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Frank Deppe / Klaus-Peter Weiner

**The "1992 Single Market" - National Labour Relations  
and Trade Unions in Western Europe**

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Frank Deppe / Klaus-Peter Weiner

**The "1992 Single Market" - National Labour Relations  
and Trade Unions in Western Europe**

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FEG am Institut für Politikwissenschaft  
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## Introduction

by Prof. Dr. Frank Deppe

The following text by Klaus-Peter Weiner is based upon the final chapter of a book published in 1991:

Frank Deppe/ Klaus-Peter Weiner (Hrsg.):

BINNENMARKT '92.

ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DER ARBEITSBEZIEHUNGEN IN EUROPA.

Hamburg: VSA-Verlag 1991.

This text summarizes and evaluates the results of a research project carried out by the Study Group European Integration (Forschungsgruppe Europäische Gemeinschaften, FEG) at the "Institut für Politikwissenschaft" of the Marburg Philipps-University. The project was dedicated to the analysis of the interrelationship between the "1992 Single Market" programme of the European Communities (EC), realized step by step since 1985, and the national systems of industrial relations in seven member-countries of the EC.

The project started from two basic assumptions:

- first, the diversity of the national systems of industrial relations is a product of the national history of class relations and conflicts; it functions as a barrier against harmonization and transnational institutionalization within the European Community;
- second, at the level of EC-legislation the "social dimension" referring to collective bargaining, labour market and wage policies, social policies, trade union legislation (including strike legislation) and especially legal regulation in the field of workers' participation does not really exist. The effort to institutionalize a legal frame of minimum standards of workers in the EC by a "Social Charter" in 1989 was not really successful.

As the Single-Market-programme aims at market liberalization and world-market orientated modernization <sup>(1)</sup>, it conforms with the strategies of national governments and non-government actors (such as Transnational Corporations). The analysis of seven EC-countries therefore asks for the transformations in the systems of labour relations which took place in the 80s. The early 70s were characterized by intensive class struggles, a general strengthening of trade union organizational and political power, as well as by a shift of ideological and political power towards the Left. Neoconservative and neoliberal politics of deregulation - together with process of economic and social modernization -

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(1) For a more detailed analysis cf. Klaus-Peter Weiner, *Between political regionalization and economic globalization. Problems and Prospects of European integration*, in: *International Journal of Political Economy* (New York), Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 41 - 62; Frank Deppe, *The Future of the European Community. A Power Perspective*, in: *ibid.*, pp. 63 - 82.

have fundamentally reversed the structures of power relations. The systems of corporatism, Keynesian economic policies, the Welfare State, institutions of workers' and unions' participation have come under attack. The deep crisis of the traditional concept of trade union policies - though articulated in different national modes - has been a result of these transformations which are characterized as elements in the structural change from Fordism to the postfordist formation of transnational capitalism.

The seven chapters dedicated to EC-member countries with a different level of economic development try to reconstruct in detail the specific course of these structural changes under the impact of EC-policies and the implementation of the "Single-Market"-programme. The evaluation of European integration and especially of the "Single-Market-Programme" by governments, parties, employers' organizations and trade unions clearly shows that - though national systems still prevail in the field of labour relations - the 80s are characterized by a tendency to align with social and economic problems (for instance: mass unemployment, deregulation, flexibilization of employment, growth of the services' sector and so on). At the same time positions of European trade unions in respect to European integration, which in the 70s were strongly split up between supporters and opponents of the EC-project, have been "levelled". This may become a point of reference for a new kind of trade union internationalism which, however, is still very weak.

The German publication includes the following chapters:

1. **Frank Deppe:** The dynamics of European integration and labour relations.
2. **Michael Felder:** Stronghold of Stability? Labour Relations in the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. **Dietrich Heither:** "Grande Nation" in Europe too? Labour Relations in France.
4. **Thorsten Schulten:** In or out of Europe? Labour Relations in Great Britain.
5. **Thomas Castens:** Adaptable "Eurottimismo"? Labour Relations in Italy.
6. **Eva Lavon:** On the way to Europe. Labour Relations in Spain.
7. **Ralf Göbler:** New Social Partnership. Labour Relations in Ireland.
8. **Antonis Karaminas:** Etatism and marginality. Labour Relations in Greece.
9. **Klaus-Peter Weiner:** National labour relations and transnational trade union policy confronting the Single Market '92.

The following text was translated into English by Peter Brollik (Düsseldorf).

