Gender Orders in a Globalizing World: Comparing Farm Women and Homeworkers

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Patriarchy, a term that inspired feminist activism in the 1970s and 80s, is out of fashion. Beyond unfashionable, the term “global patriarchy” is politically suspect. Both terms evoke universalist theories of women’s oppression, a designation of a key variable that explains the origins of it all. Oblivious to cultural and historical differences, theories of patriarchy have become associated with the worst excesses of modern rationalism, recounting an evolutionary narrative that provides an originary foundation, and complicit in establishing regimes of truth that perpetuate power relations (between races, ethnic groups, North and South) while promising emancipation (between genders).

Interestingly, the discrediting of theories of global patriarchy in the late 1980s was paralleled by processes of “globalization” entailing the compression of social space and the acceleration of (financial, migratory, information, etc.) flows, together with the “intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992). In this context, the feminist movement globalized as well, linking activists from many parts of the world, and finding a focus in international fora such as UN conferences. Global feminists found common causes in issues ranging from economic subordination and reproductive health to violence against women (Meyer and Prügl, 1999). The search for commonality in their situations, the quest to understand women’s oppression based on universalizing theories thus was tempting.

Yet, the assertion that inequality and subordination take very different forms in different contexts has become a virtual mantra in feminist circles. Related is the suggestion that there is no common experience of inequality and subordination and therefore no common oppositional strategy. Resistance, it is said, has to start locally, reject universalist theories, and draw on situated knowledge. Feminist philosopher Gayatri Spivak has gone so far to suggest that efforts to organize a global movement and to influence international politics are misguided, and indeed complicit in perpetuating oppressive regimes. According to her women organizing around inter-state institutions are misguided “feminist apparatchicks who identify conference organizing with activism as such” while “the real work may be elsewhere” (1996:4).
The understanding that feminist knowledge has to issue from local knowledge, and that feminist strategy has to be locally oriented has created problems for feminist global activists: Is there a way to measure amelioration of gender difference? Is there any way to compare degrees of oppression? Beyond vague notions of solidarity, is there any basis for global feminist strategies? Some feminists in the academy as well have bemoaned the lack of a theory of activism and the lack of common strategies that apparently is implied in the rejection of modern theories of patriarchy (Hartmann et al., 1996; Benhabib et al., 1995).

Feminists in IR can make a distinct contribution to these debates, and help move it beyond the dichotomous opposition between modern and post-modern, universal and particularistic, global and local. I suggest that they can do so by drawing on the feminist constructivist insight that the international world is a social world, a world that participates in constructing gender and in establishing patriarchal orders on a global scale. What I am suggesting is that the dichotomy in feminist theorizing between universalism and particularism can be ruptured by taking seriously international politics as a locus of gender construction. Clearly then, there are forms of gender oppression that span the globe (albeit not uniformly). These forms have emerged from international practices such as colonialism, international development efforts, and the formation of multilateral regimes. The social practices that have made up these international efforts have participated in the construction of gender orders that have perhaps not become universal, but certainly global. Once the social and political nature of international politics is acknowledged, feminist activism at that level regains legitimacy.

Around the world, women still make up a disproportionate share of those living in poverty, disproportionately hold low-paying jobs without security, and on average earn about 25 percent less than men. They are severely underrepresented in formal decision-making institutions and subject to unacceptable levels of male violence (UNIFEM, 2000). This global reality calls for an explanation, one that cannot emerge from references to local oppressions only. The following is an effort to develop the outlines of a feminist constructivist approach to explaining globalized patriarchy, drawing on ontological and epistemological premises outline elsewhere (Locher and Prügl, 2001a; Locher and Prügl, 2001b). These include a commitment to a constructivist “ontology of becoming,” a commitment to theorizing gender and power as imbricated in all social
construction (including constructions in international politics), and an epistemological commitment to taking a feminist standpoint, however provisional.

The Global as a Social Field

The notion of “global space” provides an important entry point to rethinking patriarchal forms that spill beyond the boundaries of nation states. Different meanings attach to the term global depending on disciplinary commitments. In approaching “the global” as a social field, one where social construction operates on a global scale, I align myself with sociological writings on globalization that have described the novelty of globalization precisely in the fact that it has led to an expansion of the boundaries of the social, a disembedding of space and time, the creation of a social space alternatively described as post-modern or late-modern (Giddens 1990, Albrow 1997, Robertson 1992, Beck 1997).

