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The Marstrand Study Group

NEUTRALITY: THE NEED FOR CONCEPTUAL REVISION

1. The Debate about Neutralism

Neutrality is a word that has been loaded with rather strong connotations, positive and negative. There has been some idealization, but much more aversion, which has made it a rather difficult topic.

In a way its controversial character is easily understandable. In the conduct of international relations the essence of neutrality is an effort to preserve one’s sovereignty and not to give it up in exchange of the protection that is offered within the framework of an alliance. There is, in other words, an element of self-reliance and self-sufficiency present. It is thought that there is more security to be gained - not to speak of the independence and liberty achieved - from standing aloof than seeking for the protection from one of the major powers against the possible threats and pressures of the other. Hence neutrality is a break with strict bipolarity, a sign of plurality and democracy in international relations.

This makes neutrality automatically a kind of deviant behavior. As a choice it is different from the one made by the majority of states within the East-West-system. These elements of sovereignty, independence, military self-sufficiency as well as disengagement from bloc policies make it almost automatically disputed, controversial and also contested. The argument usually goes that it is an indication of being too sympathetic to the other side.

Hence it should be of no surprise that most of the post-war period neutrality has been loaded with rather negative connotations. It has been argued that neutrality is something illusory and escapist; a sign

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of utter weakness and something that will not last, part of something disintegrating. In the end the neutrals are thought to be forced by the very necessity of events to make the fundamental choice between friend and foe, seek protection from some of the stronger powers and play the tune of balance of power policies as all other states within that bipolar system feel that they have to.

In the international power game and management of interpretations, neutrals have been seen to be objects rather than subjects. It has been assumed that they are unable to inject in any basic way their interests and values into international politics or to affect the course of developments in the international community. Neutrality has been argued to invite aggression and hostility rather than cause moderation as only a system of collective security within an alliance of nations is thought of being able to guarantee peace and prevent another war. Such an understanding excludes neutrality and makes it something to be treacherous, disputed, disapproved and condemned. With the considerable preparations for war it has been thought that under conditions of absolute bipolarity military alliances and alliance memberships are the most rational means of achieving security. The alternative option is assumed to be collective security, which is also an enforced condition of peace, not disengagement and staying aloof. This option of collective security is not thought as being in reach in present politics. Hence the conclusion is seen as obvious: alliances are the preference of the day.

For these reasons neutrality has occasioned little understanding other than in the form of abstentionism. It has not been taken to be a genuinely chosen foreign policy line but rather seen as residual category, a reserve for lesser powers, the exception for comprise when no side should gain the price, something left over at Yalta in 1945. In many ways neutrality is felt to be a dubious challenge, at the cross-roads of different security understandings, some based on the alternative of association and others on disassociation.

For those who prefer to perceive neutrality as a rather amorphous concept being too ambitious and ambivalent to become any permanent and durable feature of international relations, there is plenty of ammunition available. Neutrality is not absolute but conditioned to change depending on the conditions of various historical phases. There is no doubt that in a number of ways neutrality tends to be backward-looking and not altogether in touch with today's realities of the international environment such as nuclearism, interdependent economic relations and increased dependence on military technology. These three issues will be examined here. The aspirations for neutrality seem still to be too much dependent on the classical understanding that the state of war is neatly distinguishable from a state of peace, that governmental military behaviour is clearly distinguished from governmental non-military behaviour or that political alignment can be separated from economic intercourse. The traditional concept focusing mainly on military neutrality seems to be by and large obsolete. Instead of non-alignment containing a commitment to non-participation in war neutrality has grown in importance as a peace-time policy. It is no longer to be seen mainly as a classical instrument of regulation and limitation of the generally accepted phenomenon of war but as a policy aiming at the prevention of war. In an increasingly
interdependent world neutrality can no longer be based on autarchy and isolationism. For the most part the legalistic, formal and historically oriented concepts of neutrality that still float in the discussion are no longer adequate.

One might also add that in spite of a long tradition in the international system, there is no comprehensive theory of neutrality either as a legal system or a political strategy. This is a further reason why there are no quick answers to many challenges and questions and this tends to add to the confusion about neutrality and undermines its credibility.

All this would augur that one finds neutrality only at the fringes of the East-West system, and that is something insignificant and almost disappearing. But this does not seem to be the case at all. In real terms the position of the neutrals - and here we refer exclusively to the Euroneutrals - has been accepted as a fact of life. The various gloomy predictions of their fate, of integration into the dominant bipolarity, have fallen wide of the mark. The degree of tension and polarization of the East-West system with rather stable military blocs has also made neutrality a permanent feature of the post-1945 international system. Within this system the neutrals have not only safeguarded their independence, but also assumed a fairly established position. They seem to have a rather strong identity, their economies are viable, they are stable political entities, they seem to have considerable room for manoeuvre, they are accepted, and their security has not been endangered - at least not more than international security in general. The neutrals have in large been able to cope with all the expectations, speculations and pressures. Sometimes the major powers use rewards to influence the neutrals, while they discipline their smaller allies by negative sanctions. They worry far more about neutralist allies than the neutrals proper. All this is at variance with those numerous predictions that almost foresaw the disappearance of neutrality as an option in international relations.

There thus seems to be a number of contradictions in the picture. Neutrality has certainly not become obsolete or ceased to be a viable security option for a number of European countries. The neutrals have performed consistently well on a number of counts and seem to be by and large content with their achievements. Neutralism, the adoption of certain features of political concepts brought into being by neutrals which today find the interest of allied European states, points towards an increase in importance of such policies.

It is also to be observed that the major powers seem to have adopted over time, a somewhat more understanding position vis-à-vis the neutrals - although neutrality is still taken to be something of a dirty word. It is absolutely nothing to be copied by the smaller members of the alliances. The neutrals are no longer seen by the major powers to be carriers of change or a signal of indecisiveness inviting aggression and measures to tilt the existing balance in Europe. They are not argued to advance the cause of the enemy by their policies of refusing to take sides but increasingly accepted as independent actors in their own right.
It may even be agreed - although reluctantly - that the neutrals contribute to the lessening of tension as a moderating factor and by their existence as a buffer-zone between the blocs. It would be too much to argue that they are respected but they are increasingly tolerated. The accusations are disappearing that they by their very existence detract from the security of the allied countries. They do presumably not figure as "untouchables" whose neutrality should be given preference over the strategic interests of the alliances. However, this perspective has become more and more that of professional military planners and does not tend to dominate much the over-all debate.

But something has happened on the side of the neutrals themselves, too. Instead of stressing the deviant side of neutrality they have made themselves known as status quo-oriented countries rather than advocates of any systemic change in Europe or in the present international order at large. They do not purport themselves as anything of a third force in competition with the alliances. Rather they argue for their case individually and often in isolation from each other. In these respects they differ from the non-aligned countries. The neutrals are clearly supporters of the existing East-West order and feel that they have an interest in maintaining it rather than changing it. They present themselves as a permanent and integral part of the present order and this has certainly made it easier for other countries belonging to the East-West system to accept neutrality in its contemporary form.

These apparent successes do not imply that neutrality has become an unproblematic foreign policy line. Paradoxically enough it seems that success has also added to the difficulties of the European neutrals. Respect and appreciation has added to the expectations about the role and function of the neutrals in the European system and international politics more generally. There is again some idealization and aversion present in the debate.

Behind these more immediate and acute pressures seem, however, to loom some far more profound dilemmas. These challenges do not pertain only to the role, status and expectations which the neutrals have to take into account. They are, so we argue in this presentation, more systemic in their nature. Neutrality, in its present form, has been formed and conditioned by the post-war structure of international relations in Europe. This structure, which has been quite stable as to its main characteristics, seems now to be bound for considerable change and taken over by more interactionist forms of security. Nuclearism, the challenges by technology and economic interdependence reshape the policies of alliances and neutrals alike. So far one can only see first indications of such changes. They should be serious enough also to ponder some additional profound questions about the future of neutrality.

The present conditions for neutrality are different from those of the heyday of détente in the seventies. There are again changes in sight as to the end of the eighties and beginning of the nineties. With the recent years of the "New Cold War" the potential for neutrality has been limited, at least in its active and peace-oriented forms. The bipolar tendencies of this period have not only dominated the immediate sphere of security issues but also manifested themselves in issues pertaining to economy and transfers of
technology. Given the various signs of increasing multipolarity, what will the role and position of the neutrals be and what sort of policies should they adopt to avoid pressures but also to take stock of the various opportunities that undoubtedly exist?

These are the issues that we aim at tackling in this contribution. Neutrality is treated as something contemporary and systemic in its nature, by and large conditioned by the overall developments of East-West politics. Therefore there is no reason to idealize or to join the aversion that has been typical of so many presentations of neutrality. Rather than elevating it or downgrading neutrality we try to take stock of the opportunities provided by the contemporary situation allowing a strictly analytical treatment. We take it to be natural that there is diversity in the way the neutrals make their case and do not regard neutrality to be something given, permanent or immune to the changes that take place in the character of international relations. Rather our approach contains duality: neutrality is not disappearing, nor is it fully its old self. This aspiration for a systemic and flexible approach consequently infers that there is no need to draw a strict line in relation to other forms of foreign policy conducts - such as neutralism or de-alignment. Rather they are taken to be indications of the same basic structural developments and dependent on the degree of bipolarity or multipolarity present in international relations.

This treatment of Euroneutralism, as the overarching concept will be labeled, does not go into its specifics as they manifest themselves in different European variations, and within these in the again differing aspirations of political parties and groups. The focus remains rather on the coherent aspects. There is a common core of neutralist thinking in Europe, and this core tends to be on the increase rather than the decline.

The ambition to portray Euromeutralism per se results in additional omissions. De-alignment as the main theme of the great movement of the non-aligned countries, its potential symmetries or interfaces with neutralism will not be studied here. Nor do we go into the relationship between neutralism and development in the Third World. The paper is organized in a strictly Eurocentric manner, what certainly constitutes a major limitation. On the other hand, this treatment aims to exhaust the topic of the generalities of current Euromeutralism, as far as this is possible.

This method of treatment also foregoes an in-depth analysis of European history. While it is true that neutrality may be traced back as a political strategy for more than three hundred years, and while the concept contributed significantly to the wealth of ideas about the conduct of foreign policy, a historical account of the development of the idea is neglected. As will soon be apparent in the text, the actors of the neutralist concepts vary, and were actors stay in place, they themselves as well as their understanding of the meaning of neutrality is subject to far-reaching change. There is little use in comparing neutralism of pre-industrial Switzerland or agrarian Sweden one hundred fifty years ago with the present situation. Because of the rapid development of the scheme, this study is confined in its main emphasis to the post-war period.
2. Hegemonic Bipolar Integration, Neutrality and Neutralism

2.1 Neutrality During the Different Phases of the Post-War System

Although neutrality has been very much conditioned by the bloc system and the domination of bipolar integration over various disintegrative features, there has been also significant variance within the East-West pattern since 1945. To develop an understanding of these various developments influencing neutrality it is essential to divide the conflict into three major phases: Cold War, Détente and New Cold War. All these have coloured neutrality in the post-war system in a specific and particular way.

Europe was the territory where the main frontline of the East-West conflict was drawn during the immediate post-1945 period. The political East was separated from the political West on a number of counts: political, military, social, economic as well as ideological. On both sides, with the United States and the Soviet Union on the top of their respective blocs, positions were consolidated behind the own lines by integrative moves. There was hence considerable pressure to prevent occupied and allied countries from escaping a clear-cut bipolarity. Neutrality became unacceptable for systemic reasons and the traditional neutrals were viewed with suspicion. However, there was more to it as the neutrals could be seen as representing the ideology and principles of the corrupt European system that was defeated in war. It was possible to see certain Europeanist tendencies in neutrality as opponent to the ideologies and tendencies represented by the two principal winners, the United States and the Soviet Union.² For some time neutrality represented something original and deviant from the ideology behind the integrative bipolar tendencies that soon turned out to be the dominant trend. Once this happened, also the oppositional features of the debate on neutrality faded into the background and neutrality gave in, in the actual policies pursued, to the new tendencies imposed by the two major powers of the European political system. These features of accommodation and adoption took out most of the heat of the debate on neutrality.

