State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects

Daniel Lambach/Tobias Debiel
(Eds.)

INEF Report
87/2007

INEF
Institute for Development and Peace
NOTES ON THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS

Pinar Bilgin, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey and Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, USA.  
E-Mail: Pinar.Bilgin@wilsoncenter.org

Tobias Debiel, Dr. sc. pol., Director of the Institute for Development and Peace (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, INEF) and Professor in International Relations and Development Policy at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany.  
E-Mail: tobias.debiel@inef.uni-due.de

Daniel Lambach, Dr. des., Senior Researcher at the Institute of African Studies, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany.  
E-Mail: lambach@giga-hamburg.de

Adam Morton, Senior Lecturer at the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ) of the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK.  
E-Mail: Adam.Morton@nottingham.ac.uk

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:  

IMPRINT

Editor:  
Institute for Development and Peace, INEF  
University of Duisburg-Essen  
Logo design: Carola Vogel  
Layout design: Jeanette Schade, Sascha Werthes  
Cover photo: Jochen Hippler

© Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden  
Geibelstraße 41 D - 47057 Duisburg  
Phone +49 (203) 379 4420 Fax +49 (203) 379 4425  
E-Mail: inef@uni-due.de,  
Homepage: http://www.inef.de  
ISSN 0941-4967
State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects

INEF Report 87/2007
Abstract


‘State failure’ has become a part of the global post-9/11 security calculus. Faltering states are presented as dangers to international stability, as terrorist safe havens and as ‘black holes’ of global politics. However, the political and academic debate about this phenomenon still leaves much to be desired. This working paper and its companion piece (INEF Report 88/2006) try to revisit the phenomenon from new perspectives. The focus of “State Failure Revisited I” is on the globalization of security and neighborhood effects.

"Rethinking State Failure: The Political Economy of Security" by Pinar Bilgin/Adam David Morton argues that the relationship between ‘state failure’ and globalization is not adequately theorized. Their contribution details several problematic assumptions linked to the dominant discourse on ‘state failure’ including the unreflexive attitude to both scholarship and policy-making that it reveals; the view that globalization is understood and represented as an ‘out there’ phenomenon, whereas it is very much an ‘in here’ occurrence; and the manner in which it reduces the security dimension of globalization to the threat posed by terrorism to state security, thereby failing to move away from a state-centric account. In contrast, Bilgin/Morton lay out the contours of an alternative framework to state ‘failure’ that is attentive to the conditions of uneven development of accumulation patterns and the importation of ‘Western’ models of sovereign territoriality in non-Western locales.

The regional impact of state failure – in contrast to its global implications – has only received scant attention in academic and policy debates. To introduce the regional level into the analysis, Daniel Lambach in his contribution "Close Encounters in the Third Dimension" develops a basic model to understand the transnational interaction between national processes of failure and consolidation in neighboring states. The deductively constructed model differentiates between structural and dynamic cross-border linkages. A plausibility test of the model is undertaken with evidence from four countries in West Africa. The case study substantiates the hypotheses underlying the model, thus confirming its general applicability to other cases.
Content

Foreword 5

Pinar Bilgin/Adam Morton

Rethinking State Failure:
The Political Economy of Security 7

1. Internationalisation, Globalisation, the State and Security 8
2. Approaches to Globalisation and Security ‘before’ September 11, 2001 12
3. Approaches to Globalisation and Security ‘after’ September 11, 2001 15
4. The Traditional Approach to Security in a Globalising World 19
5. Sovereignty within Globalised Security 22
References 26

Daniel Lambach

Close Encounters in the Third Dimension:
The Regional Effects of State Failure 32

1. The State as a Variable 33
2. Making Sense of State Failure 35
3. The Regional Impact of State Failure 37
   3.1 Stages of Failure and Types of Factors 39
   3.2 Military Factors 39
   3.3 Social Factors 41
   3.4 Economic Factors 42
   3.5 Facilitating Conditions 43
4. Regional Interactions 44
6. Conclusion 48
References 50
Foreword

Since 11 September 2001, state failure is on everybody’s lips. Both the security and the development community recognize it as a problem, and groups as diverse as humanitarian NGOs and International Financial Institutions deplore the deleterious consequences of the failure of a state both for its citizens and the international community at large.

As a result, the academic study of state failure has increased substantially. Now, five years after 9/11 and about 15 years since this topic appeared for the first time in academic journals, we revisit state failure in the present working paper and its companion piece (‘State Failure Revisited II’, INEF Report No. 88/2006). These papers grew out of two panels on the topic at the 2006 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) in March 2006. The panels were organized by the University of Cologne’s Research Group on the Transformation of Political Order (http://www.politik.uni-koeln.de/jaeger/tpostart) and featured noted academics from a broad range of countries.

A key theme of the discussion in these panels was that state failure research needed to broaden its view, as the margins of the topic were only rarely being explored. Four issues in particular were singled out as being particularly worthy of further study. The first is that the relationship between state failure and related concepts (such as civil war, neopatrimonialism, political transformation, and others) needs to be mapped out more clearly. For example, is civil war an indication of state failure or is it a cause? Are all countries suffering from internal conflict failed states, or can civil war occur in the absence of state failure? How does regime change affect the empirical statehood of a state? These and other questions remain undetermined and are left to the individual researcher to answer on a case-by-case basis.

The second issue is that while the concept empowers us to talk about something (the state) that is not there, it does not give us any insight into what it is that actually is there. The concept of state failure clearly lacks a theory of what actually takes place in areas outside of state governance. Some authors seem to equate state failure with anarchy, chaos and a Hobbesian war of all against all. This point of view seems to be especially prevalent among policymakers and journalistic commentators. However, the rare empirical studies of life inside a failed state suggest that a more nuanced understanding of social order under conditions of anarchy is urgently needed.

This desideratum is closely linked to the third issue, which is that state failure research ought to employ the full spectrum of levels of analysis. At the moment, research is either concerned with the national
level (for case studies) or the global one (when debating terrorism and/or intervention strategies). However, engaging failed states at other levels of analysis would certainly improve our overall understanding of this phenomenon. As already suggested, an investigation at the individual level would force us to link state failure to broader concerns of political rule, social order, human security and the use of violence. In addition, the regional level has been neglected so far, even though state failure doubtlessly presents neighboring states with a complex challenge.

The fourth issue is that the study of the causes of state failure is biased in favor of seemingly endogenous factors such as bad governance, ethnic strife or opportunities for profit in the conflict economy, thus sidelining global-level, structural forces such as the division of labor in the global economy, the international system of states, and globalization. These and other phenomena have the power to cause, to shape, or to transform processes of state failure at the national level.

We aim to revisit state failure in this working paper by addressing the latter two issues. With regard to levels of analysis, Daniel Lambach provides an overview of the regional impact of state failure. Concerning structural forces, Pinar Bilgin and Adam Morton offer an alternative understanding of state failure within a globalized discourse of security. Thus, this INEF Report aims to address some of the theoretical lacunae outlined above.

All in all, a wider range of viewpoints on state failure would not only enrich the debate, but would also contribute to our understanding of the topic. For example, there is no sociological theory of state failure. Neither is there a political economy explanation, although both would represent fruitful avenues of research. State failure is a highly complex phenomenon and its study would certainly profit from such a multidisciplinary investigation. It is our aim with this study and its companion piece to provide fresh insights. By revisiting the concept from unfamiliar angles we hope to stimulate research into aspects of the topic that had previously been overlooked.

Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel
Dr. des. Daniel Lambach
Duisburg/Cologne, January 2007
Rethinking State Failure: The Political Economy of Security*

Pinar Bilgin/Adam David Morton

Analysis of the relationship between globalisation and security remains relatively untouched in the literature, notwithstanding the increasing interest in the impact of globalisation on security since the September 11, 2001 attacks. In the 1990s, as the literature on globalisation rapidly grew,1 the relationship between globalisation and security had received scant attention.2 Although this has begun to change in light of the September 11, 2001 events—which have led to a surge of interest in this relationship3—the continuing prevalence of the existing state-based and military-focused frameworks has so far not enabled the development of a full understanding of the impact of globalisation on security. This is evident in the way policymakers and scholars alike have represented ‘state failure’ as the greatest threat to global security due to the supposed harbouring of terrorists in conditions already rendered fragile by the impact of neoliberal globalisation.4 According to this view, “failing and failed states present a danger to international stability as well as to the well-being of their populations. Internationally, they can become safe havens for terrorist organisations, centres for the trade of drugs and arms, and breeding grounds for dangerous diseases” (Ottaway/Meir 2004).

As will be argued below, such an approach to ‘state failure’ is problematic in at least three respects. First, it focuses on the supposed symptoms of ‘state failure’ (global terrorism) rather than the structural conditions that permit such failure to occur. This itself results from an unreflective attitude to both scholarship and policymaking. Second, it betrays an ‘externalist’ conception of globalisation in the sense that globalisation is regarded as an ‘out there’ phenomenon, whereas it is very much an ‘in here’ occurrence that constitutes and is constituted by the transformation of the state. Yet, as will be argued below, the remedy to this problem cannot be found in presenting an ‘internalist’ account of ‘state failure’ as characteristic of mainstream International Relations (IR) literature. Third, the existing approach is also reductionist in that it reduces the security dimension of globalisation to the threat posed by terrorism to state security; for example by seeking to understand the globalisation of security through locating terrorist organisations within ‘failed states’; thereby failing to move

---

* Adam David Morton would like to acknowledge the Lancaster University Research Committee, Small Grant Award Scheme (Reference: PLA7621), for their financial assistance of the project ‘The Political Economy of “Failed States’”, which facilitated the presentation of this paper at the World International Studies Committee (WISC) Conference, Bilgi University, Istanbul/Turkey (24-27 August 2005). A subsequent version was presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), San Diego (22-25 March 2006). We would like to thank Tobias Deibel and all other participants at both panels for detailed comments and feedback.

1 See, for example, Rosenau 1996; Clark 1997; Wallerstein 2000; or Keohane/Nye 2000.

2 Exceptions to this generalisation could include Booth 1998; Clark 1999: 107-126; Barkawi/Laffey 1999 or Barkawi 2005.

3 See, inter alia, Tuchman Mathews 2002; Campbell 2002 or LeFeber 2002.

4 See, for example, The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002; Crocker 2002; Rotberg 2004.
away from the state-centrism that has characterised mainstream IR literature. By contrast, this argument moves towards laying out the contours of an alternative framework to state ‘failure’ that is attentive to the conditions of and the agency behind the uneven development of accumulation patterns and the importation of ‘Western’ models of sovereign territoriality in ‘non-Western’ locales. This alternative framework, it is argued, might assist in moving beyond the prevalent approach to ‘failed states’ within policy-making and academic thought. After all, as Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause remind us, ‘what has collapsed is more the vision (or dream) of the progressive developmental state that sustained generations of academics, activists and policymakers, than any real existing state’. Hence the authors’ call to analyse state failure more historically as part of a ‘broader and more prevalent crisis in the capacities and legitimacy of modern states.’ (Miliken/Krause 2002: 755).

1. Internationalisation, Globalisation, the State and Security

Globalisation means different things to different people. As a process, it has developed as an extension of neoliberal economic policy-making. Viewed as such, it is not a process without agency. On the contrary, it has been shaped by the processes of the internationalisation of the state and production set in motion during the post-World War II era. On this Robert Cox writes:

“Such procedures began with the mutual criticism of reconstruction plans in western European countries (the US condition for Marshall aid funds), continued with the development of annual review procedures in NATO (which dealt with defence and defence support programmes), and became an acquired habit of mutual consultation and mutual review of national policies (through the OECD and other agencies)” (Cox 1981: 145).