**Klaus-Peter Weiner**

**THE "1992 SINGLE MARKET" - NATIONAL LABOUR  
RELATIONS AND TRADE-UNIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE**

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# **1. Structural crisis, 1992 Single Market and change in labour relations in Western Europe**

## **1.1. From "fordist" to "flexible" capitalism**

The powers, institutions and procedures which serve to structure the field of labour relations in Western Europe have gone through various phases of far-reaching change since 1945. These were chiefly owed to the respective constellation of powers between the role-players (governments, corporations and trade unions) as well as each of their strategic orientations. At the same time they were a reaction to the conditions of capitalist accumulation which were increasingly conveyed more directly via the world market.

In the post-war era roughly four periods can be differentiated (1); each according to economic conditions of reproduction and growth, according to the balance of power between labour, capital and government and according to the intensity of class conflicts. The first period ranges from 1944/45 and the victory over fascism to 1948/49 and the beginnings of the economic boom. It is marked by the failure of the concepts of a new order carried by the trade union and labour movements and by the success of the "cold war" constellation of powers in foreign and internal politics. It is followed by the long period of the "Economic Miracle" under conservative hegemony. This phase incorporates a major part of the labour movement in the Fordist growth model of the post-war era. It lasts from the end of the forties to the mid-sixties. The third phase from the mid-sixties to mid-seventies is characterized by the end of the period of reconstruction. While the economic growth rates level off, a social need for modernization becomes ever more apparent. Intensification of class conflicts, increase of power for the labour movement and, in particular, the trade unions and a shift of the political-ideological balance of power to the Left corresponds to the conservative powers' loss of hegemony. The "short dream of everlasting prosperity" came to an end (2).

The ensuing phase is characterized by economic stagnation and the global economic crises of 1973/75 and 1981/83. Years of almost full employment are followed by mass unemployment which - due to decreasing growth rates, waves of rationalization and the shift from demand-orientated to supply-side-orientated economic and social policy - remains at a high level. The "conservative roll-back" is able to diminish the social clout of the labour movement. It "achieves political victories in nearly all developed capitalist countries and is able to stabilize itself in the eighties." (3)

The far-reaching changes in the field of labour relations since the mid-seventies are obviously not only determined by developments in the social and political areas, but are subject to the structural changes of capitalist socialisation during "major crises". While the economic "minor crises" tend to challenge and strengthen the adaptability of regulating institutions, the major crises "can be interpreted as a structural breach of modes of social accumulation and regulation: disrupted balances can no longer be overcome without changes to the regulating institutions." (4) The crisis of the "Fordist" type of regulation which secured an extensive settlement between standardized forms of production and consumption from after 1945 to the early seventies and which was based

on the institutionalization of corporate relations between capital, labour and state, greatly weakened this pattern of relations. Radical social change increasingly placed labour relations under pressure to change and, in particular, weakened the position of the trade unions in Western Europe. The "era of the permanent accumulation of labour legislation and trade union power" (5) finished. It was followed by a phase of adjustment and experimentation, of compromises and revisions of the criteria for the utilization and evaluation of labour. In this phase the new structures of "flexible" capitalism are taking shape - a new era begins for labour relations.

The crisis of the Fordist model of regulation results from an exhaustion of the productive reserves of the Taylorist organization of labour and the repercussions on productivity, capital profitability and economic growth, in the shift of the social balance of power to the advantage of the labour movement in the seventies, in the economic consequences of ecological destruction to the national economy and in the crisis of Fordist-based psychosocial subject structures. These erosions went hand in hand with changes in the world market structures and the United States' loss of superiority (7). For the "ruling capitalist expertise", in contrast, the crisis of the Fordist type of regulation is seen primarily as a political disruption of market-economic principles. As a prerequisite for a new boost for capital profitability it thus sees the necessity for a breaking up of traditional "institutional structures and the balance of power crystallized therein, especially the included structural bargaining power of the unions therein." (8) "Basically, the political attack is aimed at the trade unions' goals of equalization and collectivization of qualifications, working conditions, wage and employment terms as well as social security in cases of illness, disability or old age (which are fulfilled to a great extent within Fordist capitalism)." (9) In the move to "flexible capitalism", the deregulation of labour relations, the privatization of work risks and the flexibilization of employment become a neo-liberal concept reaching beyond the conservative "camp". This also influences the political, social and economic developments in the EC member countries of the 1980s and early 1990s.

"Flexible capitalism" stands for a new regime of accumulation and regulation. The principle elements of this new pattern of development are the introduction of manpower-saving and capital-saving new technologies, which in turn demand a change in production concepts and cause new challenges for the organization of work organization and the employee, as well as the formation of new capital structures through a burst of monopolization and centralization. In particular, information and communication technologies promote not only the national merger of corporations, but also the internationalization of production. On the level of political regulation there is a move away from Keynesianism towards policy patterns which view the economic and social standard from the perspective of world market competition. It can lean ideologically on a rapid individualization by criticizing collective structures as limitations to individual liberties of choice (10).

