Hannah Reich

“Local Ownership” in Conflict Transformation Projects

Partnership, Participation or Patronage?
**Author:**

**Hannah Reich** completed her MA in Islamic Societies and Cultures at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London with a dissertation on contemporary Islamic hymns. She holds an M. Phil degree in Human geography from the University of Bonn, where she specialised in her dissertation on Media and Conflict, analysing local radios in Palestine.

Since 2002 she has been an Associate Researcher at Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

**Contact:** hannah.reich@berghof-center.org

www.berghof-center.org /
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Abstract

The article argues that the demand for local ownership in externally funded conflict transformation projects is counterproductive, if it is seen as a concrete project objective. Nevertheless, the demand has an important function as policy ideal, pointing to the necessity for change in present international cooperation. Instead of aiming towards the impossible goal of literal “local ownership” of a foreign-funded project, which by definition inscribes the roles of donor and beneficiary, the focus should be on the nature of the relationship between the donors and the beneficiaries. It is within this relationship that power is or is not shared and that the equality of the partners may or may not be realised. The concept of “learning sites” can be used as a framework to counter asymmetrical relationships and develop a more equal partnership between “insiders” and “outsiders” in international peacebuilding work.

1 Introduction

“Local ownership” is the current phrase on the lips of all agencies for development cooperation, purporting to reflect a reorientation of approach that more highly values the need for home-grown solutions to conflict problems and for partnerships to be locally driven. While there seems to be a wide consensus in the political discussions about the value of this principle, it does – taken seriously and not simply seen as a catch phrase within the debate – pose great challenges in its practical implementation.

This paper will argue that the demand for local ownership is counter-productive, if it is seen as a concrete project objective. Given the current structures of international cooperation, it cannot be seriously implemented. Instead of highlighting those power asymmetries and working towards more transparency of
the decision-making processes within the project work, it serves more to cover up a “business as usual” approach, where rhetoric and practice widely diverge. Nevertheless, the demand has an important discourse function within the political debate, pointing to the necessity for change in present international cooperation. Instead of aiming towards the unfulfillable goal of complete and literal local ownership of a foreign funded project, given the binary division between donors and recipients, the focus should be on the nature of the relationship between those two. It is within this relationship that power is or is not shared, and that the equality of the partners may or may not be realised.

I would like to propose the concept of “learning sites” as a framework within all stages and phases of a project, wherein space and time is provided and clearly allotted to allow different stakeholders and actors to raise project-related issues, to air latent conflicts and personal disagreements and to seek clarifications on questions that arise during the process. Such a learning site may indeed not serve to realise greater local ownership of a project, but it can certainly achieve greater transparency and a deeper understanding (hence learning) of the underlying structural problems in the project partnership.

I propose the concept of learning sites as a framework in the discussion on local ownership, because I hope it can contribute to dismantling what in effect is often a patron-client relationship between donors and recipients in international conflict transformation projects. To develop such a framework, the usage of the term local ownership first needs to be problematised and critiqued in relation to conflict transformation work (sections 2.1 and 2.2). In doing so, I would like to focus on project work at the NGO level, rather than the cooperation of bilateral or multilateral actors. In addition, the question of who constitutes the local counterpart needs to be investigated. Here, I refer to the concept of local peace constituencies, as it plays an important role in conflict transformation work (section 2.3).
2 Critique of the usage of "local ownership" in project work and policy

2.1 Usages of local ownership

The term local ownership is used frequently in debates on development and foreign aid and brings into focus the implied conditionalities of external (financial, technical) support and peacebuilding. What exactly local ownership means in the context of conflict transformation projects has not been precisely defined so far (Aga Khan Foundation 2005).

As a response to the challenges of the new millennium, many donors and multilateral agencies have emphasised the need for local ownership.¹ The term first gained prominence in the field of development cooperation. Although it has become increasingly important in that context, the literature directly addressing local ownership and its conceptualisation or implementation is disproportionately modest (Saxby 2003). Reviewing the literature about local ownership in the development discourse, it is obvious that the term is hardly used to signify full control over all aspects or possession of the process by local actors. Rather, “ownership” refers to the respective capacities of different stakeholders, their power or capacity to set and take responsibility for a development agenda and to muster and sustain support for it (Saxby 2003).

With regard to conflict transformation, the importance of local actors has been increasingly acknowledged since the mid 1990s, with peacebuilding activities being more and more conceptualised not as a top-down process, but as a form of engagement involving the entire society (Miall/ Ramsbotham/ Woodhouse 1999). As conflicts take place within societies, it is within the conflicting societies that peacebuilding measures must be rooted. Acknowledging the importance of

¹ In the policy guidelines "Shaping the 21st Century", the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) asserts that sustainable development „must be locally owned" (OECD 1996). This formed a basis for the Millenium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations in 2000.
nurturing civil society, so-called local actors are increasingly managing and taking charge of peacebuilding processes. Strengthening, fostering and supporting local actors with an active interest in building peace can thus be seen as a “key principle of civil conflict management”\(^2\) (Ropers 2000a: 35). While this tenet sounds simple enough, it has consequences for the conceptualisation of activities and interventions by third parties. Experience has shown that such activities are unsustainable if they are conceptualised entirely by outsiders and merely implemented locally. Rather, local actors have to be integrated into the design and decision-making process, in order for the process to work at all. It is crucial for long-term sustainability that conflict transformation efforts are locally conceived and led (Edomwony 2003). This means the conflict management scenario of today calls not just for increased participation but even for complete “ownership” of the peace process, in order to guarantee effectiveness and sustainability. This is why local ownership was able to establish itself as one of the key principles in UN operations (Kühne 2005). While most actors would agree on the value of this principle, there are likely to be vast differences in the perception of the consequences of full support of local actors and in particular the implications for third parties. Participation is desired by all, but surely this is just one step in guaranteeing sovereignty for local actors and their integration into all decision-making processes.