The antagonism of the new system erected was in the first place based in a division into two comprehensive military alliances, but there was more to it. In the Western capitalist half of the globe, the US established a world currency system (highlighted by the Bretton Woods accord), a world financial system (lead by the World Bank), plus a world trade scheme (directed by GATT). In their much less powerful sphere, the USSR followed suit, creating an international system for economic co-operation (CMEA), some sort of a financial scheme (highlighted by the transferable ruble) as well as a modest international banking scheme.

The reasons for the smashing success of the US in reshaping global structures according to their preferences in the early post-war era are manifold. In 1945, the US were power number one on the globe, commanding the most powerful military machinery, with a monopoly in nuclear bombs, and enjoying the broadest and most productive economic base. The Dollar replaced the Pound as the world’s leading currency. At Bretton Woods, the American concept for the restructuring of world finance won over a competing British scheme. If the slogan were ever true, the immediate post-war period indeed has reflected the "American century."

Neutrals had barely survived the war, when their position was disputed. There were charges of undue collaboration with the defeated Nazi Reich. It was thought of as both disgraced and obsolete. Stalin suggested that neutrals should not have equal rights at the newly established United Nations, because of their moral indifference in the world crusade against Fascism. Moreover, a number of by now neutral countries did not have this status at the time, notably Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia. The beginning of reconstruction after the great contest did not offer possibilities for neutralist concepts outside the places which traditionally adhered to the concept, that is in Sweden and Switzerland.

In the early phase of the establishment of the new security order based on polarization and the formation of blocs the deliberate purpose was to deviate from the earlier discredited European political order. The previous European tradition of "realist" power politics of a rather nationalist type was substituted by some kind of "nationalistic universalism" of the new leading ideological and hegemonic powers.

In this light the neutrality of Sweden and Switzerland - as well as the position of Spain - was something of a remnant of the previous political order. These three countries came out of the war in such a way that they were able to put up resistance or - in the case of Spain - to stay isolated because of the recent past. Resistance occurred also in a number of other European countries such as France, Italy and Greece, but turned out to be far less successful. Somewhat later Yugoslavia succeeded in aspiring for a more independent position by being expelled, while comparable aspirations in the German Democratic Republic as well as Hungary were crushed.

The traditional neutrals were given diplomatic recognition and they were incorporated into the new political order of Europe, but only as isolated de facto cases, and as a corollary to the otherwise reaffirmed bipolarity of the system.

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Once the new bipolar system was firmly in its place as to its main features, there were some winds of relaxation and reduction of tensions in the mid-1950's. In those years also neutrality got a new - and far more positive - meaning for the post-war international system. Instead of pursuing their contest as far as possible the two major powers then accepted the neutralization of Austria as a way of settling a question that had been pending after the war. Likewise Finland got ground for its neutrality as the Soviet Union pulled out its troops from Porkkala, a base near-by Helsinki. There seems to have been potential for even more such settling issues concerning lesser powers as for example the Soviet Union made proposals for the neutralization of Germany. This idea, however, never really came off ground as the West German government forced a strict policy of integration into the West and furthermore a more chilly climate soon took over in the relations between East and West.

For quite many years bipolarity again dominated East-West relations requiring also the neutrals to keep a rather low profile in the Soviet - American contest. The political relations between the two major powers did not turn better before the beginning of the sixties. Vietnam War took a loss of worldwide American authority and loss of trust on the Soviet side with repeated military interventions, the last one in Czechoslovakia as well as a regaining of European self-confidence before developments took a different turn. Although the process of détente provided more flexibility into the East-West division, the Soviet Union and the United States were very much its basic regulators. Détente was based on a mutual recognition of the systemic, political and geographic status quo. Preconditions of this process were stability and cohesion within the alliances. Concerning the European neutrals there was increased tolerance for a middle ground - provided that neutrality was used in a complementary manner and not in search for alternatives to the prevailing structures where the two blocs occupied dominant positions.

In the era of détente neutrality was viewed far more favourable than during the preceding years of the Cold War. Individually the neutrals could provide services, host conferences and propose to mediate between the various positions. However, it can also be observed that the multilateral features of neutrality became stronger with the establishment of the N + N group (= a group of neutral and non-aligned states). There was no aspiration to form a bloc nor to establish a firm position as a collective formation of the neutrals, but some steps in this direction were taken nevertheless.

The early phase of the CSCE process (as the follow-up to the Helsinki Act soon became labeled) was essential for European neutrality also in another way. It was generally understood and recognized that the dominant structures in the post-war security system consisted of NATO and the WTO. This was made quite clear in the Helsinki Final Act. Simultaneously neutrality was recognized as a derivate part of the same setting, as one of its ingredients.

This recognition in the Final Act may be taken as a major step forward for the neutrals, but it may also be seen as a sign how well the major powers came to terms with neutrality. It fits and complements their political aspirations and the strategies pursued. This adaptive type of neutrality became part of the pre-
vailing stability with little risk that it would enhance neutralist dynamics more broadly in Europe, which was not the purpose and aspiration of the neutrals neither. They shared the aiming at stability and tried therefore, among other things, to avoid entanglement in contentious issues.

Besides participation in the CSCE process the neutrals could also register a number of other gains. The Soviet Union established relations with neutral Ireland in 1973, and adopted a much more favourable attitude towards the European Community. This made it easier for countries such as Austria, Finland and Sweden, as well as to the smaller socialist countries of Eastern Europe, to trade and negotiate with the EEC.5

Towards the end of the 1970s, détente collapsed and the previous search for ways and means of constraining the bipolar confrontation between East and West was substituted by a renewed period of political hostility and military rivalry. This more bellicose attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union towards each other was reflected in Europe but also in other parts of the world.

The New Cold War was characterized by centralizing tendencies and austerity policies. In line with this also a sharpening in the attitudes concerning neutralism and neutrality took place. The distinction between neutralism and neutrality is quite essential here as neutralism - understood as deviant aspirations within the alliances - was seen as the major danger to the established bloc system. Due to such a combat against any weakening of that system also a downgrading and devaluation of the neutrals took place.

Neutralist tendencies during the 1980s have been most distinct in Western Europe. The militant policies pursued by the United States, combined with powerful Cold War rhetorics in early times of the Reagan administration, raised some basic questions about the security entanglement with the United States. The question of costs involved in living under a regime of nuclear threats and strictly bipolar policies moved up on the politico-military agenda. Many in Western Europe were reluctant to share the new American image of the Soviet threat in the first place. There was much more worry about the increased risks of war resulting from the galloping arms race and confrontatory nuclear policies.

NATO's "double track" decision in 1979 to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II in Europe became a particularly sticky issue. It lead to widespread opposition and social mobilization in a number of countries. These movements, resisting a reassertation of centralizing tendencies, aroused particularly in countries earmarked as recipients for these nuclear-tipped missiles, that is Holland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Britain.

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This rather massive movement challenging previous cohesion, and perhaps also the basic ideology of the post-war bipolar system, remained largely societal but also reflected in the policies of NATO countries. In terms of Realpolitik these tendencies remained fluctuations around the common alliance position and it would, perhaps, be an overstatement to read too much neutralism into it. This did however not prevent from arising fears of neutralism. As a reflection of this also neutrality became an issue of greater interest. In the debate neutrality was tested as a milestone on the way towards a Europe free of blocs and thus it is not very surprising that as a counterreaction accusations of "Finlandization", together with new linguistic innovations such as "Hollanditis" emerged.

The militancy present in that debate was sufficient to be perceived as a threat to alliance unity. In the rather heavy efforts of downplaying anything that was thought to turn into disintegrative tendencies within the Western bloc, also an anti-neutralist stance was developed. In the debate the barrier between neutralism and neutrality eroded, and also the otherwise quite marginal issue of neutrality entered the European political agenda. It did so in rather coloured terms which had little to do with the adaptive, rather passive and satisfied neutrality of the previous turn of European political developments. This model and practice clashed, at least in some cases, with a more interactionist, goal-seeking and activist model of neutrality. Such future-oriented thinking, also to be understood in terms of the immediate post-war period in European politics, gave considerable new stimulus to the debate on neutrality also in the neutral countries.  

The various concerns about alliance unity were most visible within NATO. However, some social mobility and signs of efforts to tighten the division into most absolute antagonistic poles could also be observed on the Eastern European side. The societal protests remained more at bonds but a certain uneasiness resulted from the Soviet determination to deploy, as a reaction to the Western moves, INFs for the first time in smaller WTO countries. This decision of deployment in GDR and Czechoslovakia ended the de facto, undeclared policy of keeping permanently that part of Europe a subregion free of nuclear weapons. For the Soviet Union, facing the NATO decision to target increasingly the Soviet part of Europe, it was also clear to demonstrate leadership, to limit more autonomous foreign policy tendencies such as increased contacts between GDR and FRG, and to bolster bloc cohesion. The moves to downplay potential disintegrative tendencies were more nuanced. The reason perhaps is that these tendencies were rather mild in the first place. For its part the Soviet Union has continued to support various subregional nuclear free arrangements, some of them which could also include WTO countries, in various parts of Europe. This is an issue that has been met with considerably hostility on the side of the United States.

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Although both the major powers tried during the years of the New Cold War to encourage fragmentation in the camp of the opponent, there were rather clear limits to this. It seems that care was taken not to provoke any basic destabilization or endangering to the cohesion of the main features of the East-West system. Both have adhered to the argument, that in the final analysis the maintenance of the established system provides the best way of doing politics, preserve one's interests and to manage conflicts in Europe. Rather than endangering the established order the New Cold War was about preserving it. Therefore the two major powers adopted a rather strict attitude vis-à-vis neutralism in their own camp but were also cautious about it in general.\footnote{Halliday, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 17.}

This problem was reflected in numerous ways. The dominance of integrative tendencies over disintegrative ones was visible for example in the more tight NATO-policies followed by France or Spain joining the alliance. Pressure on Greece seemed to downplay any defective tendencies and in the Western camp one has to go outside the proper alliance framework to New Zealand to find some really neutralist aspirations. On the level of political parties sustained tendencies of questioning established positions of security thinking within NATO has become equal to a place outside government. This has been the fate of Labour Party in Britain and SPD in the FRG. On the other hand political forces in the governments that have displayed previously some deviant aspirations have had to moderate their disagreement considerably. Similarly there has been space for Romania to pursue its peculiar line of dissidence within the WTO. Perhaps the fate of Solidarnosc could be taken to be comparable to that of oppositional forces on the West-European side, although the situation in Poland has been more dramatic and also complex.

\subsection*{2.2 The Major Powers and Neutrality}

To focus on the views of the two major powers is to switch to an actor analysis, and may seem to be somewhat in contradiction to the purpose stated to carry out a systems analysis rather than focusing on the various actors. In the case of the major powers this may have some justification, however, as these powers are influential also in systemic terms, i.e. purport latent system dominant features.

From this perspective it is quite understandable that the United States and the Soviet Union have adopted rather similar views in regard to various signs of fragmentation, among them neutrality, in the post-war system of international relations. In the immediate post-war period and the structure of high tension the traditional neutrals were the focus of both aversion and contention. The United States was worried that the neutrals would represent, despite their clearly western credentials, a split that the Soviet Union might exploit more broadly to create disorder in the western side and to add to its relative strength. The Soviet Union was afraid that in the end one or more of the neutrals would join the
Western alliance and fall under the direct control of the United States and its allies. First there were worries about the direct expansion of NATO but somewhat later this fear turned into worries about the neutrals being tied to the West through participation in West European economic integration.