State support of the structural changes through the adjustment of overall social conditions along the strategic axis of privatization, deregulation and flexibilization has imparted "flexible capitalism" with "dynamism and vitality ... . Growth has stabilized, profitability has increased enormously since the end of the seventies, the trade unions have been weakened and the stability of the political system is great." (11) This restructuring goes beyond national borders. For the prerequisites have already been fulfilled in the world market structures through export and import competition - in particular in the high-tech sectors - so "that the implementation of a new type of

accumulation could not be conceived as a purely or even merely predominant single market strategy." (12) The "'92 Single Market" is the central project for the twelve member states of the EC for carrying through with the transition to "flexible capitalism" under pressure from "world market realities" (13).

## **1.2. The Single Market and change in national labour relations**

The completion of the Single Market by December 31, 1992 takes up a key position in the present development of Western European integration (14). It is linked historically to the significance of the Common Market for Western European integration of the fifties and sixties and is intended to form a strong foundation for the economic and political development of the EC in the nineties. The central importance of the project for the integration of Western Europe is a result, first, of the economic and social expectations linked to the intensification of market integration. The Commission of the EC and the governments of the member States are hoping for greater economic growth, for more employment and an acceleration of structural change as well as for an improved position in world market competition for EC-based corporations. The completion of the Single Market is, from a Brussels point of view, the necessary prerequisite "for withstanding the competition from outside on our own market and for maintaining our hold on the export markets worldwide." (15) This goes hand in hand with a political set of objectives. The integrative potential of the Single Market project is intended to be followed by a broadening and deepening of political integration. Progress in the harmonization of monetary, social, technological and environmental policies and the prospect of a political union are seen in close correlation with market integration. In particular, the Commission links the future perspective of economic and political developments in the EC to the success of the Single Market project. The Single Market project is not only the "key to the prosperity of Europe, but also to the future of the Community as such." (16)

The impulse taken up in the Single Market project for restructuring and modernizing the EC introduced a new phase of fundamental change for labour relations. The central theme of the Single Market project, "competitiveness", results in the strategic priority of economic integration by means of a deregulation of national markets. The regulation of labour relations on the EC level lags far behind. Binding controls are only in the initial stages (17). Those forces in the EC Commission and EC governments which stand behind deregulation anticipate that the greater mobility of goods, services, capital and labour will not only lead to a general increase in prosperity (18), but also to national adaptation to those regulative institutions and political structures which prove the most functional or efficient within the EC framework (19). "Convergence through competition" is intended to make re-regulation on EC level superfluous and ensure that the social standards in the Member States are retained on a "reasonable" level.

The realization of the Single Market project remains, however, tied to the different national structures through which the integration process will be executed. A distinct convergence or divergence of national labour and social relations is therefore not foreseeable. Rather, a "hierarchy of political change" (20) is noticeable. "The relevant protagonists in the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Italy have programmatically reacted similarly to new constellations in world politics, to changes in the international division of labour and the world market and to new trends in technological-economical and socio-political restructuring. Hereby the national formations of political and social forces have changed as well, both in party politics and

in labour relations " (21). But, although the protagonists refer to the same challenges when formulating their strategies, they nonetheless show divergent national reactive patterns due to the position of their countries in world politics, their industrial profile, their economic strengths and their positions in the international division of labour and due to their different political and social systems (22).

Does the reproduction of national structures perpetuate their divergence, or do developments exist which speak for a greater convergence of different structures and their continued internationalization? Three considerations speak for the latter assumption. First of all, the process of integration is not only based on the development of functional integrative interrelations , but also on the long historical process of the alignment of western European societies (23). In the twentieth century and, in particular, after 1945, one can observe a continual alignment of the societies of Western Europe which, in turn, influences political integration. This "social integration" of Western European societies "was surprisingly strong." (24) When comparing social, familial and employment structures, social mobility and social security, educational patterns, labour conflicts and urban development "a clear, continual and far advanced social integration of Western Europe" can be seen; "a unique European path which often went and goes a different way than in North America, in Japan, in Australia or in the USSR; a growing conformity of European societies which in some aspects went very far and there led to similarities between western European societies such as those which can be seen between American federal states or Soviet republics; a gradual reorientation of the western European away from the exclusivity of national perspectives and towards an increased consciousness of the common European situation and identity." (25) This process gave important impulses to western European integration. One can anticipate that the "long-term mechanism " of social integration will receive a boost from the realization of the Single Market.