The term local ownership remains rather vague and undefined in its usage, particularly in policy papers, which have – albeit unintentionally – drawn attention to the idea. Even in conceptual frameworks, where the importance of local ownership is highlighted, the concrete meaning or implication of such a guiding principle is barely discussed. The same is true for the term “local peace actors”, where there is rarely any reflection on which persons or groups this label actually refers to (Diamond 1999; Peck 1999; van Tongeren 1998; van Tongeren 1999). Ironically enough, most studies on locally rooted peacebuilding activities are in fact preoccupied with the role of external actors and outside parties, in spite of emphasising the importance of “local actors” (Matthies 2000: 67). Calling for local ownership implies calling for the withdrawal of external control of project processes and for more responsible third-party involvement. But, what does this actually mean for the structure of international cooperation and what does local ownership mean in practical terms? It

\(^2\) “Schlüsselbereich des zivilen Konfliktmanagements” Ropers 2000a:35
is from a practical angle that the contradictions in the concepts emerge and the lack of practical guidelines for project management becomes apparent.

Why does the term “ownership” never actually refer to full control over all project aspects locally? Are the power differences between the “inside” and “outside” stakeholders so dramatically different that the term “ownership” can be used, without ever actually signifying “inside” possession of the process? What the term does is to focus on the inequalities that exist between two sets of relations within the development enterprise: on the one hand the relations between the donor and the recipient government, and on the other between the domestic government and its citizens (Moore et al. 1996).

In my view, the understanding of local ownership can be divided according to the two functions it serves: one is the function as a policy ideal aiming to convince politicians in donor countries of the urgent need to transform current structures and practices of cooperation and external engagement. This usage of the term is common parlance, for example in policy papers issued by advocacy groups, relating to the practice of foreign-funded projects in conflict regions, serving to either merely emphasise a political stance or to criticise a paternalistic attitude of donor countries towards local actors.

In the other function, the term “local ownership” serves as concrete project objective for foreign involvement in peacebuilding projects within the present international structures. This function is, for instance, reflected in project outlines and memoranda of understanding, envisioning locally steered development and real equality in the partnership in the context of foreign-funded projects. This usage implies the possibility of practical implementation of an agreement, as compared to the mere invocation of an ideal in the first usage of the term.

I would like to argue that the demand for local ownership, if viewed as a concrete project objective, in fact tends to hinder the attainment of the goal of sovereignty of local actors in externally funded projects. That being said, the demand does serve an important discursive function, highlighting the necessity for change in present structures and patterns of international cooperation. Local ownership is a vision to strive towards, but not a practical objective within international funding and working structures. It is in fact these structures which set the conditions that determine whether local ownership is realisable or not. So if this
usage of the term is misleading, what kind of framework could then be appropriate as a strategy for action, to strive towards equal partnership or even this utopia of true local ownership, given the inequalities inherent in current funding practices? How is it possible to work towards a change in the given institutional relationships embedded in unequal structures?

2.2 Local ownership in the context of international project funding

The distinction between the call for local ownership as a policy guideline or a catchphrase on the one hand, and as a concrete project objective on the other, allows for a critical appraisal of the demand for local ownership, whilst nevertheless recognizing that this requires a serious critique of current structures of international cooperation. As a policy guideline often brought up in political debates, I would like to further distinguish between those voices from abroad which demand local ownership, in developmental or peacebuilding projects or programmes with foreign funding, as opposed to those speaking from within the conflict region demanding local ownership for the entire peacebuilding process (Edomwonyi 2003). Certainly one would assume that the social transformation of any society is pursued and thus owned by members of the society themselves. However, given the history of colonisation and global economic inequality and the current pattern of international relations and cooperation, this assumption cannot be taken for granted. Thus the demand for local ownership from the perspective of those belonging to conflict regions is not only geared to envisioning a policy guideline for the distant future, but it is meant to question patronizing attitudes and stop undue interference at the critical juncture of the present (Edomwonyi 2003: 43-47). As an argumentative catchphrase, the principle of local ownership is directed against domination by external partners in foreign-funded development cooperation and peacebuilding activities, in an attempt to shift the balance of power in favour of local actors. Supporters of locally rooted approaches to conflict transformation would argue along the same lines (Lederach 1995a: 214). However, the term local ownership is also often used in policy papers in reference to programmes and projects from
outsider countries, not as an ultimate goal or vision of the project, but as a practical strategy for action. It is this particular usage which I would like to discuss here.

One might further differentiate the usage of the term within cooperative projects between national and multinational governmental organisations on the one hand, which have to follow a certain political agenda with their projects, and the NGO sector on the other hand. The latter can more freely develop their concepts without pledging allegiance or being answerable to specific policy guidelines. That is not to deny the clear interdependency of national and international NGOs and their corresponding governments, as reflected in the strong similarities of their policy agendas. However, both of them mostly implement their projects through, or in cooperation with, local actors. Thus for both the NGO sector as well as governmental actors, the demand for local ownership is relevant. Therefore it is absolutely essential to define who these local partners are, how they are identified, how their stake in terms of ownership is negotiated and who takes a lead in the whole process.

Generally, one speaks of local stakeholders, local partners or beneficiaries. But how does one decide who the stakeholders, beneficiaries or partners should be? This is a crucial question for local ownership, and points to the difficulty of identifying local peacebuilding partners. It is also one of the first questions that come to mind when speaking about the practical aspects of a project aiming at local ownership. In the following, I would like to discuss examples at the NGO level of project work, although many of the reflections are pertinent to intergovernmental cooperation as well.

2.3 Local peace actors

In this section, I would like to take the perspective of an outside actor, seeking to implement a locally rooted peacebuilding activity. The concept of peace constituencies has developed within the conflict transformation field referring to alliances and networks that strengthen local capacities for peace. This concept emphasises the importance of the local partner. Thus a discussion of who constitutes the local partners is crucially important here. While the concept of peace
constituencies is useful in several ways, it is not sufficient to enable a guided and reasoned choice of a local partner as far as a project is concerned. Often the problem of identifying a partner is easily resolved by the claim that local partners are simply local peacebuilding actors, i.e. members of the local peace constituency. Yet what are the criteria to elucidate whether and how an individual or an organisation is a potential part of the local peace constituency? And who is by definition excluded or ruled out of the range of selection?

