Rainer Rilling

»American Empire« as Will and Idea

The new Grand Strategy of the Bush Administration

America has no empire to extend
or utopia to establish
G. W. Bush, 2002

We don’t seek empires,
we’re not imperialistic. We never have been
D. Rumsfeld, 28 April 2003

Now really, the United States
is certainly not an empire
J. Fischer, 2003

What is needed is a new kind of imperialism
R. Cooper, advisor to Tony Blair, 2002

A new Grand Strategy for a New World Order is in the making. Its central idea is to protect global capitalism through American Empire. It encompasses unrivalled military superiority, the ability to wage preventive wars and a new justification of the global sovereignty of the USA.

Updated and fully revised, May 2003

The new division of the world

The terror attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 was a »transformational moment« (Jessica T. Mathews) that focused and expedited the conceptual thinking and politics of the political class in the USA – after all it found itself under direct physical threat for the first time. The process came to a tentative conclusion with the paper »National Security Strategy of the United States of America« (NSS), which was published on 17 September 2002. The text in the style of a political manifesto articulates the current US administration’s understanding of power politics and the ensuing conception of a New World Order. It was put to a first test in the latest war on Iraq. The »transformational moment« was transformed into an »imperial moment«.

According to the preface to the NSS, signed by George W. Bush, the long struggle of the last century between freedom and totalitarianism ended with a »decisive victory for the forces of freedom«. What prevailed is »a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterpris« and an unequivocal role of the USA in this blueprint of the world. »Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence«.

This assessment of a qualitatively new disparity of power can also be heard outside the USA – as early as the beginning of 1999 the then French foreign minister Hubert Védrine spoke of the »hyperpower« USA – and, of course, above all within the USA itself. For the liberal historian Paul Kennedy, author of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, »Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing«, and at the beginning of 2003 James Kurth summed it up in the influential neo-conservative journal The National Interest: »The first decade of the 21st century, like the first decade of the 20th, is an age of empire. A hundred years ago, however, there were many empires (...) Today, there is only one empire – the global empire of the United States.«

Tony Judt described this disparity of power in the New York Review of Books as a new global inequality: »Our world is divided in many ways: rich/poor; North/South; Western/non-Western. But more and more, the division that counts is the one separating America from everyone else.«

3 Financial Times, 1 February 2002
for some, even Europe suddenly finds itself in a different situation: »Welcome to the rest of the world.«

In order to consolidate this lead on all other powers in the world, a new strategy, global in scope, was developed starting in 1989. During the second Bush administration, it became gradually more audible in the domestic aftermath of the »War on Terror« and was reflected in the National Security Directive of 17 September 2002. The National Security advisor responsible for it, Condoleezza Rice, compared this development in April 2002 with the inception of the containment strategy directed against the Soviet Union after World War II.

The players

This process was directly supported by a group of neo-conservative intellectuals from think tanks and strategic planning institutions as well as policy-makers from the military. At the beginning of the 1970’s they agreed in their criticism of détente and in the 1980’s under Reagan they began to climb the ladder of power. In the first Bush administration they attained a minority position in the military executive, then finally achieved a hegemonic majority status in the second Bush administration. Subsequently they also asserted this position in the Republican Party in an alliance with the Christian Right, which is firmly anchored in the South of the USA, with the radical market ideologists and the classical, more or less socially conservative Republican mainstream Right (»compassionate conservatism«).

In the course of 2002 they dominated the foreign policy debate in the USA. They outlined the key military policy aspects of the new Grand Strategy, incorporated them into an optimistic view of the state of the US economy and in 2002 established themselves as the vanguard of the new non-partisan movement calling for war. In record time they got nearly the whole foreign policy elite of the USA as well as – in an unparalleled political alliance – the opposing forces in Congress to rally around their project, which oscillates between hegemonic and imperial dominance of the USA. For many it directly picked up where Reagan had left off. William Kristol, one of the most influential players in the neo-conservative field, summed up this dramatic change in 2003 in the words: »The members of the President’s foreign policy team have all become Reaganites.«

But the members of this group underestimated the dynamics of the opposition outside Congress to the war in Iraq and the danger of disissidence within the ranks of the military. They also failed to get the majority of people of other countries behind the project of American Empire – with the exception of Israel, the majority in even those countries who belonged to the »coalition of the willing« was against the war of the USA. On the domestic front, this shift went hand in hand with a marked shift of power from the legislative to the executive and the reorganisation of activist »Big Government« under the banne of »internal security« (»homeland security«) the likes of which had not been seen in half a century.

