Development Cooperation after War and Violent Conflict

Debates and Challenges

Sabine Kurtenbach/Matthias Seifert

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ABSTRACT


The report asks for the determining factors and specific challenges of development cooperation after war and violent conflict. Based on an extensive review of current literature, the report identifies six issue areas relevant to development cooperation. Furthermore, relevant actors and policies of select donors are analyzed. The report concludes that many links between the different issue areas in post-conflict/post-war situations have not been analyzed thoroughly enough and thus recommends further research.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, free Aceh Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD(R)R</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, (Reinsertion) and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Frente Marti para la Liberación Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LICUS</td>
<td>Low Income Countries under Stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-DESA</td>
<td>UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRISD</td>
<td>United Nations Research Institute on Social Development</td>
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</table>
1. Introduction\(^1\)

Working in contexts of armed conflict has become of utmost importance for international cooperation, for foreign and security politics as well as for development cooperation.\(^2\) Various different discourses in academic research as well as in the related policy communities are becoming increasingly intertwined. The respective focus differs along academic and research backgrounds due to recent developments. Six debates are relevant for the identification of the major challenges international cooperation in general and development cooperation specifically have to face in the context of armed conflict and war:

1. **Root causes and early warning** became prominent immediately after the end of the Cold War due to the rising number of (interstate) wars. The violent collapse of the former Yugoslavia and many African wars heightened awareness for the importance of ethnic identities in armed conflict. Afterwards, the discussion shifted to the issue of greed and the role of resource control as a motivation for violence, with the World Bank and macro-quantitative studies dominating the discussion.

2. Humanitarian and economic consequences and dynamics of violent conflict were mostly analysed by anthropological studies at the micro level. The concept of “new wars” was developed in this line of research as was the do-no-harm approach\(^3\) focussing on the direct and indirect consequences humanitarian relief and aid has on conflicts.

3. The termination of wars and armed conflict through negotiations und the opportunities and limitations of external actors are traditional topics for international relations and peace research. Since it had become increasingly difficult to end contemporary wars with classical diplomatic approaches (track I) two new strategies were discussed: The possibilities of civil society peacebuilding (track II), and the legitimacy of military intervention for humanitarian reasons. The debate on civil-military

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1 Research for this report was partially possible thanks to a project financed by BMZ/GTZ. The discussions we had helped to strengthen our arguments. We would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of an anonymous reviewer. All opinions errors are the responsibility of the authors.

2 Development cooperation will here be understood in a very broad sense, including all policies, strategies and instruments that aim for an improvement in the quality of life of the citizens of the respective countries. Thus, peace-enhancing elements such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission are also covered by the term development cooperation.

3 The DNH-approach asks, how assistance in conflict-prone countries can be delivered more effectively and how the conflict-prolonging effects of said assistance can be reduced (CDA 2004).
cooperation to end armed conflict and on the so-called “securitisation” of development cooperation has its origins in these developments.

4. The obvious problems of ending violent conflicts and wars and the high percentage of relapse into war or locked peace processes provoked a discussion on the possibilities and limits of peacebuilding. Besides a theoretical and normative debate, the policy oriented debate centred on available and necessary instruments, strategies, timing and sequencing.

5. Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 9/11/2001 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the debate overlapped with a broader discussion on aid effectiveness (poor performers, difficult partnerships and fragile states). In the context of post-conflict and post-war countries the possibilities of external stabilisation and violence control became prominent.

6. Last not least, cooperation in post-conflict and post-war contexts is closely related to emergency aid and humanitarian relief. While natural disasters influence armed conflict, cooperation in both contexts needs a high level of flexibility and a quick response. The debate on complex humanitarian emergencies focussed, among other issues, on donor coordination and conflict sensitive approaches.

All these debates are relevant for the discussion on the challenges for development cooperation in immediate post-conflict and post-war contexts. These societies are located in a process of difficult and complex orientation as the termination of war is only seldom a clear rupture with war and armed conflict. Although an increasing number of armed conflicts is ended through negotiations, the situation on the ground can best be characterised as a grey zone of neither war nor peace. Violence may be reduced or change its form but there is no certainty that the process of transformation out of war is going on or will succeed. This high level of uncertainty and complexity is a challenge for international and development cooperation which thus needs to expand analysis, adjust instruments as well as design and modes of implementation to name just four important issues.

The goal of the present study is to give a survey on the related state of the art, based on a review on the relevant literature on post-war and post-conflict transformation processes and on donor strategies. This is not and cannot be exhaustive as the body of research and literature is increasing day by day. Hence, our aim is to present the main issues which are relevant for the work of development cooperation in the immediate post-conflict or post-war context. As there is little clarity on wording and concepts in this grey zone we will start in part I by giving a short overview and present the main definitions and concepts we find helpful. Part II is a survey on the academic as well as on the policy oriented debate on relevant issues in post-war and post-conflict contexts: The

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4 For an introduction to these debates see Ramsbotham/Woodhouse/Mall 2005, with a specific focus on development cooperation Reychler/Paffenholz 2001.
main body of literature is related to the relapse into war. Three topics – demilitarisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR), reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure and reconstruction of social relations – are intimately related to the process of ending an armed conflict and the immediate aftermath. Most donors and agencies work in three other fields relevant for the overall transformation process: promotion of democracy, economic development and statebuilding.

Part III turns to a discussion on relevant internal and external actors. Strategies and approaches major donors have developed in these contexts will be presented focusing on the World Bank, UN agencies (UNDP and the UN Peacebuilding Commission), the European Union and identifies some general problems. Part IV will identify some lessons learnt and gaps in policy oriented and academic research.5

2. Conflicts, Wars, and their Termination – some Considerations on Wording and Concepts

Conflicts are a normal consequence of development and social change as these processes influence and change existing social relations as well as patterns of power and dominance. Under some conditions conflicts can escalate into violence, the trespassing to the category of war depends on the definitions applied: Qualitative approaches are based on criteria like the continuity of armed combat, the level of organisation and the character of the armed actors, while quantitative definitions draw the line between armed conflict and war with regard to the number of directly battle related deaths.6 Empirically, this distinction is rather difficult to make due to a lack of reliable data (being themselves an important conflict asset) and due to the symbiosis of different forms of violence (e.g. between political, criminal and social violence) making it difficult to find clear-cut distinctions. The definition of war is based on the perception of violence being somehow politically motivated or having political goals. But actors may change their aims as well as their discourse depending on contexts, e.g. politicise it in the forefront of negotiations. The discussion on “new” wars is based on the observation that after the end of the Cold War many armed actors seemed mostly to be looking for personal or collective

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5 Policy recommendations are presented in a separate Policy Brief.

6 The most common beneath threshold is 1,000 deaths introduced by the Correlates of War project and used by the Uppsala/Prio data bank project. Under this threshold it is distinguished between “medium level armed conflicts” with 25 to 1,000 direct battle related deaths and “minor armed conflicts” beneath this number. In the last year the data was revised to identify (and exclude) conflicts with overwhelmingly one-sided violence like the genocide in Ruanda (see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/).
enrichment. Availability of resources is (and has been) important for armed actors to finance their combat and the establishment of structures of a war economy has heavily influenced the dynamics (and the duration) of many wars. Empirical research on the ground however contradicts the reduction of causes and dynamics of armed conflicts to these features.  

Armed conflicts are highly complex and change over time. Two features of contemporary interstate war are highly relevant: The interrelation of different forms of violence (political, economic, private and criminal) and the lack of a state-based monopoly of force. These aspects demonstrate the close relationship to the debate on fragile states. It is important to recognise that wars and armed conflicts are not static but that they change over time with regard to their intensity, their territorial focus, the actors involved and their motivation. In post-war and post-conflict contexts these features remain present as influences resulting from war and widespread violence remain in force and do not disappear all of a sudden.

The debate on wording is not merely an academic exercise but is important since external actors define their strategies and priorities according to their perspective and classification of different forms of violence. The increasing violence perceived as (political) war was answered by the establishment of specific units working on conflict prevention and conflict resolution while criminal and social violence are mostly seen under a governance perspective.

For the present study we define the category of post-war and post-conflict countries when a war or armed conflict has ended and has not resumed for three consecutive years (that is after 2005). Post-war and post-conflict countries will thus be used interchangeably for the time being. We use a “negative” definition of non-war as the concept of peace is even harder to define than war. While this pragmatic definition can be disputed, it serves our purposes, as we do not aim at statistical correlation. The following table gives a first idea on the diversity and heterogeneity of today’s post-war and post-conflict societies.