According to Norbert Ropers, peace constituencies are a “lively network of actors who are bound neither to the state nor to any political party, who are pledged to nonviolence and committed to community-oriented purposes, and who thus build a counterweight to the ethno-politically or religiously segmented society” (Ropers 2000b: 71). This clearly places peace constituencies in the realm of the society, focusing more on NGOs than on bilateral or multilateral activities. Terms such as “nonviolent” or “non-affiliation to state or political party” cover an extremely broad area of emerging potential actors in civil society. However, other analysts do even integrate state actors as a potential part of peace constituencies (see Wolleh 2002; Dudouet et al 2005).

Another criterion for identifying a peace constituency can be the level of horizontal and vertical integration (Wolleh 2002; Müller 2002). Vertical integration refers to the relations of actors running through different social hierarchies on one side of the conflict. Horizontal integration is an alliance consisting of actors originating from both sides of the conflict. Peace constituencies are supposed to work towards such a horizontal and vertical integration. This two-dimensional measurement of peace constituencies may serve to identify patterns of their formation, but most protracted conflicts show that the divisions created by violent conflict are not that easy to overcome directly (Scotto 2002). Thus horizontal integration within the work of an organisation cannot be a sufficient precondition to be counted as part of a peace constituency.³ A local organisation with no vertical and horizontal alliances can thus still be an appropriate partner and important element within a peace constituency.

³ Asymmetrical, intercultural conflicts present a particularly difficult case, since power asymmetries and different value systems or terms of reference are in fact a mirror of the existing conflict structure in society. Peace constituencies are part and parcel of, and cannot be seen in isolation from, these conflict structures.
What becomes clear from these distinctions is that peace constituencies are not institutionalised entities. Rather, they are networks or even more diffuse manifestations, which serve as conceptual tools to identify potential and necessary partners within the region and outside to reach a constructive transformation of the conflict. While the concept of the peace constituency may help to broaden horizons for the identification of further partners and future alliances, peace constituencies cannot be treated as one homogenous unit. In fact, the idea of peace constituencies being spread out almost all over the globe without being formally connected emphasises the importance of the relationship between different entities. One framework of orientation in establishing peace constituencies is constituted by so-called learning sites, which explicitly give space to the development of an equal partnership between different actors within an international peace constituency. However, the money flow still remains unidirectional from one organisation to another. Projects are planned and implemented by particular organisations and not by the peace constituency of the region as such. Thus the demand for local ownership in concrete terms and the development of equal partnership has to be realised within the relations of external and local organisations.

The idea of strengthening peace constituencies has been recognised in development policy work. For instance, concrete areas of work, actors and their qualifications or requirements are often listed as worthy of support and suitable as partners in a peace constituency. This is meant to help ease the process of drawing out practical strategies for project work in crisis regions (Mehler/Ribaux 2000: 93; Paffenholz 2002: 12f). Examples of such requirements of local actors include “being rooted in the respective country”, “showing initiative”, “having an existing organisational infrastructure”, “reflecting heterogeneity of the society, i.e. consisting of a multi-ethnic, gender-balanced team”, or “explicit dedication to democratic principles and to nonviolent conflict transformation” (Paffenholz 2002:12f). Potential addressees are peace groups, human rights initiatives, women’s groups, traditional religious authorities and other religious associations, interest-based groups and small and medium enterprises (see e.g. Paffenholz 2002: 13). While such lists of potential or ideal local actors appear appropriate in terms of

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4 The nine areas of orientation for the learning sites are: “models of peace constituencies”, “the political context”, “multi-ethnicity”, “social spheres of conflict management”, “mobilisation of education systems, peace-oriented media and cultural practices”, “rehabilitation and reconciliation”, “needs-oriented support of civilian infrastructure”, “reconciliation through joint project activities” and “learning sites” (Ropers 2000a: 43).
general orientation, they are used, in fact, as a universally valid reference frame for any, indeed all, centrally organised project planning and implementation. So in spite of an apparent openness and obviously good intentions of conflict-sensitivity, the criteria for selecting local peacebuilding actors in fact reflect a very Western perspective, which then imposes itself as universally valid and transferable.

How far do such criteria assure equal inter-cultural partnerships? To an extent, these criteria reflect double standards, for how often do civil society groups reflect the heterogeneity of the entire society? How many initiatives and associations are in fact gender-balanced, representing people from different social strata? Indeed, how many groups in Germany, for example, would explicitly dedicate themselves to nonviolence? Rather than transferring one’s own (unfulfilled) standards onto others, I believe it is important to support an approach that reflects cultural specificities, value systems and discourses of the society in which one engages as a third party. One must ask what is understood locally by the term “democracy” or by the notion of “social justice”, without assuming this to be the same as one’s own understanding. Without a space for this crucial process of inter-cultural negotiation, there can be a certain numbness or insensitivity to differences and the potentials arising out of these differences for constructive conflict transformation (Spelten 2002).

The aim of “peace” may seem noble, but considering that it means vastly different things in different contexts, finding the lowest common denominator might well mean diluting the aim of peace to mere pacification, with all its negative and passive connotations. This is particularly the case when the concept of peace is transferred to other cultures. As Paul Salem has noted, one cannot take for granted that peace has the same relevance to all cultural systems, as it perhaps does in the West (Salem 1994). In the Arab world, the notion of “justice” or “social justice” seems to carry a far more visionary potential. Activists striving for such visions are thus known as “justice activists” and not “peace activists”. Therefore the selection of who is or is not eligible as a local peace actor cannot be separated from the socio-cultural context.

For Lederach, three principles are necessary to establish peace constituencies: indigenous empowerment, cultural sensitivity and a long-term commitment. This would offer a framework for sustainable local development and could thus make possible a long-term process of the transformation of conflict.
(Lederach 1995a: 214). What kind of a framework could take into account these three principles and serve to integrate them into project proposals and outlines and therefore be used to navigate the choice of partners? To develop such a framework, it is necessary to take a look at prevailing patterns of insider/outsider relations in the NGO sector.