In ideological terms the positions of the two major powers were, however, quite different from each other. For the United States neutrality was something of an unwarranted reminder of its own past and foreign policy ideologies after the turn of the century up to the rejection of membership in the League of Nations. It had to be combatted both at home and abroad as neutrality with its strong emphasis on sovereignty and individuality was in contradiction with the post-war emphasis on universalist values. The problem with neutrality was that although clearly of Western origin, it did not sacrifice sovereignty to those values supposed to be common to all on the Western side — and thus provide the United States undisputed leadership as the main guardian and representative of those very values, also at stake in the Second World War. In other words, in the American view there was a clear-cut division into “them” and “us” and nothing was supposed to be in-between, particularly not countries that ideologically seemed to subscribe to this. This was taken to be an irritating factor that had to be corrected.

In the Soviet view neutrality was a sign that the general Western traditions still had an impact on the post-war structure as well as its values and rules of diplomatic conduct. Switzerland and Sweden, the traditional neutrals, claimed (and still do) that the obligations of the neutrals do not extend into the civil sphere such as the position of the press, rights of private firms or political behaviour of individual citizens. Such concepts were used to defend active military preparations combined with a rather passive posture of neutral policy concerning in particular contentious issues. The Soviet position vis-à-vis neutrality was doomed to be rather negative towards the values and ideology behind neutrality. If there had to be a search for some understanding, joint positions or common departures, the bases had to be found in the prevailing interests, and even here there was limited ground for collaboration. The reason why the Soviet views on neutrality became more positive even at a fairly early stage of the Cold War seem to have been systemic in their essence. In various schemes of neutrality, neutralization, disengagement and partial demilitarization policies the Soviet Union saw prospects for downgrading tension within the East-West system. The initial experimentation with neutrality in this context gave good results in the form of settling the case of Austria. However, the broader proposals for expanding a European neutral zone, as demonstrated in the proposal for neutralizing Germany, were met with considerable suspicion on the Western side and led to frustration rather than encouragement. It is in any case important to underline that the Soviet Union rather quickly moved over from viewing neutrality merely in a traditional pre-war perspective or a contentious and competitive issue aspect of the Cold War setting, to something of a systemic promise in reforming the strictly bipolar setting that had emerged.

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As regards the latter the two major powers adopted quite different positions. For the United States neutrality represented not only a discredited past and an undesired feature of the European system erected after the war but also an unhealthy sign of the potential future of that system. The Soviet Union was not much in disagreement with the United States about the past or the present of European neutrality, particularly as some of the defectors from the ranks of the WTO showed inclinations in that direction. However, concerning the potential future significance of neutrality in the East-West system the Soviet Union took a rather different view from the United States, and largely also the European neutrals themselves as in these countries there was little understanding for such more future-oriented scenarios on neutrality in systemic terms. The neutrals were preoccupied with trying to preserve and guard the positions they had, each in their individual way and separate line of argumentation. To become an object for disagreement between the major powers on the future development and wider conceptualizations of neutrality in the post-war European system was of little appeal to them.

Once these Soviet designs had failed, and the neutrals had settled their relations with the EEC avoiding too integrative ties the European neutrals were treated much more favourably. This was valid for both major powers. Neutrality was viewed with less suspicion and a less pronounced ideological or pronounced military or power-political perspective. The psychological and ideological barriers against any deep understanding were there, but in real terms there was considerable acceptance. The neutrals were dealt with as individual cases downplaying the systemic features of neutrality, and this dispersed conceptualization was very much in line with the self-understanding of the neutrals themselves. It was equally in their interest to avoid anything uniform and to aspire to freedom of manoeuvre within such a setting.

During the period of détente and a less systemic polarization the neutrals could demonstrate that from a functional point of view, by avoiding strong normative, symbolic and ideological connotations, they could be helpful in stabilizing the East-West system. By providing services, functioning as hosts and also as initiators and creators of compromises the neutrals could demonstrate their positive systemic function to the established system of East-West relations. As guardians of the existing system and its stability, rather than spearheads for any future system, the neutrals seem to have considerable freedom within the limits set by major power harmony on the overall value and purposes of the CSCE process. It is thus not surprising that the European neutrals have also been strongly advocating and supporting the continuation of this process. They have not been speaking with one voice, but this basic aspiration has nevertheless been quite distinct.

The tense period of the New Cold War meant that the neutrals had to downplay their ambitions and adopt less visible profiles. As traditional security issues again more strongly entered the East-West political agenda also neutrality became more sensitive in ideological and normative terms. This was, however, relatively mild and not to be compared with the Cold War some thirty years earlier. The neutrals have to some extent been exposed to increased hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union but by and large they have managed to cope with this. There have again, and particularly
on the Western side, been worries about its potential spreadeffect and there have been constraints as their value in the contest and in the politico-military calculations of both sides has increased. Particularly Sweden, and to some extent also Austria, have been on occasions in rough weather and under pressure.

However, in general the European neutrals have been able to meet these challenges without too many difficulties. The opportunities for co-operation with the major powers have for obvious reasons been more limited, and the possibilities and interest to speak with one voice in the context of international security diplomacy have been limited. The United States has been more critical and reserved about neutrality while the Soviet Union has preserved rather positive attitudes hoping the neutrals would join and collaborate in the efforts to reinstitute détente. It would be too much to say that neutrality has been again the focus of systemic tension. Rather there have been occasional clashes and some ideological tensions as to the ideal model of neutrality. The Soviet Union has stressed a positive, interactionist and goal-seeking model of neutrality while the United States has been clearly in favour of more classical, individual and defence-oriented conceptualizations of neutrality. This controversy has, however, been kept within bounds. The established position of the neutrals, their clear acceptance of the basic features of the present East-West system and the rather pluralistic nature of that system has made neutrality a marginal issue. The polarization of the New Cold War has been an antagonism on the top of the structure and it has not been equal to such systemic polarization that would have seriously endangered the position of the neutrals.\textsuperscript{9} Their potential for diplomatic interventions has been restricted but they have not suffered any major damage or become any major battle ground in the major power contest.

In sum it may be argued that during the Cold War neutrality was something contrary to what became a hegemonic systemic feature of East-West relations. Later the European neutrals have adopted themselves to that system and became something of its guardians. During the New Cold War the neutrals have benefited from their systemic position and neutrality has not developed into any major contested issue. Their record for the years of the New Cold War is thus tolerated, and the real challenges may still be ahead if the neutrals, during the years to come are no longer able to project themselves as guardians of the present East-West system but also to contribute to the change and possible improvement of that system.

\textsuperscript{9} Bengt Sundelius, Dilemmas and Security Strategies for the Neutral Democracies, in Sundelius, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 11 - 32.
3. Pressures, Challenges and Responses

3.1 The Euronutrals, Nuclearism and European Security

Presently the key forum for the articulation of Euronutral concepts are the follow-on activities to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The neutrals prefer to speak about a "CSCE process", hinting at the transcending element, rather than about an ordinary series of conference.

The CSCE started in 1973, the heyday of detente, and came to a first result in 1975 when the Final Act of Helsinki was signed by the leading representatives of 35 states. From the beginning, the Euronutrals emphasized the non-bloc nature of the CSCE. Because the two alliances present, however, coordinated their diplomatic manoeuvres, some sort of cooperation developed among the neutral countries which formerly acted independently. Hence the CSCE process remains also significant for a change in style of neutralist policies: these represent by now, to a large degree, a concerted European effort.

With respect to the blocs, the CSCE provided the only forum where the neutrals could participate on an equal footing, and where they were entitled to speak about subject matters which hitherto had remained within confidential debate in the blocs. The CSCE process provided the neutrals with an ideal opportunity to resort to the traditional role of neutrals as mediators, to consolidate opposing perceptions, to mitigate confrontation. Within the CSCE the neutrals were very active in initiating new approaches to the negotiating process itself, acting as chairfigures in working committees and devoting themselves to a follow-up of the conference. The Euronutrals thus transformed the CSCE, beyond the plans the blocs had, into a genuinely pan-European gathering.10

The Helsinki results have been under review since 1975. In November 1986, a Third Review Conference began in Vienna (preceded by review meetings in Belgrade and Madrid), accompanied by expert meetings, fora and events such as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm (1984 - 1986). This complex scheme of diplomatic activities soon became labeled the "CSCE process", but to the neutrals the meaning of this term is much more comprehensive.

The Helsinki process, the synonym for the CSCE, remains influenced by the overall state of affairs between East and West, what principally restrains the potential of activities of the neutrals:

"Their role is limited to situations in which both sides are already interested in positive results but do not wish to have given in to the other side by accepting its proposal or where a complex package deal has to be explored and negotiated. The pre-existing will of the parties is the condition under which the neutrals can offer their good offices by producing ideas and trying

them on both sides. When such a will is absent and the signs point to confrontation, neutral efforts to prevent it will end in frustration.\textsuperscript{11}

The increase in importance of conventional armaments after removal of nuclear weapons from European soil, or at least by one subcategory of them, demands fresh answers also on behalf of the Euronutrals. Because these neutrals are exclusively conventionally armed, they by now find themselves closer in defence matters to the majority of European alliance members (i.e. all except the nuclear powers). This may provide a chance for additional inroads for neutralist ideas.

Talks about "basket 1" of the CSCE recently focused on the possible mandate for negotiations about conventional disarmament. There were not only differences of opinion between the blocs or within NATO. The Neutrals disagreed among themselves what the role of the conference should be and to what extent they should participate. While Switzerland maintains that these were essentially negotiations between the two alliances, Sweden and Yugoslavia advocate active participation, at least at a consultative basis.

This disagreement reflects the recent disappointment of European neutrals with the record of arms control negotiations. They had offered their good services to the alliances as middlemen on a number of occasions. These offers had not been accepted. To the contrary, also the CSCE-process has been, according to the perception of the neutrals, bilateralized. With respect to the Reagan Administration, the view in Europe was that neutralism gets less accepted in America than beforehand. Both perceptions end in the notion that the space of manoeuvre was narrowing indeed for the European neutrals, and that they had hardly more to offer than their capitals for summit meetings or conference events.

Their armed forces, so the position of some neutrals, do not threaten anybody, and hence they hardly could be object of negotiated reductions. This reflects a staunch isolationism. It can also be seen in the demand that the negotiations should not impede interests of national security. Given the recent boost to the Vienna talks, some neutrals are afraid that results of negotiations about other "baskets" will lag behind, notably in the human rights issues. The Swiss head of delegation stated that a CSCE-process "à deux vitesses\textsuperscript{12}" could not be accepted, where there was progress in disarmament talks, while the human rights concerns remained blocked. Hence Switzerland and Austria recently concentrated their contribution upon human rights questions. They stressed that general declarations are of little value, and that specific cases of violations ought to be tabled and discussed on a bilateral level. The Austrian/Swiss proposal for the final document for the third "basket" resembled to some extent US approaches to the same problem.


\textsuperscript{12} Agenda, Monthly Documentation by the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs, July 1987, p. 57.
The CSCE process tends to mirror the actual political situation between the major and the lesser powers, rather than to provide the actual forum for political developments. The recent INF accord and the impulse it provides for the Vienna talks again highlight this situation. But there is some optimism in Europe that the forthcoming talks in Vienna will have a higher political standing, and with them Euroneutral efforts to contribute positively, than this has been the case in the past. The reasons are that the security element in confidence-building measures gets more and more accepted as a positive accomplishment, and the tight linkage between confidence-building measures and efforts for arms control which by now has been established.