Post-war and post-conflict societies are not necessarily on a linear path out of war but constitute specific social spaces whose direction of development is open. This space is characterised by the conflicts and fractures caused by the interaction of processes that are typical for development societies (e.g. urbanisation, social differentiation, changing patterns of social cohesion). On the other hand, the influences of war and violence are still highly relevant even if a ceasefire or peace accord has been signed. The consequences of war, destruction and violence influence developments on different levels, they are destructive (regarding the human and material costs) but they can also provide opportunities for change (e.g. consciously debilitating actors that block change). Thus the term war-torn society – shaped by a research program of the UN

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8 While somewhat arbitrary, the year 2005 was chosen for reasons of data availability and in order to remain as up-to-date as necessary.
Research Institute on Social Development (UNRISD) – is most appropriate. The consequences of war and widespread violence shape societies over time, which makes conflict-sensitive approaches to the different transformation processes necessary.

**Post-Conflict and Post-War Societies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Modes of termination</th>
<th>Classification as war (w) or armed conflict (ac)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1995-2001 w, 2002 ac (downturn – Cabinda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1997 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1996 ac, 1997-2000 w 2001 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dshibuti</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1998-99 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>downturn</td>
<td>1995-1999 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>downturn</td>
<td>1997, 1999, 2003 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>downturn</td>
<td>2000-2001 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>victory</td>
<td>1998 w, 1999 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>2002-2004 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>victory</td>
<td>1998 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1996 ac, 2000-2002 ac, 2003 w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1995-97 ac, 1998-1999 w, 2001 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea (Boug.)</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1995-1996 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhikistan</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1995-96, 1998 (accord and victory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>downturn and victory</td>
<td>2000, 2004 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia-Serbia</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1995 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (Serb.-Kosovo)</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1998-1999 w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>downturn</td>
<td>1998 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>2001 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador–Peru</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>1995 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>accord</td>
<td>-1987 w, 1988-1995 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Ext. intervention</td>
<td>2004 ac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>downturn</td>
<td>1996 ac</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Compiled by Frederik Landshöft on the basis of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and AKUF data.
Another important pattern is the increasing engagement of external actors in these societies that needs to take into account different sets of peacebuilding needs according to conflict phases:

- During the genesis of armed conflict and escalation, violent actors and dynamics gain influence that must be countered by preventive approaches and strategies of de-escalation;
- In times when there is a downturn in violence or a termination of war, international peace missions may enter and support first steps in demilitarisation and early recovery;
- During the consolidation of peace processes non-armed actors gain importance and space for action although in many cases this is a long-term process.

What makes post-conflict and post-war situations even more complex is the fact that the conflict phases may vary, differ or overlap in different regions of the country. This makes sequencing (e.g. prevention – mediation – implementation – rehabilitation) difficult or impossible (at least at a national level). Different approaches thus have to be used simultaneously or need to be combined according to developments on the ground or target groups.

Another highly influential factor for the structure of post-war or post-conflict social spaces are the modes of war termination where we can see a big spectrum between military victory – peace accords – mere downturn of violence (see table 1). These modes shape the power relations and define the scope of manoeuvre for civil actors as well as the expectations towards “peace” in the population. A comprehensive peace accord leads to higher expectations in relation to a peace dividend than a mere downturn in violence that will be accompanied by a high level of distrust and uncertainty towards the future.

And last not least, most of today’s post-war and post-conflict societies are poor developing countries with little historical experience of functioning state institutions, lacking traditions of democratisation or economic development to build on. Most of these societies are considered fragile states or hybrid regimes with a high level of instability, fragmentation and ongoing violence. Their model of economic development is shaped by patterns of globalisation and a reduction of the role of the state, while the formal economy is increasingly dominated by informal (and criminal) sectors.

The influences of these developments transcend mere economic terms and undermine for example also the integrative power of the state (e.g. through a lack of tax revenues), subvert values and norms (necessary for peacebuilding), and promote cultures of violence, corruption and impunity. This increases fragility and fragmentation at all levels; including symbolical orders and social cohesion, leading to mutually exclusive forms of legitimacy. Problems in post-conflict and post-war states are symptoms and consequences of these processes which in turn leads to situations on the ground that can be described as follows: lack of control of armed actors, high availability of small arms, high number of refugees and internally displaced people, increase in criminal and interpersonal violence, weak political institutions, high level of competition with regard to the control of external resources by different political and social actors, deficits in
health and education systems and a high level of distrust as well as a desire for revenge (Kievelitz et al., n.d.).

3. Debates on the Transformation out of War and Armed Conflict – State of the Art

During the last two decades, external actors have broadened their scope of activities due to the multitude of challenges and problems for international cooperation in these contexts. In the beginning the main focus was to prevent a relapse into war or armed conflict as expressed in the Agenda for Peace of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (p.11). This concept was extended in a supplement in 1995, through the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), the task force report “Our Shared Responsibilities” (United Nations 2004) and the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

The increasing comprehensiveness of external intervention is labelled as “liberal peacebuilding”. Based on the experiences in post-war Europe, this concept assumes a self-enforcing positive relationship between democratisation, market-based development and pacification. Perspectives vary: a theory-oriented, normative and moral approach questions the possibilities of reproducing a positive peacebuilding cycle in contemporary developing societies, which face a very different international environment and internal levels of development. On the other hand there is a policy-oriented, realist and pragmatic debate focussing on the immediate needs of development on the ground. Here long-term developments and the consequences of short-term strategies get out of sight.

These debates differ in relation to their time horizons, the respective perspective and the concepts of war and armed conflict, as well as in their understanding of peace. While the theory-oriented debate and international NGOs have a broader concept of peace (not identical but related to Johan Galtung’s positive peace concept), the policy-oriented approach follows a conception of peace as non-war (or a negative peace concept). Our overview of

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10 These discussions are related to the criticism on globalisation and on the debates on external actors and their strategies; see Richmond 2006, Duffield 1997, 2001, Keen 2008, in the German debate Imbusch 2005.

the debates will mostly focus on the latter body of research as this is closely related to development cooperation. At the same time – based on our conceptual considerations in part I – our goal is to broaden the perspective and to identify the critical interfaces and issues at stake which influence the long-term processes of social change and transformation.

3.1 Backslide into war

The most prominent aspect of the debate on post-conflict and post-war societies is the discussion on the danger of relapse back into war and armed conflict. This is seen as a precondition for other developments serving as a first benchmark for successful peacebuilding. Three critical developments and aspects are identified:

First, there exists a security gap (Walter 1999, 2002) for ex-combatants when there is a lack of guarantees for their physical security at the moment of disarmament or cantonment. If an agreement does not take this problem into account (via the establishment of safe havens, guarantees or monitoring), there seems to be an increasing danger of relapse while external guarantees or power-sharing agreements might help to close the gap.

Second, activities of so-called spoilers12 – mostly losers of war termination wanting either to change specific provisions of a peace accord or to press for the inclusion of specific provisions. In this context the question of the integration (and/or marginalisation) of potential veto-actors is discussed even if this might lead to trade-offs and concessions with regard to human rights conventions.13

Third, the persistence of root causes for violence is discussed as a motivation to continue or renew violence (Darby/MacGinty 2000, Walter 2002).

This debate is oriented mostly but not exclusively towards former combatants. Another perspective on the problems of war and conflict recurrence has an International Relations background focussing on external actors. Some authors see the reasons for the collapse of peace processes and the problems in post-war and post-conflict societies in the partial, short-term and uncoordinated engagement of the international community and the related contradictions (Hampson 1995, Paris 2004). Deficits of external intervention may be related to rapid exit strategies or to differing mandates and priorities of external actors, e.g. between peace-oriented missions and the international financial institutions.14

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13 The peace agreements in Liberia and Sierra Leone are a case in point, both including provisions on total amnesty for the leaders of armed groups.

14 This has been analysed during the mid 1990s in relation to developments in El Salvador where peace promotion was undermined by structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF; see de Soto/del Castillo 1994 and Boyce et al. 1995.
Based on a comparative study of 14 post-war societies, Roland Paris (2004) argued for long-term, far-reaching and coordinated external interventions and the prioritisation of stabilisation before liberalisation. The quantitative study of Doyle and Sambanis (2006) on UN peace missions focuses on options for the improvement of external actors, although it relates external intervention to the difficulty of the transformation and local capacities in what they call a “peace-building triangle”, including some of the relevant patterns of contemporary conflicts into analysis. But like the majority of the analysis, the main focus is on the direct combatants.