2.4 Demand for local ownership – criticism of current practice

The choice of local partners reflects the principles, values and interests of the outside party. This entails a decision, often taken from abroad, as to who may be the beneficiaries of funds and support, creating a certain power shift in the conflict setting. This power shift might actually destabilise the system and foster a social change which might not be in the interest of a great majority of local actors. Thus the power which outsiders have in their hands can indeed be enormous, although it should not be overestimated. Current practice in international cooperation, where externally funded programmes determine the agenda for action with its far-reaching consequences, contradicts the call for measures to be framed by the needs and requirements of the actors in the region. Taking the view of an insider organisation, how does one manage to find an appropriate partner from outside? Being situated in a conflict-torn situation, one obvious thing to look for from outside partners, given the current structures, is income generation. This is only possible for someone who is well-placed to know about the possibilities and the agenda of outside funders, and who has the capacity to conduct all the necessary paperwork in the language of the funder. For smaller or more informal community initiatives or a network of actors, this is often not possible at all. Given the modest salaries of most middle-level civil servants, foreign funded project work is a possibility to supplement their income sources (Spelten 2000). It is therefore not uncommon for NGOs to be set up with the specific aim to tap into outside funds. Examples of such NGO-sprouting abound in Palestine or Afghanistan, for instance. These so-called “mushroom NGOs” spring up overnight in response to donor agendas and vanish just as quickly; they

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5 This recently became clear in Russia, where suspicion towards foreign and foreign-funded NGOs has built so high that the government has altered legislation regarding NGO activities.
often consist of only one person who stays for a brief period, (hence the common nickname of “briefcase NGOs”). This does not necessarily fulfil the needs of the community on the ground nor support its envisioned development.

“There is a danger of INGOs offering the kind of support we can provide, rather than what is needed, or of encouraging the creation of local partners, often in the image of INGOs, in order to meet our own institutional needs” (Carl 2003: 3).

Thus the power of foreign funding can even create a landscape of local NGO activities, which fulfil the needs of outsiders more adequately than supporting inside development needs. In different societies, important social institutions, which provide community development, might function less formally, thus creating a lack of formal organisations, which function in such a way that they can provide the paperwork (application, documentation) and administration that are required by Western funders. These structural constraints arising from the differences in social institutionalisation are valid for governmental as well as non-governmental activities, forming a considerable challenge for constructive conflict transformation (Heinrich 1997:128f). Activities of conflict transformation are different from technical assistance projects, as they are deeply socially bound. The importance given to perceptions, interpretations and social norms involves highly charged cultural practices. Thus an openness to the conduct of more informal social institutions is necessary for successful project implementation.

Adam Curle warns against the adoption of Western methods, concepts and objectives for civilian conflict management in non-Western societies (Curle 1994). Such an approach – termed by Rupesinghe as “conflict management imperialism” (Rupesinghe 1995: 316) – leads to a marginalisation of the local experts and thereby to superimposed, unsustainable solutions. This means that for peacebuilding work, it is even more important to work in accordance with the needs and requirements of the local workers than for the field of development cooperation.

In this sense, the current demand for local ownership is an important hint towards a change in direction in international cooperation to create sustainable peace. It points to the need for change within mainstream patterns of relations between Western and non-Western organisations. Yet I believe the term local ownership is pretentious, because it covers up the difficulties inherent in asymmetrical power relations and in the mandate given to outsiders to be involved
in processes. Further, it does not help to find a clear stance in the dilemma emerging from such practical engagement in conflict.

Anja Weiss and Aleksey Nazarenko have shown in their study of NGO activities in Eastern European ethnopolitical conflicts, that within hierarchical relations between potentially Eurocentric donors and their recipients, it is almost impossible to develop democratic principles of work (Weiss/Nazarenko 1997). Given these circumstances, how can local ownership act as a guiding principle?

Taken seriously as a guiding principle for action, local ownership would mean far more than a consulting or participatory role given to the local actors on behalf of the donors or external parties. Rather it means that local actors have the final decisive power over a project's process and outcome. Local ownership then means a power shift, which goes far beyond existing practices. Local actors would not only be involved in the information gathering process or strategy development, but should have the means to decide about the agenda, strategy and budget management themselves, even decide who the beneficiaries of the project should be.6

How much the power to decide is currently shared can be seen in the way in which conflicting opinions about the issues of project management are made visible, expressed, managed and finally resolved. While local knowledge of the context is more accepted and thus strategic decisions are made in consultation with local partners, the mode of organisation, planning and time management seems to be non-negotiable, even if the project is implemented in a different socio-cultural setting. Weiss and Nazarenko have shown that in the non-governmental arena, typical cultural conflicts arise around differing attitudes towards time, time management, planning and administration (Weiss/Nazarenko 1997: 19). Local ownership would mean that such conflicts over planning, time management and administration, including financial management, cannot be solved by imposing a set of given rules. Rather local ownership would imply that the modes of conduct are defined by local conventions, which may often not be intelligible to outside donors. Control over project management and development, and not only commitment and a

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6 A lot of planning methods, such as “objective-oriented project planning” (abbreviated in German as ZOPP), Logical Framework Analysis or Project Cycle Management (PCM) have a bias towards fostering top-down processes and “how the bias is treated is largely dependent upon the quality of the facilitator” (Social Impact 2005:7).
feeling of belonging to the project, would actually be the signs of real local ownership.

Giving up complete control over the development of a project as an outside funder simply cannot be in the interest of donor agencies and other external parties. Thus local ownership can hardly be the guiding principle for action of outsiders and donors. However, their aim could be a shift towards ultimate local ownership and self-dependency of the project and programme in the long run. This would assume a struggle towards practical and financial independence of the local actors. This process is also termed “localisation”. Here, a variety of possible funding opportunities would have to exist, so that local actors can choose their strategy according to their own needs. This ultimate aim, in contrast to the short-term project aim of local ownership, which can hardly be fulfilled immediately, is indeed worth pursuing in the long term. Therefore it is misleading to use the term local ownership as immediate, project objective since it covers up all those inconsistencies within the relationship between donors and recipients, more than it reveals them.