The rhetoric, conception and strategy of this group are nothing if not radical. Their goal is to break away from the general strategic political consensus that had prevailed among the dominant US elites for decades. They draw their dynamics from the single-minded mobilisation for war – »We are in a world war. We are in World War Four« (as the former CIA director James Woolsey put it on 24 July 2002). Their tactical promise: the new, technologically revolutionary wars that the USA would wage would be a walkover. Their dynamic political core is an alliance of Reaganite-minded military and nationalistic neo-conservatives. Many of them have ties to the armaments and oil industries. Within the Bush administration this power micro-network forms clusters around the Vice-President, in the Pentagon, the National Security Counsel as well the Departments of State and Justice. Members of this alliance are

• Paul Wolfowitz, the intellectual who calls the shots, from 1989 till 1993 Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy under the current Vice-President Dick Cheney, since March 2001 Deputy Secretary of Defense under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld;
• Dick Cheney, Vice-President, who began his career under Rumsfeld in the Nixon era and stems from the culture of the »corporate Washington insider class« (J.M. Marshall). His wife Lynne Cheney held a top position at the huge US armaments concern Lockheed Martin until 2001; she is also well-positioned in the neo-conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI);
• Richard Perle, in the Reagan administration 1981-1989 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, until March 2003 head of the high-ranking Pentagon advisory council Defence Policy Board, then forced to resign;
• William Kristol, the son of the influential neo-conservative theoretician Irving Kristol, former chief-of-staff

6 Walden Bello, Unraveling of the Atlantic Alliance? in: TNI Focus on Trade, No. 81, September 2002
7 The Weekly Standard, 10 February 2003
of Reagan’s Vice-President Dan Quayle, a regular commentator on the ABC News programme »This Week« and editor-in-chief of the neo-conservative opinion-maker »The Weekly Standard« (circulation ca. 60,000) published by Rubert Murdoch;

- Donald Rumsfeld, 21st and 13th Secretary of Defense of the USA, previously chief-of-staff in the White House and NATO-ambassador of the USA. Together with Perle, Wolfowitz, Cheney and Kristol, Rumsfeld forms the core of this Reaganite neo-conservative alliance;

- I. Lewis Libby, in the first Bush administration under Cheney Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy; in the second Bush administration he held the central position of Vice-President Cheney’s chief-of-staff;

- Zalmay Khalilzad, worked closely with Paul Wolfowitz under Reagan and George Bush Sr. resp. his Secretary of Defense Cheney and in the second Bush administration became commissioner for Afghanistan and later Iraq;

- John R. Bolton, former Vice-President of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and on the advisory board of the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs, is Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the Department of State;

- Elliott Abrams, formerly Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and then Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs – at the time deeply implicated in the Iran-Contra affair, now Senior Director for Near East and North African Affairs on the National Security Council;

- Douglas Feith, Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, long-standing collaborator of Richard Perle;

- Stephen J. Hadley, now Deputy National Security Advisor in the White House; as Assistant Secretary of Defense he worked for Wolfowitz when the latter was at the Pentagon under Dick Cheney. He is a member of the Defense Policy Board;

- Eliot Cohen, in the first Bush administration on the planning board of the Pentagon and then a member of Rumsfeld’s Defense Policy Board under Perle;

- Eric Edelman, the security advisor to Dick Cheney;

- Zalmay Khalilzad, the most important »keeper of the purse« in the Pentagon (Under-Secretary for Comptroller);

- Thomas Donnelly, in the meantime employed at Lockheed Martin;

- Robert B. Zoellick, worked at the Department of State in the first Bush administration, in the second Bush cabinet he is responsible for trade;

- Bruce Jackson from the armaments concern Lockheed Martin is supposed to have been instrumental in the draft of the loyalty declaration some countries of »New Europe« addressed to the US, plays a key role in the establishment of US power positions in Eastern Europe;

- Robert Kagan, in Brussels at the think tank Carnegie Endowment, was also George Schultz’ speech-writer and is considered to be one of the most influential promoters of the concept of »American Empire«. Members of this network are present in many journalistic, political and organisational contexts, often in association with others such as the President’s brother Jeb Bush, or William J. Bennett, Francis Fukuyama, Fred C. Ikle, Donald Kagan, Norman Podhoretz, Stephen P. Rosen, Samuel P. Huntington, Richard Armitage, Richard V. Allen, Gary Bauer, Midge Decter, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Charles Krauthammer etc.

