combatants, integration into the regular armed and police forces, security sector reform, and socio-economic rehabilitation programmes. The dynamics of peacebuilding and democratisation implementation are heavily influenced by the sequential treatment of security transition and political reform by the parties, especially in cases when state or foreign actors insist on weapons decommissioning as a prerequisite for institutional accommodation of the RLMs’ demands. Nevertheless, most case studies demonstrate that the demobilisation and disarmament of insurgency movements can only flow out of the negotiation and democratisation or state reform processes.

For instance, premature demands by the Indonesian government for GAM to disarm during the first peace process (2000-3) caused the talks to break down, because the rebel forces felt that handing over their weapons would leave them unprotected, in the absence of a reciprocal engagement by the state to reduce its armed forces on the ground and address Acehnese grievances. By contrast, during the second series of peace talks, both parties understood the importance of building personal trust before reaching a compromise on security arrangements.
2005 peace agreement comprised an immediate cessation of hostilities, the
demobilisation of 3,000 GAM rebels, the relocation or dissolution of all paramilitary
units and a sharp reduction of the number of Indonesian troops in Aceh, as well as
an implementation oversight mechanism (the Aceh Monitoring Mission). All these
security arrangements were completed on schedule, by the end of 2005. GAM’s
military wing was abolished soon after, and replaced by a new entity, the Aceh
Transitional Committee (KPA), whose formal objective is to support the transition
and the reintegration of ex-guerrillas.

In Northern Ireland as well, the demand made by British “securocrats” and
mainstream unionist politicians for the IRA to decommission its weapons is
described as having had a malign influence on the peace process. It was only
through political progress, with the creation of an interim power-sharing executive
and a new all-island wide political dispensation (through the institution of cross-
border bodies) that Republicans became ready to relinquish their right to armed
resistance. In July 2005, eight years after the peace agreement, the IRA leadership
formally announced an end to its armed struggle and instructed all members to
“assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through
exclusively peaceful means” (p16). They confirmed in September that the process of
“putting arms beyond use” had been completed. Reciprocally, the study notes that
the British Army has made progress in demilitarisation, but that loyalist
paramilitaries still refuse to decommission their weapons and come under little
pressure from mainstream unionist politicians to do so.

In South Africa, the ANC officially suspended its armed struggle as early as
August 1989, as a tactical move to force the regime into formal negotiations.
However, its armed force was only disbanded in December 1994, eight months after
the first democratic elections, once it was in control of the state and army. It resisted
an earlier demobilisation process, partly because of the ongoing violence caused by
“third force” elements (e.g. right-wing militants) during the peace process. In 1994 a
new national army was created, formed by elements of the former liberation forces
and the old apartheid state army; it became a powerful symbol of the new
democratic nation.

The Nepali study cites the issue of PLA arms management as the main source
of delays in the peace negotiations, as the mainstream parties, strongly backed by
foreign voices (including the US ambassador) made the CPN-M’s entry into the
interim government conditional upon the disarmament of its combatants. In the
end, the parties agreed on a reciprocal and simultaneous process of cantonment
and registration of PLA and statutory forces (on the day of the signature of the peace
agreement), and supervision of Maoist weapons and an equal number of army
weapons, to be carried out by UN verification and monitoring teams. The very sensitive issue of army integration and/or demobilisation of Maoist combatants was not discussed until after the constituent assembly elections, and is currently being negotiated within a multi-party Army Integration Special Committee under the CPN-M-led government. Meanwhile, the continuation of armed activities by the Maoist paramilitary group Young Communist League is drawing much criticism and creating tension between CPN-M and other parties.

Throughout the conflict and peace process in Sri Lanka, the LTTE has not been prepared to open negotiations over the management of its weapons, since its aim has been to maintain its own forces for internal and external security in the manner of a state. The study also argues that international insistence on disarmament and demobilisation, coupled with a narrow focus on electoral politics, have overshadowed the other areas of political transformation which the movement has undertaken since 2002, such as its substantive and multi-faceted non violent political activities.

Finally, the M-19 followed a different approach to the other RLMs in the security sphere. Its leaders took a bold decision to disarm the movement even before the signature of a pact with the government that would address their demands for political and socio-economic reform. This was described as a “jump without a safety net” (meeting minutes). The movement disarmed on the same day that the political agreement was reached and two days before the 1990 constituent assembly elections, by melting the weapons as a symbolic gesture to demonstrate that they had not been surrendered but would never be used again. Unfortunately, the movement subsequently found itself hampered in a security dilemma, unable to safeguard the lives of its demobilised militants in a national context of ongoing conflict and acute social violence: 18% of former M-19 combatants were assassinated after 1989. This highlights the necessity of including protection guarantees for former combatants in peace accords and post-war legal dispensations.