Recent policy papers of various international donor agencies involved in projects in conflict regions indicate that the term local ownership is actually used to signify the identification of the stakeholders with the project or programme. Participatory project launches are used to strengthen the commitment of stakeholders to the project and ease its implementation (Social Impact 2005:5). The programme actions are meant to convince the stakeholders of the significance and usefulness of the intended activity. So why is that not termed a process of persuasion or convincing of the stakeholders? It is a search for others with similar convictions who are willing to be part of the implementation process. This is no different from the process which has to be used for projects implemented in the West. Calling it local ownership is not simply unjustified, it is counterproductive. Given the fact that the developmental aim is to transform hierarchical and despotic structures into structures for power-sharing and participation, the message conveyed by terming a process locally owned, while the decisions are actually taken from outside, is misleading and actually hampers the achievement of these goals.

In spite of the caution to be exercised in not glibly using the term local ownership to signify programmes or projects, the inherent critique behind the demand for local ownership needs to be taken seriously. The critique is targeted at
the current relationship between Western institutions and local actors. The project “Reflecting on Peace Practice” (RPP) of the Collaborative for Democratic Action (CDA) was significantly involved in highlighting and recognising that international organisations are seen as an integral part of the conflict setting. This is in the hope that the relationship between “insiders” and “outsiders” is taken more seriously as an influencing factor in the success or failure of any peacebuilding project.

Following the studies of RPP, the shape of the relationship between the external staff and their partner organisations is acknowledged as a decisive factor for the successful course of a project. The relationship also depends on the role external partners play and thus constitutes a variable in the project structure. Shaping the relationship in a sustainable manner should be a concern of any outside involvement.

3 Constructive conflict transformation: a critique of the relationship of actors

3.1 Concept, structure and process of constructive conflict transformation

Although the concept of “constructive conflict transformation” signifies a variety of approaches (Miall 2000:3), it generally refers to a comprehensive, holistic approach, which aims at both acute crisis management as well as the

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7 In 1994, CDA initiated a working group of international and indigenous NGOs in what came to be known as the “Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP)”. Activists in the field of humanitarian aid in this group addressed the question of how the needs of the people affected by conflict could be met, without external actors actually exacerbating the conflict. What followed was a series of case studies and reports that brought to light the way humanitarian aid was in fact closely linked to the dynamics of a particular conflict (Anderson 1999).

8 The RPP case studies introduced what has become a widely adopted distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders”.

transformation of cultural and structural causes of a conflict and the use of violence (Reimann 2000).

Adam Curle (1971), Johan Galtung (1996: 70-126) and especially Jean Paul Lederach (1995b and 1997) have been instrumental in elaborating a framework for constructive conflict transformation. Lederach speaks of conflict transformation as a holistic and multi-faceted approach to managing violent conflict in all its phases. The term signifies an ongoing process of change in the relations, behaviour, attitudes and structures from negative to positive (Lederach 1995a). To make this possible, peace constituencies have to be established, which are formed by those people, initiatives and organisations having a sustainable interest in constructive transformation of the conflict (Lederach 1997). The “integrated approach to peace building” demands a broad social participation with visions of the future. It is constructed by the perspective of an “embedded paradigm” (Lederach 1997). On the one hand, the moment of crisis intervention is embedded in a long-term time frame, and on the other hand it is contextualised into the broader social context. This perspective is combined with the step of identifying local actors for peacebuilding on several social levels (tracks 1, 2 and 3). According to Lederach, the middle range leadership level is of special importance in transforming the current crisis into the desired social change.

“The basic proposal ... is the need for an integrated approach to peace-building. Integration begins with a recognition that the middle range holds special potential for transformation, but the change will be needed at every level of human experience and endeavour” (1997: 81).

Christopher Mitchell distinguishes between the concepts of conflict resolution and conflict transformation by the fact that the latter aims at profound structural change (Mitchell 2002: 12). Further, conflict transformation explicitly addresses the relationship between the conflicting partners in addition to the structural problems.

This two-fold impact – structural change and transformation of the relationship between the conflicting partners – is also visible in the model of civilian conflict management of Norbert Ropers (2000a: 34). Mary Anderson’s “lessons

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9 In this model of civilian conflict management, both process-oriented as well as structure-oriented activities are employed to target the different conflict phases on the one hand, and the leadership levels on the other.
learned” of the impact of peacebuilding initiatives on “PEACE writ large”\textsuperscript{10} show that even for smaller projects it is necessary to combine an individual and a structural level. This again points to the dual impetus in peacebuilding activities, namely “the structural aspect and the relationship of the conflicting partners” (Anderson/ Olson 2003: 68ff.). Structures which are not inclusive, and relationships which do not allow for genuine communication, are the starting points which lie at the heart of any transformative endeavour. Such an ethos and outlook on social change demands a scrutiny of the structures in which insider/outsider or donor/recipient relationships are embedded, and calls for a serious commitment to their transformation as well. As specialists equipped with tools to trigger such change in structures as well as relationships, conflict transformation activists have to engage in the structures and relationships in which they find themselves.

3.2 Power-sharing vs. patron-client relationships

The importance of the outsider-insider relationship has been demonstrated by a series of studies conducted by CDA in their RPP project. One significant insight is that the mode of providing assistance conveys “implicit messages”, which are keenly registered by local actors. It can unwittingly transport messages that contradict the aims of constructive conflict transformation.

When, for example, employees of international aid organisations avail of military assistance for their own safety or that of their property and goods, this implicitly carries the message that security can only be guaranteed by a show of military might. When evacuation plans in crisis situations privilege international aid workers, this highlights the factual disparities in the treatment of nationals from different countries – clearly a contradiction to the otherwise loudly proclaimed principle of equality. Similarities can also be observed in fundraising strategies of charities, which explicitly focus on images of victimisation. While reinforcing the outsider’s perception of the self as helper and the other as victim, these strategies contradict, in fact, approaches of constructive conflict transformation, which seek to enable so-called victims to move away from object positions and regain a sense of

\textsuperscript{10} PEACE Writ Large refers to a broad peace and integration of the social fabric.
agency in their own histories. These examples reflect the subtle, yet structurally ingrained, perceptions which define relations between “locals” and “internationals” and how these can easily lead to power asymmetries and even to a certain cultural domination.