The members of this power micro-network have a great deal in common: the political career, of the same generation, but above all the ideological orientation, involvement in key political projects, wealth and similar or even the same institutional networking. Before they could position themselves in the institutions and power structures of the Bush administration, this group worked co-operatively in nearly a dozen think tanks that were intensely involved in the development of strategic concepts in the 1990’s and frequently financed by the same foundations. Among these are the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), founded in 1997 in the »Reaganite spirit«; the American Enterprise Institute (in whose building the PNAC resides); the Center for Security Policy (CSP), founded in 1998, and its advisory board NSAC, which developed into a central meeting-place for Reaganite politicians and ideologists in the 1990’s and together with the AEI provided dozens of key figures to the Bush administration; in addition, the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (CLI), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Jewish Institute for Security Affairs,

Empower America, the National Institute for Public Policy and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. Several neo-conservative educational institutions (Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies [SAIS] and the John M. Olin Center for Strategic Studies) also play an important role in this network.

Characteristic for the whole network is its powerful presence in some of the national media such as the Wall Street Journal, Fox News, the Washington Times and the New York Post as well as periodicals such as Public Interest, National Review, National Interest, The New Republic, Insight, Frontpage, First Things and Commentary Magazine. A key position is held by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, to which the Fox News Network, the New York Post and the Weekly Standard belong. «Lots of people at Fox have supported Bush’s policies. They have earned it that they and Murdoch himself get a little notice.» The network and its institutions are financed primarily by foundations, which to some extent in the Reagan era, but above all in the 1990’s carried out a carefully calculated extreme right-wing funding policy. Among them are above all the US-foundations Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, the foundations of the Koch Family, but also the Scaife-Foundations, the Castle Rock Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation, as well as individual financiers such as Bruce Kovner, chairman of the Caxton Corp., Roger Hertog of Alliance Capital Management or Conrad Black, chairman of Hollinger International Inc. (Richard Perle belongs to its board of directors). The financial power of these foundations is considerable: in the 1990’s Richard Mellon Scaife was among the 50 wealthiest private persons in the USA, Koch-Industries are the second largest private enterprise in the USA.12 «It’s a small world,» said William Kristol to characterise this world of neo-conservatism.11

The strategy and its basic components

Development of the assessments and objectives

In the past half-century the USA has followed a twofold objective, «to make the world safe for capitalism» and «to ensure American primacy within world capitalism.» Making the world secure meant a fundamental frontal confrontation with non-capitalistic movements and social orders, but ensuring American primacy meant above all containing and breaking up competing candidates for hegemony in the Eurasian heartland in a «long war» (Phillip Bobbitt) from 1917 till 1989. In the confrontation with the Soviet Union this dual objective of safeguarding capitalism and American hegemony were two sides of the same coin. As the «liberal hegemonic power» the USA operated through a set of multilateral institutions that at the same time conveyed, legitimitised and disguised the military dominance. In addition, there was a second set of «Western-American» values that laid claim to universal validity. After 1989 the military, technological and economic power of the USA was on the rise, but even at the beginning of the 1990’s in a debate in the journals International Security and Foreign Affairs what called the «unipolar moment» after the collapse of the USSR15 did not change the predominant assessment that the new unrivalled superiority of the USA was still subject to historical and real-political limitations. For this reason during the Clinton administration the strategic options of «liberal multilateralism» (Ikenberry), of «soft power» and the limited use of military means of force were basically retained.16 The main priority was to initiate, support and control the capitalist transformation processes in the state-socialist countries and to slowly fill the power vacuum that had emerged. The focus was on the economy. Long before 9/11 a competing option had existed that increasingly gained influence. It is reflected in the report «Rebuilding America’s Defense», published in 2000 by the neo-conservative «Project for the New American Century».17 It gives a description of the new global constellation that was to become the hegemonic blueprint for interpretation after September 2001: «Over the decade of the post-Cold-War period, however, almost everything has changed. The Cold War world was a bipolar world; the 21st century world is – for the

13 Quoted in Hagan, President Buch’s Neconservatives [11]
moment, at least – decidedly unipolar, with America as the world’s sole superpower. America’s strategic goal used to be containment of the Soviet Union; today the task is to preserve an international security environment conducive to American interests and ideals. The military’s job during the Cold War was to deter Soviet expansionism. Today its task is to secure and expand the zones of democratic peace; to deter the rise of a new great-power competitor; defend key regions of Europe, East Asia and the Middle East; and to preserve American pre-eminence through the coming transformation of war made possible by new technologies. From 1945 to 1990, U.S. forces prepared themselves for a single, global war that might be fought across many theaters; in the new century, the prospect is for a variety of theater wars around the world, against separate and distinct adversaries pursuing separate and distinct goals. During the Cold War, the main venue of superpower rivalry, the strategic center of gravity, was in Europe … the new strategic center of concern appears to be shifting to East Asia.«

The report summarised this view of a »unipolar 21st century« in a handy table at the bottom of this page.