Regarding the rehabilitation and re-entry into civil society by demobilised combatants who do not choose to join security forces, the Colombian model negotiated by the M-19 is presented as very comprehensive, as it included both economic and social guarantees for the demobilised (e.g. education, housing, training, land, employment), and development programmes in areas that were controlled by the guerrilla. But at the same time, the study also argues that the peace agreement over-emphasised political arrangements over social and economic provisions, which led to delays and mistakes in their implementation. Another
interesting remark concerns the contrasting trajectories of the former commanders, who went directly into politics (at least for the first few years) as opposed to the rank and file combatants, who faced a much more difficult transition from life as a guerrilla to life as a civilian.

Besides M-19, only the study on GAM delves into the socio-economic components of the post-war demobilisation of RLMs. It mentions setting up a reintegration fund for ex-combatants, to provide them with farming land and employment, or in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security assistance. These instruments are placed under the institutional responsibility of a specific structure, the Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA), set up jointly by Jakarta and Aceh’s government. This is an innovative institutional body which does not have any equivalent in the other contexts, although the study criticises its lack of proper planning and long-term vision.

It is important to mention, lastly, the extreme sensitivity of the six movements when it comes to the vocabulary used to refer to ‘DDR’ processes, a concept which they generally associate with “defeat” and “surrender”. In some contexts, the term “reintegration” is employed without hesitation, while elsewhere it is criticised for its inadequacy to describe militants who were never isolated from society, but on the contrary fully immersed in their community. Likewise, the term “disarmament” is strongly rejected in several contexts, while “decommissioning”, “arms management” or “demilitarisation” are judged more acceptable. Besides the need for terminological flexibility, these remarks also point to the need to reframe and define a more acceptable overarching framework to designate security-related mechanisms.

4.4 Transitional justice, accountability and “dealing with the past”

These topics were not given prominence in the project’s research framework, and accordingly they are not addressed in depth in the case studies either. The ANC report provides the most detailed account of transitional justice mechanisms. The post-amble to the 1993 interim constitution stated that “in order to advance [national] reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past” (p27). In 1995, the government of national unity enacted a law providing for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), under which individual amnesty could be applied for and granted on condition that
crimes were politically motivated and proportionate, and that the entire truth was revealed. The TRC began its work in 1996, and the study cites lengthy extracts from ANC members’ submissions and testimonies. The author also remarked that no form of individual compensation for victims of the conflict will ever be possible in a country with such a long history of oppression, and that in the end, the most effective form of reparation and healing is political – it proceeds from structural change and the building of a just and equal society (meeting minutes).

In Colombia and Aceh, on the contrary, a collective amnesty for all combatants and political prisoners was part of the peace agreement, and was granted in exchange for their cessation of military activities, as part of the legal normalisation process to enable their political engagement. In Aceh, the peace accord also stipulates that a human rights court shall be established, as well as a commission for truth and reconciliation, whose legal framework (e.g. provincial or national) has yet to be agreed upon. The Nepalese government has also started a process of setting up a TRC, although the study does not make any mention of it. And in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein is campaigning for the introduction of a Bill of Rights as well as accountability mechanisms to find out the truth about the role played by Britain during the war and the extent of its involvement with loyalist paramilitaries.

4.5 Maintaining internal cohesion and consolidating the party’s support base

The challenge of unity versus factionalism during post-war political transitions is addressed in all five case studies, and also came very high on the project participants’ list of concerns during roundtable meetings. One factor which was cited as exacerbating intra-party tensions was the return of exiled or imprisoned leadership back home, creating possible dissensions, misunderstandings or rivalry with internal underground leaders. This was most obviously the case in Aceh. Although the formation of a new entity to support the demobilisation and reintegration process (KPA) helped the movement maintain a cohesive front in preparation for the elections, the exiled government’s return to Aceh led to a split of the former GAM into two camps (the Swedish group versus KPA and field commanders), who presented distinct candidates for the provincial elections. Since the election of Governor Irwandi, supported by the “young camp” in December 2006, the consolidation of Partai Aceh has reunified them once more behind a common cause: winning the spring 2009 election. In South Africa as well, political tensions between the ANC’s former internal, external and prison forces (the “Robben
Islanders”) still have repercussions today (meeting minutes), and the difficulties of creating a cohesive post-war movement were demonstrated by the recent leadership crisis and formation of a breakaway party.