Secondly, the internationalization of the capital structures is changing. The internationalization of capital has not been the most important driving force of western European integration up to now. The integration process in western Europe, which concentrated chiefly on the liberalization of trade, mainly stimulated the national process of concentration until the early nineteen-eighties. European corporate structures were, however, not the result. Impulses for integration came chiefly from the political level. Now, the project "1992 Single Market" intends to introduce a real fusion of national economies as the basis for "community" policy (26). This brings "a new stage of integration, namely that of production and the companies themselves into view"; the project "aims for a new stage of integration, in which the 'fusion of national economies' will lay the foundations for community policy." (27) But will it succeed? A "new stage" of integration is, nonetheless, necessary for two reasons. First, because the "border fences" of the Common Market will be raised higher in order to improve the position of internal suppliers. And because the international race of rationalization and technology can no longer be effectively run within the framework of national economies. The wave of concentration and centralization triggered by orientation on 1992 therefore increasingly reveals "European" features (28). This impetus for the formation of European corporate structures and the development of industrial policy on the EC level increases the tendency towards the interweaving of national economies. "Both aspects taken together implicate the possibility of surmounting the nationally determined internationalization which has characterized reality up to now and pressed for the development of European regulating mechanisms." (29)

Thirdly, the integration process has established a new level of transnational cooperation. It serves towards agreement in national policies to which community policy reacts complementarily. The nation-state is thus supplemented with a regionally structured model of regulation. It is used for processing problem situations such as global economic structural breaks, economic globalization, dissolution of post-war structures or environmental crises. They confront the western European type of nation-state with problems which cannot exclusively be solved within a national framework. Besides the growing significance of national policy, simultaneously demands are made of EC policy areas which help extend the nation-state's capability for action. The attempt to extend national potential for action by means of the EC level has at the same time unintentional and unanticipated consequences. For specific national interests can only be realized in the EC while taking other specific national interests into consideration. When this "basic barter" is settled as a "package deal" - by players who are formally equal but actually part of a hierarchy - implementation is placed in the hands of the EC Commission. Thus, the individual member states partially lose direct access to implementation. The implementing regulations enacted by the Commission result in interests which were taken up for the sake of compensation becoming independent and asserting themselves in the memberstates as relatively autonomous areas of policy (30).

## **2. Trade union policy in Europe**

### **2.1. The Single Market and trade union policy**

The restructuring of the relations between labour and capital and the internationalization of economics and politics also demand a reorientation in trade union strategy. If the trade unions wish to remain a powerful factor they must accept the challenges of the 1992 Single Market. Since the establishment of the EC unions have criticized its neglect of social integration as compared to market integration. And in the beginnings of the Western European integration process the shift of power from the national parliaments to "non-public and uncontrolled bodies of the governments and ministry bureaucracies" (31) was evaluated as a de-democratization and non-political shaping of the EC system (32). However, in the more liberal Single Market they must prepare themselves to a greater degree than they have in the past for Western European integration. Cross-border corporate strategies, alliances and mergers are nothing new, but the internationalization of capital has increased in intensity and dimension before the backdrop of the Single Market. (33) The Single Market orientation of those participating in business and politics underscores the necessity for trade union coordination and cooperation on a European level. Only this can prevent an increase in the incongruity between internationalized economic forces and national trade union counter-forces.

The necessity for "Europeanization" has been acknowledged by the unions. "Officially", the unions are orientated towards an increasingly transnational point of view: solely national trade union strategies and patterns of action are viewed as being insufficient for the effective representation of the interests of workers (34). For this reason, it is necessary that active trade union forces and their instruments and institutions on a European level be restructured and given new emphases and that a European system of labour relations be set up (35).

An increased trade union presence and coordination on the European level are necessary for a variety of reasons. Market globalization and capital internationalization are structurally shifting the balance of power between capital and labour on the national level to the disadvantage of the unions. Since companies are increasingly behaving "euroflexible" in their decision-making with regard to locations, investments, production and logistics they have a strategic advantage over the nationally-orientated unions with regard to potential of action and can thus chalk up an increase in power (36). In the second place, the challenges which the trade unions are already confronted with on the national level are growing with the Single Market project. Since, in Single Market policy, "negative" integration in the form of the elimination of market barriers is not accompanied with "positive" integration in the form of regulative policy, it also serves as a political justification for the national offensives of deregulation and individual economic flexibilization. National, sectoral and company competitiveness in the Single Market are offered as ideological excuses for limitations in the area of social rights. The national institutions for social regulation become competitors and thus the social rights of workers and employees in progressive EC countries are increasingly under pressure due to the lack of community regulations (37).