The neutrals give great significance to the continuation of the CSCE process. This process has been a result of detente policies of the Seventies. It survived the New Cold War at the beginning of the Eighties, when the super powers were not at talking terms. During the "year of the missiles" 1983/84, the CSCE process served as one of the few channels of communication between East and West which remained open. In their esteem, the neutrals contributed significantly to this accomplishment - the US did not want to jeopardize relations with these strange Euroneutrals by sabotaging these talks.

The ambitions of the neutrals towards the future talks remain typical. They can be grouped into four. (1) Euroneutrals are motivated to increase the relative significance of cooperative elements in East-West relations. (2) They are interested to lessen ties within the blocs by means of cooperation overarching the East-West divide. (3) They opt for incrementalism and gradualism in the development of intersystemic relations. (4) Euroneutrals want to sharpen political awareness of the interrelationship which they see between security and cooperation between East and West in non-military regimes. These programmatic ambitions shall be briefly highlighted.

According to letter and spirit of the final document of the Helsinki summit in 1975, the CSCE process is shaped as a process of intersystemic cooperation. In the years since then, however, the forum has been misused - as Euroneutrals see it - for other purposes than the enhancement of cooperation. It served as some sort of battleground for accusations in phases of confrontation. The Euroneutrals are aiming at a dominance of cooperation in the CSCE process, and they hope that the reassessment of national interests with regard to these talks will induce also other participants to share this ambition. The road in this direction is considered to be a difficult one. Flexibility, firmness in one's position, preparedness for coordinated steps and similar diplomatic virtues are considered as prerequisites to make progress along this road.

The lessening of ties within the blocs will necessarily rise suspicions on the side of alliance leaders. They opt into the opposite direction, the increase of bloc cohesion. But also superpowers should know that the maximum of possible bloc integration does not necessarily benefit their national interest. A severing of ties, in the view of neutrals, on the other hand could greatly contribute the chances of success of the CSCE process. The talks arc, after all, conducted by 35 formally independent sovereign nations. The in-
sistence upon equality of all participants in the process by promoting intersystemic cooperation would place the Euroneutrals on a more equal footing with the other European states and would help to bar isolation.

In reality, there are narrow limits to this particular concept. Efforts to build up informal collaboration between different CSCE participants were frustrated by effective preparatory meetings of WTO or NATO members, by efforts to coordinate policies at the negotiating table within EC members, and also by comparable moves on the side of the so-called N + N-countries (neutral and non-alignment countries) - which felt that they had to found their own club. Differences rather than similarities characterize the status of the Euroneutrals. Cooperation between them is by nature a limited one, and they never wanted to be considered as a "third bloc". Till 1970 there were only bilateral relations between the neutrals in Europe. Compared to other smaller states in Europe the neutrals had more mutual diplomatic contacts but their cooperation remained rather loose and strictly bilateral.\(^{13}\) The few successes in intersystemic cooperation are praised by neutrals as remedies to soften the division of Europe and as a contribution to a more stable peace.

The third issue, gradualism in the development of the East-West relationship, certainly is built into the Helsinki concept. They contradict in part objectives on the side of the United States, which in the case of human rights demanded rapid improvements in the Eastern World instead of limited concessions. The philosophy of "deep cuts" into arsenals also is again the incrementalism preferred by the cautious Euroneutrals. Bold moves, as they attract the interest of both superpowers, albeit on differing fields, are not seen as an effective long-term strategy. Messianism on the side of a superpower is disregarded as a real danger to substantive progress.

The fourth principle, emphasis on the interrelationship between military security and cooperation is also not something which stimulates imagination, but it is a concept at the roots of the whole philosophy how the East-West antagonism may be reconciled.

The question of military preparedness lies at the roots of neutralism, and the conditions for an adequate response recently have changed considerably. For decades in post-war Europe, neutralism implied two principal elements within respect to military defences: Euroneutrals lived without the protection by nuclear weapons, and they relied on an independent, purely conventional defence.

Both principles deserve qualification. Euroneutrals factually have not been so far off from nuclear questions as declared politics might hint. Military strategists in those countries have been well aware of the fact that the nuclear umbrella spanned out by the alliances did not end with necessity at the geographical borders of both the Western and the Eastern alliances. In Switzerland as well as in Sweden there were

voices that the security of the country on an emergency would be ensured by NATO precautions, while other Euroneutrals felt that the strategic impasse between the East and the West contributed to their national military security. Critics were of the opinion that this de-facto-situation induced military planners in neutral capitals to look in an undue manner at military concepts of the Western alliance.

In the early years of the atomic age, established Euroneutrals seriously considered nuclear armaments as a viable option. Military writings in Switzerland ended with the conclusion that the defence of neutrality in the end would require nuclear weapons, produced by indigenous means. In Sweden, the Defence Research Establishments conducted work in the fields, at least in order to establish a point of reference to nuclear powers. In hindsight, these projects may look illusionary. But they indicate that in contrast to later years the neutralist stance was not married to anti-nuclearism.

Concerned criticism until this day questions the absolute freedom of nuclear means of warfare on the side of the Euroneutrals. These questions range from potential sanctuaries for Soviet strategic submarines in Swedish coastal waters (where they are said, although not proved, to train the scenario that in times of tension Soviet missiles carrying subs are seeking additional protection by loitering in neutral waters, imposing thus the extra burden on American countermeasures that these would violate Swedish neutrality) down to the threat of cruise missiles trespassing neutral air space, queries whether electronic devices on the territory of neutral countries contributes to C3I activities of one of the superpowers. It remains difficult to assess thoroughly this spectrum of opinion, but the feeling is that nuclear weapons have indeed compromised the military posture of Euroneutrals to some extent.

The second principal item, independence of military preparedness even autarchy, certainly also deserves comment. The range of conventional weapons which the prototypical Euroneutral was expected to turn out, by whatever means, turned out to be prohibitive with each new spiral in the arms race. As smaller industrial powers, Euroneutrals were forced to opt out of the arms race in key categories of conventional armaments. Sweden by now is the last neutral country which relies on its own make of a tank. All other neutral countries are forced to import this kind of war machinery from abroad. Fighter aircraft, another key technology in military preparedness, possibly will be discontinued to be developed in Sweden due to cost reasons.

The influences of the two blocs on neutralist concepts of national defence have been overwhelming. They reduced the essence of traditional neutrality, the potential to defend the country independently, to a mere myth, and even worse to a myth of little credibility. Neutrals and lesser members alike borrowed their security from the nuclear powers. There was, of course, a continued facade effort to organize Euroneutral military defences autonomously. But this continuity can only be explained in terms of political identity, which required conventional measures with regard to symbolism also in the shape of armed forces. In terms of military efficiency the defence measures became soon illusionary in the post-War world.
The visual aspect of this dependency of Euroneutrals can be seen in the integration of their territories into alliance strategies. Neutral territories, according to the perception of military planners on both sides, form flanks or parts of fronts, which definitely can be turned into battlegrounds in war.

The recent tendency to downgrade the importance of nuclear weapons affects the military position of Euroneutrals in a number of ways. They are coming closer, as far as military technology is concerned, to postures of European alliance members. The principal difference, of course, remains in force: alliance members prepare collectively for national defence, whilst the classical neutral does this on its own.

This main difference is losing in importance. European countries cannot be defended by nuclear warfare, nor by the high technology variant of so-called conventional weapons. Both concepts would leave destroyed what ought to be defended. This insight is by now widely shared in the Old Continent. Hence a great number of proposals and remedies to find way out of this dilemma. The common denominator of these new ideas on military defences is non-offensive defence, a truly convincing organization of one's own forces in a way that no neighbour reasonably could fear a threat of attack.

It is noteworthy to recognize that this reformist debate about restructuring of the military has stirred up attention in allied and non-aligned European countries alike. The pressures and developments working on strategic concepts in Europe tend to make the outcome rather uniform, and there is likely a process in which neutrals and non-neutrals mutually accept specific positions of each other. The main consequence for superpower positions will be that the reduced relevance of nuclear weapons will also impede the overall control leverage these powers enjoyed for decades in the Post-War world.

3.2 The Meaning of Technology

3.2.1 The Development of Military Technology and Neutral Dependencies

The treatment of technology, both by alliances and by neutral countries, underwent dramatic change. In the past, the tradition of free world trade and US technological dominance did not spur much concern about limitations of international technology transfers. The establishment of COCOM, the Coordinating Committee for the control of military relevant technology transfers into the Eastern bloc, remained the one exemption. The New Cold War changed this situation. The arms race between the two blocs has altered into a technological contest, it is not any longer a race in numbers of weapons deployed or soldiers under the flag. COCOM by now is considered by the US as a decisive weapon to restrict trade flows in a way that the other side may not gain undue advantages, to the detriment of the Western alliance, by plundering the technological assets of the West. The older US strategy of denial, formerly of diplomatic recognition or of territorial access due to military force, has been extended into the regime of technology. Much of the barriers, which have been erected in the age of thorough bipolarity, have faded away.
Denials of modern technology remain to provide one of the most effective tools to keep the East-West frontier into being.

Euroneutrals also had to redefine their relation towards technology. In traditional diplomatic thinking, technology hardly is an issue in its own rights. The gaining insight into the significance of modern technology for modern industry and international exchange was a troublesome process.

Neutralism in the past was strongly related with the concept of autarchy, at least in providing military equipment for the armed forces of the neutral country. Provisions in international law regarding neutrality point towards self-sufficiency in military preparedness as one obligation of the neutral state. Especially the traditional neutrals in Europe, Switzerland and Sweden, maintain a strong domestic armaments base to bolster their prime orientation in foreign relations.

The rapid development of modern technology has undercut this traditional fundament of neutralism. Neutrals as other highly industrialized countries in Europe had to learn that because of the costs of most advanced weapons they had to opt out of segments of the high technology arms race. Early demands of the end-fifties that atomic weapons are needed for the defence of neutrality have acquiesced. Neutrals do not produce heavy bomber aircraft or heavier missiles. Sweden as the last greater designer of indigenous weapons is at the brink to discontinue the manufacture of nationally designed armoured vehicles or jet combat aircraft. Key components, such as jet engines, and especially advanced electronics, are out of the reach of domestic armaments bases of neutral countries. In fact, the neutralist position has been effectively eroded by modern technology, and all neutrals are vitally dependent in their defence efforts from supplies of sophisticated military technology, be it from the Western or the Eastern alliance.

The impact of modern technology transcends the regime of military preparedness by far. Not only because of the dual use aspect of a number of high technology items, but because of the growing dependency of a modern economy on a broader specter of high technology, ranging from the energy industry (nuclear power stations) to modern equipment for manufacturing (CAD/CAM techniques, NC machine tools) or sophisticated office equipment, Euroneutrals find themselves in fact engulfed as advanced industrialized countries into an intimate technology community with the West. This provides for an enormous amount of control leverage of the suppliers of this advanced technology.

The argument about alternative defences, which arose throughout Europe as a consequence of demands by peace movements for a more trustworthy defence, and which also is supported by discontent among the armed forces with the present reliance on nuclear weapons, tends to mitigate the high-tech dependence on military technology to some degree. Superintelligent chips for advanced PGMs do not necessarily originate in defence research establishments. They may be bought on the market for leisure electronics. Yet the fundamental dependency of the economies of the Euroneutrals from inflows of a broad variety of high technology items will remain an irreversible trend. And this trend will labor to converge ever more the issue areas of economics and military technology.
In a long range perspective, the prospects of neutralism with regard to technological dependence are grim. Technology, the possession of know-how, indicates power - power beyond the ability to create industrially advanced goods. Technology generates, in political terms, the ability to disseminate or to deny something others do not have, but what they need. Hence technology becomes, alongside with the conventional attributes of power, more and more an original resource for the execution of power in international relations. Euroneutrals will find it hard to defend their principal posture in the future while loosing continually the independence of the economic and technological base for this stance.