The discussion on relapse into conflict neither analyses other actors in the transformation process nor is the relationship between armed actors and society included systematically. This mirrors the structure of peace agreements and of military power relations, shaped by leadership and elites. The fundamental flaw of such a reduced perspective lies in the fact that the dynamics in post-war and post-conflict societies are not exclusively driven by these actors. With the formal termination of war, non-armed actors gain new options for actions, whose scope and utilisation is essential for the success or failure of peace processes. Due to its orientation on long-term development, development cooperation has to have a broader perspective taking into account these actors and their empowerment. The following sections will present the main debates on six fields of action for development cooperation in post-war and post-conflict societies.

3.2 From DDR to Public Security

In the immediate post-conflict and post-war context security is a fundamental problem beyond the case of relapse into war. The first aim of demobilisation and public security projects is directed to the disarmament of ex-combatants and the “civilisation” of their behaviour, that is, to transform them from military to civil actors. The broader process is directed to the establishment of (physical) public security through transparent, accountable and democratically legitimised and controlled institutions (e.g. through reform or renewal via security sector reform). This aims not only at ex-combatants but is related to the overall issue of violence control and the sanctioning of violent behaviour. On the ground, external actors mostly support a sequence of DDR programs first and SSR and justice reform (if done at all) later on and in most cases without an explicit focus on conflict.

DDR activities as they are conducted nowadays are a relatively recent phenomenon. Before the end of the cold war, DDR programs were mainly

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15 To stabilise post-war countries he even argues for the establishment of protectorates. Empiricism however shows that countries with such a heavy footprint approach (e.g. Cambodia, Timor L’Este) are not really models of successful peacebuilding. Apart from this, the international community has neither the resources nor the interest (or the legitimisation) for such cost-intensive and long-term engagement.
focused on the reform of “[...] formal military structures in lesser developed countries” (Collier 1994, quoted in Muggah 2009a: 4). In most recent violent conflicts however, the distinction between civilian and military personnel becomes increasingly difficult, thus also rendering DDR-programs more difficult. “However, civilians can be victims, combatants and beneficiaries all at the same time” (Jensen/Stepputat 2001: 24).

DDR is a sector where donors have gained a lot of experience, beginning in the early 1990s with war terminations in Central America and Africa. The main questions have been of a technical nature, related to the organisation, implementation and verification of these processes. During the last decade, a more or less standardised procedure developed: first ex-combatants are cantoned in specific and internationally monitored zones (or camps), second they hand over their arms and are provided with food, medical care and documents. The third step is monetary re-compensation, training or education before they can leave and go back to their home regions. UNDP has systematised these experiences 2006 in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards.16

Three sets of related problems are visible in many post-conflict and post-war societies: Deficits in DDR (mostly in relation to disarmament and reintegration) increase violence and shift it from politics into society. This is related to marauding gangs of former combatants surviving through the use of violence. Having no alternatives or capabilities to gain their livelihood in the formal economy, they have to resort to violence. Second, DDR-programs usually distinguish their benefits for former combatants by rank. This is highly conflictive as well, since only few rebel or militia groups keep records at all. If these fighters are to be reintegrated into a civilian life, discrepancies with regard to monetary benefits can thus lead to renewed tensions. Third, and related to both, violence due to deficits in DDR undermines the establishment of new, democratically controlled institutions in the security and justice sector. The central mechanisms are selective violence and intimidation, utilised against reform-oriented police officers, prosecutors and judges as well as corruption. Criminal organisations either recruit ex-combatants or form alliances and networks with armed groups based on the common interest to sustain a situation of fragility and insecurity. Indirect consequences for the overall process of peacebuilding are the maintenance of a climate of distrust and fear serving populist policies promising “hard hand” approaches, which have a rhetorical commitment to democratic transformation at best.

16 At http://www.unddr.org a series of documents from different DDR processes can be consulted. The World Bank experiences are documented in Ball (1993) among others. In Germany the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) has documented some processes in Africa, East Europe, the Balkans, Colombia and Aceh. (see http://www.bicc.de).
These problems already indicate the necessity of pursuing integrated approaches. Reductionist, partial approaches or sequencing often lead to a power vacuum that can be utilised by criminal (local or transnational) networks to increase their influence. In cases where they succeed to establish themselves inside core state institutions (police, judiciary), dealing with them is very difficult as experiences in Guatemala, Bosnia or Guinea-Bissau show.

Due to these problems in many post-war and post-conflict societies a vivid debate on new police structures and justice reform has begun during the last years. A close relationship to fundamental debates on governance is obvious, although the difficulty for and complexity of transformation in post-war and post-conflict states is even higher than in other developing societies due to the mostly unresolved legacies of violence and gross human rights violations.

3.3 Physical and material reconstruction

The material reconstruction of the social and economic infrastructure is a precondition for social service delivery (in education and health) as well as for the satisfaction of basic needs (water, housing, etc.). At the same time (re-) construction is necessary for sustainable development processes. The majority of the post-conflict and post-war societies belong to the poorest and least developed countries indicating the urgency and the amount of need. But although reconstruction after war and violence is quite different from reconstruction after natural disaster these differences are rarely discussed. Reconstruction in post-conflict and post-war contexts needs to be highly conflict-sensitive as new conflicts can arise or old be revived, e.g. when infrastructure is (perceived as or really) benefiting one of the warring factions more than the other.

Reconstruction after natural disaster and after armed conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>similarities</th>
<th>differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Necessity of rapid reaction, massive funding available necessity to strengthen or even establish organisations for reconstruction Financial instruments of World Bank available (e.g. Multi Donor Trust Fund)</td>
<td>Post-disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly not predictable Capacities of state institutions might be existent Project design mostly linear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* e.g. when a peace process gains ground.
Based on Fengler et al. (2008: 4)

17 Interesting approaches including civil society participation have been developed by UNRISDs project on war-torn society, e.g. in Guatemala (Torres-Rivas/Arévalo de León 1999). The implementation was hampered by a lack of political will by the government and external actors.

During the last years there has been an increasing debate on the modalities of reconstruction in war-torn societies and the possibilities of conflict-sensitive design and to support reconciliation and understanding. Most donors (financial institutions having an important role) have to adjust their priorities to the specific context. At least in cases where direct survival is not at risk, fast execution has to stand back for conflict-sensitive and peace-building modalities allowing for participation of different social groups or warring factions. The joint reconstruction of a bridge or a well might not only help to bridge former animosity but can create a visible peace dividend for everybody at the same time. As a surplus, this legitimises the peace process.

The social and economic infrastructure is also challenged by processes of rapid and increasing urbanisation which are related to war and violence. This leads to the increase of slums and unplanned settlements and all the other consequences rapid urbanisation has in the context of fragile institutional capacities. The related problems are not discussed in peace accords but are important for the social groups affected (e.g. refugees or IDPs) as well as for the overall transformation process.

3.4 Reconstruction of social relations and coping with the past

The reconstruction of social relations is directed towards the rehabilitation and construction of a societal basis for peaceful development and civil conflict resolution. This includes treatment of violence-related trauma as well as reconciliation between victims and perpetrators at different levels. At least in theory the end of war and armed conflict signifies a break and the opportunity of a transformation from violence-based forms of conflict resolution to those based on the rule of law. The establishment of institutions and structures promoting the rule of law is a basic requirement for this process. Only when there is a minimum of trust in the existence and application of rules for the

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19 See Boyce 2008. In 2006 and 2007 the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) organized a series of workshops with conflict and infrastructure experts discussing the different phases of (re-) construction of the material infrastructure (from project idea, to design, implementation and handover) in different conflict phases (see Mashatt/Long/Crum 2008). A basic recommendation was to be conflict sensible. On participation of local communities see UNDP/BCPR (2008).

20 The causes for urbanisation are manifold: In many conflicts rural livelihoods are no longer viable for survival due to security-related reasons (e.g. when tilling is impossible due to mines) or to labour shortage (when most men participate in armed conflict). A pull factor is related to the presence of donors in the cities leading to an improved availability of social services and income-generating opportunities.
resolution of conflicts can these be solved without the recourse to or the threat of violence.  

Coping with past atrocities is of utmost importance in this process, thereby going beyond the prosecution of the perpetrators and the political rehabilitation of the victims. Policies of dealing with the past can have preventive functions if they delegitimize the use of violence in the public, independently from the question of prosecution or amnesty for perpetrators. The specific forms of dealing with the past will depend on the relations of power as well as on historical and cultural factors. This process is highly conflictive because power relations on the ground interact with the growing influence of international interventions via the International Court of Justice, demanding prosecution in case national institutions fail to address gross human rights violations. Since the establishment of the charter of the ICG, war termination by overall amnesty is not possible anymore. This is welcome under a human rights oriented and a normative perspective, but can lead to a prolongation of violence on the ground. External military intervention could be an exit option to end gross human rights violations and to prosecute perpetrators. This however is bound to fail due to a lack of political will and resources as discussions on Darfur indicate. This is a structural contradiction on the side of external actors not (yet?) resolved.