Asymmetrical intercultural conflicts pose particular difficulties for third-party interventions. Relations of domination often render differences in culturally influenced patterns of signification invisible. Given the absence of a common system of reference, a single communication code equally recognised and followed by all, it is in fact necessary to agree upon one such mode at some point in the process, through negotiation. In an asymmetrical conflict setting, this is an extremely difficult goal to achieve, since one side is in a position to place its own system of reference as universally valid and thus unquestioningly uses this in the process of communication with the other parties. Although the advantage of such a clear-cut adoption of one set of references is obvious, it impedes a deeper understanding of the viewpoints, interests and needs of the other conflicting parties. Examples from the Middle East conflict have shown that cultural differences were felt to be a hindrance, especially when one side feared that the other side sought to enforce its own culture or use it as a means of domination (Salacuse 1993: 202). Nadim Rouhana has worked on making the subtle effects and outcomes of power asymmetries in inter-group conflicts evident (Rouhana/Korper 1996). He points out the difficulties of making the voice of the “weaker party” audible in the process of conflict transformation, and he shows how easily third party interventions in fact tend to perpetuate these asymmetries (ibid: 364).

Sensitivity to cultural differences alone is not enough. This sensitivity must extend to the subtle mechanisms of dominance and hegemony in an intercultural context. For constructive conflict transformation, this in fact demands changes in institutional practices. An appropriate attitude on behalf of all the actors concerned is a pre-condition for such change.

Programmes of conflict transformation seek to alter social relations towards more power-sharing and participation. Accepting the importance of the implicit message, special sensitivity is therefore required for handling uneven power relationships, which often exist between “outsiders” and “insiders”. This distinction between the actors is useful in that the categories are not restricted to nationality or
geographical location. The term “local” in a globalised world can hardly refer to some geographic area, but rather implies a closeness to the impact of the projects, a sense of being personally and directly affected by the course it takes. As Randolph Kent has noted in his study of the relationship between security and local ownership:

“It is increasingly evident that local is not a geographic construct. It is an issue of proximity and directness of impact. To an English customer seeking information about his or her insurance policy, the assistance being received from an outsourced station in Bangalore in India is “local”. The impact of the relationship is direct and immediate, though proximity has no geographical relationship” (Kent 2005: 3).

This distinction is reflected in the terms “insiders” and “outsiders”, which is not the case when speaking of the “local” and “international” partners.11

“Insiders are widely seen as those vulnerable to conflict, because they are from the area and living there, are people who in some way must experience the conflict and live with its consequences personally.... Outsiders are those who choose to become involved in the conflict and who have personally little to lose” (Anderson/Olson 2003: 36).

This distinction is also useful, because it does not automatically count members of the diaspora as “insiders”, but rather emphasises that indeed the diaspora often carry a completely different perspective on the conflict than those who remain in the region. Further, not only the diaspora, but also people within the conflict region itself may be outsiders, if they cannot be counted as affected by the conflict either as a result of the geographical distance, for instance through the rural-urban divide, or because of social-cultural alienation through living in a completely different social or cultural stratum of society.

Similar to the heterogeneous composition of the “insiders”, the category of “outsiders” consists of a diverse range of actors. Whether it is funding, expertise or simply international connections, outsiders often – though perhaps not admittedly – appraise their own position as providers.12 Since the providers do not receive money

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11 “Insider-Outsider” is more open to different perspectives, offering two equal terms for the different actors, while the term “local partner” actually lacks a corresponding term for the outsiders. It functions as referring to “them, there” in contrast to "us, here", who do not need to be specifically qualified.

12 This is, for instance, apparent in terms such as the former German term for development cooperation (Entwicklungshilfe or development aid).
from the insiders, their expected return is loyalty, to be proven by way of enthusiastic participation in the project, commitment to its goals and strategies. What indeed emerges is a picture of a patron-client relationship.

Given the fact that local decision-making conventions are themselves often hierarchical, and that patron-client relationships are a common feature of institutional relationships, it is relatively easy to put the external expert into the position of a patron with decision-making authority. Often, this role of the outsider is in fact expected, so that the mechanism remains unnoticed or at least unquestioned. That is all the more reason why the relationship between inside and outside staff must be consciously addressed. An experience of power sharing and participatory decision-making processes would markedly depart from hierarchical, patron-client relationships. Such a new experience could contribute to developing new models of decision-making which can potentially snowball into new social structures. Thus the power given to the outsider can be used not just to bring people to follow certain instructions of how to plan, implement and evaluate a project, but to also foster an experiential learning process.

The context of a conflict transformation project can be used to offer a space for both instructive learning, i.e. enrichment of contextual knowledge and skills through better information flow between insiders and outsiders, as well as experiential learning of different decision-making processes. To provide such a space for mutual learning between insiders and outsiders could be a project goal in itself. This is usually located on the organisational level of the project and therefore viewed as secondary to the actual project aims. However, I would like to argue that this should be one of the main aims within any project framework.

An existing power imbalance should not be covered up by merely upholding an image of equal partnership. Rather, the awareness of imbalance allows for the implementation of space for its transformation. How could a project be conceptualised in such a way that both instructive and experiential learning can take place and greater transparency is introduced in the working processes? At present, the occurrence of a mutual learning process is a matter of the personal attitude of insiders and outsiders and thus an arbitrary side effect. A concrete framework could allow for the learning process to be independent from personal will, and move towards more institutionalised learning.
One such framework could be developed from the concept of “learning sites”. The discussion on mutual learning is relevant to the debate on local ownership.

“Local ownership requires more than dialogue. It requires adapting to the environment in which one [sic! “the outsider”] is working” (Kent 2005: 7).

To be able to adapt to a new surrounding, time and space are needed to adjust, to understand, and to learn about it. Rather than emphasizing a presumed shift in the material ownership of the project from outsiders to insiders, the idea of learning sites can be seen as a first step towards establishing an equal partnership, in that it clarifies differences in attitudes, interests, values and even working styles between the different stakeholders.