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The attacks of 11 September 2001 did not really change any part of the two fundamental objectives (»safeguarding global capitalism in exchange for American hegemony«), but three options for taking action came to the fore that reflected the change in priorities:

1. Directly after the attack on the World Trade Center, the reaction of the US administration concentrated only on the battle »war« against terrorist groups that it suspected to find in over 60 countries. A decisive factor in opening up options for action was the definition of the situation which followed directly after the attacks. They were not characterised as »crimes«, but rather as »war« against a global enemy who made a fundamental political distinction possible: »either you are with us, or you are against us«.

20 George W. Bush, »Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People«, Washington, 20 September 2001. A few days later the former speaker of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich: »There are only two teams on the planet for this...«

9/11 influenced the methodology of solving these tasks and their legitimisations. On the one hand, the road to a policy of mass mobilisation by means of bellicose rhetoric became accessible. This made the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy and coercive diplomacy appear normal and compared with hegemonic rhetoric ever more imperial rhetoric came to the fore. On the other hand, the use of risk-reduced war technology had become a real possibility, some of which had already been tested in the wars of the 1990’s (Iraq, Yugoslavia), and this made a global military power projection of the USA possible in the long run. Finally, with the »war against terrorism« a new lever had been created to bring regional powers (Russia, China) into the fold. 9/11 associated the situation of war with an understanding of the USA now being an openly revisionist power that strives to change the international system in order to solve the three tasks outlined above. From now on, the use of US military power is not to be reactive and passive, but rather active and offensive – »our best defense is a good offense«, as formulated in the NSS.

The assessments and strategies of the Bush administration drew conclusions from the situation after 1989 and 2001 – and they became a power factor. Gradually, by the autumn of 2002, their advocates were able to implement them as the decisive factors (up till then).
are with the terrorists. From this moment Bush founded his presidential legitimisation on his leadership in war and the virtues and values it invoked: »We have found our mission« (Bush). This mission was the victory in war. But war forces partners as well as competitors to choose between support and opposition.

2. Neither Cheney nor Rice nor Bush had Iraq on their agenda – but Rumsfeld, Perle and above all Wolfowitz did; the latter most clearly recognised that the threat to security through terrorism and geopolitical empowerment overlapped, and he jumped into the topical gap between them. Wolfowitz was able to make the most essential contribution to focussing the planning of these objectives; two days after 11 September he declared that the USA would be »…ending states who sponsor terrorism« (PBS-Frontline). Especially since the beginning of 2003, more voices have been raised who do not limit the »imperial oversight« (Max Boot) of the USA to Iraq, but also include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria (Boot) and Libya (Bolton). Perle made a case for »regime change« in Syria and Iran (through internal revolts) and Libya (where pressure from the outside is needed).

3. In his address on the State of the Union in January 2002, Bush extended the legitimacy of the use of military means against terrorist organisations to include states (»axis of evil«) that threaten the USA with weapons of mass destruction whether from »outside« or »inside« the territory of the USA or the battle against terrorist groups.

4. In April 2002 the President declared the »regime change« in Iraq to be a military objective – in strategic documents of the 1990’s such talk about »regime change« had not explicitly played a role, but, of course, the USA had always been trying to bring it about.

5. In his fundamental programmatic speech at West Point Military Academy in June 2002, Bush declared that the former doctrines of deterrence, containment and balance of power were no longer sufficient. He emphasised the importance of «pre-emptive action» and intervention. From now on, he said, »We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge«. »Pre-emptive action«, »regime change« and »disarmament« have become «buzz words» of the rhetoric of the Bush administration.

6. Finally the claim of the USA to global military sovereignty was formulated, which is regarded as the key to the reconstruction of a new international regime that guarantees security hegemonically mediated by stability. The overriding objective is not the defense of the territory of the USA or the battle against terrorist groups or states, but rather retaining and consolidating the inequality between the USA and the rest of the world by preventing the emergence of hegemonic competitors and perfecting the world-wide assertion of the American dominated model through »export of security« (Barnett). It is a matter of safeguarding the »functioning core« of the hegemonic structure and the gradual closure of the »gaps«. This is the only way to simultaneously ensure that no military attack can be launched against the USA (»homelands«) and that the paradox between vulnerability and invincibility can be dissolved. A USA »beyond challenges« (Bush, NSS) is the concept in the face of which all other political objectives pale. If this strategy of reducing the commitment of the USA to international alliances and global groups becomes part of power politics, then the USA positions itself against the rest of the world.