Since the erosion of *pax Americana* principles of world order in the 1970s, there has been an increasing internationalisation of production and finance driven, at the apex of an emerging global class structure, by a ‘transnational managerial class’ (Cox 1981: 147). Taking advantage of the conditions of uneven development, there has been an integration of production processes on a transnational scale with Transnational Corporations (TNCs) promoting the operation of different elements of a single process in different territorial locations. It is this organisation of production and finance on a transnational level that fundamentally distinguishes neoliberal globalisation from the period of *pax Americana*. The *transnational* restructuring of capitalism in globalisation is thus realised in this definition, which acknowledges the emergence of new social forces of capital and labour (Bieler et al. 2006). Besides the transnational managerial class, other elements of productive capital (involved in manufacturing and extraction), including small and medium-sized businesses acting as contractors and suppliers, and import-export businesses, as well elements of financial capital (involved in banking, insurance and finance) have been supportive of this transnationalisation of production. Hence there has been a rise in the structural power of transnational capital promoted by forms of
elite interaction that have forged
common perspectives, or an ‘emula-
tive uniformity’, between business,
state officials, and representatives of
international organisations favouring
the logic of capitalist market rela-
tions.5 In security terms this means
that

“Part of the globalist agenda is to push NATO
into a large-scale modernisation programme
so that its forces can share military responsi-
bilities with the US and maintain similar op-
erational capabilities. It is a strategy that in-
corporates NATO expansion into eastern
Europe, and US military corporations are
anxious to be part of this build-up by develop-
ing ‘transatlantic industrial alliances’
(Harris 2002: 19).

Since the period in the rise of such
transnational capital in the 1970s, the
social bases across many forms of
state have altered in relation to the
above logic of capitalist market rela-
tions. Whilst some have championed
such changes as the ‘retreat of the
state’ (Strange 1996), or the emergence
of a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae 1990,
1996), and others have decried the
global proportions of such changes in
production (Hirst/Thompson 1999,
Weiss 1998), it is argued here that the
transnationalisation of production has
profundely transformed—but not
eroded—the role of the state. The
internationalisation of the state
(meaning the way transnational proc-
esses of consensus formation, under-
pinned by the internationalisation of
production and the thrust of global-
isation) has been transmitted through
the policy-making channels of gov-
ernments, with direct consequences
for security issues. The network of
control that has maintained the struc-
tural power of capital has been sup-
ported by an ‘axis of influence’, con-
sisting of institutions such as the
World Bank, which have ensured the
ideological osmosis and dissemina-
tion of policies in favour of the per-
ceived exigencies of the global politi-
cal economy. Across different forms
of state in countries of advanced and
peripheral capitalism, the state has
become restructured through a neo-
liberal logic of capitalist competition
from the 1970s to the present (Cox

This approach to globalisation is
significant because it does not take
‘states’ and ‘markets’ as ahistorical
starting points of analysis, whereas
mainstream approaches to globalisa-
tion within IR generally concentrate
on whether global structural change
implies the loss of state authority to
the market or whether some form of
control can be maintained. David
Held and Anthony McGrew go be-
yond this dichotomy in that they ar-
gue that the state has neither re-
mained unchanged nor lost authority
but has become transformed and thus
its powers, functions and authority
have been re-constituted (Held/
McGrew 2002: 126). The different
stress by the two authors, nevertheless,
results in similar outcomes. The
state is still perceived to be in an exte-
rior, or external, relationship with the
market, controlling it separately from
the outside, even to the extent that the
sphere of civil society is exalted as an
intervening realm of autonomous
action. Jan Art Scholte speaks about
public management of private market
forces, where “state, substate and
suprastate laws and institutions take
firm hold of the steering wheel and
harness the forces of globalisation to
explicit and democratically deter-
mined public policies” (Scholte 2000:
291). Yet “the autonomy and democ-
ratic qualities of associational life are
partly belied by the historical associa-
tion of civil society with the liberal
state and capitalism” (Pasha/Blaney

5 Cox 1987: 298; Gill/ Law 1989: 484; Gill
1995: 400-401
1998: 420). Put more explicitly, state and market only appear as separate entities due to the way production is organised around private property relations in capitalism (Wood 1995: 31-36). By neglecting the central importance of the sphere of production, ‘global governance’ approaches embodied in the work of Held or Scholte overlook the historical specificities of capitalism and the vital internal links between state and market, with the former securing private property within civil society to ensure the functioning of the latter. After all, as Tarak Barkawi writes, “states are not victims of economic globalisation so much as they are agents of it. Contemporary economic globalisation is in part the result of the uses of state power to pursue the political project of a global free market” (Barkawi 2005: 10). Hence the relationship between the globalisation of the world economy and the emerging condition of ‘globalised security’. As will be argued below, insight into this relationship—and the agency of the state in its formation—is found to be lacking in existing approaches to IR in general and security in particular in so far as they confuse internationalisation with globalisation. The two are not the same thing. This point begs further clarification.

The trend towards internationalisation of security (understood as increasing recourse to collective security and multilateral efforts, as with the foundation and later expansion of NATO) has been recognised in the field of strategy for some time. Indeed, throughout history, states have attempted to address issues raised by the need to project force in faraway lands and to defend against enemies with imperial ambitions through forming alliances, security regimes, collective security organisations and security communities. The globalisation of security is different from the internationalisation of security in that the former involves the latter but goes beyond being an inter-state phenomenon. In the case of internationalisation, states can opt for, or opt out of, multilateral security arrangements without experiencing a fundamental change in their political authority. Globalisation, on the other hand, involves the simultaneous transformation of the state and its security environment (Leander 2004).

The process of globalisation has complicated the security predicament of states in at least four respects. First, in a non-globalised world, states assumed the twin roles of guaranteeing their members’ security and posing the main threat to the security of other states. This has changed with the impact of globalisation; the threat is no longer merely another state, but mostly the internal weakening of states (Guéhenno 1988/9: 5-19). As witnessed in the September 11, 2001 attacks, internal weakening of some states can become a security concern for others. In this case, ‘non-state’ actors that remained unchecked within the boundaries of Afghanistan acquired the ability to project force across boundaries, thereby exporting their own problems to the United States. What is more, not only the developing but also developed states have begun to experience this weakening in recent years. Whereas states have been growing stronger in a number of respects (in an attempt to supervise the global political economy), they have been weakened in some other respects. Spheres of state activity such as security, which were previously dominated by governmental actors, are now increasingly being shaped by ‘non-governmental’ actors (Sørensen 2004).
Second, politics is being displaced as an increasing number of issues are located beyond the control of governments (Leander 2004). Issues such as global warming, depletion of global resources, gendered violence and human cloning cross boundaries and place themselves onto the agendas of states. This has created pressures for governments to address a broader range of security concerns. However, not all states have the capacity to meet such a broad security agenda (which includes environmental, economic, societal and political as well as military threats). This is more of a problem for developing states that already suffer from a limited capacity in handling their ‘internal’ affairs while seeking to minimize ‘external’ interference.

Third, states now have to cope with an increasing number of ‘non-state’ actors who have become more active and influential due to the opportunities created by the process of neoliberal globalisation. What has happened with the impact of neoliberal globalisation is that areas of decision-making such as national security, which previously did not avail themselves to public scrutiny, are now politicised by way of being exposed to public scepticism and debate. That is to say, the transformative effects of neoliberal globalisation have created extra strain for the already fragile state structures in the developing world by limiting their freedom of action, subordinating them to larger bodies and eroding their distinctive identity (Grugel 2005: 204). Many developing states are therefore faced with the dilemma of choosing between openness to the international states system and neoliberal globalisation (which runs the risk of becoming vulnerable to threats against regime security) or closing off debates on issues they consider ‘sensitive’ (at the risk of endangering democratisation and sustainable development efforts).

Fourth, states have to operate in an environment where the privileges they once enjoyed are further restricted by international norms. Traditional approaches to security have yet to account for the dynamics that create pressures for states to transform if they are to cope with the impact neoliberal globalisation has had on security. This is true not only for the developing but also for the developed states of the world. The globalisation of the world economy has made it difficult for governments to provide basic security to their citizens not only in remote parts of Africa but also in North America. The United States government, during the George W. Bush administration, has increasingly found it difficult to cope with some aspects of the neoliberal global political economy — which it has championed in the post-Cold War era — as it began to tarnish US people’s confidence in the government. The Bush Administration responded by representing economic globalisation in security language (Higott 2004).

Yet, this predicament of the state in the security sphere should not distract our attention from the ways in which state power has been used to further the processes of internationalisation and globalisation. Barkawi’s work is illuminating in this sense in that he points to how, through waging war, states have contributed to the process of neoliberal globalisation. From this perspective, the US-led ‘War on Terror’, emerges not as a description of “the state we’re in” but as “the governing influence in world politics,” shaping events “in many distinct locales, even as it is shaped by them” (Barkawi 2005: 171). Viewed as
such, representations of the issue of ‘state failure’ as the threat against international security constitutes not so much a diagnosis of a ‘threat’ but a technique of governance on the part of some actors that seek to sustain the workings of neoliberal economic order. Yet, the prevalence of existing frameworks has so far not allowed us to appreciate such dynamics. Accordingly, ‘state failure’ has increasingly been represented as the greatest threat to global security without paying due attention to the broader context within which some states ‘succeed’ while others ‘fail’. In what follows, the article will turn to look at approaches to globalisation and security within pre- and post-September 11 literature to point to how our understanding of ‘globalised security’ in general and ‘state failure’ in particular has become impoverished.

2. Approaches to Globalisation and Security ‘before’ September 11, 2001

Before September 11, 2001 the security dimension of this transformation was left relatively unexplored. This could be explained with reference to an ‘optimism’ that, at the time, was shared by scholars and policy-makers alike. The so-called ‘hyperglobalisers’ expected the world to become a more ‘secure’ place as a side-effect of further globalisation (Gantzke/Li 2003). Their thinking was that globalisation would induce states to solve their conflicts via non-military means not only because they would achieve common ways of thinking but also because a breakdown in business relations would simply be regarded as too costly (Friedmann 1999; Barber 1995). Thomas Friedman, one of the early upholders of this view, maintained that even those who were further impoverished as a consequence of the side-effects of the globalisation of the world economy were not against globalisation; for they wanted to go to ‘Disneyworld, not to the barricades’. Without neglecting how globalisation also creates opportunities for terrorists who threaten global security, Friedman nevertheless maintained that further democratisation of the process of globalisation would eventually help to remedy the problems that it causes (Friedmann 1999).

Contrasting with the ‘optimism’ that characterised the literature, many so-called ‘sceptics’ begged to differ. They pointed to the destructive impact resulting from the global integration of production and finance on the peripheries of the world and highlighted the processes of ‘structural violence’ perpetuated by global forces (Thomas/Wilkin 1997). The hyperglobalisers, they noted, failed to acknowledge such processes as long as these did not disrupt the course of further neoliberal globalisation and market integration. Even one of the chief proponents of the liberal tradition, Michael Doyle, exposed how the process of neoliberal globalisation further exacerbated global inequalities and injustices and pointed to its likely repercussions for global security (Doyle 2000). According to Doyle, “globalisation both sustains elements of the Kantian peace and also undermines it, making it less sustainable and indeed vitiating some of the democracy on which it is founded” (Doyle 2000: 82). Recognising such
effects of globalisation, however, would have required the adoption of a reflexive approach that is cognisant of the effects of one’s thinking and acting on world politics (Rasmussen 2002).

It is worth emphasising here that during this period, optimists and pessimists alike shared a ‘narrow’ understanding of ‘security’ as the prevention and/or limiting of interstate war. Other, more structural kinds of insecurities that are not addressed (if not caused) by states did not make it into prevalent definitions of security. What is more, the hyperglobalisers, who declared the retreat of the state in economic affairs, believed in its continuing centrality so far as the security sphere was concerned. This was evident in their definition of security as the absence of ‘direct’ violence caused mostly by the threat and use of military force, to the neglect of the more ‘structural’ kinds of violence that also take economic-political-cultural and social forms (Galtung 1969). Accordingly, they failed to see how the process of neoliberal globalisation further exacerbated the insecurities faced by myriad actors — both individual and collective social groups — in different parts of the world.