In Nepal, the CPN-M has not been affected to the same extent by post-war factionalism, but the study mentions some internal dissensions which were expressed during the August 2007 all-party convention, over ideological and strategic decisions on the path and pace of peace implementation processes. Since then, and especially since the formation of a Maoist-led government, the level of intra-party tensions seems to have increased, as those confronted with the realities of power (in particular Prime Minister Prachanda) emphasise a pragmatic stance and discourse while the party “ideologues” and “radicals” remain focused on safeguarding the Maoist values and struggle for socialist democracy. In Northern Ireland as well, Sinn Fein’s adoption of a strategy of dialogue led to the formation of Republican dissident groups who have attempted to derail the course of the peace process; but the study claims that although they still exist, “they have no support, no political organisation, and have articulated no alternative to the strategy to which the overwhelming majority of republican activists and former prisoners subscribe” (p16).

The M-19 leaders did not follow the same path as the other movements, as instead of transforming their resistance movement into a party, they joined forces with other leftist activists to form a broader political coalition. Therefore, the challenge faced in the post-war period was not so much a phenomenon of intra-party divisions than a risk of dispersion. The combatants’ return to civilian life implied the end of social and political recognition that they had enjoyed as guerrillas, and also entailed a loss of collective reference that had given them their identity as an armed group.

The original subtitle for the M-19 study, upon the authors’ suggestion, was: “Striving to keep the revolution connected to the people”. This reflects a serious preoccupation by political leaders with their loss of touch with their former grassroots power base, and this seems to be a common tendency linked to the process of institutionalisation of underground or popular movements. All five RLMs share a common concern about maintaining their revolutionary image or their identity as “servant of the people” after seizing state power. In fact, the ANC continues to define itself as a liberation movement rather than a political party, and strives to conserve a strong relationship with the mass organisations that helped it defeat apartheid, such as the trade unions (meeting minutes). For its part, Sinn Fein upholds a policy of equal salaries across the party hierarchy, partly for fundraising
purposes (the additional income raised by its politicians being transferred to the party) but also in order to maintain its connection to the reality faced by “ordinary people” (meeting minutes).

Besides the need to consolidate cohesive movements with solid ties to their popular roots, success in the electoral arena is also conditional upon the ability of the new political formations to broaden their support base beyond their initial constituency. The ANC has been quite successful in pursuing a very inclusive programme which cuts across racial and ideological party lines. Former M-19 leaders, as mentioned above, play an active part in consolidating an unarmed democratic left-wing, flying the political flag for more social justice, better democracy and the defence of national sovereignty. They also try to actively support the dynamics of peacemaking with the remaining armed groups in the country. Sinn Fein has now become the largest party representing the nationalist community in Northern Ireland (a position previously held by the SDLP), but it remains a community-based party focused on the demands of one side of the electorate, and does not really seek to rally support from across the former party lines. As the transitions from insurgency movements to non-violent political formations are still unfolding in Nepal and Aceh, it is too premature to comment on their likely post-transformation performance. As for the LTTE, it is very difficult to predict its post-war trajectory, since even the prospect of peace negotiations seems presently more distant than ever.
CONCLUSION

To summarise and conclude this study, it might be useful to refer back to the original analytical framework introduced at the end of section 1, which presented three clusters of “drivers of change” in conflict transformation: internal shifts, inter-party dynamics and international factors. How do the six case studies contribute to advancing the state of the art in researching the factors, dynamics and outcomes of war-to-peace transitions?

**Internal shifts:**

First of all, all of the studies emphasise the complex interplay between the means and goals of insurgency struggles, and the inadequacy of linear approaches to conceptualise the transition from war to politics. The six RLMs involved in this project have waged a political struggle from their inception, through flexible and adaptable objectives and a combination of violent, non-violent and conventional (e.g. electoral) strategies, which were constantly reassessed and adjusted in the light of a constantly evolving environment. Some of the studies seek to justify the legitimacy of armed struggle through the “right to revolt” and the choice of violent tactics bound by the normative rules of “self-limiting armed insurrection”. The authors also explain the move made by RLMs from conflict escalation to conflict resolution as proceeding from a rational calculation of the possibilities and limitations inherent in conventional politics, as opposed to continuing the armed conflict.

The studies also emphasise the role of internal decision-making processes and the importance of leadership within RLMs in political transitions. In order to effectively manage the shift from running an armed insurgency to heading a government or at least an effective political party, insurgency leaders need to be willing to take bold initiatives, engage proactively and react swiftly to structural and geopolitical changes. The decision taken by these movements to open the negotiations track is described in several cases as resulting from an individual strategic decision, based on a shrewd assessment of current power relationships.

The importance of internal cohesion and consultation within the movement (including consultation with its support base) during all phases of conflict transformation also comes up as an important factor of success for political transitions. As a result, none of the six RLMs were faced by any major intra-group
splits or defection, and in the few cases where the peace processes did generate dissident factions contesting the strategic or organisational shifts, the leaderships were strong and committed enough to keep their movement firmly on the path of negotiations and internal reform.