Thirdly, market integration without regard to social and structural policies, the structural asymmetry of economic integration and social cohesion - understood as an alignment of working and living conditions - could become greater in the EC in the course of Single Market integration. Since economic resources are concentrated in the productive centres of a liberalized economic region, the peripheral regions are structurally put at a disadvantage (38). Another argument for the "Europeanization" of trade union policy is the fact that along with the realization of the Single Market project the field of "European" topics and demands which must become a matter of collective bargaining for the unions will increase. Even now this involves the establishment of minimum standards for employment and labour contracts, the equal treatment of women and men, the regulation of working hours, protection of part time employment, the regulation of benefits, the humanization and democratization of labour, protection of employment and health as well as the regulation of education and training (39).

## **2.2. Deficits of European trade union policy**

Just as indisputable as the necessity for the transnationalization of trade union policy is the fact that the capabilities of the institutions and instruments of the unions on a European level lag behind the demands of economic internationalization since they are "prepared neither programmatically nor organizationally ... for cross-border politics". (40) It can be seen as one of the "most critical failings" of the past 30 years that "the status of international cooperation was not developed to a level corresponding to the character of the scope of potential of capital on an international level." (41) For although the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the European Trade Union Federations as well as the European Works Councils and Factory Groups and the Interregional Works Councils Representatives Committees (IGR) form " a multi-faceted communications network ..., which works toward the harmonization of social and labour policy in western Europe" (42), they are no more than the pragmatic, institutional beginnings of a trade union system of counter-forces in Europe.

- The ETUC, as an alliance of 39 trade union federations in 21 western European countries representing approximately 40 percent of the 120 million workers in western

Europe, is the most important instrument of European trade union policy (43). However, it possesses only limited competence and funds. For, as a transnational trade union federation, the ETUC has only as much power as the national unions are willing to give it. The willingness to delegate competence is not very well developed among the member unions. The federation's activities are therefore chiefly limited to the exchange of internal information and opinions and work on the programmatic level. Positions which are drawn up are represented in the name of the member federations in EC institutions, but political reverberations are limited although the ETUC "was capable of influencing many aspects of community policy." (44) ETUC-planned campaigns, such as parallel or joint demonstrations are a rarity. Not until after the Stockholm Conference of 1988 has it become apparent that "the ETUC member unions are willing to liberate themselves from traditional national differences to the advantage of a joint strategy." (45) Nevertheless, the debate on joint campaigns for asserting common goals and the discussion whether the ETUC should be granted expanded competence in limited areas, also in the area of wage policy, have only just begun (46).

- The fifteen European Trade Union Confederations which are recognized by the ETUC currently can hardly be called independent articulators of transnational union policy. For the most part, they are an extension of the national branch unions which the committees view more as a source of information than of action. Their chief task involves the internal exchange of information on national wage systems, wage agreements and trade union policy objectives. In addition they are expected to influence the decision-making process in EC bodies with joint statements and lobbyism. But this orientation threatens to neglect "autonomous union activity ... in the form of education and mobilization of the members at the grass-roots level for European objectives." (47)

- The European Works Councils Groups as instruments of cross-border rights to information, consultation and participation exist with trade union participation in only a few companies (48). Such committees are, however, confronted by resistance as soon as the decision-making freedom of management is limited or individual corporate interests are overstepped. Additionally, the "Wirtschafts- und Betriebsausschüsse" have not yet been able to rest on legally secured foundations in the EC. The Draft Directive on European works council representatives has thus been welcomed by the trade unions in principle; the German unions in particular, however, criticize the restrictions with regard to the lack of employee participation rights (49).

- The ten interregional trade union councils are concerned almost exclusively with problems of the respective border areas. They are particularly involved in problematic situations ranging from higher than average unemployment rates, cross-border commuter travel to differing tax and social security systems, educational and job training systems, environmental and infrastructural issues or cultural relations (50). They fulfill an important medial function in the emerging "Euroregions" as a practice field for cross-border trade union work and regional union policy. In trade union discussion about "Europeanization", however, they are hardly acknowledged as a resource for practical experience.