If the optimism of the hyperglobalisers was one of the reasons why the security dimension of globalisation was left relatively untouched in the literature in the pre-September 11, 2001 period, another reason had to do with the academic field of security studies which failed to consider fully the potential impact of globalisation on security. None of the lively debates on security that took place during the 1990s was directly about neoliberal globalisation and its impact on security. During this period, scholars in the United States debated the virtues of ‘defensive’ versus ‘offensive’ realism (Mearsheimer 1990; Frankel 1996), whereas those who adopted constructivist approaches researched ‘security culture’.6 Scholars in Britain, Canada and continental Europe, on the other hand, contributed to the development of Critical Security Studies, which made use of the theoretical tools provided by critical theories to re-think security.7 Yet, notwithstanding such significant contributions to re-thinking security on both sides of the Atlantic, very few scholars focused on neoliberal globalisation as a context that gave rise to the need for re-thinking. On the contrary, these new approaches to re-thinking security were mostly seen as having been encouraged by the end of the Cold War (Tuchman Matthews 1990). The process of neoliberal globalisation, which could be considered to have created the conditions that allowed for the end of the Cold War, on the other hand, was left relatively unexplored. Another development that cannot solely be explained with reference to the end of the Cold War was the variation of threats in terms of both their sources and their targets. What was left untouched was how some of those developments — which are usually considered to have been caused by the end of the Cold War (such as the broadening of security, or the emergence of the politics of identity as a source of conflict) — were also the consequences of neoliberal globalisation.8

6 For examples of constructivism in security studies, see, inter alia, McSweeney 1999 or Weldes et al. 1999.
8 This is proposed by Clark 1999: 113-114 and critically dealt with by Morton 2004.
During this period, the authors of the relatively few works on globalisation and security focused upon the issue of the impact of globalisation on ‘national security’, i.e. state security. It was argued that the effects of the process of globalisation on security and strategy were minimal given the centrality of states and the military instrument in shaping inter-state relations in this field. Maintaining that globalisation did not call for a questioning of established ways of approaching security issues, they argued that existing institutions and actors should be expected to adapt to the globalisation of the world economy and assume new roles in the shaping of security relations. This is because the process of neoliberal globalisation has not changed the central dynamics of world politics; in the absence of a world government to provide for citizens’ security, states will continue to exist and provide for this need. According to a key realist author, Kenneth N. Waltz, the increasing economic interdependence and integration among states has not decreased but made more central the roles played by states in world politics. This is because international politics is shaped not by economic relations but by power differences among states. What is more, this situation should not be expected to change so long as governments and citizens continue to forego their welfare and even security to meet perceived threats against their identity (such as religion and ethnicity). In Waltz’s words, “politics, as usual, prevails upon economics” (Waltz 1999).

Not all studies produced during this period played down the impact of neoliberal globalisation on security. Yet, those works that focused upon the relationship between globalisation and security invariably represented globalisation as a process that developed outside states and constituted threats to their ‘national security’ (Flanagan et al. 2001). Although the authors of this study adopted a broadened definition of security appreciative of its non-military dimensions, they invariably analysed this broad agenda from the perspective of states without paying due attention to the social forces underpinning the global dimensions of (in)security.

To sum up, during the 1990s, not enough attention was paid to the impact of globalisation on security. The reasons for this include the ‘optimism’ of hyper-globalisers as well as security studies experts’ underestimation of the significance of neoliberal globalisation for security. This was because the latter channelled their energy into proving the hyper-globalisers wrong about ‘the retreat of the state’ by pointing to the continuing centrality of the state in the security sphere. While doing that, they failed to inquire into the factors that seemed to sustain the centrality of the state’s role in this sphere. They also failed to look into the issue of the impact of neoliberal globalisation on security and the erosion of the state’s capacity in the production of ‘national security’, which is due to competing claims against the states’ monopoly over the means of coercion, and the increase in the range of threats faced by states through the overburdening of state security agendas resulting from broadened security concerns. In those relatively few studies that focused upon the security dimension, globalisation was represented as a process that is ‘external’ to the state and that constitutes a threat to its ‘national security’. As a consequence of this tendency, the role played by the state in the process of neoliberal globalisation is neglected to a great
extent. Another consequence of such neglect is that the security dimension of neoliberal globalisation is left under-researched. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that this has caused an impoverishment of the literature on both globalisation and security.

3. Approaches to Globalisation and Security ‘after’ September 11, 2001

The September 11 attacks in 2001 against New York and Washington, D.C. have caused an upsurge of interest in the impact of globalisation on security. So much so that in the few years that followed the events, other dimensions of globalisation were momentarily left aside to analyse the security dimension (Green/Griffith 2002). This was caused partly by Western leaders’ representation of the events within the framework of globalisation. Paul Wolfowitz, who was US Assistant Secretary of Defence at the time, chose to explain the events in the following terms.

“Along with the globalisation that is creating interdependence among the world’s free economies, there is a parallel globalisation of terror, in which rogue states and terrorist organisations share information, intelligence, technology, weapons materials and know-how.”9

In 2002, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America also pointed to globalisation as the context which allowed for terrorists to reach anywhere around the world, announcing that ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’ with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) similarly producing a ‘Fragile States Strategy’ focusing on the problems of governance and civil conflict arising from poor state capacity and effectiveness (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, United States Agency for International Development 2005). It was announced in the most recent National Security Strategy (2006) document that ‘the United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies’ leading to the establishment of a new Office for Reconstruction and Stabilisation and increased likelihood of military-to-military co-operation between the US and African states (The National Security Strategy 2006; The Guardian 2/13/2005). Those studies that were produced in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 were inevitably shaped by this discourse and its equation of the globalisation of security with terrorism and a focus invariably on the threat posed by globalisation to the national security of states (Anderson 2004). Indicative here is also the recently-launched UK Commission for Africa report, Our Common Interest, that has at its centre

“the long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states . . . to build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions” (Commission for Africa Report 2005).

As Tony Blair indicated, in launching the Commission for Africa report, “to tackle the instability, conflict, and despair which disfigures too much of Africa and which can fuel extremism

---

and violence, is to help build our own long-term peace and prosperity” (Blair 2005). Yet the issue of how to interpret such events in alternative ways within different conceptual frameworks has been raised very infrequently. Likewise, the calls for a total rethinking of security relations or the adoption of new security policies worldwide have been quickly dismissed.

Although policy-makers’ pointing the finger at globalisation as the culprit behind the September 11 attacks has helped to generate more intensive questioning of its security dimension, many of the studies produced in the past few years have indicated that traditional approaches continue to prevail and shape interpretations of security dynamics. Two characteristics are shared by most if not all of these studies. First, they are ‘externalist’ in that they have portrayed globalisation as a process ‘external’ to the state. Second, they are reductionist in that they have identified ‘international terrorism’ as the major threat to security and have busied themselves with looking for strategies to cope with this threat, both inside and outside national boundaries (see, for example Satanovskii 2001). In what follows, each of these two characteristics will be viewed in turn. Before this, though, a word of caution is in order. Criticising the post-September 11, 2001 literature for its almost exclusive focus on terrorism should not be taken as underestimating the threat terrorism poses to individual, national and global security. What is being criticised here is the externalist and reductionist character of the traditional approaches, which prevent a fuller understanding of the current dynamics.

The traditional approaches are ‘externalist’ because they look at globalisation as a transformation that is taking place in the external environment without realising how the state is also being transformed at the same time. As Ripsman and Paul have characteristically emphasised,

“very weak or failed states such as those in sub-Saharan Africa have had their fragile national security establishments buffeted by the pressures of globalisation, adding further impetus for state collapse” (Ripsman/Paul 2005: 200-2001).

Yet, these authors fail to see the role played by the state in this process. As Georg Sørensen has pointed out, both those who maintain the ‘retreat of the state’ and those who underline its continuing centrality fail to understand the character of the transformation of the state. This is because their understanding of this relationship is that of a ‘zero-sum game’ of only winning or only losing (Sørensen 2005: 6-7). This is perhaps most starkly supported in the scholarly community by Robert Kaplan’s vision of the ‘coming anarchy’ in West Africa that is regarded as a predicament that will soon confront the rest of the world.

“The coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering” (Kaplan 2000: 9).

Hence a presumed reversion “to the Africa of the Victorian atlas. It consists now of a series of coastal trading posts . . . and an interior that, owing to violence, and disease, is again becoming... ‘blank’ and ‘unexplored’” (Kaplan 2000: 18). Similarly, Samuel Huntington has referred to “a global breakdown of law and order, failed

10 A signal exception in this regard is Cammack 2006.
11 See, for example, Booth/Dunne 2002: 1-23; Tickner 2002; or Agathangelou/Ling 2004.
states, and increasing anarchy in many parts of the world” yielding to a ‘global Dark Ages’ about to descend on humanity. The threat here is characterised as a resurgence of non-Western power generating conflictual civilisational fault-lines. For Huntington’s supposition is that “the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc... from the bulge of Africa to central Asia... has bloody borders and bloody innards” (Huntington 1997: 285, 321; 1993: 35). In the similar opinion of Francis Fukuyama, “Weak or failing states commit human rights abuses, provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack their neighbours. Since September 11, it also has been clear that they shelter international terrorists who can do significant damage to the United States and other developed countries” (Fukuyama 2004: 125).

Finally, the prevalence of warlords, disorder, and anomic behaviour is regarded by Robert Rotberg as the primary causal factor behind the proliferation of ‘failed states’. The leadership faults of figures such as Siakka Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), Siad Barre (Somalia), or Charles Taylor (Liberia) are therefore condemned. Analyses, in the case of these states, rely on an ‘internalist’ as opposed to an ‘externalist’ account pointing to the ‘process of decay’, of ‘shadowy insurgents’, of states that exist merely as ‘black holes’, of ‘dark energy’ and ‘forces of entropy’ (Rotberg 2004: 9-10). Neither of the two alternative accounts is able to capture the relationship between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ that allows some states to ‘fail’ while others ‘succeed’.

Likewise, the security sphere is currently characterised by “as much ... state performance as of non-performance” (Clark 1999: 107). In the eras that preceded the globalisation of security, “political communities both guaranteed their members’ security and posed the main threat to the security of other communities” (Guéhenno: 1988/9: 9). This began to change as part and parcel of the process of neoliberal globalisation. This is because “the threat is no longer another competing community, but rather the internal weakening of communities” (Guéhenno 1988/9: 10). What this means is that the ‘insecurity dilemma’ has become a fact of life for not only developing but also developed states of this world. The term ‘insecurity dilemma’ was put forward by Brian Job to point to the increasing inadequacy of the ‘security dilemma’ when accounting for the predicament of developing states whose major insecurities stem from ‘inside’ the boundaries whereas the realm ‘outside’ is relatively secure thanks to the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, which are the building blocks of international society (Moon 1995; Hey 1995). What the process of neoliberal globalisation seems to have also brought about is the condition that both developed as well as developing states of the world now have to face insecurities stemming from ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ their boundaries. In other words, the ‘security dilemma’ may no longer be adequate in accounting for the insecurities of the developed world either, if it ever was a suitable metaphor in the first place.

When globalisation is understood as the blurring of the line that distinguishes ‘inside’ from ‘outside’, the need to analyse the state along with its structural environment becomes clear. What distinguishes neoliberal globalisation from the other transformations in world history is the way in which it alters both the state together with its environment. What is understood by the transformation of the ‘inside’ is the ‘displacement of politics’ in an environment beset by the blurring of the divide between ‘do-
mestic’ and ‘foreign affairs’. Yet it is not enough to assume that states attempt to legitimize their actions simply within their own boundaries. This is because today’s neoliberal globalisation is:

“characterised by the weakening of existing institutions, public and private, and the direct confrontation of individuals with global forces . . . This evolution calls into question the role of political institutions: their power and relevance seem to recede, at the very moment when they are expected to meet the increased demand for identity” (Guéhenno: 1988/9:9).

However, the literature mostly equates globalisation with internationalisation and/or multilateralism. For instance, as Jan Aart Scholte has noted, the journal Foreign Policy (which is translated into many of the world’s languages) looks at state-to-state relations (foreign investment, foreign travel, membership to international institutions and organisations, international phone traffic) when preparing its globalisation index which is used to measure which state is globalised and to what extent (Scholte 2000:19). Equating globalisation with internationalisation, this perspective fails to see the transformation the state is going through. Likewise, studies on the security dimension of globalisation equate globalisation with states’ increasing resort to multilateral efforts in security maintenance. Needless to say, the two are not the same thing.