Diverse propositions in the globalization literature resonate with this approach. In the field of economics, propositions of institutional economists and political economists are compatible with this theorization of the global as a social space. Their writings do not limit themselves to describing the acceleration of trade, investment and other monetary flows that cross national boundaries, but describe as well the attendant institutional arrangements: trade regimes, monetary regimes, and other interstate or private regulatory mechanisms. From this political economy perspective, the global social world consists of regulatory modes created by a diverse set of agencies, ranging from inter-governmental organizations, private-sector regulatory bodies, to academic discourses that have prepared the grounds for globalization by elaborating neo-liberal economics.

There is a considerable portion of gender politics in the social space of global economics, as Diane Elson (2000), Isabella Bakker (2001), and other feminist economists have shown. The figure of economic man, autonomous and self-interested, has led to a considerable distortion of economic life. Thus, because women’s unpaid labor is not counted, austerity programs typically have streamlined public economies by drawing on women’s unpaid labor to take up the slack. Furthermore, economic models that have ignored the “provisioning” economy of households
have led to policy prescriptions that may have gotten indicators right but hurt people. The spread of gendered liberal economics thus has contributed to a globalization of a particular form of patriarchy.

In the field of **anthropology and cultural studies**, globalization is treated for its tendency to produce cultural forms that are no longer territorially contained. Studies of the “hybridity” of cultures, the way in which cultural elements from different parts of the world intermingle, are part of this body of literature. They include so-called “post-colonial” studies probing the mingling of colonizing and colonized cultures (e.g. Appadurai 1996, Ling 2001), studies of geographers probing politics in one geographic location by exploring scales ranging from the “very local” (bodies and “inner landscapes”) to “the global” (e.g. Price 1999, Newmann 1998, Katz 2001), and studies of transnational cultures such as the globally linked Chinese diaspora (Ong 1999). Here as well, gender constructions are prominent: in Ling’s descriptions of the formation of the Oriental girl, in Price’s analysis of the way austerity discourses piggy-back on dietary discourses that discipline the female body, in Ong’s descriptions of the reconstruction of manhood and womanhood in the Chinese diaspora.

What unites these very different studies of globalization is a radically new conceptualization of geography. The global world increasingly is not one ordered according to territorial principles. The Westphalian system that ordered the world territorially is unraveling, even as states themselves continue to exist as regulatory entities. In parallel, politics is changing. We can no longer think of the world as divided into inside and outside, an arena of domestic politics where democracy, representation and gender construction happen, and one of interstate politics of security management, devoid of politics, including gender politics. In the academy, we can no longer separate international relations from comparative politics – the division makes little sense in a world where the political and social operate globally.

Yet the world remains populated by institutions that developed in the Westphalian system. These institutions prominently include states and inter-state institutions. The latter in particular have gained prominence as globalization has increasingly limited state autonomy. Theories of globalized patriarchy thus need to take seriously these institutions and the politics of global governance that they have helped spawn.
Describing the global as a social space is only a first step towards theorizing globalized patriarchy. Such a theory demands the development of propositions about how gendered power operates in global space. Because it is primarily an ontological commitment, constructivism is of little help here. We need to draw on conceptual models that resonate with constructivist commitments.

The study of the European Union holds particular interest for finding models that break through the Westphalian divide while also taking seriously institutions. Notions of “multi-level governance” and “policy networks” promise a way out of the dualistic conceptualizations of the state-centric model. I find the notion of policy networks particularly effective in breaking away from the Westphalian spatial imagery. The imagery of up and down, of higher levels of politics that encompass lower levels of politics fundamentally still informs the notion of multi-level governance even while it multiplies layers of policy-making. It is a hierarchical model that may be agnostic about the strength of a particular level, but one that also suggests a teleology of higher and lower. The image of policy networks not only does away with the teleological hierarchy of levels, but also moves beyond the narrow focus on institutions. To be sure, institutions form a core element of any political field. However, when probing gender politics in a global space, institutions should not be thought separately from social movements. Focusing on movements brings to light agency, in particular the power that emerges from acting in consort. Furthermore, the discursive and identity politics that constitute such a significant part of the feminist movement cannot be captured adequately without a focus on discursive politics, an element central to all new social movements. Networks encompass both movement advocates and officers of institutions. They link the power that comes from association with the power vested in institutions in order to construct new rules with a global reach.