These deficits of European-level trade union institutions level or with a cross-border nature make clear that the European trade unions are still far from being a common transnational wages policy power and transnational creative social force. The causes for these deficits are a result of the strategic advantage of capital internationalization and hence of the resistance of the predominant majority of industry to a "Europeanization" of labour relations. European trade associations such as UNICE have not yet shown the

willingness to expand the "social dialogue" carried out within the EC to a real negotiatory forum between employers and trade unions on the European level. Secondly, the western European process of integration continues to be characterized by national interests and national integrative strategies and therefore by the national balances of power between labour and capital as well. This structure of Western European integration reflects the dominance of the national over the European level in the conception of trade union policy. The national governments remain the preferred contacts for the unions, even when decisive processes in the EC are the target of influence. Thirdly, the international competition which also exists within the EC, with its consequences for job security, wages and working conditions also increases the national ties of the trade unions. Particularly in phases of economic crisis the tendency to renationalization continues to determine trade union policy as well. Fourthly, the ideological and political fragmentation in the trade union movement because of differing political affiliations has prevented cooperation on the national as well as on the international level. Finally, dominance on the national level is also based on the historical differences in national labour relations. They produce strategic differences between the unions resulting from different forms of interest representation, organizational structures and collective bargaining systems as well as from the differing levels of conflict.

### **3. National labour relations and the Single Market**

#### **3.1. On the development of labour relations in the run-up to the 1992 Single Market**

The differences in national labour relations are the main barriers to an intensification of trade union coordination and cooperation on the European level. In spite of the long-term tendency towards social alignment in western Europe, the systems of labour relations - and hence central areas of the social order - seem to be considerably resistant to convergence. For although western European societies in the twentieth century have become "more and more similar" in "the development of the welfare state", "the labour conflict disrupted ... the social integration of Europe." (51) Although tendencies towards alignment can be seen from the early seventies, great differences still exist between western European countries in the degree of trade union organization, in their organizational forms and in their strike behaviour (52). These are the result of different political cultures and different social structures, but also of the differing overall social balance of powers and forms of regulation. Only the great wave of strikes directly after the end of the Second World War and in the late sixties were "all-European waves and thus give a sudden insight into similarities in the western European labour conflicts." (53)

The differences in the labour relations of the EC member states are also expressed in the regulation of employment. A comparative study by the EC Commission on the regulation of working conditions in the member states (which compared the regulation of employment contracts, atypical employment relationships, procedures for the determination of wages and salaries, arrangement of working hours, labour disputes, job training, hearing and participation of dependent employees and the scope of wage agreements) concludes that it is "very difficult" to "emphasize certain groups of member states which have executed or developed similar legal and/or wage agreement regulations or corresponding common pragmatic regulations in all ... areas under study." (54)



Nevertheless, three general statements can be made about labour relations in the EC. Firstly, state labour legislation is broadly common in view of the stipulations on working conditions. Secondly, in almost all of the member states the wage agreements are an important basis for the regulation of working conditions. Thirdly, judiciary precedents play a significant role in some areas and/or some member states in the creation or interpretation of standard-setting regulations for working conditions.

Within this general political-institutional framework changes occur, some of which have a structure-influencing character (55). Among these, above all, is the changed role of government in labour relations, the decrease of the assertive power of trade unions, new industrial strategies and a renewed presence of trade associations in the political sphere, the decentralization of wage policy, the growing significance of qualitative wage demands, the diversification of employee remuneration and the changed status of forms of union participation and company-determined participation strategies (56).

The role of government in labour relations receded in the course of the eighties (57). Corporatist policy patterns moved to the background (GER, FRA, IT, SP, IRL) or were entirely replaced (GB). At the same time the significance of government-mediated social pacts also decreased (SP, IT, IRL). Government intervention was focused on one hand on the deregulation of working conditions. They accompanied the flexibilization strategies of industry and aim at the containment of trade union assertive powers. For instance, the right to strike was partially curtailed (GB, GER, IT). This trend was especially pronounced in Great Britain where the neo-conservative politics of the eighties could be implemented most effectively. Here, a bundle of legal measures decreased the possibilities for trade union achievements. In other countries such intervention was more moderate (GER, IT). Greece is a special case. There the state continued to have great influence on labour relations in order to stabilize clientelistic relationship patterns. Only in the recent past has a decrease in government intervention been signaled. France and Spain are also exceptions, where the role of the trade unions was institutionally intensified by changes in labour legislation. Beginnings in this direction can also be seen in other countries (IT, GR, IRL). The goal is to make labour relations more stable and predictable. In Britain as well, the cuts in trade union power serve the objective of stemming the frequency of strikes and conflicts by increasing legislation and formalization.