Military superiority

The first means to achieve this objective is to guarantee unrivalled military superiority. On the domestic front

24 This terminology stems from Tom Barnett, since 2001 Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation of the Pentagon, cf. his article The Pentagon’s New Map, in: Esquire 3/2003. According to Barnett, of the 132 military interventions of the USA in the past twelve years, 95% were in areas he calls »gaps«, which (in his terminology) were either not ready or willing to cooperate up to (US-American dominated) capitalist globalisation and in which ca. 2 billion people live. This gap has to be closed by the military »export of security«: »the basic argument that it is important for the United States over time to-in effect-export security to those parts of the world that lack internal regional security because it encourages foreign direct investment by outside corporations« (Barnett on 13 February 2003 in the Glen Mitchell Show; http://www.mnc.navy.mil/newsreleases/Glen%20Mitchell%20show.htm). Correspondingly differentiated procedures as well: multilateralism to safeguard the »core«, selective bilateralism to safeguard the transition regions between the core and the gap, pre-emptive unilateralism to reduce the »gaps« – the latter will be the »main objective of the security policy of the USA in the 21st century«.
this requires a build-up of national potential: armaments, strengthening the military and the culture of the military. In terms of foreign policy it means preventing the emergence of military and political competition by all necessary means. As early as February 1992 the draft of the Pentagon’s »Defense Planning Guide« for 1994–1999 stated: »Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.« The USA, the document declared, »must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.« Now as then this document was understood as »the doctrine of a world dominated by Washington«. The NSS, published over a decade later, underscores this objective: »Our forces will be strong enough,« it states, »to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.« In an interview on the Public Broadcasting Network the national security advisor Condoleezza Rice put it more bluntly: »But if it comes to allowing another adversary to reach military parity with the US in the way that the Soviet Union did, no, the US does not intend to allow that to happen, because if it happens, there will not be a balance of power that favours freedom.« Consistent with this, the so-called »threat-based« military planning is replaced by a »capabilities-based approach«, according to which armaments and military positioning should be designed to counter any conceivable military action by any conceivable adversary at any conceivable time. »Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one: to prepare to act pre-emptively.« – »We must build and maintain our defenses from the real actions of an enemy. The idea of self-defence, at the root of the concept of pre-emption, is abandoned. What used to be regarded as the last resort becomes the norm – striving for a »license for permanent preventive war«. The high insecurity of information and decision-making, hence the danger of destabilisation that characterises a policy of prevention is not under discussion here.

2. When there is talk of »war«, the idea of prevention can be inserted into the traditional model of war with its whole gamut of violent measures. By shifting legiti-
sation of military action to apply to states that support terrorists, the doctrine could be incorporated into military policy traditionally focussed on enemy states. The Nuclear Posture Review, formulated in January 2002, allows nuclear weapons to be used against states (»rogue states«) that themselves do not possess nuclear weapons but are only suspected of developing or trying to gain possession of such weapons.33

3. When reference is made to the globality of terror (»60 states«), the spatial restriction of military action is abandoned: the license to wage preventive war is valid worldwide. Since this new quality of terror, against which war is being waged, is a global phenomenon, the Rubicon to a global claim to sovereignty has been crossed: The USA is supposed to have the singular right to intervene everywhere in the world – including »pre-emptive«, »anticipatory«, »anti-access-denial« military action.

4. In the debate after 9/11, preventive military intervention has been detached from the original security and military legitimisations; this also distinguishes the politics of the Bush administration from its predecessors. And a hardly audible parallel discussion emerges: taking precautionary, hence preventive measures to hinder a presumptive global rival from emerging – the concept is to wage preventive war so that no new challenge can arise, safeguarding hegemony instead of peace.

5. Where limitation of war is breached in this manner, there is danger that another dam will burst as the result of the asymmetry of such military actions: it facilitates the connection to the classical waging of civil war that ignored limitations (such as the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants).34

Global sovereignty

Imperial sovereignty?

The third element of the new Grand Strategy is, above all, the idea of an exclusive right to preventive military intervention everywhere in the world. The strategy of preventive war (pre-emption), understood as expanding the paradigms of deterrence and containment, means transition to a policy of prevention based solely on the sovereignty of the USA. The concept behind this is that in a future world order the USA alone has the right to sovereignty that can be realised on a global scale: »Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others.« (Bush)35 The meaning of this concept of global sovereignty is that the USA lays down unilateral rules on an international basis (e.g. alliances and bloc formations), formulates universally valid objectives (»expand liberty«), determines what constitutes a crisis (»state of emergency«) and differentiates between friend and foe and then decides on the use of force. Alone the USA has the capability to use force everywhere in the world, hence in future its military presence will not be limited to North America, Europe and Northeast Asia: »To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.« (NSS, p. 29). Only the USA is capable of disciplining neo-liberal global capitalism. At the most, it enters into temporary, limited alliances between unequal partners. The World Order at stake here is not a common undertaking of great powers, but rather the result of military hegemony of the USA. The USA is the system administrator of globalisation.36 It possesses the eminent right to restrict the sovereignty of other nation-states and intervene as it sees fit. The Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department Richard Haass puts it this way: »What you're seeing from this Administration is the emergence of a new principle or body of ideas – I'm not sure it constitutes a doctrine – about what you might call the limits of sovereignty. Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the right to be left alone inside your own territory. Other governments, including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can even lead to a right of preventive, or peremptory, self-defense. You essentially can act in anticipation if you have grounds to think it's a question of when, and not if, you're going to be attacked.«37