In a post-modern polity, networks may routinize as a perhaps not even so novel form of policy-making. Networks operate in the functional policy arenas that David Mitrany (1976) predicted more than fifty years ago as the predominant political organizing structures in a technologically complex world. Accordingly, one would expect networks to form in particular functional issue areas. They have done so but, against Mitrany’s predictions (and in contrast to Haas conception of networks as “epistemic communities”), they have also formed in areas not
related to technology, such as human rights, gender, and environmental politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998), suggesting a much broader application than Mitrany had envisaged. Thinking of the world as separated not into territorially based entities but into functionally differentiated policy fields moves us away from the opposition between local and global, domestic and international, and opens the way towards developing a theory of globalizing patriarchy.

Because they connect movements to institutions, networks are at the heart of a new form of policy-making that anchors feminist identity and framing politics. The suggestion then is to study global space as an array of functionally differentiated fields of institutions and movements, differentially linked through networks. Movements constitute the primary locus of discursive production, of framing and reframing. Whether they can network into institutions will influence their ability to effect change. I hypothesize that networks are a meeting point for functional/technocratic/modernizing elites and modernist activists that develop the regulatory shape of the post-Westphalian world. They are nodes of a global polity, less bringing together state and civil society (perhaps not particularly relevant descriptors in the global age), but functional elites interested in change.

The challenge for a theory of globalized patriarchy is to specify the gender orders that emerge from functional policy fields. The production of these orders may involve actors from all “levels” in global space, but united by a focus on a policy field. Networks in different issue areas may produce not only distinct but also sometimes contradictory policies, distinct and sometimes incompatible gender orders. Such orders may be geographically localized or extensive, depending on the reach of the networks and on the power of its frames. At issue, in talking about global space, however, is less the geographic reach of a network’s constructions (which may fall far short of comprehensively covering the globe), but its aspirations for global application.

In the following, I explore two arenas of gender construction to flesh out some propositions about gender orders in a globalizing world. Starting from “the local”, I begin with experiences of women that I encountered in my home-town in rural Bavaria. First, I deal with homeworkers, i.e. people who work at home for pay. Second, I deal with women working on farms. Both have been the target of international debates, albeit in different ways. The regulation of homework became a topic in the International Labor Organization in the 1990s, as the result
of network activity. In the process, and drawing on the discourse of equality, homeworkers were constructed as equal to other workers, a construction that is now actively diffused through institutions and movements. European farm women have received much more limited attention. While the “women-in-development movement” (perhaps better understood as a “network” since it links feminist movement activists and advocates in development agencies) has given considerable attention to women in agriculture in multilateral institutions, European farm women have not linked themselves to this discourse which is distinctly part of the global women’s movement and of aspirations for equality. Seeking justice their own way, they have demanded a distinct status for farm women and received support for this demand in the EU. Thus, there is a network linking activists and officers in the institution, albeit at a regional level. The resulting gender construction differs considerably from the global construction of homeworkers as European farm women have maintained the gender division of labor on the farm while demanding a status that recognizes the value of their labor contribution.

Homeworkers

In July of 1996, the International Labor Organization passed a new convention on homework, committing its member states to treat homeworkers like all other workers. The convention constituted the outcome of a decade-long activism by a network that linked movement activists from the European Union (mostly Great Britain), India and South Africa. Furthermore, the network included committed individuals from within the International Labor Office, project officers who had been engaged with projects on home-based labor in India, an officer who directed a project to organize home-based workers in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, as well as some sympathetic union officials. It was a small network, including perhaps 20 key people. While they saw themselves as members of different movements (the women’s movement, the labor movement), their strategies were low-key, consisting of convincing and cajoling – the main purpose being to change the identity constructions that attached to home-based workers and to invoke a frame of social justice.

When home-based work was on the agenda of international debates at the beginning of the 20th century, the shared understanding was that it was an evil to be eradicated. Associated with crowded homes, neglected children, disease spreading from unhygienic conditions to consumers, exploitative pay and working conditions, virtually all agreed that this type of work was not desirable. In Europe and the US, unions lobbied for a ban (also seeing in homeworkers competitors that allowed employers to evade labor laws and negotiated tariff agreements), Christian reformers sought to organize them as housewives - praising the advantages of keeping women at home while deploring their wages and working conditions. Both approaches constructed homeworkers as mothers whose poverty forced them to work, but who were not real workers. As one German professor belittled the Christian homeworker organizations: they get together, not to change the world and make history, but to gain new strengths that allow them to be exploited further.