The expansion of government influence on labour relations can thus also correspond with attempts to channel and institutionalize labour relation conflicts. Both have the goal of relieving the state in the regulation of labour relations. The reprivatization of state-run enterprises and public services also aimed in this direction (particularly in FRA, SP, but also in GB, GER). The partial retreat of state from labour relations is accompanied by trade unions and companies in their search for new "rules of play". On the part of industry, recognition of economic and technological "compulsions for modernization" are used as the basis, on the part of the trade unions guarantees for standardization of employment of core staff are demanded. On the national level company arrangements are supplemented by union restraint from wage and salary demands and from strike activities for "political barter" for state assurance of social services in return. Nonetheless the trade unions have not been able to attain more than a certain consolidation in these "barter" (58). The role of trade unions has decreased in comparison to the seventies in all countries covered by the study. (59) Their economic and political power lessened. However, stark differences are seen. In Germany the trade unions have only lost a little of their capabilities for achieving demands within the wage system. The loss of members

is also low. In contrast, the assertive abilities of the trade unions in Great Britain has receded immensely due to anti-corporatist policy in the Thatcher era. Nevertheless the British unions still possess a strong grass-roots basis in the companies. The degree of unionization of over 40 percent is also comparatively high. Additionally, the fusion of trade unions are a starting point for overcoming the high degree of fragmentation. In France the degree of unionization has dropped by a half to 10 to 15 percent since the seventies. In particular, the conflict-orientated trade union federations are experiencing a decrease in membership. The French unions are "embroiled in a battle for existence" (60) which makes it difficult for them to use the chances offered by the Auroix laws to renew their influence. The Italian trade unions have politically better prerequisites to stabilize their abilities to organize and act. As in Great Britain, in Italy "a certain process of legislativeness of labour relations is no longer seen as an attack on their individual autonomy, but rather as collective protection from rapid deregulation, especially in crisis situations." (61) In Ireland the high rate of unemployment has undermined worker status and the mobilization abilities of the union movement more than the structural changes. At the same time its influence on politics has weakened. Also in Spain and Greece the political significance which the trade unions enjoyed in the transition from dictatorships to parliamentary democracies has receded greatly. In Spain only about one million employees are organized in trade union federations. Hence, their assertive powers are limited on company, wage-policy and government levels. This favours the increase of cooperative negotiation patterns.

Another sign for the defensive position of the unions is the drop in labour's share in the national income which was on the level of 1979 in the mid-eighties. Pragmatic trade union wage and salary policy is also increasingly moving towards the "German model" in which wage and salary demands are adjusted according to the development of central macroeconomic indicators. The loss in union power in labour relations also is expressed in a drop in strike activities, in particular in those countries where the amount of working time lost by strikes was comparatively high (IT, SP, but also IRL, GB, FRA). In Greece, strike activity remained at the level of the nineteen-seventies. Only in Germany did the amount of working time lost to strikes increase in the first half of the eighties. Since then, it again lies far below average. In contrast to countries with a great number of strikes, in Germany they have the character of social conflicts of principle. But, even countries whose politics are traditionally full of conflict are revealing a tendency towards a change in the function of trade union "weaponry". Negotiations are no longer necessarily preceded by strikes in order to create an advantageous balance of power, but are used increasingly as a means of putting pressure on during the negotiating process.

In the nineteen-eighties strategies of industry were concentrated on the objective of a higher degree of flexibility in the utilization of labour. It was able to lean on the consent of some trade unions in this goal (I, SP, FRA GR, also some in GER, GB, IRL). With the consent to internal flexibilization (compromises in changes in work organization, performance and work demands and the wage system) the trade unions attempt to keep the external flexibilization urged for by industry (dismissals, atypical employment relationships, mobility) in check. In "exchange" they demand an increase in qualifications and expansion of further training. At the same time the trade associations dropped their demand for limitations to social benefits and pursued a decentralization of labour relations. The workplace is the favoured level of regulation. Both tendencies induced a renewed presence of industry in the political sphere through which it was able to enhance its public image. Although industry uses the shift of power in labour relations to its advantage it has not resulted in a all-out attack on the trade union movement with the

objective of eliminating collective agreements altogether. However, there has been an increase in attempts on the company level to expand the directive rights of management to the detriment of collective agreements.

The levels of wage negotiations have undergone a strong shift in general. The eighties were characterized by a general trend towards the decentralization of negotiations. The negotiations were moved further to the company level, particularly in countries with a high degree of centralization. In countries with a tradition of decentralization the trend was reinforced. Decentralization does not always occur without conflict because the employee councils must often take on tasks which traditionally were dealt with by the unions. Whilst the course of decentralization is running relatively smoothly in Germany, in Great Britain it is linked to a loss of importance for the wage councils. In Italy, representation of the trade unions in the workplace is still unclarified to a great extent.