3.2.2 The Euroneutrals and Arms Exports

Trade statistics indicate that the Euroneutrals play an increasing role in the international transfer of armaments. Evidence from reports about sales to belligerents in the Gulf war suggests that, alongside with alliance members, the arms industries of neutral countries try to get their share in sales.

In each of the European neutrals arms trade seems currently to be a much debated issue. There are parliamentary discussions, governmental study groups, proposals for new legislation and administrative procedures indicating a search for a new ground. The reasons for this turmoil variate somewhat from one country to another and the pressures differ in acuteness but much is also common to them all. In all cases there seems to be reason to conclude that their arms trade policies as devoted neutrals are at a crossroad.

Revelations of illicit trade has considerably spurred the debate - and all of the neutrals have been somehow involved although there is also considerable variance here. The measures of controlling arms trade have usually been based on a chain of trust. The respective authorities have trusted the companies trading in arms, the government has trusted these authorities and governments have for their part extensively relied on each other in not demanding end-use certificates or taken measures of inspection other than in most dubious cases. The media has by and large trusted each and everybody.

Now, as this trust turn out to have been illusory, the relationship between these actors has to be reconstituted and the various controls tightened. The issues involved are politically sensitive and the governments have to make their moves with care. The discovery of illicit trade alone brings up a lot of issues, external and internal, and it would be naive to believe that they could be coped with merely by some legislative measures and a tightening of the control machinery. Also more profound issues will come to the surface, among others questions of why to engage in arms trade, for what purpose and at what price.

There is much in arms production and the dynamics of defence economy that is understood to call for more liberal policies. Also for the neutrals industrial endeavours as well as R&D efforts have become in-
creasingly important in their policies of defence. Capital, technology and industrial capacity count more while manpower counts less. Countries belonging to military alliances have been able to ease burdens by sharing costs. The neutral countries have not, at least not to the same extent, this possibility. Therefore the various constraints and pressures seem to be more difficult for the neutrals to solve. Already the spiraling price of sophisticated military equipment creates considerable difficulties among the neutrals. They may, in the long run, have to face the alternative of opting out of the technological arms race, at least some of its aspects, unless remedies are found.

The increased emphasis on industrial capacity and growing costs of military equipment create pressures for transnationalization of arms production in Europe. On the other hand there seems to be a significant and permanent restructuring of the international arms traffic taking place.\(^\text{14}\) There has been a sharp increase in the intensity in the supply-side competition. One indication of this that major producers are placing far more emphasis on marketing and advertising, and are vigorously courting potential buyers, particularly in the Third World. Today the arms market is a buyers market indicating that buying has become also far more advantageous for the neutrals than selling.\(^\text{15}\) To penetrate the market one has to be prepared to make concessions in price and credit terms, to engage in offset and barter agreements and to give the purchasers access to advanced military production technologies. Sometimes also assurances on continued transfer also in times of crises and war has to be given as has been the case recently between India and Sweden.\(^\text{16}\)

The commercialization that is one of the characteristic features of contemporary arms trade does generally not favour the neutrals. However, they may have something to gain from that many of the recipients endeavour at diversifying their acquisition patterns in their search for a greater degree of political autonomy. The difficulties to meet the conditions for successful deals - and simultaneous pressures to export - might explain why there has been a tendency on the side of exporters from neutral countries to engage themselves in black-market as well as grey-market transactions. Both of these markets have significantly increased while there seems to be a saturation of the open market.

Also the polarization in the relations between the superpowers have aggravated the dilemmas of the European neutrals relating to military technology and industrial capacity for arms production.\(^\text{17}\) Particularly the United States and the Western bloc have during the beginning of the eighties increasingly linked their economic policies and transfers of technology to national security policies. The restrictions


\(^\text{16}\) For information on this, see Björn Hagelin, Fribrivet "lucka" i riktlännerna. Dagens Nyheter, 13 December 1987.

\(^\text{17}\) See for example Bengt Sundelius (ed.), op.cit.
established tend to create new barriers and strengthen the formation of blocs. Also the neutrals have been under strict observation as to whether they follow these policies of restraining the transfer of "strategic" goods and technology to the Eastern side. This implies a certain politicization of exports that has military significance. It also makes it increasingly difficult to draw a line between civilian and military technology, something that is quite essential to the conceptual bases of the arms trade policies of the neutrals. The duality of having to operate with ambiguous concepts, one originating from their own neutrality legislation with its roots in how "war material" was understood some time ago at the beginning of this century, and another on military related materials and technology as defined by the Western bloc in their COCOM activities, causes a number of problems.

3.2.3 Neutrals co-operating?

In the crosspressures between limited military budgets, the need for an indigenous defence production, increased pressures for arms export to obtain the benefits of large production runs and to ease the pressures on budgets, the engagement in illicit arms trade, the decline of the world arms market as well as increased transnationalization of arms production and trade, the European neutrals have tested the idea of increased co-operation.

This was discussed - unofficially - at a meeting of the Defence Ministers of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland in 1985 in Salzburg. It seems that Austria - with its considerable decline in arms trade and difficulties of employing and using at least some share of its considerable capacity for arms production - was the country most interested in this idea. The others were clearly reluctant to engage in such a discussion. For Sweden and Switzerland the reasons are quite obvious as the companies producing arms in these two countries are mainly competitors on the international market. The production profiles are such that the neutrals would still be in most cases dependent on countries belonging to military alliances in their aspirations to get sophisticated military technology such as jet engines, sophisticated electronics, guiding systems etc.

It seems, however, that the issue still remains on the table. Proposals for increased military co-operation have publicly been voiced for example by Finnish military spokesmen inviting Swedish firms into closer co-operation. In this context there was also a reference to concrete negotiations that will continue.\(^\text{18}\)

It seems also to be difficult to make sense of the concept of neutrality in relation to arms trade. On one hand it is taken for granted that the neutrals have to have a sound defence economy and a sufficient amount of indigenous arms production. For that, it is argued, they also need some arms export. But on the other hand it is equally clear that the engagement in such export may produce damage to their

image. Neutrality is associated with impartiality in conflicts, and particularly the withholding of support from belligerents. They are seen to be under obligation not to participate in ongoing conflicts or contribute to war and violence in the international system. So how to make these contrary points of departure to mix, to constitute a whole that properly takes into account the defence policy needs of the neutrals but also to the image of neutrality as non-participation in war and the spread of violence?

In view of the various arms trade related issues, neutrals apparently have got to redefine their posture. Active neutrality today demands efforts to regulate and restrict war in order to enable neutrals to stay out of war. There may be a broad base for neutrality in peace, but the concept has also got to stand the test of war. Hence neutrality turns into a co-operative effort, among Euroneutrals and with other powers, into something which emerges from the adjustment of state policies to the requirements of other states. Neutrality today is thus not merely related to the denial of arms exports and self-sufficiency in equipping one's armed forces, but intrinsically bound up as interactionist, with the search for compromise, approval, recognition and acceptance by other states, rather than by engaging in the transfer of arms the neutrals could jointly contribute, by political initiatives, to the curbing of the traffic in conventional weaponry. In conclusion, future arms trade policies of the Euroneutrals could also contain an arms control aspect, adding to their role as agenda setters, status and standing in a positive way.

3.3 Economic Integration, Economic Interdependence and Euroneutralism

European economic integration, the emergence of a truly European economic Community, is posing a serious challenge to the understanding of neutralism on behalf of every Euroneutral. In the past, in terms of economic strategy, neutralism was married to concepts of autarchy, thus reflecting the foreign policy stance. This may have been a myth, but by now staying out of affluent integration poses a real threat to the Euroneutrals, who find themselves at the periphery of the Common Market. And the economic issue is pressing: Until 1992, the Twelve plan to implement the scheme of a West European internal market, i.e. the abolition of all customs.

From the earliest conception of the Monnet Plan for the integration of Europe after World War II, the concept of a Political Union evolving through economic cooperation was central. The victory of the neo-functionalist strategy over other compelling plans for resolving the quarrels between the European states led to the Treaties of Rome and Paris which legislated for integration but left the longterm aspiration for European or Political Union outside the legal framework of cooperation. The failure of an early, ill-judged attempt in 1954 to hasten the process by integrating the military sector drove home the neo-func-

19 This part of our paper is based largely on Bill McSweeny, The European Neutrals & the EC, mimeo, Dublin 1988.
nationalist lesson and ensured that the ideal of European Union would remain on the moral agenda of the Parliament, but not in the business agenda of the European Commission.

European Political Cooperation began in 1970 as a cautious, inter-governmental arrangement between member-states to coordinate foreign policy on the basis of consensus, not majority, decision-making and, since then, it has been the main agency of the Community for the expression of its political aspirations and for their embodiment in limited fields of foreign policy. Lacking the supra-national authority of other sectors of the EC and even the structural basis of a secretariat, it posed no apparent threat to sovereignty in this sensitive area of foreign policy. Its success in achieving a practical consensus on international issues during its first decade - such as the Middle East, US/EC dialogue and the CSCE - was due in large measure to the coincidence of détente and to the pragmatic, intergovernmental character of its structure. The breakdown of consensus because of Ireland's withdrawal from sanctions during the Falklands War - on the declared grounds that Ireland, as a neutral country, could not impose economic sanctions on a party to military conflict - was not interpreted by the Community as a whole as a breach of EPC norms.

With the emergence of the New Cold War and the collapse of détente, cracks began to appear in the EPC structure which made it imperative, if the momentum of the Seventies was to continue, to limit the pragmatism and informality of its approach and to bring to the forefront of debate the concerns of the eleven NATO members (all except Ireland). Not only Ireland, but also Denmark and Greece found the NATO lobby within the Community problematic. The need to consolidate solidarity against these challenges of the Eighties and the frustration felt by the Germans, French and Italians in particular at the slowness of progress towards Political Union, brought to prominence three related concerns which had previously been articulated in various reports of the European Parliament.

These were a) the formalization of EPC through the establishment of a secretariat and the more explicit articulation of policy aims; b) the need for the completion of the internal market to embrace also a common industrial policy - to include common arms procurement - and a common programme on Research and Development which would include R & D in the military and space fields. The third concern was the more general one of the creation of a European Pillar of NATO, with the status of an alliance within the Alliance.

The Parliament had hitherto functioned as a forum for debate, without formal power, but with the capacity to select and define issues for wider discussion in the member-states. These three questions had, since the mid-Seventies, been tested for public reaction in the twelve nations of the EC and it was the Strasbourg Parliament which, in 1985, launched the official report which later became the Single European Act, designed to accelerate the completion of the internal market and to take the first formal step in EPC away from pragmatism and towards integration on the model of the other sectors of the Community.
3.3.1 The European Neutrals and the EC

Of its nature, European or Political Union, as understood within the earliest forms of the EC, is incompatible with legal neutrality and it is a moot point whether membership of the Community prior to the achievement of European Union, but with the aspiration built into its structure, is consistent with international law governing the status of neutrality. For this reason, none of the four major Euroneutral states fit to apply for membership at the outset in 1952 or on various occasions since then.

But the Single European Act, which finally came into force in July 1987, has posed a serious problem for the Neutrals. The Act envisages the completion of the internal market by 1992, including the abolition of all non-tariff barriers to trade between the member-states. The Neutrals enjoy considerable trade advantages through their membership in EFTA, where tariff barriers have been effectively removed to allow them to trade with EC countries. In 1992, they will be seriously disadvantaged in their access to the 320 m market of the EC. Their dependence on this market, furthermore, will force them to legislate in tandem with the EC on most questions of economic and industrial policy, but without any voice in the decision-making process.