The homework ban never made it through the International Labor Organization, although the Roosevelt administration did ban the practice in the United States and lobbying fiercely for a ban in the 1940s. But the construction of home-based workers as “not-real-workers” remained, not only in local practices around the world that denied such workers rights and decent pay, but also in declarations of the ILO and unions that continued to bemoan the practice.

In the 1970s, the global feminist movement, in particular women working in development set out to bring to light and revalue the vast amount of women’s work, often invisible, rarely valued. The notion of the “informal sector,” introduced by the ILO to describe various street-based activities of the poor, helped to cast light on women’s work as well. Development practitioners now designed projects to foster women’s “income-earning activities” – home-based work became something to be supported. HomeNet, the network of advocates seeking protection for homeworkers, smartly linked the industrial homeworker of lore in the North with the informal sector worker in the South. This allowed them to frame the so-called informal sector workers of the South as dependent workers, invoke a frame of social justice, and gain ILO action on behalf of these workers.
This is a case where a network operated successfully in order to change gender constructions in a way that furthered gender equality. A network was established that included feminist movement activists and feminists in the ILO. The network reconstructed the identity of home-based workers insisting that they were part of the working class. This allowed them to link the equality frame of the movement with the social justice frame of the ILO in order to gain state protection for home-based workers. Gender was reconstructed in one issue area, i.e. in the area of labor relations. The inclusion of home-based workers into the category worker further chipped away on the already crumbling notion of the male worker/breadwinner. Home is no longer opposed to work; work doesn’t lose value just because it is carried out in a private location.

The homework convention was only a small step in the gender politics of the global arena of labor relations. HomeNet is now attacking the gendered understanding of dependency in labor law and social science discourse that frames dependency purely on the basis of class relations. Self-employed workers who cannot prove legal dependency on a work giver thus gain no protection even though they lead a totally marginal existence that at least in part is often a result of gendered rules. HomeNet has enlisted UNIFEM in a project (WIEGO) that brings together activists and academics in order to initiate a rethinking of such dependencies and lay the groundworks for regulatory structures that are truly gender-sensitive.

European Farm Women

Gender norms in agriculture played a prominent role in the global women’s movement early on. The women-in-development (WID) movement put agriculture on the agenda. Ester Boserup’s (1970) path-breaking book gave the impetus. An agricultural economist concerned with Third World development, Boserup identified two types of farming systems (male and female), alerting the development community to the fact that in many places women bear the primary responsibility for farming. Furthermore, she found that agricultural modernization in the two systems affected women negatively, albeit in different ways. On the one hand, with mechanization, women lost responsibility for jobs on the farm (e.g. milling), and with it sources of independent income. On the other hand, agricultural extension efforts typically targeted men, the assumed “heads of household,” even when women were the farmers. Often they lost land to new
male cash crop production. The effect was a “domestication” of women, making Asian, African and Latin American women resemble the bourgeois housewife ideal of Europe and North America (Rogers 1980, Tinker 1976).

The housewifization of farm women also took hold in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. In Germany, the development of training in farming for men in parallel with training in home sciences for women contributed to a rural division of labor that sought to approximate bourgeois patterns. In addition, women systematically lost income-earning opportunities with the strict regulation, and during World War II even prohibition, of direct marketing (Schmitt 1997: 15; Kolbeck 1990: 156-159). This push towards housewifizing farm women was accompanied by the modernization of European agriculture. As industrialization created attractive income-earning opportunities, farmers lost access to cheap rural labor. With government support they modernized and increasingly relied exclusively on family labor, their own and that of their spouse in most cases. Accordingly, European farming today is overwhelmingly family farming – farms are family-owned and maintained through family labor. In 1997, almost 80 percent of the total agricultural labor force in the fifteen member states consisted of family labor (EUROSTAT 2000). A distinct gender division characterized this labor: 80 percent of all workers classified as “spouses” were women whereas 81 percent of all farm managers were men (Fremont, 2001).