Opposition is manifold in post-conflict and post-war societies, provoking a debate on the conflicting priorities of peace (as non-war) and justice (prosecution of perpetrators). While national and international human rights organisations want perpetrators to be held responsible, politicians adhering to “realism” favour a policy of drawing a line under the past. What is important on the ground is to find approaches that take the existing relations of power into account but which are open for change as well as for future investigation at the same time. The debate on transitional justice aims to close this gap.  

Besides conflict-sensible approaches culture-sensible strategies are necessary because there are fundamental differences between cultures of shame and cultures of blame as well as a variety of historical and cultural patterns legitimising or de-legitimising violence. Hence, coping with the past is a highly political process related to existing forms of social cohesion that were transformed by violence.

3.5 From Bullets to Ballots

External actors and development cooperation contribute to the transformation of military into political contest by supporting democratisation. Elections are held to legitimise governments and to establish civil forms of conflict resolution. The academic discussion on democratisation in post-war and post-

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21 This is also discussed under the label of social capital see Coletta/Cullen 2000.

22 On transitional justice see Thoms/Ron/Paris 2008 and section V of the Berghof Handbook on conflict transformation (http://www.berghof-handbook.net) and the literature mentioned there.
conflict countries has focussed mostly on the “civilisation” or transformation of armed actors.\textsuperscript{23}

Most of the engagement of external actors in the immediate post-war and post-conflict is related to the preparation, execution and monitoring of free and fair general elections. The technical and legal preparation of the elections (e.g. the compilation of voter registers, electoral laws, election observation) is as important as the support of the participation of marginalised groups (via educational programs directed at the rural areas or specific target groups like women and youths). At the same time, the first post-war elections serve external missions as an exit option mostly when they have an interim administrative function like in Cambodia.

For Walter (1999) democratisation and its consequences are responsible for “security gaps” arising for ex-combatants. Early in the debate Mansfield/Snyder (1995) pointed towards the conflicts inherent to democratisation processes heightened in a war-torn context. Research focussing on mechanisms of institutionalised power sharing in post-conflict and post-war countries mostly focuses on the problem of relapse into war (see Bastian/Luckham 2003) and does not address long-term consequences of these provisions.

Democracy promotion in post-conflict and post-war societies faces specific challenges that need to be addressed in a context specific and conflict sensible way. As war-torn societies are characterised by a high level of distrust, impartial monitoring and observation of elections will be of high significance (as in the DR Congo 2008). On the other hand, power relations are diffuse and it is not assured that losers will accept the result of the vote or not take up arms again (like in Angola 1992). To circumvent these problems, some peace accords establish provisions on minority protection or consociational forms of power sharing.\textsuperscript{24}

Elections in post-war settings involve two main risks: First, the inherent conflicts may threaten stability; second, many collective actors are still structured in an authoritarian manner, thus endangering the democratization process. A newly elected government can then gain a social basis through inclusive and integrative policies.


\textsuperscript{24} These are inherently instable, as they tend to mirror relations (either demographic or political) at the moment they are agreed on. If power-sharing systems are not designed to assure minority participation or adjusted to changes on the ground they cause new conflicts. Developments in Lebanon are a case in point where demography undermined the established rules of power-sharing.
Experiences with the transformation of armed actors into political actors are quite mixed: Highly organised and coherent groups with a common political or ideological project mastered the transformation into the political arena successfully. The Salvadorian Guerrilla FMLN is a case in point, the separatist GAM in Aceh or Nepali Maoists seem to follow this pattern (at least up to now). But even these developments have their difficulties, e.g. when the groups transfer their hierarchical (mostly authoritarian) internal structures into the party or when the participation in politics is bought by impunity (see Söderberg 2008). The transformation is even more complicated for groups lacking internal cohesion, being bound together just by a common enemy or having mere economic reasons for fighting (greed). They are in danger of becoming politically irrelevant (see the Contra in Nicaragua) or can easily convert into spoiler or criminal gangs.

Last not least there is a broad debate in conflict research as well as in transformation research on the role of civil society. In peace and conflict research the main focus is on civil society participating in track II processes of conflict termination or promoting civil conflict resolution. For a long time there has been a very positive notion on civil society as distinct and an antipole to armed actors. This has been questioned by empirical evidence that civil society can include very uncivil groups or actors that might not take up arms but can influence conflict and violence by other means (e.g. hate propaganda, financial resources, political backup, see Putzel 1997 or Belloni 2008). Civil society mirrors the strengths and weaknesses of a specific society and is thus mostly divided by the same conflicts. The possibilities for civil society to gain influence in favour of peacebuilding seem to depend on having a solid social rooting as well as on external support (including protection against assaults by armed actors; see Paffenholz 2010).

The options and limits for the support of civil society for peacebuilding and the transformation from war to peace have so far not been adequately researched. Although war and conflict termination as well as democratisation enlarge the space for civil society action, the organisations have some difficulties to adjust to the new context. Specifically in societies where armed groups transform into coherent and strong political actors, civil society organisations lose ground. As the common goal (war termination and violence reduction) seems to be achieved, sectoral priorities and issue-specific strategies become more prominent.

3.6 Development as a Basis for Peacebuilding

Economists state that there is a peace dividend due to high macroeconomic growth rates in post-conflict and post-war countries (Collier et al. 2003). Even in

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25 See Lederach 1997, Paffenholz/Spurk 2006, Paffenholz 2010, for NGOs Goodhand 2006. So far, there is no consensus on the concept of civil society as distinct from the state, from economy or from the private sphere or if civil society is overlapping with all of them.
cases where this growth has helped to reduce poverty and to improve indices of human development, patterns of exclusion and marginalisation have more or less remained the same. The slow changes in the Human Development Index for post-conflict and post-war societies are a case in point.

Debates on economic development and poverty reduction in these contexts are closely linked to reconstruction (see II.3.). A series of very different topics are addressed, depending on different economic schools and premises: Strategies based on classical modernisation theory (Collier et al. 2003, Forman 2002) emphasize the (re-) activation of the formal economy and the private sector through the civil use of conflict resources, the establishment of legal foundations, promotion of trade and provision of basic services. The establishment of functioning state capacities and a minimum of rule of law play an important role.26 A similar approach with a slightly different focus is related to the question of business’ role in peacebuilding (see Gerson 2001, Nelson 2000, Brück et al. 2000).

Only recently a debate has begun to relate economic development and post-conflict/post-war contexts systematically. Boyce and O’Donnell (2007b) focus on the necessity for the state to mobilise financial resources as a precondition for an active role in economic and social policies. They advocate a conflict-sensible assessment of state expenditures. During the early 1990s international financial institutions like the IMF connected financial support for post-conflict and post-war countries to the implementation of economic adjustment programs. Kamphuis (2004) argues that this conditionality is counterproductive for several reasons:

- Employment opportunities in the formal sector of the economy (mostly in the administration or state owned enterprises) are destroyed although they would be valuable for the reintegration of ex-combatants.
- The economic winners of war are able to profit from the privatisation of state enterprises thereby protracting existing patterns of inequality.
- The necessary transparency for the execution of privatisations is lacking leading to the establishment of new monopolies (based on criminal networks among others).

A third, incipient, debate relates to the question of how to deal with and how to transform war economy structures. Spoilers are for the most part a political problem since they have a high degree of autonomy due to their control of war economy resources (trafficking of drugs, humans, natural resources, see Pugh 2000, Pugh/Cooper 2004). The persistence of war economy structures undermines peacebuilding by hampering economic development, as it tends to weaken state institutions and the rule of law as well as fragile processes of democratisation either by corruption or (selective) violence. This contributes to

26 Although in these contexts the informal sectors is (at least in relation to the population surviving there) the most important, its contribution to peacebuilding has not been researched up to today, see Woodward 2002.
the maintenance of a high level of distrust and insecurity in the population. Related to this are two issues which are analysed under a post-conflict/post-war focus: the relevance of crime and corruption, and the combat against drugs (Rausch 2006, Rubin/Guáqueta 2007). More research on these issues is necessary as these are overlapping problems in the triangle of rule of law, governance and conflict-oriented strategies in post-conflict and post-war countries.

3.7 Statebuilding

The high level of instability in post-war and post-conflict societies and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 shifted the debate on peacebuilding towards statebuilding.27 The stabilisation of war-torn societies is seen as the central priority while liberalisation has to come afterwards. The ultimate goal of statebuilding is the construction of stable, preferably democratically legitimated and non-corrupt state organisations serving not just the power of a specific group but providing public goods for the population. The question of what is necessary in the context of peacebuilding is highly disputed.