The neutrals differ in the degree of their dependence, of course. Those with a more balanced trade between East and West (Finland and Sweden) face a more manageable problem than Austria and Switzerland. But the longterm economic future for all, in the light of the Single European Act, is problematic, to say the least. In Sweden, Austria and Switzerland, the process is already advanced of their major industries merging or locating within the Community and, effectively, creating a situation where industrially they already belong to the Community but politically they are committed, by their neutrality, to remain outside it. The consequences of this trend for employment and trade balance could be enormous, unless some solution is found.

Austria is currently the most advanced on the road to seeking the solution of integration into the EC. Already, a lively debate is in progress on the benefits and disadvantages of membership, on the legal ramifications and on the possible reaction of the USSR in the light of the Soviet role in the Austrian State Treaty which established its neutrality in 1955. The government is by no means neutral in this debate and appears to be taking every opportunity to emphasize the disadvantages of non-membership while at the same time declaring that neutrality will be no obstacle and will not be compromised by such a step.

The issues involved should, however, not be discussed merely in terms of the strategies to be adopted and options open for individual European neutrals at different phases. Rather one should address comprehensively the basic issues at stake. Neutrality has come to its utter limits conceptually and in terms of norms applied in international relations. A search is needed, common to the Euroneutrals, for new ground to be broken and strategies adopted.
It is obvious that the basic issue, for the part of current neutrality, is embodied in the supra-national tendencies present in European economic integration, represented particularly in the EC. It is at stake already in the discussion of approaches to be taken and the powers to be given to within EFTA, of which most of the neutrals are members. For EFTA to gain sufficient leverage in order to negotiate satisfactory terms of trade and co-operation with the EC, these powers would already be needed.

With increasing interdependence, assuming also supra-national forms, there is an obvious need among the neutrals to develop a conceptual bases and norms form behaviour. How far can the neutrals go in their commitments and what are the policies to be pursued in regard to supra-nationality?

An important variable for the decisions by the Euronutrals certainly will be provided by the emerging political European Community. Presently, it is hard to say whether the EC will end up in an alliance within the Western alliance, with a clearly visible defence posture. Both would be unacceptable to the neutrals, because it would compromise their status. They would prefer a purely civilian market integra-tion.

A European integration process with military connotations furthermore would endanger chances of democratization in Eastern Europe, and it would impede the Europeanization of all countries on the old continent. Also for these reasons, Euronutrals will be uneasy and reluctant to go along with the ambitions of the EC members.

The recent active foreign policies by the Euronutrals, and their efforts to co-ordinate these, may also influence the course of European developments, because the neutrals are likely to make their case towards the EC.

Ireland has aspired to find answers and develop norms within the context of its EC membership. However, also other neutrals are facing these challenges - disregarded whether they finally will opt for membership or choose to stay outside the community. There is no denying that the issues are politically sensitive and difficult to tackle conceptually as supra-nationality is something rather contrary to the traditional understanding of neutrality based on strong sovereignty, autarchy and disengagement. It seem that the systemic aspects of European economic integration speak for a considerable revision. As the neutrals face, in this regard, quite similar challenges both conceptually and politically, they would gain from tackling the issues jointly and pulling their force together in the development of the policies and norms needed.
4. The East-West System in Transition

4.1 A Mixture of Bipolar and Multipolar Tendencies

It seems obvious that after considerable turbulence and tension the East-West-System faces the chance to cross the threshold of another, less confrontatory period. This has been most clearly evidenced by the high-level meeting in Washington and the double-zero agreement abolishing one category of nuclear weapons in Europe.

A simple explanation of these recent developments would be that détente and a period of relaxation are again taking over after years of high tension. This cyclical understanding would, however, be misleading. There has not only been a reversal of the approach between the two major powers and their respective alliances but something more profound has taken place. The transition that has occurred contains many old features familiar also from the years of détente but there are also new concepts, practices and systemic features appearing. This distinction between old and new becomes clear if the present developments and features are compared with those dominant during the period of détente.

During détente there were efforts to stabilize international relations, and particularly East-West relations, by establishing something of a regime based on various rules, norms and institutions. The process also contained various functional aspirations to create contacts and interdependence transcending the basic bipolarity of the system. This was done to counteract the adversary effects of the military factor, that is to ease and smooth its consequences. In essence détente was a political rather than a military process. Issues pertaining to armaments and arms control were left largely outside the broad multilateral diplomatic process. It was assumed that this was primarily the sphere of the two major powers, and in the case of conventional armaments in Europe, the two alliances were seen to be in charge. The purpose was mainly to stem the tide of the arms race, not so much turning the tide. The concerns for cutting the spiral of nuclear and conventional armaments were not acute; it was understood that this had to be tackled later after the core part of détente, the political process, had provided results.

These priorities and order of aims turned in reality to be one of the main weak points of détente and the European security process. Modernization of armaments, increasingly offensive doctrines, military moves in various parts of the world, accentuated feelings of vulnerability as well as the failure of arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union in the nuclear field created a crises of confidence. The developments of the military power structure turned out to carry more weight than those containing the promise for more relaxed and peaceful developments.

Against this background it is understandable that there has been over the past years a multitude of proposals focusing on military developments within the East-West setting. Military issues and developments occupy a central position in the current East-West security dialogue. It is widely recognized that détente yielded a number of achievements but it failed in stemming military instability and counter the adverse
effects of military developments on other parts of the process. In the present search for less polarized and dangerous developments the corrective measures are largely understood to be found in this sector.

In implementing this it is not only the agenda of the European security process that has been reversed. There has also been more profound change in the sense that reductions of armaments are aspired for. The United States and the Soviet Union have a central role in this search for renewed stability but besides these bilateral major power talks also the two military alliances have become important fora for articulating proposals and launching initiatives in the East-West-dialogue. Their role, and the process within the proponents and opponents in the form of some “footnote” countries (expressing their deviant opinions inside NATO), has become far more dominant than it used also for the part of the CSCE process. It are primarily the major powers and the alliances that have decided the agenda and format of the post-Vienna phase of the process. This time they have also reserved themselves a central, and sometimes exclusive position in these talks to come.

The totality of the security order that is emerging has been described best as one of increasing complexity. It contains both strictly bipolar and multipolar tendencies.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, it has features of dynamic centralism but also ambiguity and internal conflict.

The role of the United States and the Soviet Union remains quite central. These two powers act as the key managers and regulators of the process, primarily by aspiring towards a less nuclearized security order. They remain as system dominants as ever, although the content of the policies that they are pursuing is rather different from other phases of the East-West security system. The tendency towards a less nuclearized security order is as such in contradiction with the very centralized fashion of aspiring for this goal. However, thus far the two major powers have been able to cope with it and preserve the momentum in their hands, perhaps partly because other actors have been taken by considerable surprise. If the various suggestions for radical nuclear disarmament really are implemented one may nevertheless assume that contradiction will emerge and more multilateral and pluralistic tendencies will enter the picture.

NATO and the WTO have served as a corollary to the process conducted bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union, as sounding boards for other proposals and issues related to the efforts to restabilize the military scene and to add to the confidence across the East-West borderline. This increased visibility and significance is also to be discerned within the context of the CSCE, a process hitherto at least formally the forum for talks between all the 35 participating states. Now an intervening variable is introduced by concentrating the talks on conventional disarmament in Europe to member states of the two alliances. The 35 is reduced to a core of 23 with the neutrals and the non-
aligned pushed to the sidelines. This is a feature that indicates considerable change and polarity within the CSCE itself as military issues and conventional disarmament is finally entering the agenda.

The alliance-to-alliance context is also used in a number of other ways, for example in presenting various schemes for disengagement, elimination of short-range nuclear weapons or adoption of less offensive postures. The most recent proposal was contained in the Murmansk speech of Secretary General Gorbatchevshev. He proposed that talks could be initiated between the alliances on reducing offensive naval presence as well as provocative manoeuvres in the "High North".

The current security system also shows some sights of diversity and multilateralism. These tendencies are, however, less pronounced than the more centralized and bipolar ones and appear mainly in the form of subregional tendencies. They are manifested, for example, in the various proposals for nuclear-free zones in the Balkans or in the Nordic region. In the Nordic case there is also some quite concrete dynamics present as the countries concerned have established a joint foreign ministry civil servant study group for further analysis of the idea. The various proposals for nuclear-weapon free-zones contain significant developments in subregional terms and are becoming tools in the prevention and countering of tendencies of entangling the northern or southern parts of Europe increasingly into the nuclear calculus. Fears are expressed that this could happen as an indirect consequence of reducing land-based nuclear weapon systems on the continent or as a result of the more general tendency to emphasize air- or sea-based systems. These zoning proposals may thus have considerable political and military significance in subregional terms. However, plans for such measures do not occupy any central position on the over-all European security agenda. They are not probable to be taken up at the CSCE and in general the attitudes towards zoning are quite reserved within the alliances, at least on the Western side.

There are also some proposals covering the central part of Europe. Poland proposed in 1987 a new plan for further demilitarization and reduction of conventional armaments in Central Europe. The plan also contains ideas about a more defensive approach and is, more generally, a subregional application of the broader lines of thinking that have been agreed upon within the WTO. The states in focus of the plan are only allied countries in central Europe. Conceptually the Polish plan resembles some of the earlier Eastern proposals for disengagement and diversification, but this time neutrality has been cut out altogether. There has also been proposals presented from the side of the GDR on reducing considerably the number of tanks in Central Europe. The idea is one of disengagement in the form of a "tank-free" zone. To judge from the reactions, that these two proposals have caused, subregionalism has not much more momentum there than in other parts of Europe.

One of the really crucial tendencies of diversification within the East-West security system seems now to be found within NATO in the form of Europeanism. This development seems to carry at least as much weight as the various subregional schemes for arms control and disarmament. The aspiration of some of the NATO members to form a more distinct subgroup within the Western alliance have become stronger
with recent years. They are visible in the new emphases on the WEU as well as different measures of French-German or French-British bilateral military co-ordination and co-operation. There are efforts among these countries to strengthen both the credibility of nuclear and conventional deterrence on sub-regional bases. There are various views and interpretations on the significance of these developments. Some argue that in reality they substitute any real measures towards more independent European positions while others take them for first steps in preparing for more autonomous European defence policies in view of a potential US withdrawal from Europe.

In any case Europeanism is a dominant form of development on the East-West security scene. It introduces already as such, as a topical issue, considerable diversity into the alliance structure and could in the long run develop into something of an intervening structure in Europe as opposed to the traditional bipolar setting. It may co-exist with the NATO transatlanticist umbrella but in any case it represents much of the dynamics of the current European situation.

4.2 Euroneutrality at the Sidelines

The way of describing developments in East-West relations as growing complexity is as such correct. However, this term remains too broad and does not sufficiently catch those aspects that are essential for neutrality and neutralism. A more sophisticated way of putting it would be to say that these relations are not merely dominated by bipolarity and centralization. These features are there but there is also growing interdependence, heterogeneity and pluralism present. From a structural point of view these latter aspects are particularly important for neutrality. They provide the ground needed for neutrality to exist, but also form the systemic bases for a variety of other in-between positions such as neutralism and dealignment.

It seems, however, that the neutrals are rather confused about their situation and the rather diffuse and unconventional policy agenda they have to work with. Out of the opportunities and dilemmas that exist the dilemmas have been seen to be more prominent. Therefore the neutrals have remained more at the fringes, and each in their individual way, of the East-West system than was the case previously. Among the Euronutrals there has been signs of marginalization, perhaps even self-marginalization, and neutralism has been with recent years a more visible phenomenon than neutrality.