While these figures paint a picture of a clear division of labor, they hide diversity, in particular the reality of part-time farming in many European countries and the unique role that women play in enabling such farming. Part-time farming in Germany traditionally meant that the farmer held a full-time job in industry or construction and reorganized the farm so that it could be run on the labor of his wife and his own after hours. But the pattern is not uniform across Europe. In Northern Europe women contribute a large share of the off-farm income. In the South and in central Europe, in contrast, there tend to be more outside opportunities for men. As a result, some have talked about a feminization of farming in some Mediterranean states (Braithwaite 1994: 63; Overbeek et al. 1998: 58; Schunter-Kleemann 1995: 1998) and in part-time agriculture in Germany (Inhetveen and Blasche 1983: 153; Pfeiffer 1989). Even though women

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2These tendencies are in contrast to developments in Greece where agricultural modernization in the absence of alternative employment opportunities has entailed a much more pronounced exodus from farming for women than for men, resulting in a „masculinization” of Greek agriculture where the ratio of men to women in agriculture increased from 1.7:1 in 1971 to 2.8:1 in 1991 (Overbeek et al. 1998, p. 27).
may often work part-time on smaller farms, they appear to increasingly do most of the work on such farms. Indeed, small farming (which correlates with part-time farming) is sometimes associated with a disproportionate number of women managing farms. In 1997, women managed almost 20 percent of all farms in Europe. They were much more likely to be located in regions where small farms predominate. The holdings of female farm managers were smaller economically than those of men, with 82 percent of women’s farms classified as small compared to 68 percent of men’s (EUROSTAT 2001).

Although European women working on family farms rarely have independent income and only recently gained independent social insurance, and although they have often carried excessive work loads with little recognition, they have hesitated to jump on the feminist bandwagon. The main organization of rural women in Germany, the Deutscher Landfrauenverband (DLV) had its origins at the turn of the 19th century in the Landwirtschaftlicher Hausfrauenverein (Organization of Agricultural Housewives) whose purpose it was to improve the lives of women by training them in housekeeping skills, but also by creating structures to facilitate direct marketing. Like many feminist organizations of the first wave of the women’s movement the DLV saw women less as equals to men but as complementary. But, unlike bourgeois and working-class feminist organizations, the DLV today is torn between notions of women’s equality and notions of women as complementing men in their work. It combines politics targeted towards equal treatment with understandings of women as occupying unique roles and supporting them in these roles. In the context of modernized family farms this role has been that of the professional housewife. Increasingly, however, the ideal of farm women as co-entrepreneurs complements the housewife ideal.

In contrast to the concerns of the WID movement, there is very little talk in the DLV and in its counterpart at the European level, the COPA women’s committee, of gaining women access to land and helping them become better farmers. Instead these organizations have focused on the one hand on gaining women social insurance and a legal status that recognizes their work and their role as a co-worker. On the other hand, they have promoted the professionalization of housework and the business skills of farm women in order to allow them independent income through businesses that complement the farm. Unlike the homeworker advocates that sought to make women homeworkers equal to men working in factories, advocates for farm women do not
see in them potential farmers but potential business women who can draw profit from their uniquely feminine skills.

Farm women were successful at the European level in achieving a directive that specifically extended the principle of equal treatment to self-employed women and women in agriculture (86/613/EEC). Whether an effect of the directive or as a result of other pressures, farm women in Northern Europe now typically have a legal status as co-managers of the farm for social insurance purposes (Bandarra-Jazra 2001). Statistical practice, however, continues to group the agricultural labor force into “farm managers” and “spouses” (e.g. Fremont 2001: 3), ignoring the legal fiction of co-management, and no doubt reflecting popular understandings. Schmitt (1997) describes the difficulty that German women have in being taken seriously as farmers even when they have agricultural training and experience equal to their husbands. But this is not a battle that the DLV consider its own.

In focusing on entrepreneurship among rural women, the strategies of European farm women’s organizations resemble those popular also in the WID movement. Despite this similarity, however, there are few links between European farm women and the WID network, and European farm women do not draw on framing practices of global feminist networks. There is no talk about the “rural informal sector,” the “feminisation of rural poverty” and the difficulty for rural women to access credit, themes that pop up in the statement of the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) on agricultural trade negotiations. There also is little talk about women being the “true farmers” or about gaining women access to land and improving their property rights in face of the widespread practice of patrilineal inheritance. And while in international development practice the disproportionate targeting of male farmers has become an issue, there is no questioning of this at the European level (although the bulk of funding under the CAP’s price support mechanism goes to men and to the large farms typically managed by men, and although gender considerations are marginal in the structural funds targeting rural areas, see Braithwaite 2000).