Even those studies that professedly focus on the transformation of security in a globalising world often fail to recognize what it entails. As noted above, this arguably is due to the continuing prominence of mainstream approaches within IR. Notwithstanding the recent proliferation of works seeking to understand globalisation’s impact on security, debates have so far tended to focus on ‘globalisation and national security’ to the neglect of ‘globalised security’. The difference between the two is no mere semantic juggling; it is central to how we understand the world that we live in. Indeed, these two terms stand for two distinct approaches to understanding the relationship between globalisation and security. Those who think about this relationship in former terms (‘globalisation and national security’) understand globalisation as a transformation that is taking place merely in the environment that is ‘outside’ the state boundaries, causing a proliferation of threats and thereby adversely affecting the ‘national security’ of states. Those who think about the relationship between globalisation and security in terms of ‘globalised security’, on the other hand, point to how the ‘inside’ is being transformed in tandem with the ‘outside’. Viewed as such, globalisation of security involves the transformation of the state as well as the environment in which it is set. This, in turn, requires viewing neoliberal globalisation not merely as an ‘out there’ but also as an ‘in here’ phenomenon.

The traditional approach to security is not only externalist but also reductionist in that it equates the security dimension of globalisation to the terrorist threat. This approach is also statist by virtue of its privileging of state security over human, societal and global security. Denying its statism, it presents itself as merely state-centric.12 The primacy accorded to ‘national security’ is explained with reference to the central role states play in the production of security. Accordingly, it fails to move away from the more traditional approaches to IR that have neglected studying the state while adhering it a central role in

12 On the difference between the two perspectives, see Bilgin 2002.
world politics. The only significant change in the traditional framework remains that of placing non-state actors alongside states. Needless to say, both groups of actors continue to be viewed as billiard balls. It is because of the continuing primacy of this traditionalist approach that many scholars continue to view globalisation as a process that is ‘external’ to the state and as causing an environment within which it is easier for the harbouring of terrorists, thereby failing to see how the ‘inside’ is being transformed along with the ‘outside’. This is no more evident than the post-September 11, 2001 focus on ‘failed states’ as the major threat against US national security (Washington Quarterly Special Issue 2002; National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, 2006). This indeed is a prime example of how attempts to understand a phenomenon such as terrorism have developed within the strait-jacket imposed by the traditional ‘national security’ framework, as the next section outlines in more detail.

4. The Traditional Approach to Security in a Globalising World

Philip Zelikow’s article entitled ‘The Transformation of National Security’ could be viewed as an example of this problem (Zelikow 2003). Zelikow prefaces his analysis by pointing to how “the division of security policy into domestic and foreign components is breaking down” (Zelikow 2003: 20). Yet the author clearly considers this diagnosis to be of relevance in some but clearly not all parts of the world. This becomes clear in the remainder of the article, where Zelikow puts forward the policy recommendation that the United States, from now onwards, “must delve into societies, into problems from law enforcement to medical care, in novel ways—challenging international institutions and the principles that define them to adapt” (Zelikow 2003: 20). This, in turn, could be considered as an indication of an unreflective attitude to scholarly analysis in that the author fails to note how, throughout the Cold War, the United States did “delve into societies” through resort to military as well as non-military means (Kolko 2002). What the author also seems to miss is that the blurring of the internal/external divide is not new within the developing world context. It has just become more acute due to the process of globalisation. Lastly, the author fails to note how this divide is also blurred in the developed world. For Zelikow, it is the world ‘out there’ that is changing, thereby constituting ‘new’ threats to US national security. Characteristic of his externalist approach to security, Zelikow maintains that what the US should do is to adapt to this new ‘external’ environment; reminiscent of arguments outlined earlier about the ‘coming anarchy’ of security concerns soon to flood the West. The author’s analysis also smacks of reductionism in that he understands the problem of security in a globalising world as the threat international terrorism poses to the national security of developed states such as the United States.

The line dividing the developed and developing world is also blurring in a way that Zelikow fails to notice. The United States constitutes a good
case for studying how this works. The neoliberal global political economy has brought about an increase in economic insecurities of US citizens. With the government finding it difficult to fully meet such insecurities, US citizens have begun to question the state’s ability to fulfil its duty of maintaining security (Lipschutz 1995). The US government, increasingly under the George W. Bush administration, has come to ‘securitise’ economic policy in an attempt to cope with the economic insecurities brought about by the neoliberal global political economy. Indeed, “economic globalisation ... is now seen not simply in neoliberal economic terms, but also through the lenses of the national security agenda of the United States. Economic globalisation is seen not only as a benefit, but also as a ‘security problem’” (Higott 2004). It should be noted that such securitisation has occurred not merely out of concern for citizens’ well-being but also in an attempt to “[re-boost] the US economy at the expense of the others.” In that sense, the US government’s actions could be viewed as “more nationalist than neo-liberal in its attitudes towards the drivers of economic globalisation and institutions of global and economic governance” (Higott 2004: 161). Zelikow’s approach, which focuses on the question of the adjustments to be made in US national security policy, fails to notice such dynamics that render globalised security different from what the world has witnessed before. Accordingly, he fails to see the need to look at the state-civil society complex when analysing the security dimension of globalisation.

The weight of the traditional approach on the strategic mindset is so strong that even those works that are otherwise critical of it fail to escape it fully. Many build on earlier assumptions, such as Robert Jackson’s focus on the extent to which international society should intervene in ‘quasi-’ or ‘failed states’ to restore domestic conditions of security and freedom (Jackson 1990). The notion of some form of international trusteeship for former colonies has therefore been entertained that would be designed to control the “chaos and barbarism from within” such “incorrigibly delinquent countries” as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, and Sudan, and to establish a “reformation of decolonisation” (Jackson 2000: 309-310, Lyon 1993). Andrew Linklater has similarly stated that “the plight of the quasi-state may require a bold experiment with forms of international government which assume temporary responsibility for the welfare of vulnerable populations” (Linklater 1999: 107-108). In the opinion of some specialists, this is because “such weak states are not able to stand on their own feet in the international system” (Jackson/Sørensen 2003: 283-284). Whilst the extreme scenario of sanctioning state failure has been contemplated, the common response is to rejuvenate forms of international imperium through global governance structures (Herbst 2004). Backers of a ‘new humanitarian empire’ have therefore emerged involving the recreation of semi-permanent colonial relationships and the furtherance of Western ‘universal’ values, echoing the earlier mandatory system of imperial rule.13

In Robert Keohane’s view, “future military actions in failed states, or attempts to bolster states that are in danger of failing, may be more likely to be described both as self-defence and as humanitarian or public-spirited” (Keohane 2002: 282). What

---

these views neglect, however, is how the expansion of international society and the adoption of specific Western norms, values, and property rights is itself linked to the international expansion of capitalism. For,

"on the surface of it, the expansion of international society was measured by the adoption of civilised norms of international intercourse; underlying this process, however, were the surreptitious forces of capitalist accumulation and exchange, imposing the universal logic of value creation and appropriation" (Colás 2002: 126-127).

Such a tendency of neglect is evident in two recent articles by Audrey Kurth Cronin and Robert H. Dorff despite the authors criticising the prevalence of ‘established mind-sets’ and calling for a new approach (Cronin 2002/03; Dorff 2005). Needless to say, both authors’ studies suffer from externalism and reductionism. Additionally, their analyses also suffer from another central problem, that of state-centricism. This point is worth emphasising because they both are firmly critical of the ‘state-centricism’ in existing US approaches to the problem of state failure (Dorff) and international terrorism (Cronin), which they view as having been exacerbated by the process of globalisation. Yet, in their respective analyses, neither of them succeed in moving away from state-centricism. For, while emphasising the need to look at actors other than states, they themselves look at these non-state actors in a way that is reminiscent of the black-box approach of the more traditionalist scholars. That is, they do not look at the processes through which these ‘non-state’ actors emerge, operate and transform. The problem with state-centricism, after all, is not only that the state is placed at the centre of analysis to the neglect of other actors but also that these actors are not considered as the dynamic relational entities that they are.

Beyond the phenomenal form of state failure—which is what much of the above focus on state failure is enamoured with—what needs to be given greater consideration is how the different logics of sovereignty and capitalism are intertwined which shape the structural conditions confronting postcolonial states—‘failed’ or otherwise. These contradictions are captured through the manner in which specific state forms internalise capital accumulation processes and associated forms of rule. The next section therefore asserts the necessity of a more nuanced approach to understanding ‘state failure’ that is appreciative of alternative forms of social organisation that arise within different historical processes of state formation and conditions of capital accumulation. In sum, a thorough historicisation of state formation processes in the ‘non-Western’ world is required that is cognisant of the political economy circumstances within which such states have evolved. However, this is not to recommend the view that states have a simplistically predetermined structural position within the world economy where “the world-economy develops a pattern where state structures are relatively strong in the core areas and relatively weak in the periphery” (Wallerstein 1974: 335; 2004: 52-56). Nor does it entail acceptance of non-Western state identities such as that of ‘protostates’, held as reflecting an impasse in the relationship between state and society; ‘lumpenprotostates’, which ‘manifest bizarre forms of arbitrary rule resting on the violence of armed thugs over an inarticulate majority of the population’; or the ‘black holes’ of governance in Somalia, Angola, Liberia, or Mozambique (Cox 1996: 218-219; Cox 1987). What is instead at stake is the need to
more fully relate an historical understanding of state sovereignty to the political economy of security (Inayatullah/Blaney 1995).

5. Sovereignty within Globalised Security

According to Mahmood Mamdani, following independence, the African postcolonial state comprised a bifurcated political structure in which the formal separation of the political and economic characteristics of modern capitalist states was compromised.

“The colonial state was a double-sided affair. Its one side, the state that governed a racially defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime of rights. Its other side, the state that ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coercion and administratively driven justice” (Mamdani 1996: 19).

The postcolonial state was therefore bifurcated due to the existence of a civil political form of rule similar to modern capitalist states, based on law, and concentrated in urban areas; and a customary form of power based on personalism, extra-economic compulsions, and exploitation centred in rural society and culture (Mamdani 1996). This distinct process of state formation and the associated form of sovereignty emerged within a global division of labour shaped by the expansion of capitalism and uneven processes of development. A considered appreciation of the contemporary nature of globalisation, security and ‘state failure’ is thus best advanced through an historical understanding of the uneven development of processes of capital accumulation within which different processes of production were combined in colonial territories (Rosenberg 2005).