4 Towards independence and equal partnership:
The framework of learning sites

4.1 The concept of learning sites

The term “learning sites” (in German, Lernfelder) is borrowed from Norbert Ropers, used in describing elements of the establishment of peace constituencies (Ropers 2000a: 43). Here learning sites refers to the way in which different members of a peace constituency mutually learn from each other and ascertain their common ground. I would like to explore this concept and expand on its implications concerning local ownership in project management in conflict transformation by developing it as a framework.

Controlling the implicit messages conveyed in the form of the relationship between insiders and outsiders demands a framework which allows for the relationship to be at the core of all endeavours. Therefore processes of negotiation and compromise must be given adequate space in the project outline. They are a site of learning for all participants, including the facilitators. By now it has been well established that the attitude of the trainer to learning is crucial for effective training
and capacity building, particularly in conflict transformation. Considering that training and capacity building play a key role in the process of conflict transformation (see e.g. Francis 2002), couldn't the project itself be conceptualised as a learning site?

I would like to explore how learning sites could be elaborated as a framework, specific enough to be allotted space and time in the project outline, budget and working schedule. Learning sites can be envisaged as workshops of varying duration, placed at different stages of the project, right from the initial conceptualisation phase to the final wrap-up. They can be imagined as some kind of staff “retreats” within an ongoing project, involving insider and outsider staff, with specific thematic foci. In contrast to a normal staff meeting, it is not the day-to-day problems which are on the agenda. Nor are learning sites concerned with organisational development and long-term visions. Rather, they address particular needs and issues that unexpectedly arise in the course of the work. The issues may be related to inter-personal difficulties, circumstances of work or political changes, but their content can be left completely open, to be defined according to the particular situation.

However, three issues should particularly be allotted time and space. These are:

- **The decision-making process**
  Which issues are decided by whom and how? Which issues can be decided by the insiders alone, and which issues by the outsiders? Where is participation recommended, and where has a consensus to be established? What has already been decided by the outsiders and what are the minimum conditions for both sides to work together, without which collaboration in the project would not take place at all? This is the moment where outsiders have to be very clear and transparent about their own interests. For instance, if it is the interest of the outside partners that decision-making in the project is participatory, and with all that implies, then it should be mentioned here as a non-negotiable condition for engagement. Also if certain aspects are already decided upon, this is the place to clearly mention them as non-negotiable conditions for cooperation.
• Budgetary allocations and restrictions

Questions of budgeting and financial management have to be addressed in an open and transparent manner. Who earns what kind of money, who can decide upon budgetary allocations and how is an agreement reached on each partner's contribution? What are the given facts or restrictions, what is negotiable and how does the financial decision-making process work in practice?

The significance of this aspect has to do with the assumption that power is not simply given away. Rather, the budgetary example refers to the need for a certain transparency concerning decision-making processes and financial management policies – central issues concerning the distribution of power. Alloting space and time could enable insiders to identify where they could take a possible lead in the project. This does not alter the basic attitude of a “patron”, nor does it propose a shift in the asymmetrical constitution of the structures and relationships. But since the different positions are made explicit and transparent and not portrayed as “equal partnerships”, a first step towards institutional power sharing is thus taken.

• Proposals to alter or modify project implementation

Understanding the stakeholders, including their literacy levels, gender or other social roles, indigenous management practices and work ethics is an important step towards equal partnership. Learning sites should provide a space to strengthen awareness about the different possibilities of project management. Space, time and resources should be allocated within the learning sites for difficult questions and problems to be raised, discussed and thought about. Whether they concern project developments, unexpected difficulties or opportunities, the relationships within the project team or with outside partners, here is the place where they can be reflected upon. What is supportive in my work, what makes me feel impeded? Do we spend enough time on the important issues, or are we so busy with the fulfilment of ongoing tasks that we do not recognise upcoming opportunities or difficulties which demand serious engagement?

Leaving aside the project goals, learning sites also offer a possibility for transparency in the attitudes towards project procedures and developments of the inside and outside staff, and to re-think the impact of personal or societal developments on other stakeholders, in a way in which a project evaluation cannot.
4.2 The Potential of learning sites in constructive conflict transformation

The notion of constructive conflict transformation aims to alter and extend the regimes of knowledge of the conflicting parties as well as third parties or cooperating partners. Effectively, this extension implies structural growth as well as an alteration of the forms of knowledge production. Conflicts pose challenges in stretching the personal horizons of all those involved, with the aim of opening up new possibilities for action. This is why conflict analysis is an important part of any third-party intervention. It is not only the compilation of data about the conflict that is significant, but also the process of compiling information, for this is in itself an act of intervention, through which local activities can be either supported or discouraged (Carl 2003: 2). Thus for any project in the field of conflict transformation, the process of gathering information by involving a variety of perspectives and different voices – even if the topic is not directly related to the chief project concern – is a significant step. The process of learning itself must be learned.

At this juncture, one basic difference in the personal attitude of the actors involved becomes relevant. The difference can be measured by the degree of willingness to question, and if necessary even radically alter, one's own world view. The difference in attitude can be expressed through the dialectical binary of “teacher vs. pupil”13. While some see themselves as suited to this position in the relationship and take it as a given duality, where one is either a teacher or a pupil, others try to transform their role in the relationship. Mostly the transformation takes place in the arena of communication.14 The decisive question for practitioners to ask is: who learns from whom?

The network of conflict management practitioners Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) refers to an important condition of learning in its handbook on

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13 The “teacher-pupil” simile is appropriate, in that it points to a certain form of communication, employing a given structure and through a given medium, anchored in a socio-political context, yet at the same time representing a structure of power differences.