Thus, European farm women’s organizations have not made it a priority to attack constructions of women as non-farmers and have instead focused on professionalizing activities
considered feminine in conventional divisions of labor. In part this may be because few of them are autonomous of the male-dominated farmer interest organizations, in part because their members accept the existing structures as normatively right and objectively beneficial. Only recently has there been some movement in this landscape of European rural women’s organizations. Independent rural women’s NGOs have become stronger in the European South, and they are gaining footholds in the EU. In addition, with the ecological movement gaining a hold in the countryside, new farmer organizations have entered the political stage, also providing room for women with more equality-oriented feminist movement agendas (e.g. the women’s committee of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft in Germany or the Coordination Paysanne Européenne at the European level).

What emerges then in the issue area of agriculture is a corporatist form of women’s interest representation largely divorced from the themes of the contemporary global women’s movement. Interestingly, its successes lie in areas where it has anchored its demands in the equality frame, gaining an EU directive and equal legal status for farm women with their farmer/entrepreneur husbands. But rural women’s interest organizations have put little effort into changing other patterns of inequality that are pervasive in the European countryside and in European agricultural policy, patterns that have come under attack in global WID discourses and have gained attention in international organizations other than the EU. The absence of a strong link to the movement hampers progress in these areas.

Conclusion

The comparison of homeworkers and European farm women has yielded a review of different networks engaged in efforts to reconstruct gender orders in global issue areas. HomeNet linked the feminist and labor movements to the ILO in order to effect a definition of home-based workers as workers. The WID network linked the feminist movement to development institutions in order to effect an empowerment of rural women. And the COPA women’s committee networked European farm women in order to represent their interests at the EU level. The last network is only weakly attached to the contemporary global women’s movement.

3 in addition to “other family members,” and “permanent employees”
In line with my introductory considerations about the global nature of gender construction, the comparison suggests a first set of propositions about the construction of global gender orders:

1. Gender constructs differ profoundly in different economic arenas and women and their organizations participate in producing and reproducing such constructs in different directions.

2. Change in such orders in the direction of equality is most likely when a network of activists and officers of an institution draw frames from the global movement to anchor demands. Organizations at a distance from the movement are less likely to effect change.

3. Change is more likely when frames resonate.
   In the case of homeworkers, for example, once homeworkers were constructed as workers, the feminist equality frame resonated with the social justice frame of the labor movement and of the ILO. In the case of the WID network, considerable work has gone into finding a resonance between the equality frames of the movement and the poverty, empowerment, and efficiency frames of development institutions. In the case of European farm women there is an apparent clash between the feminist frame focusing on equality on the one hand, and a policy frame that centers on securing the family farm on the other. The focus on preserving the farm (rather than securing the well-being of individuals) perpetuates an understanding of farming households as harmonious and devoid of power; a site where resources are pooled and employed for the good of all.

Equality discourse resonates more strongly with economic discourses in the industrial and service sectors (where homeworkers are located) and much less with the discourses in European agriculture. Equality discourse does not threaten the regulatory structure of industry and services. On the contrary, making homeworkers into workers signals that flexibility does not detract from worker status. In this way, making homeworkers into workers supports industrial interests that
have sought to dismantle labor laws. The opposite is true in the European agricultural sector. Agricultural interests want to preserve existing subsidies together with the myth of the family farm, which has served to legitimate these subsidies. The myth of the independent farmer and his contented wife maintaining values, tradition, and the European heritage has helped cement the regulatory order in European agriculture. Attacking the family farm as an institution of women’s oppression destabilizes the system that is in place.

This paper set out to take a first stab at a big issue, i.e. what does it mean to speak of globalized patriarchy. It shows that gender constructions can differ significantly in different economic sectors. Preliminary hypotheses suggest that networks and the salience of feminist movement frames are key to explaining whether women’s network are successful in changing gender orders in the direction of equality. The adoption of the equality frame is facilitated if such frames resonate with the frames of other organizations populating the policy field and if it resonates with the economic regulations of the sector. Gender orders thus emerge as perpetuated and contested through network politics and as interwoven with modes of economic regulation. As such, they are never universal, but shapes on a global landscape of culture and power.
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