This entails understanding how very different processes of primitive accumulation have unfolded within the framework of competing logics of sovereignty and territoriality linked to the emergence of capitalism and the international states-system (Harvey 2003). Hence a distinction can be drawn between ongoing processes of capital accumulation in the domain of advanced capitalist states and ongoing primitive accumulation in the domain of (post)colonial states facing different conditions of development. This process of uneven and combined development — involving uneven processes of primitive accumulation alongside combined processes of development — has contributed greatly to shaping state sovereignty and economic development in the non-Western world. In the latter, the age of imperialism suffocated the process of primitive accumulation so that the state became the prime channel of accumulation serving as a ‘surrogate collective capitalist’, for instance in Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Zaire, and Sierra Leone (Young 2004: 31). At the same time, though, “the distortions of the state are not just the result of the external dependence of African political systems. They also arise from the evolution of their internal stratification” (Bayart 1986: 121). Hence, “primitive accumulation ... entails appropriation and co-optation of pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and supersession” (Harvey 2003: 146). This is where Jean-François Bayart’s notion of ‘extraversion’ gains purchase in appreciating the general trajectories of state formation shaped by historical patterns of the uneven and
combined development of capital accumulation alongside the predatory pursuit of power and wealth tied to specific cultural routines, practices of social action, and social forms of organisation in the postcolonial era (Bayart 2000). Hence the “use of external resources to manage internal conflicts, alliances with foreign actors to strengthen central power, the transfer of the burden of foreign conditionality to the mass of the people, the instrumentalisation of conflicts among the powers to extract more resources” (Hibou 2004: 33). The point is that this focus on aspects of uneven and combined development that has emerged as part and parcel of globalised security is a much more fruitful, historically rich, and empirically nuanced way to understanding conditions of neoliberal globalisation, security, and ‘state failure’. It is this alternative, historically-oriented, conceptualisation of the relationship between sovereign territoriality and capital accumulation that potentially offers a way of moving beyond unrelective assumptions of mere anarchy within theories of the international, shaping notions of statelessness in Africa and elsewhere.\(^\text{14}\)

By way of illustration, factional struggles within and between sub-Saharan African states (Liberia, Rwanda, DRC and Uganda) would be better interpreted as the use of war as a mode of political production: a source of primitive accumulation that enables the seizure of the resources of the economy based on strategies of extroversion involving new claims to authority and redistribution (Bayart 1993: 74-75; Duffield 2001: 136-140). For example, the strategies of rebel groups in Sierra Leone in the 1990s such as Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) engaged in predatory forms of primitive accumulation through the seizure of resources such as conflict diamonds, whilst Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) similarly funded warfare through the timber, rubber, and diamond trade (Szeftel 2000). Also, in the late 1990s, the rebel Alliance for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, led by Laurent Kabila, played off the diamond cartel De Beers against one of its rivals, America Mineral Fields, concerning diamond mining contracts as well as contracts to mine copper, cobalt and zinc in just this fashion (Reno 2001). This arrangement is also somewhat mirrored by the intervention of the Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) in the ensuing Congo war through which some officers of the UPDF managed to institutionalize their private interests and benefit from the predatory pursuit of primitive accumulation whilst simultaneously underwriting the Ugandan state’s compliance with debt obligations to creditors within the global political economy. Long-term aims of state building, however, remain thwarted by the volatile balance sustained by these competing factional interests in the Ugandan state (Reno 2002). Elsewhere, the conflagration in Côte d’Ivoire, since 19 September 2002, initially involving the launch of an attack by army rebels on Abidjan and two northern towns, Bouaké and Korhogo, in an attempt to seize state resources, reflects again more the conditions of extroversion — the predatory pursuit of wealth and power through primitive accumulation — that has to be related to the specific historical experiences, cultural, ethnic, and political conditions of the region, rather than seen as an-

\(^\text{14}\) For a parallel argument seeking to extend a redefined relational theory of the state, anarchy, and the international to Africa see Brown 2006.
other case of a ‘failed state’. Additionally, bodies such as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SSRC), set up on 1 April 2002 to establish a fourth Somali government in Baidoa, joining the breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland in rejecting the authority of the Transitional National Government in Mogadishu, is less an example of a ‘failed state’ and more a contestation over social and political organisation embedded within the above complex processes of historical state formation and capital accumulation. In sum, there is a need to shift the focus from pathologies of deviancy, aberration, and breakdown in relation to the analysis of ‘failed states’, in order to better appreciate the centrality of strategies of primitive accumulation, redistribution, and political legitimacy that unfold in uneven and combined conditions of development shaping post-colonial state sovereignty. This is needed not only to be able to understand the dynamics in ‘other’ parts of the world, but also in order to become able to grasp the dynamics through which the contradictions between the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ have been constituted. The development of such an understanding is more necessary than ever at a time when discourses of ‘globalisation’ and ‘state failure’ are being employed to shape political processes ‘at home’ and ‘abroad’.

6. Conclusion: ‘State Failure’ within Conditions of Globalised Security

On the 4 May 1898, Lord Salisbury delivered one of his most notable and controversial speeches as British Prime Minister to an audience at the Albert Hall, London. The ‘dying nations’ speech, as it became known, applied Darwinian principles to the emerging international states-system and the symptoms, causes, and threats facing Britain at the time. Salisbury argued:

“You may roughly divide the nations of the world as the living and the dying . . . the weak states are becoming weaker and the strong states are becoming stronger . . . the living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying and the seeds and causes of conflict among civilised nations will speedily appear” (Greenville 1964: 165-166).

Imperialism was seen as a biological process that, according to the laws of nature, would lead to the ‘curing or cutting up’ of weak states, equated with ailing ‘patients’ ready for autopsies. Just as Lord Salisbury drew distinctions between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states in the international states-system at the height of classical imperialism, policy-makers and international scholars today are making similar assumptions about states outside the Western context. Evoking the medical metaphors of Salisbury, it has been assumed by William Zartman that “state collapse is a long-term degenerative disease” although “cure and remission are possible” (Zartman 1995: 8). Albeit with shifts of emphasis, states in the ‘non-Western’ world are still seen in a pathological manner as the main sources of instability and disorder threatening the security concerns of the ‘West’. In this vein, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw spotlighted the perfusion of warlords and terrorists within failed states to the extent that he has ‘no doubt’ that the domino theory applies to the chaos,
disorder, and anarchy of ‘failed states’ (Straw 2002).

At a time when it was claimed that the post-Cold War order lacked an overwhelmingly dominant cleavage, the threat of ‘failed states’ has come to the fore of policymakers’ and international scholars’ concerns. What is new — and problematised here — is the attempt to fit the defunct ‘national security’ framework of the Cold War years to the context of globalised security of the post-September 11 2001 world order (Bilgin 2002; Bilgin/Morton 2004). As argued above, such efforts have resulted in a failure to grasp the dynamics of the age of ‘globalised security’ that we are living in. Exemplary of such approaches to security from within the policy world include Richard Perle, Chairman of the Pentagon Defence Policy Board (2001-3), who has maintained that

“the struggle against Soviet totalitarianism was a struggle between fundamental value questions. “Good” and “evil” is about as effective a shorthand as I can imagine in this regard, and there’s something rather similar going on in the war on terror . . . [that is] a battle between good and evil” (BBC interview of Richard Perle 2004).

Another, more recent example is found in the words of President George W. Bush,

“The murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals is the great challenge of our new century. Yet, in many ways, this fight resembles the struggle against communism in the last century” (Bush 2005).

As with practice, the prevalence of this traditional approach is also apparent in the scholarly studies on ‘state failure’ in much IR literature. Statehood is assumed to be a universal order achieved through the acceptance of objective conditions of sovereignty shaped in the self-image of Western development. Yet, the argument here has raised the need to problematize such universally recognizable signs of sovereign statehood in order to highlight two things. First, there is the phenomenon of the ‘failed universalisation of the imported state’ that begs critical scrutiny (Badie 2000: 235). In particular, greater account has to be given to the relationship between sovereignty and capitalism that shapes state identities. This is proposed as an alternative to the hackedneyed state-centric assumptions of IR and its externalist conception of globalisation. Second, there is the set of problems created by the US attempts to export ‘national security states’ to different parts of the world. Negligent of the inside/outside nexus in security dynamics worldwide, existing approaches end up being either ‘externalist’ (as with traditional approaches to security that focus on the threats to ‘national security’ coming from the ‘outside’) or ‘internalist (as with traditional political economy approaches that focus solely on internal dynamics such as corruption and misuse of resources). Accordingly, these approaches both fail to capture the processes through which some states ‘failed’ while others declared themselves as victorious in the Cold War.15

The predicament of the Afghan people is a case in point. The aim here is not merely to point to the irony in the fact that

“the very same fighters who used American funds and arms to defeat the Soviets during the 1980s led the most important opposition to the United States after the mid-1990s, and that many of the Afghan warlords whom the Pentagon supported with air cover, money and supplies in the fall of 2001 once fought on the Soviet side” (Kolko 2002: 45).

The aim here is also to highlight that the US-led operation in Afghanistan has failed to bring peace and security

to this part of the world, where Pakistan has experienced further instability, fragile relations between India and Pakistan have worsened, the Afghani people has remained insecure, and the production of opium has continued with its global destabilising consequences. There is, then, a distinct failure in traditional approaches to questions of ‘state failure’ that precisely neglect the political economy of wars over primitive accumulation under conditions of globalised security. Recognising these rather different political economy processes of security is essential in moving beyond the increasingly problematic preoccupation of mainstream security theory and practice within international studies.

References


Barkawi, Tarak 2005: Globalisation and War, Lanham


Leander, Anna 2004: Globalisation and the State Monopoly of Legitimate Use of Force, in: University of Denmark, Faculty of Social Sciences, Political Science Publications No. 7.


Schweizer, Peter 1996: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Has-
tened the Collapse of the Soviet Union, New York.


Szeftel, Morris 2000. Between Governance and Underdevelopment: Accumula-


Thomas, Caroline/Wilkin, Peter (eds.) 1997: Globalisation and the South, London.


Washington Quarterly 2002: Special Issue.


Weldes, Jutta/ Laffey, Mark/ Gusterson, Hugh/ Duvall, Ray mond (eds.) 1999: Cultures of Insecurity. States, Communities and the Production of Danger, Minneapolis.


Close Encounters in the Third Dimension:
The Regional Effects of State Failure

Daniel Lambach

The concept of failed states has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Since September 11th, it has entered the discourse of international politics as a serious threat to the well-being and prosperity of Western countries. Nowadays, failed states are cast as potential safe havens for terrorists, drug cartels, human traffickers, money launderers and other actors comprising the various networks of shadow globalization. This discussion, while highlighting some important issues, has several blind spots. Firstly, it is quite ahistorical, even though state failure has existed as long as there have been states. Secondly, it lacks an understanding of the regional impact of state failure which is, in most cases, more serious than its global repercussions.

This paper examines the second proposition that “neighboring countries [...] suffer most from the immediate consequences of state collapse” (Eizenstat/Porter/Weinstein 2005: 144). Even though this assertion features regularly in the literature on state failure, it has not been systematically studied so far. Therefore, the aim of the present paper is to lay the groundwork for further inquiry into the topic. Its central argument is that the decline and dissolution of the formal state leads to a decentralization and transnationalization of order at the local level. The paper identifies several transnational mechanisms through which the external effects of state fragility affect other countries in the region. It further investigates the hypothesis that these regional dynamics have a detrimental effect on the stability and strength of the countries affected. In the paper, a model of the regionalization of state failure is constructed that will be tested against a case study of four West African countries between 1989 and 2004.

1. The State as a Variable

When examining failed states, it is imperative to first provide a definition of state fragility which can be used to separate analytical content from political discourse. This paper starts from a Weberian definition of the state. In Weber’s terms, the state is an institution that exercises authority over a delimited territory and the population resident therein. To this end, it has been invested with a monopoly over the means of physical violence which has been accepted as legitimate by its subject citizens. The state is sovereign in the sense that no political authority exists above it. Beyond these definitional elements that Weber pointed out, it should be added that the state is also in control of the monopoly of taxation as well as the monopoly of setting and enforcing rules and regulations that are binding for every citizen. It either exercises these monopolies itself, empowers agents to act on its behalf or legitimizes private acts of violence, taxation or rule-setting. The state can thus be defined as follows: it is a form of social order that the people resident in a given territory have imbued with the authority to set and enforce binding rules. To this end the state possesses monopolies on the use of physical violence and the levying of taxes.

It should be stressed that the above is the definition of an ideal type that ‘real’ states conform to only in varying degrees – not even the most prosperous and powerful states of our times are able to enforce their respective monopolies under any and all circumstances. Some states, however, are so deficient in their attributes of stateness that they can be described as ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’. ‘State failure’ thus represents the decreasing ability of these states to implement its rules, collect taxes and enforce its monopoly of violence. If a state does not have any meaningful capacity in any of these three areas, then it can be considered to have ‘collapsed’. Similarly, a state that never exhibited any ability to regulate its internal affairs can likewise be considered ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’, even though it did not experience a period of decline as these terms suggest. Thus, just as the state exists in the three dimensions of rule-making, taxation and violence, its failure takes place in those same areas.