Hegemonic law

»This new approach is revolutionary« in the opinion of Henry Kissinger, who adds blunt criticism: »Just as the willingness of the USA to justified preventive attacks38 is in full contradiction to modern international law.« Such a conception violates the NATO-Pact and the

33 Cf. Stephen Blank, The Return of Nuclear War, ISA, Los Angeles 2002
37 Quoted in Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order, in: The New Yorker, 1 April 2002 (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/020401fa_FACT1)
regulations of the UN. Article 51 of the UN-Charta permits the use of force by a state only when an attack is taking place or is imminent. Hence, this is not a matter of hegemonic unilateralism, but rather of enforcing it by means of the breach of law.\textsuperscript{38}\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{38}} The risklessness resulting from military superiority makes rulelessness a temptation. The erosion of the potential of international law to limit wars continues at a dramatic pace since numerous exceptions have been introduced in the past years: prevention of humanitarian catastrophes (Yugoslavia), protection from terrorism (Afghanistan), or even safeguarding vital resources (NATO-strategy 1999). The USA lays claim to a special status others are not entitled to. This marks a fundamental transition from a unipolar hegemonic to a unipolar imperial system, rejection of the norm of equality on which international law is based. It is a step down the road back to an era when state sovereignty meant the unfettered sovereignty to wage wars.

\textbf{Policy of devaluation}

The USA rejects extensive ties to international alliances and especially to the UN resp. to concepts of multilateral conflict management as a restriction of its freedom of action. The articulated claim to global sovereignty (»freedom from attack and freedom to attack«) includes the devaluation of international ties via multilateral treaties, international institutions and alliances and the enforcement of American law on an international scale as far as possible. There are numerous statements devaluing international institutions from neo-conservatives in the Bush camp. A statement by Bolton illustrates this: »There is no such thing as the United Nations (…) if the UN Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference.« And: »There is an international community that can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that is the United States, when it suits our interests and when we can get others to go along.«\textsuperscript{39} Bush himself expressed his fear that the Security Council is »a hollow debating society«\textsuperscript{40}. Richard Perle also wrote that the »security through international law, guaranteed by international institutions« is a »liberal vanity« lying in »intellectual ruins«\textsuperscript{41}. The destabilisation of international security regimes is not only accepted, it is actively pursued with the goal of nullifying the historical achievement of the UN-Charta limiting war and making the self-commitment of the USA to international law conditional. Regulations of multilateral armaments control were weakened: the ABM-Treaty was terminated in December 2001, attempts to reinforce the Bio-Weapons Accord broke down at the 5th Verification Conference due to the resistance of the USA\textsuperscript{42}.

\textbf{Empire Reloaded}

\textbf{The new grammar}

This transition from a unipolar hegemonic to a unipolar imperial system was tersely summed up by Stephen Peter Rosen, director of the neo-conservative Olin Institute for Strategic Studies (Harvard University) in mid-2002: »The United States has no rival. We are militarily dominant around the world. Our military spending exceeds that of the next six or seven powers combined, and we have a monopoly on many advanced and not so advanced military technologies. We, and only we, form and lead military coalitions into war. We use our military dominance to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, because the local inhabitants are killing each other, or harboring enemies of the United States, or developing nuclear and biological weapons. A political unit that has overwhelming superiority in military power, and uses that power to influence the internal behavior of other states, is called an empire. Because the United States does not seek to control territory or govern the overseas citizens of the empire, we are an indirect empire, to be sure, but an empire nonetheless. If this is correct, our goal is not combating a rival, but maintaining our imperial position, and maintaining imperial order. Planning for imperial wars is different from planning for conventional international wars. In dealing with the Soviet Union, war had to be avoided: small wars could not be allowed to escalate, or to divert us from the core task of defending Europe and Japan. As a result, military power was applied incrementally. Imperial wars to restore order are not so constrained. The maximum amount of force can and should be used as quickly as possible for psychological impact – to demonstrate that the empire cannot be challenged with impunity. During the Cold War, we did not try very hard to bring down communist governments. Now we are in the business of bringing down hostile governments and creating governments favourable to us. Conventional international wars end and troops are brought back