It seems that the neutrals, as far as government activities are concerned, still define themselves predominantly as guardians of the East-West system as it used to be during the period of détente. They look backwards in their policies rather than forward. Ideas of acting as carriers and organizers of new policies exploiting the fact that current structures support neutrality rather than challenge it are by and large missing. The neutrals refrain from grasping any new openings, rather they aspire for old policies ranging from passivity to what could be called policies of status quo plus, that is doing away with unnecessary
tensions and conflicts in the East-West system but leaving it structurally intact. It is as if the European neutrals would have become accustomed to defining and seeing themselves as reflections of alliance relationships and dominant bipolar universalism. They react as if the crises of that system and its logic would also be their crises and feel rather uncertain about the new tendencies present. With this understanding they are paralyzed rather than relieved. In the field of military co-production there are some scattered new schemes among the neutrals. In this regard they deviate somewhat from their previous quite individualistic profiles but even these schemes are more results of ad-hoc pressures and traditional concerns rather than sign of any innovative and conscious thinking.

The complexity of current East-West developments allows a certain choice in the conclusion to be done. One may either focus on bipolarity and the trends of centralization or one may stress the features of interdependence, pluralism and diversification. It seems that the neutrals take it safe, in the analyses done, to upgrade bipolarity and centralization. The dilemmas are taken to be more pressing than the opportunities. Instead of calling into question their traditional and rather diversified self-understanding the neutrals stick to these conceptualizations. The challenges embodied in the development of East-West relations thus remain potential rather than actual. It is easily felt that experimenting with anything new, even if it would be in line with systemic developments, would be too uncertain. It could also produce a crises of identity, legitimacy and foreign policy consensus in the respective neutral countries. Furthermore, there are worries that aspiring for forms of neutrality that would be in harmony with current structural developments of the East-West setting would be a risky undertaking in view of major power reactions.

There is no denying that this could be the case. Both United States and the Soviet Union seem to favour rather centralized patterns in their current policies of introducing systemic reforms such as denuclearisation. Strong and active neutrality would not be in line with this. Furthermore, the major powers still have in some respects different views on neutrality. Soviet preferences, particularly during the last two years, appears to place increased emphasis on interdependence in the international community. Soviet policies seem, at least in some respects, to be aimed at opting out of the very narrow zero-sum conceptualizations of international relations. In the evaluations there is a recognition of competition and confrontation, but also of trends towards a more integral, non-competitive world. This tends to lead to a position of respect for neutrality, particularly in its active and positive forms. This tolerance for plurality goes, to some extent, also for smaller socialist countries. As the theory behind Soviet foreign policy strongly implies universalist and totalitarian explanations for particular features of international relations, a phenomenon such as neutrality still creates some difficulty on the more basic level of understanding. These theory-related difficulties have, however, not been a major hindrance to the acceptance of neutrality, and even the difficulties at the level of theory have somewhat decreased. With time, they might be expected to decrease further if new conceptualizations turn out to take root.

The United States, traditionally quite reserved about neutrality, has also adopted a more positive view during recent years. The intermediary role of the neutrals during a period of increasing East-West ten-
sion has been given some recognition. There has also been less talk about neutrality as free-riding or about its immoral nature, or the neutrals as defectors from the ranks of the faithful. The existence of a third way is recognized, although there is no understanding for it in more general, theoretical terms.

However, this thaw does not apply to every form of neutrality, and particularly not to active and positive neutrality. It has been made clear that the United States favours classical individualist neutrality or deterrence neutrality with a strong fortress mentality. Neutrality in the form of mere abstentionism does not cause any major reactions as long as it remains in the choice of some small and peripheral country. Any efforts at model-building or resort to collective forms are, however, discouraged, and any indications of neutrality as a sign of pluralism as opposed to the universalism required by the standard discourse are challenged. This has been important, among other reasons, for encapsulating neutrality and keeping it separate from the various neutralist tendencies among the Western allies. This goes particularly for the Federal Republic of Germany. It has also been underlined that neutrality does not require abstention in ideological issues such as human rights. The neutrals are in this regard seen to be part of the Western culture and forms of life and they are expected to behave accordingly. On the other hand they are expected to keep their rhetorics on arms control and disarmament in check, and required to adopt a low profile or at most a position of equidistance in issues where the West is on the defensive.

It is felt that armed neutrality is beneficial to the Western alliance within a certain division of labour. Particularly in Central and Northern Europe the neutrals constitute a buffer that frees allied forces for other purposes, provides additional time before action has to be taken in the case of war, and attrite the forces of the Warsaw Pact. They are simply seen as a first line of defence for the West.

This does not imply that the reason for seeing neutrality primarily in military terms is merely a tactical one. The military aspects of security are predominant in American thinking in general, and views on neutrality are in line with this. Neutrality without a strong military component is seen as illusory. The neutrals are expected to accept their place in the new strategic order that is being formed. In this way, they are brought from the "outside" to the "inside", the Western realm of identity. It is often stressed that it is the balance of power, as set by the major powers, that restricts and regulates the use of force in international relations and prevents anarchy from taking over - and not norms or other comparable factors. The neutrals are also supposed to recognize this, and thus not endanger international security by becoming agents of systemic change by contributing to an erosion of the established balance and the way confrontation is organized in the present international system.

In sum, the United States operates with conceptions that from the point of view of the neutrals tend to look somewhat outdated, while the Soviet Union expresses preferences for something that according to the neutrals looks utopian rather than realistic. The United States wants a restoration of neutrality and the Soviet Union explores future options for it within a less confrontatory East-West system. Thus, there is clearly potential for strains and material for considerable friction in these conceptualizations.
Under these conditions it has been concluded among the Euronutrals that the safest strategy is one of remaining status quo oriented, keep a rather low profile and to stay at the sidelines. There has been a conscious efforts to refrain from situations where neutrality would become a contentious issue between East and West. The effort has been one of conflict limitation within the prevalent structures of power rather than responding to the various challenges as well as the opportunities that the situation provides.

5. Euronutralism and Increasing Multipolarity: Conclusions

During the past forty years, European neutrals had to find answers to the numerous new challenges by the two blocs, especially when these blocs were built, and when the camp leaders looked around for additional support. Traditional concepts of neutrality were not of much help, especially if the regime of military politics was left. The twentieth century added to the challenges to neutralism two basic features. First, there was the basic antagonism with ideological overtones which was new to the European scene, and second there was protracted Cold War, at the brink of hot warfare, throughout decades. The totality of this recent contest placed severe demands upon the policies of countries which had developed neutralist postures for generations, such as Switzerland and Sweden. And the challenges were at least equally difficult for neutralist newcomers, such as Finland or Austria.

The Euronutrals had to adopt to this setting, which was not their choice, but they accommodated to it and found the Cold War setting quite affordable. As has been indicated, this environment for the conduct of neutral politics is coming to the end of its useful life. Neutrals are bound to consider to take a more active stance in the shaping of the new European order than they did in the past.

Today, European neutrals are facing predominantly three issue areas, to which their responses vary significantly.

The first one is the approach to conventional armaments and efforts to control them, after the abolishment of INF, and after a possible removal of nuclear tactical weapons altogether. The INF accord, as a natural consequence, has increased the importance of conventional armaments, and may thus have added in boost to the Vienna CSCE negotiations. Because the neutrals are conventionally armed, the majority of European alliance members (i.e. all except the nuclear powers) find themselves much closer in their respective defence postures than it has been the case earlier.

The second important issue area was found to be the neutrals'relationship with the European Community and the plan to implement a European domestic market scheme until 1992. This step is seen in neutral capitals with fear. In the past, neutrality was rarely related with the economic sphere. In the past, Euronutrals never had questioned the principles of the capitalist world economy. Today, they find
themselves confronted with difficult economic issues which challenge their past isolation from economic concerns.

The response to both challenges, the security and the economic one, however, render the pursuit of past insular policies and staying aside is a rather shortsighted solution. The adoption of such an approach in a period of transition certainly is supported by the historical traditions and political values of the various European neutrals. But this is precisely the juncture when dogmas should be challenged and traditions openly questioned. Neutrality should everywhere no longer be perceived in terms relevant either during the Cold War or the years of detente, that is as a corrective tool for some of the smaller states to function within a system of hegemonic bipolarism. Much more could and should be aspired for taking into account structural developments in East-West relations in the spheres of security, economy and technology. The neutrals should be less concerned about the views and policies of other international actors, among them two major powers, and focus their attention primarily on international systemic transformation. Otherwise they endanger becoming something of remnants of previous systemic features and objects, not subjects, of the policies of forces better in command of that transformation. The current changes of the structures conditioning international interaction also provide for neutrality in the form of increasing heterogeneity, pluralism and multipolarity, i.e. depolarisation instead of polarisation. With their fixation of providing the middle ground, each in the individual way, in a basically bipolar system, the neutrals seem to be ill equipped to resort to any other measures than bolstering their unilateral defence efforts. A number of features of the contemporary security environment correspond to the security interests of the neutrals, as well as the international community at large. The neutrals could, by turning their unique roles into a platform for efforts towards a further transformation and strengthening of interdependence, in the long run, also increase their own security.21

In a way it is understandable that the European neutrals stick to their traditional policies and refuse to engage themselves into any future-oriented, visionary exercises. There is much power in the traditional symbolizations of neutrality. Pluralism and heterogeneity in contemporary international relations do not form any special challenge, but make things more easy for the neutrals and may encourage passive policies. The crux of the matter is growing interdependence transcending also bipolarity. This is a problematic systemic feature for the neutrals to deal with.

Interdependence is difficult in combine with the strong sovereignty, autarchy and fortress mentality embodied in the classical model. Under interdependence the security policy requirements are different; instead of opting out and trying to avoid the consequences of war, security becomes a matter of scoring high in terms of usefulness to the international system. There is a broad basis for neutrality during peace but hardly any during war. Hence neutrality turns into a cooperative effort, into something variable that emerges from the adjustment of states to the requirements of each other. It is not permanent but con-

21 Sundelius, op.cit., p. 31.
stituted over and over again. Within such a setting, neutrality also becomes interactionist, not a way of staying apart and strengthening frontiers for the sake of a separate, abstentionist identity. It is no longer limited to denial, that is "status negativism" and to some very narrow aspects of interaction with other states. The aim becomes one of "status positivism", and to remove motives for threatening another nation, moderating confrontation as well as creating patterns and constellations where no actor has anything to gain by pursuing policies of conflict and confrontation. This is far more than staying aloof and the mere avoidance of becoming the target of military intervention. It is a policy of conflict resolution rather than conflict limitation. Stability is not seen as an enforced condition originating in mechanistic principles such as balance of power. Rather, it is a result of mutual recognition of the legitimacy of certain basic interests in national security policy and the community nature of international relations. Neutrality rests on this community nature, which partly originates with the nuclear threat, and aims at strengthening such a communality.

Neutrality is thus not related merely to various material resources and self-sufficiency, that is capabilities of preserving the frontier, but intrinsically bound up with the approval, recognition and acceptance of neutrality by other states. Instead of some general norms and specific definitions enforced primarily by the aspirants themselves or the great text of international law regulating war, neutrality becomes dependent on dialogue and the overall development of international relations. It becomes systemic in its essence and is constantly at stake in the interaction with other states. However, it should not be understood as requiring the consent of all, but as a carrier of common interests, ideas, proposals or actions such as peace-keeping operations. Sometimes the common interest has to be defended against particular interests. Since an interactionist stance makes neutrality critically dependent, in action policies, on its external acceptability, it becomes a political relationship to be constantly guarded and strengthened. It is understood that in the world of today, in the nuclear era, the age of deterrence, deepening economic integration and a tight technology community, neutrality as an isolationist kind, as a rigid and permanent status in the post-war context defined by the neutral country merely for itself on legalistic grounds, makes little sense. Much more can and should be aspired to.