Having said that, it should also be clarified what a failed state is not. The state, say Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1982), contains a juridical and an empirical aspect. The juridical face of the state is turned outward. It is dependent on the recognition of the state by other states as an equal, and it allows the government to engage in international relations (Crawford 1977, Österud 1997). The empirical face is turned inward and is responsible for addressing the domestic duties of the state, i.e., providing security and public goods for its citizens. The failure of a state takes place in its empirical dimension, usually without affecting its juridical status. Somalia, a country that has largely been without a functioning government since early 1991, is still a formal member of the United Nations and even has a Permanent Representative accredited at the world body. On the other hand, cases like the dissolution of Czechoslovakia represent a breakdown of juridical, not empirical statehood.
The comparison of failed states to a Weberian ideal type has been criticized as ethnocentric and/or as the application of a norm to an empirical situation where it is fundamentally inapplicable (Migdal/Schlüchtre 2005, Bilgin/Morton 2002). In a sense, this is correct, but one would caution against abandoning the concept altogether in the face of these objections. Much better, I suggest, to clearly delimit where and when the concept can be fruitfully applied.

In fact, in many countries across the world the state does not work in the way that we expect it to. Nevertheless, societies in these countries do not implode into anomic violence and chaos, but instead construct local alternatives to state governance. So, a lack of state governance is an empirical fact which begs the question whether, or better yet, when the concept of ‘state failure’ is useful in understanding and classifying this phenomenon. Therefore, one would argue that the proper place of a concept of state failure based on a Weberian ideal type is at the global level, for two reasons. One reason is the level of analysis: when we talk of a ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ state, we have constructed a variable that represents the state as a whole. This means that we are striving for a parsimonious description of the situation while accepting a certain loss of information about intra-state variation. However, talking about a single state (as so many case studies do) as ‘failed’, ‘failing’ or ‘weak’ is meaningless without an accepted referent. The Weberian ideal type represents such a referent, but there is still no generally accepted consensus about the exact definition of failure. Therefore, it would be better to use the terms in comparative research across geographical areas.

Another reason is methodological: in order to compare different countries, we have to adopt a global perspective, not just a national or even a regional one – for comparisons within a geographic area could conceivably be conducted with concepts better suited to local conditions. In this framework, following Giovanni Sartori (1970), one has to define a class (states) before identifying intra-class variation (the three dimensions of stateness). The class of states consists of those elements that possess juridical statehood; the kind of variation that we try to observe is their empirical statehood. In such a research framework, the concept of state failure can be fruitfully employed. However, there are two caveats to be made: First, the concept does not allow assumptions about what happens in spaces outside of state control. Some assume that these spaces are in the grip of some primeval chaos (Rotberg 2004: 9-10, Krasner/Pascual 2005: 153), but neither the Weberian ideal type nor our definition of the state allow a priori inferences about the outcomes of such a process. Second, talking about a ‘failed state’ inevitably papers over local differences. For instance, Colombia is a state that works reasonably well in the central and urban areas of the country but only has a sketchy, and largely ineffective presence in the rural and sparsely settled areas in the Southeast and elsewhere. If we classify Colombia as a failing state, as some authors do (Rotberg 2004: 46, McLean 2002), this is not an accurate reflection of the political reality in either of these zones. We need to be aware of these limitations of the concept of state failure in order to guard against an over-extension of our argument.

2 See e.g. the discussion about the distinctiveness of ‘the African state’ (Englebert 1997).
2. Making Sense of State Failure

In the literature, the term ‘state failure’ has been used to signify a condition as well as a process. Over time, additional concepts have been popularized to disambiguate this duality: as for conditions, both ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’ label a state as vulnerable yet still functioning (to a degree), while ‘failed’ and, more emphatically, ‘collapsed’ signify a condition where the state has lost all its attributes of empirical statehood. As processes, ‘failing’ or ‘collapsing’ are reserved for cases that exhibit a deterioration of statehood (although in some cases ‘failing’ simply covers the middle ground between ‘weak’ and ‘failed’).

Of course, this is a highly idealized model of the overall concept generally called ‘state failure’. States usually do not show a unidirectional downward trend, but instead oscillate between failure and consolidation. In some cases, it is highly debatable whether the states were ever institutionalized enough to be considered weak or fragile. This systematization, however, brings together the various adjectives that abound in the literature. It further allows us to focus on different elements of state failure: the process of failure and the condition of collapse. In this section, I will construct a two-stage model of state failure that includes both of these elements.

In the first stage of failure, the political system progressively exhibits dysfunctional traits. These traits can take two different forms, the occurrence of but one being sufficient to lead to an onset of state failure. The first form is what William Reno has called the ‘shadow state’: a personalist and clientelist model of politics that exists outside of, but parallel to formal state structures: “The shadow state is the product of personal rule, usually constructed behind the facade of de jure state sovereignty” (Reno 2000: 45). The purpose of the shadow state is the privatization of the state’s assets for the benefit of those who control it. The shadow state is constructed like a pyramid, with the country’s leadership at the top. Non-state elites and state officials are integrated into the shadow state at various levels. Rents accruing from state businesses, the sale of natural resources and international aid are distributed among the shadow state’s participants to ensure the loyalty of everyone involved.

With the development of the shadow state, the ‘formal’ state structure is starved of resources, and gradually loses its authority to its shadowy counterpart where the real decisions are being made. In fact, Reno argues, shadow state rulers have an incentive to destroy and hollow out formal institutions: by making public goods scarcer, citizens are forced to come to the shadow state as supplicants for access to health services, schools, and even physical security. Nevertheless, the formal state is not allowed to die, for its continued existence shields the beneficiaries of the shadow state from external intervention and allows them continued access to international rents and markets.

The second form of state failure is the fragmentation of the national political arena. This process consists of four aspects: the politicization of identity, the polarization of the political spectrum, an even distribution of power resources, and the militariza-
tion of political actors. Fragmentation occurs in situations where no single political actor is able to dominate the state on his own and where cooperation with its rivals cannot be achieved. During more peaceful times, such heterogeneous systems function through compromise and the building of ruling coalitions comprising various factions; following the polarization and militarization of politics, the actors instead choose to make a grab for power through armed force, forgoing the political process.

Personalization and fragmentation are not mutually exclusive, as cases such as Burundi, Somalia, or Afghanistan show. Therefore, they should be thought of as variables, each of which is sufficient to constitute state failure. Regardless of the form that this first stage of failure takes, violent conflict (whether it is called civil war, internal conflict, ethnic conflicts, or ‘new war’) makes up the second part of state failure. The violence makes the failure of the state obvious for external observers and exposes the blatant inability of the state to defend itself against armed aggression. It needs to be pointed out that large-scale violent conflict is not chaotic per se: violence is usually employed in structured ways by collective actors who exhibit varying degrees of cohesion. These two types were constructed through a comparison of 18 cases of state failure from 1960 onwards. Cases were selected by how clearly they fit the notion of state collapse. To preserve a certain degree of representativeness, care was taken to include cases from as many geographical regions as possible. In Table 1, the cases are listed by the first phase variable that was crucial in inducing failure. Where the other variable was present as well, cases are also listed in the second column (these cases are italicized). The dates given represent the approximate onset and termination of state collapse, the second phase of failure.

The distribution of cases reveals some striking features of the two forms of failure. For example, seven of the nine cases of personalization are from sub-Saharan Africa, while of the nine cases of fragmentation, just four are from this region (and two of these have been relatively brief episodes). At the same time, five cases of fragmentation took place in newly independent countries, while none occurred among the first group of cases.

One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that a personalization of politics takes time and can only be undertaken within an established, if weak political framework, while a fragmentation of the political arena might already be present at the independence of a country.

---

3 Rotberg 2004 and Esty et al. 1998, who represent two of the few authoritative attempts to construct a comprehensive list of state failure events, were employed as reference works during the selection stage. Inclusion of cases ultimately depended on a qualitative assessment by the present author whether the country could beyond reasonable doubt be considered a case of state failure.
Table 1: Cases of State Failure post-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personalization</th>
<th>Fragmentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Dates given were determined through qualitative case studies. Varying margins of error apply. Where the other variable was present as well, cases are also listed in the respective other column in italics.)

The four remaining cases of fragmentation all occurred in political systems that had been relatively well institutionalized at one point in the past. From this one can hypothesize that the personalization of politics is more likely to take place in states that are already very fragile, while fragmentation occurs either in newly independent countries or those with a relatively stronger political system.

3. The Regional Impact of Failed States

In recent years, attention has been focused on the global consequences of state failure. Undoubtedly, failed states are highly globalized through economic and social ties to diasporas, connections to the small arms trade and, where interventions have been undertaken, through a plethora of international actors (IOs, NGOs, other state actors). Comparatively less attention has been paid to their regional impact, which in most cases arguably has much greater repercussions.

The concept of the region, while ostensibly neutral and objective, has attracted its share of controversy, mostly because concrete regional boundaries have been impossible to establish. For heuristic purposes, I understand the region in a Deutschian
sense, as being structured by the intensity of human communication:

"People are marked off from each other by communicative barriers, by ‘marked gaps’ in the efficiency of communication" (Deutsch 1966: 100).

Regions coalesce around dense patterns of human interaction; where such interaction decreases, boundaries between regions can be drawn. The regional level represents an intermediate layer between the national and the global one.

Regional and global effects can be subsumed under the label of the ‘transnational’, which denotes their trans-border quality without specifying geographic distance. State failure will cause both regional and global-level repercussions. However, the regional effects are likely to be larger both in quality and quantity. For example, while some refugees will seek asylum in industrialized states, the vast majority will stay within the region of their home country. Most cross-border military incursions (even interventions by outside powers) take place within the region. Only those effects relatively unfettered by physical limitations (e.g., financial transactions) will affect the global level as much as, or even more than the regional one.

As already mentioned, very little research has been conducted on the regional effects of state failure themselves. However, there is a substantial body of literature that deals with the regionalization of other political phenomena, specifically violent conflict. Empirically, it has been shown that conflicts tend to spread, involving additional parties over time. For instance, the State Failure Task Force reports an increased risk of political instability for countries that neighbor at least two other countries experiencing civil war (Goldstone et al. 2000: 18). These results have been replicated for several different types of conflict, from demonstrations, coups and regime change to civil war and interstate war. One explanation for this phenomenon, diffusion theory, holds that new actors are drawn into an ongoing conflict. Contagion theory, on the other hand, assumes that conflict does not ‘spread’ as such. Instead, a new conflict breaks out in the vicinity of the previous one, because actors there ‘learn’ from the example provided.4

These two theories are not necessarily incompatible; rather, they attempt to explain different phenomena. Nevertheless, as Michael Brown correctly points out, both of them represent a highly abstract and mechanistic view of conflict, divorced from the specific actors in a conflict and their motivations. Furthermore, these theories both view neighboring states as “passive victims of turmoil in their regions”. Instead, he insists, these states are

“often active contributors to military escalation and regional instability: opportunistic interventions are quite common. It is therefore a mistake to think of internal conflicts ‘spilling over’ from one place to another through a process that is always beyond human control” (Brown 1996b: 26).

This paper heeds Brown’s argument that the regionalization of political processes should be approached as being a result of conscious decisions made by actors (who are situated in and informed by outside structures) involved in the process. However, these actors should not be thought of as atomistic individuals, but rather as embedded in a social environment that influences their acculturation and

socialization, structures incentives and provides opportunities (Scharpf 1997). This perspective helps to avoid the false dichotomy of individual- vs. structural-level explanations for an actor’s behavior.

3.1 Stages of Failure and Types of Factors

I differentiate between two kinds of regional effects: structural and dynamic factors. The first kind represents long-term social formations, attachments and networks that evolve slowly over time, whereas the second encompasses shorter-term developments that directly affect neighboring countries. (For a typology of factors, see Table 2. These factors are discussed in greater detail in the rest of the chapter.)

The stage of failure determines which regional effects are generated. In the first stage, during the formation of the shadow state and the gradual withering away of the formal state, structural factors are strengthened. The more the citizens are excluded from the benefits of the state, the more they have to rely on private social, economic and military networks to ensure their survival. Residents of border communities, but also urban dwellers intensify their connections to relatives, friends and kin in other countries.

In the second stage of state failure, during violent conflict, the dynamic regional effects come into play. These regional repercussions will follow the shape of the structural factors: refugees will mostly flee into areas where ethnic kin or other groups live to which they feel some kind of attachment and from whom they can reasonably expect solace and solidarity. Cross-border military escalation will be structured by the political-strategic environment in which armed actors operate and the conflict economy will employ pre-existing shadow economic networks that operate throughout the region. Implicit in this model is the hypothesis that the regional repercussions will, on the whole, have negative effects for neighboring countries by contributing to internal conflict and state failure.