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\item[38] Cf. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Pre-Emption and Exception: The US Moves Beyond Unilateralism, in: S\textsuperscript{3}F 3/2002, p. 136
\item[40] \textit{Berliner Zeitung}, 5 February 2003
\item[41] \textit{Spiegel-Online}, 28 March 2002
\item[42] Peter Rudolf, Wie der 11. September die amerikanische Außenpolitik verändert hat, Bilanz nach einem Jahr, in: \textit{rup-aktuell} 33, September 2002
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home. Imperial wars end, but imperial garrisons must be left in place for decades to ensure order and stability. This is, in fact, what we are beginning to see, first in the Balkans and now in Central Asia. In addition to advanced-technology weaponry, an imperial position requires a large but lightly armed ground force for garrison purposes and as reassurance for allies who want American forces on their soil as symbols of our commitment to their defense. Finally, imperial strategy focuses on preventing the emergence of powerful, hostile challengers to the empire: by war if necessary, but by imperial assimilation if possible.43 For about a year and a half the »new unilateralism« (Charles Krauthammer) of the USA has been accompanied by a political and political science grammar that operates with the terms Empire and American Empire. Politicians like Henry Kissinger spoke of it (»Empire or leader?«) or Patrick J. Buchanan (»A Republic, not an Empire«), writers like Gore Vidal (»The last Empire«), Tom Wolfe (»the mightiest power on earth, as omnipotent as... Rome under Julius Caesar«), Norman Mailer (»to build a world empire«) or Jerry Pournelle (»... empires ... have been the largest, longest-lasting and most stable form of political organisation for most of the world through recorded history«), journalists like Rothstein (»An old idea transformed. Call it Empire«) and Maureen Dowd of the New York Times (»The Empire Strikes First«) or Jay Tolson of the magazine U.S. News & World Report (»Are we witnessing a smart-bomb imperium?«), social and political scientists such as Joseph F. Nye (»Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others.«), A. Etzioni (»Semi-Empires«), Michael Ignatieff (»The Burden«) or Charles Fairbanks of the Johns Hopkins University (»an empire in formation«), historians like A. Schlesinger (»would never be an empire«), Lewis Gaddis (»We are now even more so an empire, definitely an empire«), Niall Ferguson (»The Empire Slinks Back«) or Michael Hirsh (»relatively benign power«), finally neo-conservatives like D’Souza (»America has become an empire, a fact that Americans are reluctant to admit«), Max Boot (»to enlarge the ›empire of liberty‹«), Deepak Lal (»In Defense of Empires«), William Kristol (»And if people want to say we’re an imperial power, fine.«) or Charles Krauthammer (»The fact is no country has been as dominant culturally, economically, technologically and militarily in the history of world since the Roman Empire«). At the beginning of May 2003 the New York Times counted that the term »American Empire« had appeared nearly 1000 times in the news in the previous six months.44 Donald Rumsfeld had a study done on the subject of Empire,45 the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer expressed disbelief46 and, finally, the President of the USA47 himself—and he got an unheard echo in tens of thousands of literally the same descriptions of the United States that were varied at the demonstrations on 15 February 2003.

The new concept

In the autumn of 2001 Max Boot of the Wall Street Journal wrote an article »The Case for an American Empire«48 in which he justified the military occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq with the stabilising effect British domination had in this region in the 19th century. Since this article appeared, the concept of Empire to characterise a globus americanus has been spreading like wildfire. In many and various ways attention is drawn to America’s own colonial history and the first two cycles in its attempt to create an American Empire (1898-1919 resp. in the era of Roosevelt’s »New Order«).49 In the meantime, a core group of neo-conservative ideologists has made »American Empire« as a political, to some extent also as a scientific term to a battle-cry of their own. »The logic of neoimperialism is too compelling for the Bush Administration to resist ... imperialist revival«.50 Since then, the Empire debate has made inroads into mainstream journalism, the discussions in the political think tanks and, above all, the culture of power. The »Global« that Clinton stood for has been superseded by the »Imperial«. The arguments of the supporters of the concept of Empire is as simple as it is traditional. »We are the good guys,« in the words of Max Boot. The USA is a »kind hegemonic power«, a »benevolent empire« (Kristol). Accordingly, a distinction must be made between good and bad Empire. Empire carries within itself the potential for good – c.e.g. it can link the imperious logic of

43 Stephen Peter Rosen, The Future of War and the American Military, in: Harvard Magazine 5/2002. Rosen worked at the Department of Defense auf the National Security Council of the USA as well as at the Naval War College and was one of the founding members of PNC.