14 The popular term dialogue, used in the context of conflict transformation, often becomes a diluted one. It takes more than just an exchange of monologues between two people, where there is hardly any broadening of horizons or scope to change any opinion or stance, to make a dialogue.
conflict management, namely the principle of unlearning (ACT 2003: 19). This critical skill is the ability to discard previously held assumptions. As an element of conflict transformation, training implies that everyone is involved in a process of learning and unlearning, and this is particularly true of the trainer. Here the difference to the common understanding of training is thus a qualitative one: it is not only about the transmission of skills and concrete capacities, but must also include a process of broadening one’s knowledge and stretching the flexibility of one’s world view. It is therefore of utmost importance to provide the process of learning with sufficient space, in order to allow for dealing with cultural differences and various levels of disparities. This mutual learning does not only have an effect on the broadening of horizons and possibilities of action, but it has an implication for the attitude performed. A mindset committed to learning from a person is the best protection against adopting an arrogant or patronizing attitude. Further, such an attitude of willingness to learn and unlearn from each other will have its impact on the relationships concerned. This is valid for both partners, the outsider as well as the insider.

Thus the criticism raised here is not simply targeted towards the use of mainly Western methods in training, dialogue and problem-solving workshops. Constructive transformation of conflict is indeed the transformation of cultures of conflict. As Carl emphasises:

“We should avoid the tendency to romanticise local and indigenous capacities for peacebuilding. While they are vitally important, it has often been overlooked that traditional capacities for conflict management have failed to manage or contain the conflict” (Carl 2003: 3).

Any kind of knowledge and insight which can potentially alter and broaden the spaces of action of all participants is thus to be perceived as an asset. The critique is directed towards the claim of universal validity of one’s assumptions, perspectives and concepts, and towards the blindness to one’s own limitations. Lederach proposes a methodological answer to this problem by way of what he terms an “activating” and “elicitive” approach in training seminars (Lederach 1995). Admittedly, global structural disparities make it difficult for activists to achieve a meeting of equals in a seminar context. It is nonetheless an aim to strive towards.

But what is to be done, if local partners actually expect outsiders to “play the role of the expert”? How does one deal with working situations where – as opposed
to the theoretical principles – the common pattern of decision-making is not participatory and where people are used to the practice of those in power simply making most decisions? Is it then in the interest of the outside peacebuilding actor to merely give up power to the local actor for the sake of the principle? The instrument of “learning sites” could be employed not to change decision-making processes, but to bring them to consciousness, to simply make everyone aware of the way they work in the given circumstances. At least, learning sites can provide space for transparency, for explanations and clarifications, even if the whole project should finally be planned and implemented in a hierarchical mode. This is a very important step towards a clarification of the roles.15

A focus on the relationship within the framework of learning sites, instead of on local ownership, recognises on the one hand the importance of the implicit message. It allows on the other hand for more flexibility concerning the choice of the partner. The choice of partner is not based on the name or the labelling of a group or organisation, but is done in accordance with their willingness to engage in an active learning process, where ground rules are negotiated and decisions are made by a particular process within the framework of “learning sites”. This would enable engagement with organisations very different to those accredited by the norms and agendas of international NGOs. A possible partner could thus for instance be a religious party, in which the general opinions on, say, gender equality, clearly differ from the outsider’s (outwardly declared) principles of gender equality. Given a certain accountability in the process, such an engagement could enrich the knowledge of models of decision-making within the framework of the people from this party, while on the other hand also enriching the knowledge of the modes of thinking and action of such religious parties in the eyes of the outsider. Simple openness to such a process of learning sites and a willingness to engage could be a sufficient criterion for the choice of the partner. This would be a responsible choice for projects aiming to strengthen transparent leadership and decision-making processes based on power-sharing within the region. Further, this focus would strengthen the ability to develop equal partnership within inter-cultural settings shaped by existing asymmetrical international power relations.

15 “If the role of the outsider funder is not done carefully and deferentially, its presence can become an obstacle to local ownership and local political control of the agenda”. Annie Casey Foundation, p.1.
So much for theory. Does the framework of learning sites actually serve the goals of transparency and power sharing as a first step towards local ownership? To verify this, a cluster of questions need to be addressed by practitioners in the field and those involved in policy making and project planning:

- **Questions relating to power-sharing and the insider-outsider relationship:**

  How does such a framework affect or change patron-client relationships?

  Does such a framework, consisting of a specific duration of time, facilitated in a mode which is more alien to some than to others, actually offer an open and secure space, or does it simply create another place where the existing roles of insiders and outsiders are perpetuated?

  Does the framework of learning sites help insider actors to find appropriate partners, and does it help to give more informal actors or networks who are not necessarily educated and socialised in Western ways of working a possibility to enter into the conflict transformation scene?

- **Questions relating to implementation and practicability:**

  Especially in intercultural settings, is the "learning sites" framework capable of airing latent conflicts between cooperating partners and tackling the crucial issues, or is it simply a time- and resource-consuming exercise?

  Can learning sites be implemented in such a way that they are not seen as overly complex and technical, laden with unfamiliar jargon and constraining specificity, as indeed many planning tools are actually viewed?

- **Questions relating to institutionalisation of an equal partnership:**

  As a framework, learning sites could become visible in the project proposal, schedules and budget. In how far would such institutionalisation depend on the interest and personality of the project coordinators?

  How would it positively or negatively affect existing project management procedures and structures? Does such a framework fulfil Lederach's criterion of effective conflict transformation work by local empowerment, does it implement cultural sensitivity, and does it work towards long-term commitment?
In the debate on local ownership in conflict transformation projects, I have delineated the term as misleading and counterproductive, when formulated as a concrete project objective. In doing so, I have argued for a shift in focus from local ownership as attribute of a project structure, to a discussion of the relationships between outsiders and insiders in the complexities of conflict transformation projects. The framework of the learning sites could be one step towards altering existing asymmetries and disparities in international relations, and it remains to be seen whether conflict transformation practitioners are willing to explore the sites of learning and unlearning from the experiences of the past.
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<td>Jugendförderung als Potenzial und Herausforderung für den Friedensprozess in Bosnien-Herzegowina/ Youth Development as a Potential and Challenge for the Peace Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Martina Fischer</td>
<td>2004</td>
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## Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation
(www.berghof-handbook.net)

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<tr>
<th>Handbook Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook</td>
<td>A. Austin, M. Fischer, N. Ropers (Eds.)</td>
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