3.2 Military Factors

Empirically, violence, whether employed by state or non-state actors, is an inescapable phenomenon during the process of state failure. To construct a very rough typology, one can identify several ways how armed violence and military actions can affect neighboring countries. The first type would be unintentional spillovers of violence, e.g., small cross-border raids by low-level soldiers, combat damage to another country’s infrastructure, and the like. However, these phenomena are hard to identify without detailed local knowledge and will generally have little impact on the overall situation.

Much more interesting are modes of intentional regionalization. Here we can distinguish two ideal types: the inside-out and the out-side-in modes of regionalization. Inside-out regionalization comprises acts by conflict parties inside the failed state that serve to ex- port violence to neighboring countries. Examples include constructing bases in other countries or conducting large-scale raids on other countries. These acts can be committed with or without the support, tacit or overt, of the government of the affected country or of the dominant local authorities in the areas across the border.
Outside regionalization, on the other hand, covers all moves by outside actors to intervene in the failed state, usually by deploying military or military force or by deploying armed actors across the border. Again, this can either be done with the blessing or against the wishes of local authorities. In both of these cases, it should be noted that, regionalization can be achieved through 'proxy' fighters instead of committing one's own military forces. For an intervening government, bank-rolling local militias can be a cheaper way of intervening in their neighbor state and avoiding the dangers of a military deployment while still retaining plausible deniability of any involvement.

Neither is regionalization confined to acts by the political elite: reports from West Africa attest to the existence of a 'fact' that a large pool of local mercenaries exists, whose members have been recruited for various conflicts in the area (Human Rights Watch 2005). And while their involvement did not

### Table 2: Typology of Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Structural Factors</th>
<th>Dynamic Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Political relations between relevant actors</td>
<td>Crossborder incursions into neighboring states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military intervention by neighboring states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Crossborder links of solidarity or identity groups</td>
<td>Refugee flows(^9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Financial burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Social conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ethno-political imbalances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Infectious diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Refugee warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Small arms proliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Networks of the shadow economy</td>
<td>Proliferation of weapons and military equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Export of conflict goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Financial transactions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) Refugee flows start out as a dynamic phenomenon that poses an immense logistical and humanitarian challenge for their host country. However, once the refugees are settled in camps or settlements, they become a refugee population that represents a structural factor. Furthermore, crossborder links of solidarity or crossborder identity groups can in some cases be created through displacement and flight.
create new armed conflict, it is likely to have increased the conflict’s intensity and duration.

In most cases, inside-out and outside-in regionalization cannot be easily separated because the regionalization of state failure creates highly complex situations (as the Great Lakes region shows) where governments support proxy militias in a neighboring country financially and, at the same time, allow them use its territory as a safe haven. In these cases, simultaneous processes of outside-in as well as inside-out military regionalization are at work.

Intentional military regionalization does not happen on a whim. It is the result of long-term strategic decisions made by military actors, be they state agents or warlords. In deciding when, and in relation to which country, to transnationalize the military conflict, these actors usually follow pre-existing diplomatic patterns of alliance and enmity. For example, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, president of Côte d’Ivoire, supported Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, in order to install a regime favorable to Côte d’Ivoire in an Anglophone country in the region, but also because of his long-standing personal dislike of Samuel Doe, the then Liberian president.

These kinds of relations are usually quite stable and exist for longer periods of time than the short- or medium-term exigencies leading to the kind of trans-border operations described above. Therefore, prior diplomatic relations are considered to be structural conditions of military regionalization for the purposes of this typology.

3.3 Social Factors
Social factors play an important role in regionalizing the effects of state failure. Throughout the world, people are connected by links of kinship which cross boundaries and connect people across several states. Processes of globalization, migration and urbanization contribute to the geographical fragmentation of identity groups and the transnationalization of social spaces (Portes/Guarnizo/Landolt 1999). Furthermore, in many countries where homogenous state-nations have not been constructed, ethnic and other identity groups frequently straddle inter-state borders. Combined with the aforementioned lack of state control over the borderlands, this leads to strong social and economical linkages across the border. Such cross-border interaction can be used to mobilize fighters, generate resources, spread information, channel conflict goods and armaments and shelter refugees. As such, these transnational bonds of solidarity represent one of the most important structural factors in the spread of state failure (Mincheva 2002).

Refugee flows represent another factor that is intimately connected to the presence of cross-border solidarities. While these have an impact on Western countries, too, some 90% of refugees (even excluding internally displaced persons) remain inside their home region, usually staying in neighboring countries (Tetzlaff 1993, Schmeidl 2002). Refugees impose a great financial burden on their host countries which is usually only partly alleviated by international assistance through UNHCR and other organiza-
tions. They contribute to economic and social conflicts by competing in the job market, thus lowering local wage levels. There is a possibility that refugees upset the ethnic balance within the province where they are sheltered. International and local funds necessary for the support of the refugees usually go to areas that are relatively poor and underdeveloped compared to the rest of the country, which might upset fragile political balances. Refugee flows, especially in tropical and underdeveloped regions, can also lead to a spread of infectious diseases such as Malaria and HIV (Collier et al. 2003: 39).

Not least, civilian refugees are notoriously hard to separate from former fighters. Dealing with refugee warriors has been a recurring problem for the UNHCR. Refugee camps have been taken over wholesale by rebel organizations which use them as a base for cross-border raids as well as for training and recruitment. Refugees also contribute to the spread of small arms by either bringing them into their host country or by acquiring them there for various reasons (Mogire 2004). Therefore, refugees are not only a problem for their host country in and of themselves, they also serve as a structural factor for a broad range of other negative effects. Even if only some of the consequences mentioned above materialize in a given case, they are sufficient to create serious problems for the host state.

3.4 Economic Factors

State failure also produces a number of economic ripple effects that are felt by other states in the region. Several studies have shown that countries in a state of civil conflict produce considerable negative externalities for their neighbors. In a recent paper, Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier calculate a net annual loss of 1.5 percentage points of economic growth for countries that border on a Low Income Country Under Stress (LICUS). Since a LICUS loses some 2.3 percentage points of growth but has, on average, three neighboring countries, the aggregate losses sustained by the region are much higher than the damage to the country itself (Chauvet/Collier 2004, Murdoch/Sandler 2002).

As to why these losses are incurred by neighboring countries, there are several possible explanations: countries next to an internal conflict usually raise their level of military expenditure, thus taking resources away from more productive investment; external investors could be frightened away from the region; transaction costs could rise if transport and communication infrastructure are endangered or damaged; the economy might be deprived of an export market (or a supplier of primary goods); finally, tourists might be discouraged from visiting the region. In most cases, a combination of these factors will be responsible for the economic damages to neighboring countries.

However, there are other, more direct consequences of state failure, notably in the area of shadow economies. Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (2004) have argued convincingly that the contemporary view of civil war economies as transitory epiphenomena of internal conflict is wrong (also MacGaffey 1991, dos Santos 1990). Instead, they argue, shadow 5 LICUS is the term used by the World Bank to denote poor countries characterized by weak policies, institutions and governance. This definition adds an economic dimension to the notion of weak statehood but describes the same underlying concept.
economies are permanent features of the daily life of many citizens in war-torn societies, where they offer a means of survival outside the formal economy to poor and marginalized people. During conflict, these economies are utilized by war entrepreneurs and conflict parties to import small arms and military equipment, export conflict goods (e.g., drugs, timber, precious metals, diamonds) and conduct financial transactions. Akin to cross-border bonds of solidarity, shadow economies represent a structural factor facilitating the interaction of actors in failed states with their business partners throughout the region. It is through these networks that small arms find their way into the region and that organized crime gains a foothold in the failed state and surrounding countries or, if it was already present, extends and entrenches its position.

3.5 Facilitating Conditions

The regional effects of failed states have a much bigger impact on neighboring countries when these countries are themselves close to failure. Such states have little capacity to shelter refugees, prevent fighters from entering their countries and alleviate economic externalities. Partly a reason for and partly a corollary of weak statehood is the porous nature of the country’s borders. In large parts of sub-Saharan Africa the problem is especially pronounced: borders had been drawn without respect to local conditions, resulting in a sizable number of identity groups being bisected by state boundaries. In addition to this, local transport infrastructure is usually underdeveloped. Coupled with the difficult topography of African hinterlands and the relatively centralized nature of the post-colonial state, this means that the state has historically been more or less unable to extend a meaningful presence into its own border provinces (Herbst 2000). The same applies in other poor regions of the world, albeit to a lesser degree. Looking at this problem from a regional point of view, it becomes clear that areas on both sides of most boundaries are not governed by central state institutions, resulting in broad swaths of land that are essentially divided into a range of fields governed by local, non-state authorities.

It is theoretically possible that the failure of one state in a region of weak states might produce repercussions that push one or more neighbor states along on the road to failure. Specifically, the dynamic factors that emanate from one failed state’s civil war might cause a neighboring fragile state to experience an escalation of conflict itself. While such a knock-on effect leading to a ‘zone of statelessness’ is plausible in theory, it is not enough to explain the prevalence of regional clusters of state failure (Ignatieff 2003). We need to take a closer look at how such processes interact across neighboring countries in order to understand this phenomenon.

In recent years, attention has been focused on the global consequences of state failure. Undoubtedly, failed states are highly globalized through economic and social ties to diasporas, connections to the small arms trade and, where interventions have been undertaken, through a plethora of international actors (IOs, NGOs, and other state actors). Comparatively less attention has been paid to their regional impact, which in most cases arguably has much greater repercussions.
4. Regional Interactions

So far, this paper has mostly talked about state failure in an isolated manner. However, given that what this paper set out to explain are the regional effects of state failure, this perspective needs to include several neighboring countries at the same time. To begin with, Barry Buzan’s perspective on what he calls “regional security complexes” is useful: these are a group of states whose security concerns are interlinked to such a degree that they cannot meaningfully be analyzed separately (Buzan 1991, Buzan/Waever/de Wilde 1998). To add leverage, and to move Buzan’s model away from the state level of analysis, I combine this with the concept of regional conflict formations developed by Barnett Rubin (2002). Regional conflict formations are sets of subnational conflicts within a region that develop mutually reinforcing linkages, making them more protracted and obdurate. In this view, the regional clustering of violent conflict is neither the result of pure chance nor of simple spillover from a single ur-conflict. Instead, regional conflict formations are made up of interlinked conflict processes with local causes and transnational connections. The concept is valuable because it highlights the primacy of local causes of conflict but focuses on the transnational interdependencies that help to keep the conflicts going.

The concept of regional conflict formations can easily be applied to state failure. Accordingly, a region consists of several states, each with its own domestic process of state failure and state consolidation. These processes, however, are heavily interdependent. They are connected through military, social and economic networks, through refugee flows, trafficking in small arms and demonstration effects. The security of all states in the region is strongly influenced by the state of the state in the other countries. In this manner, whole regions might become zones where state governance is almost entirely absent. In fact, it can be argued that there have been instances of such ‘zones of instability’ in West Africa or the Great Lakes region, to name just the most prominent examples.

This begs the question what it is exactly that takes place in these zones once the state’s rule has been removed. Very little research has been done to address this question. Evidence from Somalia, which has the dubious honor of being the longest running contemporary failed state, shows that not all is chaos. Instead of the Hobbesian jungle that alarmists predict, we find systems of social order – sometimes stable, sometimes temporary – at the local level that are based on solidarity ties, business interests and/or control over the means of violence (Menkhaus 2003).

In regions where multiple states failed or where several weak states are unable to control their borderlands, modes of governance emerge that cut across political boundaries. These transnational formations of governance differ from sub-state formations in a single state because, firstly, they are able to exploit differences in political systems like citizenship laws, economic regulations or diplomatic relations to their advantage, and secondly, their relations to the respective national polities might differ substantially from each other (e.g., they might be power-holders in
one country, but persecuted in the other). Armenians and Azerbaijani are a good example of how such transnational political formations can lead to a protracted inter-state conflict. Armenia’s policy towards its Azeri minority cannot be understood without reference to the situation of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan (and vice versa).