External actors face five dilemmas (Paris/Sisk 2007):

- Construction and/or reform of the institutions of the state is highly conflictive, independently of the design of the intervention.
- External decisions on “legitimate” internal actors collide with local ownership.
- Statebuilding activities are guided (implicitly or explicitly) by values and norms that are not always compatible with the local context.28
- Post-war/post-conflict societies do not part from a point zero, but most external actors underestimate the persistence of existing social organisations and practices.
- Short-term goals (e.g. the inclusion of specific actors through concessions) may obstruct long-term goals (justice, equality) freezing structural conflicts without making them accessible to future resolution.

The high level of overlap between fragile and post-conflict/post-war states is obvious, post-conflict/post-war states however are not a mere sub-group of fragile states. Armed victory might strengthen a state either through the

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27 On basic aspects of state fragility see Zartman 1995, Rotberg 2004, Fukuyama 2004. Fragility is mostly defined as a lack of capacities or political will to provide public goods (security, infrastructure, social services). In the Anglo-Saxon debate, statebuilding is mostly equalled with nationbuilding, but these concepts are quite distinct. While statebuilding can be supported via technical measures, nationbuilding relies on many “soft” factors like identity. For a differentiation see Hippler 2004.

28 An example are women rights that are based on the equality of all humans, an idea that is not shared all over the world.
appropriation of resources or by the weakening of blockade forces (see Kurtenbach 2004).

Hence, the effects of war and violence on the state are highly context specific. Core functions of stateness have to be established. A mere reconstruction will not serve, as old structures were often part of the causes or dynamics of armed conflict. Public security (see II.2.) and capacities for integration will be as fundamental as accountable and transparent (“good”) governance. Revenue collection must be a priority for peacebuilding and stabilisation according to Boyce and O’Donnell (2007a, Boyce 2008):

1. A sustainable financial basis is essential for new democratic institutions and social programs to reduce root causes of conflict (grievances);
2. Fiscal capabilities are necessary to establish legitimate state structures through the delivery of social services and public goods;
3. Restriction of illegal tax or revenue collection (e.g. by warlords or other armed actors) is a contribution to public security.

In these core functions of statebuilding, political and economic aspects coalesce with short-term and long-term necessities of peacebuilding, which reach beyond the technical establishment of state capacities.

Development cooperation always has an influence on the social relationships within the intervention area. The individual influence depends on the size, length and resources of the cooperation (“heavy footprint”). Thus, even the apparently technical interventions (like decentralization or administrative reform) have to be seen under their potentially social and political influence. Especially in post-war situations, changes in power relations are extremely political and should therefore be analyzed with regard to their conflict potential. Donors have to be aware of these effects.

4. **Actors and Donors in the immediate Post-War Context**

This chapter will ask first (IV. 1.) about the internal actors relevant in a post-war situation. Which groups are relevant, where are the spoilers and how can a vulnerable group be defined? The direct aftermath of large-scale violent conflict is usually connected with an accelerated change in local power structures. Often, relationships between individuals and/or groups follow a distinctly different logic after the (perceived) end of a conflict. This entails changes on all levels of society; be it a new government, which is possibly supported by an international peacekeeping mission; be it a change in the relationship between two (formerly) opposed ethnic groups.

In a second step (IV.2), the strategies and approaches of some key donors are analyzed. Which debates are currently taking place and how do they influence each other? Which means does the international community have to offer for development cooperation in the immediate post-war?
4.1 Internal Actors

In post-war situations it is often quite difficult for the development community to identify cooperation partners and target groups. It is rather dangerous to follow a strict dichotomy between victim and perpetrator. Within most contemporary wars and crises, there is a large grey area, roles of individuals and groups can change over time or can be ambivalent. Thus it depends heavily on the context with which partners which aims can be achieved. The central focus thus has to be the search for legitimacy and social roots. This is central for the medium- and long-term implementation of stability and peace: legitimacy is relevant if the actors are supposed to use force and implement reforms; social roots for the sustainability of reform processes. On a general level, five groups can be identified as being relevant for development cooperation:

Governments

The governments of the partner countries are the regular counterparts for official development cooperation, at least if the government is not completely collapsed (e.g. Somalia). Their legitimacy may result from a plethora of sources (clientelism, ethnic representation etc.), although they will probably not be accepted by the whole population. A characteristic feature of post-conflict and post-war societies is differing legitimacies, some of which exclude each other. This is an argument in favour of elections early on to generate at least some procedural legitimacy.

Former conflict parties

Development cooperation has to deal with the former conflict parties due to a number of reasons. It is possible that these actors do now form the government or parts of it, or they may have become important political actors (opposition groups) or they have developed into spoilers. It is necessary to get a dialogue between the different parties going in order to build bridges between them and to finally achieve reconciliation (see II.4.). It is a weakness of external actors - and development agencies - that they have often dealt with spoilers in a reactive way. It is however necessary to develop creative strategies that can either integrate spoilers or, if no other solution is feasible -to minimize their influence.

Civil society

Since post-conflict and post-war states are usually weak, NGOs are often preferred partners for cooperation, especially if the institutions of the state are either unable or unwilling to contribute to reform efforts. This however can lead to the creation of parallel structures, not only in a post-war context, but also in the context of fragile statehood. In general, the social base and the legitimacy of these groups are limited. Usually they are urban-based and follow very specific issues (for example refugees, women, and trade unions). It is however very uncommon to find alliances for the necessary reforms or equal relationships between civil society and the political system. Even if the rule of law and democratic practices are in deficit, these relationships are important for
democratic systems, since reforms have to be regulated by laws which in turn have to be passed by parliament. In many post-war and post-conflict countries however, parliament is either a tool for the executive (especially in authoritarian regimes) or an autonomous actor interested in the sustenance of its own influence or the blocking of reforms. Development cooperation can act with different approaches and on different levels, although the focus should be on supporting the cooperation and interaction between state and civil society, transparency and accountability.

**Vulnerable groups**

Without doubt, the most important target groups for development cooperation in the immediate post-war are vulnerable groups: refugees, IDPs, women, youth and children. The term “vulnerable groups” however has undergone remarkable change with regard to its content, as is demonstrated by the approaches to child soldiers: A “child soldier” is any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members” (UNICEF 1997: 8).

The past decade has seen increasing attention of the international community for the necessities of child soldiers. Starting with the special report by Graça Machel (Machel 1996), the use and abuse of child soldiers has sparked continuous debate and media attention. Especially notorious cases like the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda contributed to the dissemination of the problem via media reports. The reinsertion and reintegration of child soldiers has to follow an internal logic that is different from the reintegration of adult soldiers (Springer 2008: 121-126).

It is important however not only to conceptualize these groups as victims, but as autonomous actors as well. For example women as well as youth can gain new and additional freedom of action if traditional mechanisms of social control (by older members of their group, usually males) are weakened or destroyed. Following the end of a conflict, these relationships have to be reconstructed, albeit with a focus on the special needs of women and youth.29

Slightly different is the situation of refugees and IDPs, whose return is highly conflictive. The return into their province of origin is only one problem among many. In Cambodia for example, the returning refugees from across the border were better educated and nourished than the part of the population which had remained in Cambodia. This in turn leads to obvious conflicts. The conciliation between returnees and the part that stayed at home is thus central, even if no ex-combatants are involved.

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**Ex-combatants**

Reintegrating ex-combatants is among the most pressing issues new governments and administrations face in the immediate post-war context. Development cooperation has a wide range of instruments at its disposal in order to support these processes. Ex-combatants can be reintegrated into either the (new) armed forces or into a civilian life. DDR(R) processes however are very complex and immensely political endeavours (see II.2).

### 4.2 Donor Strategies

The reaction of the international community to complex situations in conflict-ridden countries is influenced by recent developments on the conceptual level as well as by differing perceptions of the importance of the respective conflict for global security and international relations. This is especially apparent with regard to the size and range of the instruments and the financial means. In the current donor discourse, various debates from the past decades converge, namely:

- aid efficiency with regard to poor performers, difficult partnerships or Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS);
- how development cooperation is supposed to deal with fragile or failing states;
- the gap between humanitarian relief/emergency aid and regular development cooperation.

All three debates are relevant for the immediate post-war context; however, the connected problems are aggravated by the fact that there is no clear cut between war/armed conflict and non-war. Thus, if a post-war situation will develop into lasting peace or fall back into large-scale violence remains largely open.