Finally, a key lesson emerging from the studies is that the RLM’s ability to run a newly democratic country and implement necessary structural reforms is dependent on their successful management of the transition from the battleground to the electoral arena. They should therefore be adequately prepared for the shift from an underground military structure to a legal entity (e.g. political party), which implies two different organisational logics and political cultures.

**Inter-party dynamics:**

The role of the state and its key actors is omnipresent in the studies, starting with the root causes and immediate triggers for the formation of RLMs and their adoption of violent strategies. The main sources of grievances are located in the closed nature of the political system or highly unequal power structures, and the move from opposition to insurrection is defined as being the only alternative which was open to oppressed communities, in the face of violent state repression of nonviolent protest or electoral strategies.

When it comes to defining and explaining the key turning points at which conflict parties start exploring the possibilities of a peaceful negotiated solution, the study authors mention the role of (actual or perceived) power shifts towards a situation of “mutually hurting stalemate”. When RLMs succeed in altering an overall asymmetric relation between power-holders and power-seekers, so that the army and government (or sub-national authorities) realise that they will not be able to defeat them by force, they start to perceive the time as “ripe” for transferring these power gains to the negotiation table.

Other societal factors such as building alliances with civil society and other political forces is also cited in several of the studies as a powerful form of leverage to pressure the government into talks. But on the other hand, an increase in social “war fatigue” and public pressure for peace, especially from the constituencies and communities which RLMs strive to represent, are also cited as a powerful stimulus for peace negotiations.

Once peace agreements have been signed, the success of their implementation is also partly dependent on the respective degrees of power and leverage exercised by the various signatory parties, as well as their level of commitment and political will. In this respect, the M-19 study offers very relevant
lessons-learnt which can largely be applied to the other cases as well, and are therefore worth citing in full:

- “The peace agreement should be made concrete in the form of a law or constitutional reform, to avoid its falling prey to shifting political dynamics.
- A political force needs to be built that can defend changes and reforms within the democratic infrastructure of the country (…).
- A transitional political regime has to be built, which can deal with the weaknesses and inexperience of the forces that emerge from the peace process: a regime which can guarantee that, even in the worst conditions of electoral failure, those who surrendered arms have a minimum level of power.
- Verification monitoring commissions established by a peace process and the agreements resulting from that process (…) must be strong enough to insist on compliance from the parties, especially from the government” (p35).

**International factors:**

Besides the case of the LTTE, none of the studies really delve into the cross-border and international drivers (or obstacles) of change, which can be explained by the fact that at least three of the transitions were internally led through direct negotiations, and foreign interveners only played a secondary support (or “spoiling”) role. When they are mentioned, foreign actors, and in particular Western governments or NGOs, are alternately described as having helped to alter inter-party power relations in favour of the RLMs (through granting diplomatic legitimacy or launching sanctions against the state), in favour of the state (by listing and treating non-stated armed groups as illegal “terrorist organisations”), or having played impartial roles as facilitators during peace processes. Other triggering factors for conflict transformation arising from the international environment were cited, such as the end of the cold war, the September 11 2001 attacks and subsequent “war on terror”, a regional wave of democratic transitions across Central America, or the December 2004 tsunami in South East Asia.

Numerous themes arising from the six studies would be worth investigating further. In particular, there is a crucial topic which was dealt with too briefly and superficially by most of the authors; this concerns the relations between political, security and socio-economic post-war transitions. The label “demilitarisation of politics” (Lyons 2005) fits very well with this project. Understood as the shift from violent to electoral or conventional politics, it includes at least three interlinked dynamics: building institutions capable of supporting democratisation, such as
political parties, constituent assemblies and power-sharing mechanisms; restructuring the security apparatus through demobilisation and the formation of new armed forces and police; rehabilitating demobilised combatants and enabling them to build new personal projects and become active participants in post-war peacebuilding and reconstruction. These are all interdependent processes: on the one hand, most case studies show that militants are unwilling to transform their military structures until they firmly believe they can pursue their interests by non-violent means; on the other hand, demobilisation increases the confidence of all parties in participating in a political process; and finally, social and economic reintegration helps to prevent ex-combatants from relapsing into political or criminal armed activities. These various dynamics merit far more in-depth analysis, and will be investigated further through follow-up Berghof activities on RLMs and “security transition processes”.

Finally, to conclude, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the authors and contributors of the six studies, who have boldly agreed to offer their points of view on the challenges of transitions from political violence to peace and democracy, and reflect truthfully and critically on their own experiences and trajectories. We believe that these studies are important because they reflect the voices of crucial stakeholders who are usually excluded or devalued by outside experts and policy-makers. By choosing to relay their voices, what we might have lost in objectivity or neutrality (if there ever is such a thing as an objective or neutral analytical standpoint) has been gained in authenticity and legitimacy, and it is hoped that these studies will contribute to understanding better the role and practice of resistance/liberation movements in waging war and making peace.
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