The increased interdependence and heterogeneity of present-day international relations allow as such, and even invite, for various new forms of neutrality. The reasons for drawing a strict line in the direction of countries with neutralist tendencies are no longer there to the same extent as before. Interesting and important coalition could emerge if systemic developments of the East-West setting would be fully exploited. Conceptually the neutrals have much to contribute in the sphere of security to the present discussion of non-offensive defence or policies of common security. They have traditionally pursued policies aimed at ensuring the trust of the potential adversaries rather than threatening them with utter destruction. Their record could now serve as examples of the practical application of such concepts and thus fuel and guide the present East-West security debate on a number of issue pertaining to mutual
accommodation through peaceful means.\textsuperscript{22} This would mean the translation of neutrality from a dissociative approach and identity to an associative one and something else than merely opting out of major power rivalries and becoming an anti-pole of alliance policies. It would imply the use of a structural approach rather staying merely at the level of traditional actor policies by directing their concerns increasingly at transforming the international environment. What is needed is a systemic consciousness on how to shape developments and structures conditioning also the survival and well-being of the neutrals themselves.

To counteract those current trends of marginalization that can be discerned in the spheres of politics, economy and technology, such policies should also take some collective forms of involvement. The CSCE process is a natural forum for such aspirations. The consultative practices of the N+N group should be developed and the neutrals should aspire for more than brokers of compromises or procedural managers. Above all they should aspire for a multilateralization of the group of 23 and active participation in the arms control and disarmament regime that is emerging in European security policies. Likewise, the Euroneutrals should be able to develop a more coherent and common strategy vis-à-vis the supra-national features increasingly present in European economic integration and specifically the European Communities. They should be conscious of the inextricable link between politics and economics existing in these questions and develop an explicit line of what policies are to be advanced and what is to be counteracted as incompatible with a more peaceful European order, and neutrality within that setting. Obviously the neutrals would gain from tackling these issues jointly.

Also the UN would seem to offer opportunities to advance and codify contemporary neutrality. Firstly, the neutrals could opt for various forms of UN recognition like the recent registration of the Anglo-Irish Agreement by the Security Council. Those occasions when the UN is making use of the services of the neutrals in its peace-keeping operations could also be used to stress the usability and benefits of neutrality for the common good. The fact that the neutrals seem to be better equipped for such functions also in the sense that they have experience of the non-offensive approach that these operations require should be made use of, particularly as this goes for a number of other services - as well. For the second, the neutrals could establish a secretariat of their own at the UN to work on common problems of active neutrality. There are some obvious issues in the field of arms control that could serve as topic examples. The first one is that of banning cruise missiles, a weapon system that inherently endanger the inviolability of the territorial integrity of countries which are overflown, e.g. the Euroneutrals. Control, regulation and curbing of the traffic in conventional arms on the international market is another issue area where the neutrals could move jointly. So far it has been too sensitive for any of the neutrals to act individually, but jointly they could introduce some fresh initiatives. In general, some of the experiences of the neutrals as procedural managers and movers of stalemated issues could in such a way be taken over from the European scene and the CSCE and made use of also in the context of the UN. Again the purpose should

\textsuperscript{22} ibid.
be as much concern for the common good and the development of the UN, not that of featuring the neutrals as a specific bloc among other blocs. 23

Quite obviously, with significant changes in the East-West system, reconceptualization of neutrality is needed. However, it is not only needed in an idealistic sense. Looking into systemic development, it is also apparent that there are realistic possibilities for such change.

In the final round of assessment of neutrality, we will turn to the question, whether the concept has to offer more than an strategy for survival of a few European countries. The issue is whether neutralism may become a guideline for European policies in general. It might well be that despite all differentiations neutralism can be organized as an active peace strategy.

Neutralism as a peace strategy 24

Neither in relation to historical background of their neutrality (except Sweden), nor in relation to their chances of preserving their status of neutrality in a possible military conflict, nor in relation to their duties under international law the Euroneutrals are playing the role of active peacemakers. Their policy largely has been to use there status as a negative and passive means for asserting their own national state interests. The neutrals formed a sort of veto-group in order to prevent the worst during the deterioration of East-West relations in the Eighties.

None the less the governments of all neutrals pretend to contribute to the prevention of war and to the reduction of international tension. This will be correct from their point of view, but if one sees the limitations of neutralist policies to influence major power concepts, one can only speculate what the impact of this position is, which mostly is maintained for domestic consumption. Especially the peace movement, in neutral countries and elsewhere in Europe, is asking whether the concept of neutralism can be widened and actualized into an active peace strategy.

The boldest demand reads:

"Neutrality policy has to develop strategies to lead the bloc countries out of the bloc confrontation." 25

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24 This idea has been especially developed by Josef Binter, see e.g. The Actual and Potential Role of Neutrality. In Search of Peace and Security, in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 16, 1985, no. 4, pp. 387 - 398.

This statement, coming from the so-called Coordination of N+N Peace Initiatives, certainly is overambitious, but it points into the direction how other activists would like to see the concept of neutralism developed. A more realist approach would firstly ask how presently Euroneutrals in fact contribute to peacekeeping, and secondly, how this role may be enhanced.

Indications as to how neutrality could function as a peace strategy are:

**Good offices.** This refers to all measures by a third, disinterested party, which is aiming at establishing or improving contacts between states being in dispute. In particular Switzerland is renowned for rendering services to mediate international conflicts by offering neutral locations for negotiations, transmitting information between conflicting parties and offering formal proposals for procedure. According to the logic of this concept, the neutral part may not articulate its own positions concerning the object of dispute and not intervene. The goal is to bring conflicting parties together without exercising influences. This concept of neutrality is strongly linked to a traditional, passive understanding of neutrality. Rendering good services differs markedly from mediation. The concept of good services, how helpful it may have been in a number of cases, apparently can not be developed for an active peace strategy on the side of the neutrals.

**Active mediation** is more far-reaching because it requires the involvement of the neutral party in a conflict. Mediating means presenting specific proposals to parties in conflict, with a view to conflict resolution.

An equivalent to the originally Swiss concept of good services is the Austrian one of bridge-building between East and West. An example is provided by the Helsinki initiative: Finnish interest in the European détente process led to the initiative to present the proposal to the governments of European states, USA and Canada, for a security conference. Additionally, Finland offered Helsinki as a venue for the negotiations.

For a number of reasons, this function of bridge-building between the East and the West can be substantiated. Euroneutrals are in unique position, because they are generally perceived to be part of the West, while the Soviet Union accepted the neutral role with the view that those Euroneutrals are capitalist countries which do not belong to the NATO alliance.

Part of the bridge-building is also the Euroneutrals' attempt to increase economic exchanges and interdependence in Europe. An open question is whether balanced economic relations with both East and West are necessary requirement for the functioning of an active neutralist peace policy. Finland and Austria hitherto have considered such a balance in the field of economic relations as an instrument to increase credibility of their neutral status.
On top of such indirect means for the enhancement of peace rank direct initiatives for arms limitation and disarmament efforts. The Kekkonen plan for a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone or the Swedish proposal for a nuclear weapon-free corridor in Europe are examples for such an active peace policy. In the past, such proposals have been brought into debate by individual governments (which also aims to impress upon their constituencies the notion of an activist and responsible government). Maybe that forthcoming initiatives will be based on more than the good intentions of one particular government, and that possibly Euroneutrals as a group pose proposals which the alliances may find difficult to reject. Apparently, there are possibilities to enlarge the peace activist role of European neutrals.

Neutralism as a peace strategy can also be adopted by European states which belong to one of the alliances. Both formally declared neutrality and neutralism in the foreign policy of a state remaining within an alliance may serve the same goals, in a directly comparable manner. It is not necessary that alliance members turn formally towards neutrality. It appears as much more reasonable, given the resistance of alliance leaders against such moves, that European states interested in the possibilities of the neutralist approach reorientate their conduct in foreign affairs in effect towards neutral positions.

An indication of such a role can be seen when allied members stress their special national interest, which may not be fully in line with the intention of the alliance leadership, in deliberations with the other side. Reducing support for the alliance leader may stir up tensions within a bloc (a goal both sides found attractive at times). On the other hand, dissidents in an alliance have used the pursuit of their national interest against the declared will of the alliance leader to emit positive signals to the members of the other coalition. The Dutch resistance against deployment of Euromissiles in this country may be understood in this context.

This kind of neutralism in the application of alliance decisions could alleviate moves found counterproductive by the other side, it could moderate East-West tensions and induce alliance leaders to look out for concepts which promise a greater consensus in the coalition.

Basically, neutralism can be seen as one tool in the process to find ways and means leading from a continuously militarized systemic conflict to safer grounds for the carrying out of the controversy. The label for such a normative structure has been coined by the formula of a "New European Peace Order". But there are many views what this catchword should mean. It is unlikely that there will be speedy consensus about an acceptable design of this new European peace order. But similarly to the call for a new international economic order, which failed to lead to actual reforms, the appeal for conscious rebuilding of military relations may stimulate insight, awareness and preparedness to go into appropriate directions.

Not only the East-West conflict, neutralism itself is bound to change. The reasoning given above gave a number of hints towards this requirement. If the change will be regulated, to whatever ideas, the norma-

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tive question comes in again. - There is a feeling among some activists that such a change is indeed on the agenda, if neutralism shall contribute more actively to peace. The group of neutralist peace activists cited above, in a somewhat helpless manner, calls for some sort of seminar jamboree to improve the situation:

"Together with peace researchers, political and social scientists, international law specialists - the peace movement should work out a memorandum for a new interpretation of neutrality. This memorandum should give guidelines for a transbordering cooperation."\(^{27}\)

The proposition will sound politically naïve but it highlights the requirement that a future European peace order requires changes on the side of neutralists, and adoption of the old concept to new contexts.

The various proposals made to fill the formula of the European peace order with life and spirit all imply substantial change both within the membership of alliances and elsewhere. The "World Order Project" as depicted by Falk, Johansen and Mendlovitz,\(^{28}\) arguing in legal and formalist traditions, see possibilities for improvement of global security in "demilitarization, depolarization, denationalization and transnationalization". The Project advocates nuclear weapon-free zones, which in the event could lead to layers of "zones of peace". Within the activities of the United Nations University, the Scandinavian peace researcher Hettne has submitted an assessment of various future models for Europe. He recommends in the end a model based in fundamentally new interpretations of the common peace. According to this findings, social justice will be a key element in peace structures which will be characterized by "sustainability, invulnerability, and legitimacy."\(^{29}\)

A third model, focusing explicitly on a new European peace order, has been submitted by a group of young West German researchers, Böge/Wilke, accompanied by reasoning coming from the same institute.\(^{30}\) The well elaborated concept identifies phases, individual steps and gradual measures towards the realization of a regional system of collective security, recommending neutralism as a final step towards the dissolution of the blocs. Alongside with the phasing out of the bloc scheme these analysts envisage the parallel build up of a new European order based on the idea of collective security, with the temporary "neutralization" of former pact states.

All the ideas mentioned and more which will stir up attention may not be perfectly convincing. For one, neutrality and the concept of collective security are regarded hitherto as mutually exclusive. But the citations indicate that there is a debate, that arguments are formed to shed light on the issue, that compara-\(^{27}\) Iraischko, op.cit.  
\(^{28}\) Cf. R. Johansen, World Policy, How to Start Ending the Arms Race, New York 1983.  
\(^{29}\) Björn Hettne, Transcending the European Model of Peace and Development; (UNU), forthcoming.  
tive assessments are submitted and recommendations are made. As usual for academic contributions, their actual meaning does not rest with the proof that the models get practically adopted. These model approaches rather signify the intellectual awareness of undercurrents which are acting and in force, albeit they do not surface. The academic writings may also overdo the issue or idealize too much. But they remain handy references to a complicated development which indeed may submerge an activist European peace policy by virtue of neutralism.