These complex problems and various challenges have led to developments within all major donors on four levels. First, conceptual readjustments took place, second, new departments were founded for the internal consulting work, third, operating procedures in the respective countries were adjusted and fourth, evaluation of results and the analysis of lessons learned increased significantly.

The main focus of the following chapter are the developments within the multilateral and international organizations World Bank, UNDP/UN and the

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30 This section is based on a survey of donor documents and a series of interviews in Washington, New York, Geneva and Brussels in April 2008.

31 US activities in Iraq and Afghanistan for example are mainly shaped by geostrategic interest, not by priorities of peacebuilding. With regard to Germany, Afghanistan had not been a country Germany was cooperating with before the fall of the Taliban, after their fall it developed straight into a partner country.
EU. The importance of work within the post-war context will be dealt with, as well as readjustments of strategies, organisation and procedures. Based on these findings challenges for prospective work in the post-war context will be formulated.

So far, there is no established concept or comprehensive strategy. Most donors are currently undergoing significant developments and are trying to reflect and systematize the complex problems emerging from the planning and implementation of projects in post-war situations. The actual reform process in turn is dependent on the respective agency, its structure and especially its mandate.

**World Bank**

Three different debates converge in the Bank’s current dealings with post-conflict situations: first, the question of the costs of war and violent conflicts, second, the debate on aid efficiency, and third, the debate on the role of the state in the development process. While the Bank does mainly lend money, it also delivers technical assistance and policy advice for partner governments. It is necessary for the Bank to have a contract with the government of the respective country in order to cooperate, which has a significant influence on the possible activities of the Bank.

Since 1999, the Bank has conducted comprehensive research, which in turn has massively influenced the international discourse. Among the most prominent examples are the macroeconomic studies by Paul Collier, which developed into the debate on the reasons for war and violent conflicts (Greed versus Grievance). This in turn generated policy advice aimed mainly at the avoidance of violent conflict. The main argument was that stronger economic growth was necessary in the immediate post-war context in order to minimize the risk of relapse into conflict.32 The debate however has been criticized for the simplicity of its arguments.

The Bank integrated fragile states into its work in 2002 under the label of LICUS, later on a separate Fragile States Unit was created, which also administered the LICUS trust fund. Due to the overlap of post-war countries and fragile states, these departments were merged under the name of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries. Special attention is given to the refinement of project design and the improvement of the quality of the work in the respective countries.

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32 Collier/Höffler/Söderbom 2006. Based on calculations by Collier, approximately 40% of violent conflicts re-ignite in the first decade after their official end. This figure is frequently quoted, although more recent publications come to rather different conclusions (Suhrke/Samset 2007).
Violence, conflict and criminality however are dealt with in the Social Development Department. Since 2008, three aspects of violence are under special scrutiny:

- common violence, for example committed by gangs;
- domestic violence and
- bellicose violence, which overlaps with the unit on fragile states and post-conflict.

Here, the regional experiences from projects and studies in Latin America, Indonesia, East Timor and Aceh are most prominent, the main target group are youth. Also under surveillance is the MDRP in central Africa and unemployed youth in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Sudan and Somalia.

It is intended to support the employees of the Bank in the respective countries with a series of notes and assessments, which draw on the work of other departments (Health and Conflict, Rule of Law). For example a publication on justice and poverty in Indonesia states that 80% of conflicts are dealt with by traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

The Bank however is seriously hindered by its mandate, which allows neither emergency aid nor the exertion of political influence. This in turn influences possible approaches within the six areas identified as relevant for the post-war context (see II). The Bank can for example finance DDR activities, but cooperation with the military and the army is not allowed. With regard to the promotion of democratic structures, the Bank can only support governance initiatives but has to refrain from openly political activities. Reconstruction of physical infrastructure and development however are within the core mandate of the Bank. With regard to state-building activities, a rather restricted definition must be followed which mainly aims at the improvement of the capacities of national institutions. In 2007, OP 800 (Operating Procedure) was introduced and solved at least some problems by allowing the Bank to participate in peacebuilding activities.

Another restriction concerns the necessity to have a government as counterpart. In the immediate post-war context, governments usually only have partial legitimacy, which in turn renders assistance politically very sensitive. Control over big loans from the Bank and the authority over the implementation of huge projects is potentially conflictive. This in turn rendered an adaptation of procedures with regard to transparency and accountability necessary. OP 800 allows for more flexibility in these cases as well.

The third restriction can only be solved through medium- and long-term measures: To sensitize the employees of the Bank for conflictive contexts, where

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33 How violence is defined depends to a high level on the respective context.

34 These distinctions are arbitrary. Even the most „technical” activities have a political aspect, for example administrative decentralization does lead to massive changes in local power structures.
the logic of a bank is not always appropriate. Mainstreaming of certain subjects and the constant vocational training of employees are thus necessities.

During the past years, some changes became apparent. One result is the PCNA (Post-Conflict Needs Assessment), written in cooperation with UNDP (and participation of the GTZ, Kievelitz et al). So far, the PCNA was applied in five countries (Iraq, Liberia, Sudan, Haiti, and Somalia); earlier results in Afghanistan and East Timor were evaluated. In 2006, a common UNDP-World Bank Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices was written, which in turn influenced the OECD/DAC Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States.

It is the aim of the PCNA to identify priorities for peacebuilding and to translate these into a strategy. This however presupposes a functional government in the partner country, which is not always given (e.g. Somalia). Following large-scale conflict, it is not the aim to simply reconstruct the structures of the state (since these structures were often at least partly responsible for the conflict) but to create new structures.

At the same time, the Bank’s classic instruments and measures were made more flexible in order to be better adapted to the volatile context of post-war situations.

- On the strategic level, Interim Strategy Notes are phrased, which are valid for only two years. This allows for a more flexible and quicker adaptation.
- On the level of implementation, cooperation with the UN was improved considerably. This is manifest for example in Iraq, where the Bank and UNDP administer one multi-donor trust fund each.
- Responsibilities have been decentralized from the main office into the field offices of the respective countries. This might not always prove successful, but at least the necessity has been recognized.
- An additional training for the staff dealing with fragile situations is currently being developed. In addition to that, the background of the employees has become more diverse; the bank employs staff from different educational backgrounds (i.e. political science, anthropology etc.).

**United Nations**

Belonging to the core mandate of the UN, work in the context of violent conflicts has undergone major changes. Due to the increasingly broad mandate of UN missions, an intensive debate on the challenges of these missions is taking place. The following section will thus focus on the debates, approaches and problems for development cooperation of UNDP in immediate post-war situations as well as the work of the newly founded Peacebuilding Commission. Conflict prevention is being discussed on different levels within the UN, the Framework Team for Conflict Prevention serves as coordinating board, where experts from different organizations are assembled (BCPR, PBC, UN-DESA, etc.).
**UNDP/BCPR**

In 2000, the UNDP board decided that UNDP should focus increasingly on crisis prevention and recovery. “By 2005, activities in conflict-affected countries constituted nearly 40 percent of UNDP’s global expenditure” (UNDP 2006a: vii). Against this background an evaluation of six conflict-affected countries was conducted in 2006. These countries (Afghanistan, DR Congo, Haiti, Tajikistan, Guatemala and Sierra Leone) differ strongly with regard to conflict origins, conflict cycles and basic conditions. The central concern of the study was an assessment of the extent to “which UNDP has helped address the structural conditions conducive to conflict so that a recurrence of armed conflict could be prevented” (UNDP 2006a vii).

The study finds that the UNDP has regularly contributed to the stabilization of conflicts, however many structural causes for these conflicts were left unaddressed. UNDP mainly conducts activities in the following fields:

- recovery and reintegration of war-affected populations;
- restoration of state authority and governance capacity-building;
- justice and security sector reform;
- poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods;
- support for civil society;
- regional cooperation.

The main focus is hereby on the first three subjects, which are of central importance in the immediate post-war context. Here, UNDP has significantly influenced the international debates and the development of new strategies. The study however also mentions some factors which constrain the work of UNDP. Among the most important are

- The architecture of international agencies, which is still modelled on a phased approach to conflict. This however does not reflect the approach that UNDP considers necessary.
- The lack of core funding for development. The evaluated countries show an enormously high rate of non-core to core funding. This in turn leads to UNDP taking increasingly the function of filling gaps and fulfilling administrative tasks.
- Lack of systematic conflict analyses or best practices in conflict areas;
- Insufficient attention to civil society and gender;
- Lack of expertise on the part of staff and training for such staff;
- Bureaucracy and delays;
- Lack of information about activities and procedures of UNDP (UNDP 2006a viii).