44 New York Times, 10 May 2003
46 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 March 2003
47 The remarks quoted at the beginning of this text were made in Bush’s speech at West Point in June 2002 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html) and in a speech to veterans at the White House in November 2002.
security with the virtue of world betterment. Imperial appropriation and protection of restive places creates calm, order and security for the inhabitants of Empire and for the natives being incorporated, to whom the New Order also brings democratic values and institutions. In areas like Iraq, American Empire is »the last hope for both democracy and security«.51 Whereas Boot thinks the USA is destined for this role of Empire, which is to be formally realized through the UN, Mallaby advocates an independent corporate body outside the UN under the leadership of the US. At the same time Robert Cooper, a leading foreign policy advisor to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, develops the idea of »corporate empire«, to re-stabilise zones of unrest (Afghanistan, Burma, Somalia, Colombia, Zimbabwe) and to assure that the old British Empire remains a player in the new game. »What is needed is a new kind of imperialism, one compatible with human rights and cosmopolitan values: an imperialism which aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle.«52

At the root of all the talk about American Empire is the attempt to grasp the idea that America is no longer just an exceptional super-, hyper- or hegemonic power. Terms like these from the era of the Cold War and the competition between the systems are now definitely obsolete. What is needed is »the gorilla of geopolitical designations«53 – Empire. The conceptual shift from »hegemony« through »domination« to »empires« is significant above all because the classical conception of direct, permanent control by an imperial centre comes to the fore. The »unipolar moment« after 1989 is supposed to turn into a »unipolar era« (Krauthammer). Unlike the imperia of history, it knows no »outside«. It is affected by everything and considers everything its own. It is a new order that is integrated through the nodes of global networks, but their structure emanates from one centre. The American Empire as Will and Idea is – still – only an attempt to break out of the strategic constellation in effect to date: Breakout. Resources, rhetoric, conception, strategy and politics of the Empire camp are not new. But now they are in power.

Translation: Joan Glenn

An updated and more comprehensive version (64 pages) of this text in German can be found at http://www.rainer-rilling.de/texte/american%20empire.pdf

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The Pentagon’s New Map

SO WHAT PARTS OF THE WORLD can be considered functioning right now? North America, much of South America, the European Union, Putin’s Russia, Japan and Asia’s emerging economies (most notably China and India), Australia and New Zealand, and South Africa, which accounts for roughly four billion out of a global population of six billion. (...) If we map out U.S. military responses since the end of the cold war, (see below), we find an overwhelming concentration of activity in the regions of the world that are excluded from globalization’s growing Core – namely the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia. That is roughly the remaining two billion of the world’s population. (...) If we draw a line around the majority of those military interventions, we have basically mapped the Non-Integrating Gap. (...) If a country is either losing out to globalization or rejecting much of the content flows associated with its advance, there is a far greater chance that the U.S. will end up sending forces at some point. (...) In many ways, the September 11 attacks did the U.S. national-security establishment a huge favor by pulling us back from the abstract planning of future high-tech wars against »near peers« into the here-and-now threats to global order. By doing so, the dividing lines between Core and Gap were highlighted, and more important, the nature of the threat environment was thrown into stark relief. Think about it: Bin Laden and Al Qaeda are pure products of the Gap – in effect, its most violent feedback to the Core. (...) But just as important as »getting them where they live« is stopping the ability of these terrorist networks to access the Core via the »seam states« that lie along the Gap’s bloody boundaries. It is along this seam that the Core will seek to suppress bad things coming out of the Gap. Which are some of these classic seam states? Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia come readily to mind. (...) If we step back for a minute and consider the broader implications of this new global map, then U.S. national-security strategy would seem to be: 1) Increase the Core’s immune system capabilities for responding to September 11-like system perturbations; 2) Work the seam states to firewall the Core from the Gap’s worst exports, such as terror, drugs, and pandemics; and, most important, 3) Shrink the Gap. (...) The Middle East is the perfect place to start. (...) This country has successfully exported security to globalization’s Old Core (Western Europe, Northeast Asia) for half a century and to its emerging New Core (Developing Asia) for a solid quarter century following our mishandling of Vietnam. But our efforts in the Middle East have been inconsistent – in Africa, almost nonexistent. Until we begin the systematic, long-term export of security to the Gap, it will increasingly export its pain to the Core in the form of terrorism and other instabilities. (...) But it all has to begin with security, because free markets and democracy cannot flourish amid chronic conflict. (...) In my mind, we fight fire with fire.

Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, in: Esquire March 2003. Barnett is a professor at the Naval War College in Newport and has been Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation at the Pentagon since September 2001.