As this paper argued above, state failure as a concept is at its most useful when applied comparatively, preferably using cases from different geographical regions. The same caveat applies to the model of regional effects outlined in parts 3 and 4: it can only be considered to be conclusively proven if case studies that are representative of the general universe of cases agree with its predictions. That said, the following case study of four countries in a sub-region of West Africa is only in partial fulfillment of these requirements. Therefore, it represents a preliminary stage of research, serving to demonstrate the plausibility of my previous argument without proving it in a methodologically rigorous way (Heupel/Zangl 2004).

The case study investigated four central hypotheses:

H1: During the process of failure, structural regional linkages incorporating actors from the failing state are strengthened.

H2: The collapse of the state leads to dynamic regional effects.

H3: Structural linkages influence the shape and direction of dynamic effects.

H4: The regional effects of state failure are, on the whole, negative for human security in neighboring countries.

H1-H3 were further disaggregated into their respective military, social, and economic dimensions to increase and specify the number of observations (King/Keohane/Verba 1994). The first three hypotheses investigate propositions that undergird the two-stage model of state failure (see table 2). For the model developed earlier in this paper to be considered valid, its three constituent hypotheses (H1-H3) have to be proved individually. H4 represents a normative claim that state failure is a public bad that the international community would do well to help avert. If it can be verified, it would form the basis for policy recommendations.

These hypotheses were tested against empirical material from a sub-region of West Africa comprising the countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire between 1989 and 2004. The recent history of the sub-region is very much defined by a chain of events that was set in motion with warlord Charles Taylor’s uprising against the Liberian government in 1989 which plunged the country into a seven-year civil war, prompted an intervention by a regional peacekeeping force and, through the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), spread to Sierra Leone in 1991. After Taylor managed to get himself elected president in 1997, Liberia experienced a brief moment of peace. However, from 2000 onwards, the country was plunged back into civil war when Guinean-backed anti-Taylor forces started an offensive.
against the Liberian government which culminated in Taylor’s resignation and exile in 2003 when an interim government was installed under the auspices of the international community.

Sierra Leone experienced a bloody civil war and no less than five changes of government between 1991 and 2002. The RUF, with the support of Taylor, remained a constant threat until about 2000/2001. During the 1990s, the Sierraleonean army practically disintegrated as soldiers began to prey on the population, sometimes allying themselves with rebels and militants. Only after a British reinforcement of a faltering UN peacekeeping mission in 2000 was the democratically elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah able to assert its authority over the whole country.

Guinea remained relatively free of civil war during the time period although it was involved in its neighbors’ conflicts through their support of Kabbah and various anti-Taylor forces. In 1999-2001, war threatened to engulf the southeast of the country, but the Guinean military was able to repel the offensive from a coalition of Guinean rebels and RUF fighters seeking to carve out a safe haven as their fortunes in Sierra Leone were faltering.

Côte d’Ivoire suffered from domestic instability after the death of the country’s old patriarch Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. A succession of governments contributed to an ethnicization of politics. Declining resource rents starved the formerly affluent state of funds. In 2002, a mutiny broke out among parts of the military that quickly led to a short, but violent civil war. In the end, a coalition of rebel forces held the north and parts of the west of Côte d’Ivoire while the government controlled the south. This is the situation in which the country presents itself currently. The Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement is frequently violated and disregarded while a UN force is trying to monitor the ceasefire.

At the outset of the time span, all of these states could be considered weak, though to varying degrees. During the 15-year period, there were four cases of state collapse: Liberia 1990-1997 and 2000-2003, Sierra Leone 1991-2002 and Côte d’Ivoire 2002-ongoing. The phases of collapse, as well the respective process of failure preceding them, generated regional effects that largely agreed with H1-H4. Data was taken from secondary sources as well as statistical publications.6

Unfortunately, the claim that structural regional linkages incorporating actors from the failing state are strengthened during the process of state failure (H1) could only be partly validated because of insufficient data. In its military dimension, the evidence was the strongest. There, the 1980s, prior to the outbreak of the Liberian civil war, the region saw a flurry of para-diplomatic activity, as Charles Taylor managed to construct an alliance including heads of state Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso), Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire) and Muammar el-Gaddafi (Libya). At

the same time, the Liberian president Samuel Doe developed a close connection, even a personal friendship to Nigerian military ruler Ibrahim Babangida. In the social and economic dimensions, evidence of increased structural linkages was harder to pinpoint due to the limitations of data sources. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the predicted intensification of structural connections did indeed take place. For example, during the late 1980s, with the Sierra Leoneen state largely decayed, diamond smuggling to Liberia reached record highs, showing a strengthening of shadow economic networks.

The dynamic regional effects resulting from state collapse predicted by H2 existed in abundance. Cross-border incursions were commonplace among all military actors, including state armed forces. There was widespread financial, logistical and military support to allies and proxy militias in neighboring countries, as well as interventions by outside actors in collapsed states. Neighboring countries experienced a huge influx of refugees, with up to 800,000 Liberians (out of a population of about 2.5 million) residing in the three other countries in 1996. A regional conflict economy developed where everything was traded from diamonds, timber and iron ore to small arms and drugs. Actors of all ranks were active in this economy, from warlords and political leaders to ordinary foot soldiers selling looted goods.

The hypothesis that structural linkages influenced the form and direction of dynamic effects (H3) was also broadly confirmed. In the military dimension, diplomatic blocs had emerged by 1989 that stayed constant throughout the various civil wars. The rivalries between Liberian warlord and erstwhile president Charles Taylor on the one hand, and Guinean president Lansana Conté, various Sierra Leonen governments, and the current Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo on the other, structured military actions throughout the period. Similarly, refugees often fled into areas to which they were connected by links of solidarity. For example, both Mandingo and Kpelle refugees from Liberia fled into areas in neighboring Guinea where their respective ethnic kin resided. However, being on opposite sides of the Liberian civil war, they formed armed militias and participated in fighting in both Liberia and Guinea.

In the economic dimension, H3 could not be confirmed readily since it emerged that conflict economies did not automatically follow regional structures of the shadow economy. While the individual soldier in fact employed pre-existing economic linkages to sell and access loot, elite transactions were structured more by personal relationships than any long-term social formations. Furthermore, it could be seen that the conflict economy adapted easily to changing fortunes on the battlefield: Taylor’s forces exported conflict goods either via Liberian harbors or, when these were inaccessible, via Ivorian ports. Different routes for transport and trade were easily substituted for each other.

H4 claims that state failure has negative repercussions for the human security of citizens in neighboring countries. In this sense, human security should be understood in a wider sense (i.e., including indirect violence and deprivation); however, the following argument also holds if one uses a narrower definition (Burgess et al. 2004). The case study shows that
the overall effects for human security in neighboring countries were negative. These states suffered from military incursions, and had to deal with refugees (sometimes hundreds of thousands) and a burgeoning regional arms trade. Even regional effects which might seem positive at first glance cannot be considered beneficial upon closer inspection. For example, supporting armed actors in neighboring countries by providing them with a safe haven might have furthered the regime’s political agenda, but it usually imposed hardships on the population near the border, as civilians were preyed upon by militias or suffered from fighting that had spilled over from the failed state. Similarly, any gains that could be made from the conflict economy only accrued at the top of the state apparatus. The only area where concrete benefits to human security could be recorded was the occasionally higher quality of public services resulting from international assistance. For example, the local population in the Forest Region of Guinea profited from investments into the health and transport infrastructure undertaken by UNHCR and the Guinea government to better support the masses of refugees living in the area (van Damme et al. 1998, Jacobsen 2002). However, these gains, though substantial, were more than outweighed by the increased dangers of armed predation that resulted from the collapse of neighboring states.

6. Conclusion

This paper has argued that failed states represent a much bigger threat to their immediate neighbors than they do to global stability or the national security of Western countries. As an analytical framework, a typology of regional effects was constructed that differentiated between military, social and economic modes of regionalization. It was argued that state failure is a two-stage process consisting firstly of the development of a dysfunctional political system, and secondly of the outbreak of violent internal conflict that leads to a collapse of formal state institutions. During the first stage, the structural linkages of the population to actors in neighboring countries are strengthened, as citizens try to construct alternative networks of support to ensure their survival. In the second stage, dynamic factors are created, including cross-border military incursions, refugee flows and regional conflict economies.

After this, a case study of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire 1989-2004 was presented. Overall, the model fit the case very well and can be considered to be plausible for further empirical research. Hypotheses generated from the theoretical discussion were generally confirmed, though a few of them could not be adequately judged due to a lack of data. Nevertheless, this preliminary result bodes well for further case studies. These would be necessary to conclusively confirm or falsify the applicability of the model. It is expected that further case studies will exhibit a lower level of regional effects, since the countries in the current study were relatively weak to begin with and were thus more susceptible to the regional repercussions of a neighbor’s failure.
As this paper is largely concerned with conceptual questions, it does not generate insights that are immediately relevant for policy. Nevertheless, it highlights one imperative that is too often overlooked in present policies addressing failed states: these policies need to consider the regional context in which such processes take place. As an example, the reconstruction of Afghanistan should not be limited to the work done in Afghanistan itself, it also needs to address the networks of the drug economy that connect the northern provinces to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the lack of state governance in the Northwest Frontier Province in neighboring Pakistan that has served as a place to regroup for Taliban fighters as well as social and economic networks of refugee Afghans in cities such as Quetta.

To take another example, the United Nations recently employed separate peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Liberia (UNMIL) and Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Considering the high degree of interconnectedness of these respective conflicts, a joint mission for all countries (or, indeed, the wider region) might have been a better solution, even though such an approach would still require some conceptual development before it can be put to operational use. It would also be advisable to treat state failure as an issue that merits a whole-of-government approach. A policy response that coordinates defense, development, foreign and economic policies would be a great improvement over current practices in most countries (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2005).

References


Recently Published INEF Reports


Single copies can be ordered at:
Institute for Development and Peace, University Duisburg-Essen, D-47048 Duisburg.
Please add 1.45 EUR in stamps.
All INEF Reports can be downloaded from our homepage:
http://inef.uni-due.de/page/Serien.html/rep
The Institute for Development and Peace (INEF)

The Institute was founded in 1990 on the basis of a cooperation agreement between the Development and Peace Foundation (SEF), Bonn, and the University of Duisburg-Essen. Based on an interdisciplinary approach, INEF is concerned with

- global trends and global governance,
- interrelationships between development and peace in developing countries,
- global interdependencies between the economy, the environment, and security,
- development perspectives of developing countries in the World Economy
- the interplay between states, international organizations, the business sector, and civil society in world politics.

INEF and the SEF have set themselves the goal of

- playing a role in shaping the national, European, and international dialogue concerning global interdependencies and global governance, and
- providing impulses for political action, based on global responsibility, in North and South, East and West

INEF, often in cooperation with national and international partners, conducts research programs and systematically explores available international expertise and world reports. The Institute is integrated in a strong and viable international research network.

Directors and Executive Board

Director: Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel
Executive Director: Dr. Cornelia Ulbert

Members of the Executive Board: Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel (spokesperson); Prof. Dr. Thomas Heberer (deputy spokesperson); Prof. Dr. Heinz-Jürgen Axt; Prof. Dr. Gerhard Bäcker (Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University Duisburg-Essen); Prof. Dr. Michael Bohnet; Prof. Dr. Othmar Haberl; Dr. Brigitte Hamm; Prof. Dr. Dirk Messner; Prof. em. Dr. Peter Meyns; Prof. em. Dr. Franz Nuscheler; Prof. Dr. Werner Pascha; Prof. Dr. Karen Shire; Jessica Zeltner.

The INEF Report series

INEF Report is a series that appears at irregular intervals. It publishes major findings from the institute’s ongoing research projects as well as overview studies on academic and policy debates concerning global issues. INEF Reports are primarily addressed to the research community and students of international relations, but also try to reach out to policy-makers interested in relevant scholarly results.