These developments contributed to a restructuring of the BCPR by the end of 2006. Since then, a clear distinction between natural disasters and armed conflicts is being made. Nine outputs were devised, although these are rather
abstract (e.g. reduce risks, establish local governments etc.). In addition to that, UNDP follows two basic priorities: capacity building and activities on the local level. Despite its importance for the immediate post-war and post-conflict context, criminal violence is dealt with in the governance department – comparable to the World Bank.

UNDP covers all six thematic areas discussed in part II, albeit with differing intensity. Early Recovery is considered to be a special focus area. Comparable to the concept of Development-Oriented Emergency Aid (DEA) developed by the GTZ/BMZ, Early Recovery tries to bridge the gap between emergency aid and regular, conflict-sensitive development cooperation (roughly 18 months). The question of Early Recovery was first discussed in 2005 against the backdrop of a reform of humanitarian aid of the UN. A cluster-approach was chosen to combine different points of departure like social services, health or education in a specific territory leading to two advantages:

- The presence of the international community can thus provide a certain protecting function for the partners in the immediate post-war.
- In comparison to peace-enhancing projects, practically oriented approaches (infrastructure, education etc.) offer a peace dividend that is immediately visible.

There are three differences in contrast to Early Recovery in the context of natural disasters:

- Many countries experiencing violent conflict oscillate back and forth into and out of armed conflict. This makes the decision of when to start a project increasingly difficult. With regard to natural disasters however, the starting point of projects is rather clear.
- Local Capacities (government, civil society, economy) are usually weakened following armed conflict. After a natural disaster, it is often possible to cooperate with existing structures, e.g. if an earthquake only hits certain parts of a country.
- Usually, the main partner for the recovery after a natural disaster is the national government; in the immediate post-war, the situation is more complex.

The main difference between emergency aid and Early Recovery can be summarized as “saving lives versus sustaining lives”. Experiences are still incomplete however with the phasing out-phase of Early Recovery. The transition phase into regular development cooperation has to be dealt with thoroughly, without adequate local capacities the transition will probably not lead to sustainable results.

In 2008, early recovery cluster approaches were implemented in 15 countries, a Guidance Note on Early Recovery was published in 2008 (CWGER 2008). A light version of the PCNA is currently being developed, which is supposed to accelerate the usage of windows of opportunity.

Especially relevant for the immediate post-war and post-conflict context are the experiences with DDR, justice and SSR and governance. In these areas, the basic foundations for the curtailing of violence have to be created. Comparable
to the World Bank, UNDP distinguishes between criminal violence and violent conflicts. Relevant for the distinction is the question if the crisis is the cause for violence, for conflicts or for the fragility of state structures. This again demonstrates the necessity for detailed analyses of causes for conflict and conflict dynamics.

The BCPR covers DDR activities especially in countries where no UN peacekeeping missions are present (e.g. Indonesia, Sudan). Experiences have been systematized in the comprehensive UN Integrated DDR Standards (http://www.unddr.org). Two basic problems have become apparent:

- The necessity for improved conflict analysis, because DDR consultants usually do not participate in peace negotiations
- The differentiated and necessarily political approach to spoiler groups which have to be identified by the project manager. Especially important is the middle management of these groups; here, specific program components have to be developed (as for example in Afghanistan and Guinea Bissau).

Besides DDR processes, the rule of law and SSR are central challenges in these contexts. SSR however has to be planned and implemented not as an isolated program, but as an integral part of post-war recovery. UNDP follows a sequential approach, focusing on subjects like women’s rights, institution building and forms of transitional justice.\(^{35}\) It is necessary to adjust the ethical framework to the local context, enabling humans to admit mistakes. Under certain circumstances, peace has to prevail over justice. These processes are long-term and impossible to implement without local ownership, also including perpetrators and spoiler groups.\(^{36}\) An emerging conflict between different donors concerns is the question of how to integrate SSR. Considered by the BCPR as the last step of the realization of the rule of law, the DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (OECD/DAC 2007: 22) mentions the rule of law as part of the security system.

Besides other things, these discussions show the close connection between conflict and governance. Many governance concepts are theoretically elaborated but lack the possibility for practical implementation in post-conflict or post-war contexts. Governance concepts have to be adjusted accordingly to make them conflict sensitive. If, for example, elections are to be promoted, the differences become obvious: Following a purely technical perspective, the focus is on the question of free, fair and equal elections. Under a conflict perspective however, existing local power relations (e.g. intimidation of voters) have also to be taken into account, thereby broadening the view.

\(^{35}\) In Darfur this was first approached with regard to the rape of women. Following a phase of confidence-building measures between UNDP experts and the population, the police, judges and lawyers were sensitized for the subject. After three years, the first criminals were sentenced.

\(^{36}\) See also Baker/Scheye 2007.
Therefore, conflict contexts demand for a different sequencing and different focal points. Within “classic” democracy promotion, a consensus on rules and participation has to be created, thereby increasing legitimacy. Within conflict contexts however, interventions have to aim at a raise of legitimacy and representation and a reduction of exclusionary practices. The most recent CWGER Guidance Note (CWGER 2008) can thus be considered as an important development due to two reasons: First, because it clearly distinguishes between Early Recovery in situations of natural disasters and after violent conflicts. Second, the note explicitly promotes conflict analysis (ibid: 21).

In general, the experiences of the BCPR within the different thematic areas are systematized and documented on different levels.

- The area of conflict prevention and conflict analysis is documented thoroughly;
- With regard to DDR, many tools have been developed (Integrated Standards), but few lessons learned have been set up;
- The implementation of Justice and SSR has proven to be quite complicated; nevertheless, field offices often request assistance from the BCPR in this area.
- Forms of armed violence and communal security are increasingly dealt with in the context of local security policy, not any more in the context of small arms and light weapons.

**UN Peacebuilding Commission**

Founded in 2006, the Peacebuilding Commission started working in 2007. It was established to deal exclusively with post-conflict and post-war-situations, thus being a special case in comparison to other bi- and multilateral donors. Due to the short time of its existence however, only a rough assessment of its potential is possible. The establishment of the commission was motivated by four interrelating sets of problems which had become apparent in the 1990s:

- Despite extended UN-mandates only insufficient cooperation with the international financial institutions took place;
- Lack of coordination between the UN agencies and departments as well as between the donors;
- Lack of financial means for central tasks during the reconstruction or the setting up of state institutions;
- Lack of political attention for countries in transition from post-war situations.

Thus the mandate of the PBC was developed within strict confines: The PBC does only have a consultative function and does not have own resources. The Peacebuilding Trust Fund was set up to support the activities of the PBC; money from the fund has to be designated by the Secretary-General however.
The PBC only works in countries where the security situation is acceptable, thus it does not work in the immediate post-war or post-conflict and is not suitable for Early Recovery activities.  

The PBC has to rely on at least a minimum of state capacities, thereby fostering local ownership. The aim is to develop national peacebuilding strategies with broad participation of different groups from state and society. It became quickly apparent however that the lack of own funding poses a significant problem for the commission. In Burundi, ONUB/BINUB, the integrated UN office, took a coordinating role during the formulation of the national peacebuilding strategy, in Sierra Leone the process was stalled in 2007 until the end of the elections. In both cases the presence of an integrated UN office proved to be of great advantage. The process of drafting the national strategy however demands a high level of cooperation and political will from the respective government. It is roughly comparable to the drafting of a conflict-sensitive PRSP or PBNAs, thus raising the question of a doubling. The PBC can especially work as a lobby organization for countries that are “forgotten” by the international community. It can try to influence the policies of organizations and donors towards these forgotten countries. The main problem for the activities in the receiving countries is the weakness of state structures; this heavily influences the work of the PBC. A strengthening of local capacities as well as monitoring and research thus becomes necessary.

Two basic questions remain for future activities of the PBC:

- Is the Commission supposed to work in contexts where UN peacekeeping operations are still present? This would mean work in the immediate post-war and post-conflict context.
- Depending on the point of view; the question remains unanswered if peacebuilding is equal to development (as is the position of the G 77) or if peacebuilding is mainly supposed to create security and avoid a relapse into conflict (as is the position of the P 5). Depending on the position, the internal logic and intensity of the respective interventions differ markedly.

**European Union**

Over the past few years, the EU has been working on the question of cooperation with countries in conflict. Especially with regard to Africa, governmental and non-governmental actors have been working on the formulation of strategies and policies. The first activity in this context was the strengthening of capacities for early warning. In 1998, the European Council passed a resolution on *The Role of Development Cooperation in Strengthening*

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37 Originally, the PBC worked in Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. By mid-2009, the Central African Republic was included as well.

38 This debate was part of the discussion within the DAC of the OECD, where multiple guidelines were passed, cf. Guideline on the prevention of violent conflict 1997 and its supplement 2001.
Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, which went beyond Africa geographically. At least theoretically, the EU can use a broad variety of measures, ranging from military intervention to political mediation, development cooperation and emergency aid.

Until 2006, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was responsible for immediate post-war and post-conflict situations. The RRM had 30 millions € at its disposal with which projects with a duration of up to 6 months could be funded. This timeframe however has proven to be too short. Within the framework of the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the financial means were raised significantly and project duration was raised to 18 months (possibly even 24 months).

The instruments within the IfS are supposed to narrow the gap between emergency aid and “normal” development cooperation. In contrast to the regional approaches of the EU, measures do not have to be coordinated with the partner government. Thus, the question of the respective capacity and coordination becomes less relevant. Within regular development cooperation of the EU, a Country Strategy is formulated which is translated via a National Indicative Programme and an Annual Programme into projects. In contrast to this, project ideas are translated directly into projects within the IfS.

The IfS however is limited in two ways: First, where humanitarian aid (within the responsibility of OCHA) is concerned and second, in the domain of military operations. These are considered to be part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and thus within the jurisdiction of the member states. The development cooperation of the EU in contrast lies with the Commission. Thus, arguments over competencies have led to the loss of a potential strategic advantage: A homogeneous policy that could cover all aspects of intervention.

The IfS consists of three components:

1. Crisis Reaction (2007: 95 millions €), lasts usually between 48 hours and six weeks, 3 months maximum;
2. Long-term transregional threats, e.g. drugs, weapon smuggling etc.;
3. Capacity Building: Education, training, political planning especially from NGOs with regard to natural resources and mediation.

Measures within the IfS however are not implemented by the EU, but by third parties: UN, GTZ, occasionally also civil society. Direct support to the respective governments would equal budget support, which is seen rather critically within the EU. Local ownership is to be achieved through the inclusion of governments and society during planning and monitoring.

Internal criteria for the use of the IfS are

- An immediate crisis or danger justifying rapid action;
- Upcoming Windows of Opportunity within a frozen conflict;
- A crisis that cannot be solved by local structures;
- The preparation of long-term projects like demining, but also capacity-building (e.g. cooperation with Iraqi refugees in Syria, preparation of a project on the rule of law in Afghanistan).
It is not mandatory for the respective country to appear on the watchlist of the EU. The EU has also adjusted its operative procedures. Funds can now be delegated to public agencies of the member countries (indirect management tasks), until now this was impossible. Within the EU, the IIS is located between the pillars of the CFSP and development cooperation. The central outstanding task will be the conversion of measures from the IIS into the geographical project lines of the development cooperation. Further development of EU policies in this area will be heavily influenced by the debate on the constitution of the EU and its implementation. The planned foreign ministry will prove to be especially important because this will mean the communitisation of a formerly exclusive domain of the member countries. The Pisani report (2006) for example demands that a duty to solidarity be extended beyond the member states when certain threats are concerned.39

General Problems and Adjustments

This cursory glance at the strategies and policies of international donors in the post-war and post-conflict context shows five basic problems:

Definitions and Terms. The donor community does not have a common understanding of the terms post-war and post-conflict. Currently dominating is the perception of post-war situations as a “grey zone”, without clearly delineated beginning or end. This is not only a problem for the donors, but for academics as well. Whereas Collier et al. (2003) mention a time span of 5 - 10 years, this is often seen as being to schematic and unrealistic.

Most donors differentiate between violent conflicts with any kind of political motive and individual violence/criminality. This is usually perceived as a problem of governance, not a problem of conflicts. In most recent wars however, different forms of violence interact frequently and create symbiotic relationships. Thus it would be more useful to analyze the interface between governance and conflict. First approaches have been made by the BCPR and UN-DESA, but otherwise no systematic analyses are discernible.

Priorities and Perspectives. The conflict between stabilization and liberalization influences the activities of the donors on many different levels. Stabilization is often a priority, especially with regard to the limited influence of donors during phases of continuing violence, unclear power relations and lacking capacities. Comparable to the academic discourse (Paris /Sisk 2007), state-building is regularly equalled with peacebuilding. This however leads to a shift in strategy and priorities. This tendency becomes apparent in the combination of departments that are concerned with fragile states and those responsible for post-conflict countries (World Bank, DFID, and OECD/DAC).

39 Due to unforeseen developments (the weak Czech presidency in 2009, elections to the European parliament), these subjects have been pushed in the background. New developments can in all likelihood be expected only in early 2010.
Processes and operative flexibilisation: All donors try to close the gap between humanitarian relief and emergency aid and regular development cooperation. For the transition from the new instruments however (EU - IfS, UNDP - BCPR), no systematic analyses have been written. Connected to this is a flexibilisation of organisational procedures and a decentralisation of administrative structures. The EU for example delegates responsibility for the projects under the IfS directly to its delegations in the respective countries. Furthermore, recruitment procedures have been adjusted; vocational training has become quite common.

Cooperation, coordination and harmonization: Comparable to the whole of government approach on the national level, coordination, cooperation and harmonisation play central roles on the international level. The DAC of the OECD plays an important part, the PBC has a huge potential for activities in the respective countries. Coordination has significantly improved on the level of the headquarters (especially between World Bank and UNDP), for example with regard to the Peacebuilding Needs Assessment. In the field however, many conflicts and rivalries persist between the different institutions, for example with regard to the MDRP program and UNDP/World Bank.

All donors are still in need of coherent and systematic analysis and evaluation of their experiences in the immediate post-war and post-conflict context. These experiences will then have to be systematized and fed back into the policy circle.

5. Lessons Learnt and Issues for further Research

There is a growing consensus on the complexity of challenges for development cooperation in the immediate post-conflict/post-war while the debate on priorities and adequate strategies is ongoing. Positions vary and illustrate the central dilemmas for development cooperation in these contexts:

- Short-term needs of stabilisation versus long-term peacebuilding needs and a necessity of openness for future change;
- Local ownership versus external agendas; and
- Peacebuilding priorities versus other donor agendas.

Development cooperation in these contexts has a series of comparative advantages vis-à-vis other external actors if it finds creative ways to cope with these dilemmas. The fundamental challenge is to identify and address the context-specific issues and actors for long-term transformation. They have to be supported, empowered and protected (via cooperation with other actors or through presence and/or publicity) to give peace processes a social, economic and political rooting. Short-term activities should not hinder long-term change.

Research and the systematisation of experiences on the ground is necessary to enhance our knowledge on these contexts, the dynamics, the interrelation between different processes and the relevant actors. Learning by doing might be necessary due to the high level of needs on the ground, but is not enough. A
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central challenge that needs to be addressed is to systematically merge or relate research on post-conflict/post-war situations with the basic questions of transformation and social change. There are some interesting quantitative approaches on the relationship between democratisation and conflict (Hegre 2004) but there is a lack of systematic qualitative comparison at the meso-level. This is necessary for the generation of knowledge on relevant mechanisms and triggers with regard to transformations as well as for the identification of entry points and context-specific strategies for peacebuilding.

There are a series of highly relevant issues:

First of all the interaction and the interfaces between the different issues development cooperation and other actors are addressing (e.g. between DDR/SSR, reconstruction, democratisation) need to be identified. This is highly relevant for development cooperation as many risks for peacebuilding programs (e.g. a war economy undermining the rule of law) are caused through these interactions. On the other hand the identification of these interfaces allows for strategic entry points and can produce synergies.

Second, there is an obvious need to research and link the overlap between governance and conflict-oriented approaches to control violence. Finding creative approaches and rule of law-based solutions to the increasing and changing violence and/or the criminalisation of the transformation processes should be a high priority for development cooperation.

Third another under-researched issue highly relevant for development cooperation is rural development. The discussion on “lootable” and other war-relevant resources has to be broadened towards the analysis of war-related change in rural livelihoods and the consequences of their lacking viability. The consequences and dynamics of rapid urbanisation in war-torn societies can only be addressed if push and pull factors are included in the analysis as well as in the strategies. At the same time in many post-war/post-conflict countries developments in the rural areas influence national developments, e.g. through the parliament or political constituencies based on traditional or clientele networks.

Last not least, research should be conducted on specific social groups and their specific transitions out of war. Refugees and IDPs are important here as are women and youth. They might not have been direct participants in war and armed conflict, but peace processes will only succeed if their special needs are understood.

A societal perspective on post-war and post-conflict societies might be understood as “complexification”, but is without alternative for successful transitions out of war as well as for sustainable peacebuilding.
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