The decentralization of wage agreements to the company level indicates the alignment of the "European" model to an American or Japanese model of trade union policy. But a counter-tendency has also been felt. The great increase in company agreements is accompanied by a contextual expansion of sectoral negotiations. This applies particularly to the "qualitative" aspects of wage policy (ranging from the arrangement of working hours, job training, occupational classifications to initial approaches to ecological problems), which gained more importance during the eighties in contrast to the "quantitative" aspects (wage and salary issues). Hereby it appears that the sectoral agreements are beginning to have a guarantee function for regulation compliance on the company level. Britain is the exception. There the number of sectoral agreements is dropping both for wage issues and for other topics (62).

The decentralization of collective agreements is accompanied by an increased diversification of labour remuneration. The individualization of wages and salaries has increased greatly particularly in Britain, Ireland and France. Additionally the companies are increasingly connecting wages and salaries to company performance. In Germany, for example, the profit-related share of earnings increased from 10 percent in 1986 to 15 percent in 1987. Tax-exempt benefits (ancillary pay) have also increased. This development is a common tendency in all EC countries (64).

The former rejection of co-determination and participation strategies by unions with militant traditions (FRA, IT, SP) or "volunteerism" (GB, IRL) has given way to an increasing acceptance of forms of representative participation. Nevertheless, in the eighties no great progress could be made in the expansion of co-determination rights. Exceptions to this can be found only in the public sector in France and the state-run enterprises in Italy as well as in legal regulations for employee co-determination in Greece and Spain. This trend towards the legal establishment of employee co-determination and participation rights will probably be continued in Ireland and Britain. In Ireland the trade unions and the Ministry of Labour are working for the legal regulation of employee co-determination. Industry, by contrast, prefers voluntary agreements. In Britain discussion about new forms of regulation for representative worker participation has increased as well (65).

But although minor improvements in institutional-legislative safeguards could be achieved in some countries, the employee representative bodies of the trade unions continued to be put under pressure. For on the one hand, the internationalization of the economy led to further shifts of corporate decisions to international levels and the growing danger of national participation and co-determination regulations being

undermined. On the other hand, "new production concepts" (66) and the growing importance of quality aspects for the competitiveness of companies is partially accompanied by direct employee inclusion by management (67). This simultaneously blurs the differences between industrial responsibility, forms of employee participation and co-determination and autonomous representation of interests (68).

There are no sure qualitative figures on the distribution of employee representation. It is estimated that in 1988 48.5 million employees (approximately 47 percent) in the EC had employee representation available to them (69). Legally regulated employee councils (or comparable bodies) exist in only a few countries (GER, FRA, SP, GR). In Ireland co-determination rights are limited to state-run enterprises. No legal regulations exist in Great Britain. The rights of employees or trade unions are regulated there in wage agreements. These differences also result in discrepancies in the rights and functions of employee representation. These vary with regard to rights (information, hearing, counselling, negotiations, co-determination with veto rights), with regard to areas (ranging from areas directly related to the employees such as work safety and work organization to strategic areas such as market strategies, investment decisions and product development) and with regard to the time that participation takes place (from late, operative decisions to the early, planning phases of company decisions): "Large-scale forms of participation such as negotiations and full co-determination exists in approximately ten percent of the companies." (70)

By contrast, in the eighties forms of direct employee participation initiated by the company executives have increased (71). Introduced either without or against the trade unions, they compete against the traditional trade union and employee representative competencies and are expected to ensure a "flexible 'all-round utilization'" of employed staff (72). In exchange for the acquisition of productive and motivational resources, especially of the core workforce, the employees affected are offered relatively secure jobs as well as an upgraded and post-qualification. Among the direct forms of participation are the quality circle, total quality management (TQM) and partially autonomous committees. Hardly any hard figures are available on the distribution of these types of direct participation. Quality circles, which are intended to improve product quality, the quality of the working process and working conditions as well as the company performance level and work satisfaction are the most common form. An estimated 600000 employees (0.5 percent) were registered in quality circles in 1988 (FR 40000, IT 4000, GER 3-4000, GB 2-3000, SP 1-2000 quality circles) (73). The TQM is less widespread. It aims at conquering and securing markets by means of quality improvements and the optimum satisfaction of customers' needs, which cannot be achieved without the inclusion and participation of employees. Of the approximately 100 large European corporate groups which established the "Total Quality Management" foundation seated in Eindhoven (NL) an estimated 1.8 million employees are registered in TQM concepts. Far fewer employees are organized in partially autonomous committees. They number around 400000. The spread of new production concepts has lent them a new impetus and they are expected to do away with Taylorist work methods and consolidate planning and implemental tasks (74).

A total of less than 2.5 percent of all employees in the EC are registered in quality circles, quality management concepts and partially autonomous committees. Hence, company-initiated, direct forms of participation still lag far behind trade union representative participation and influence. But they are spreading rapidly in core industrial sectors and transnational company groups which take up a pioneering role here

(75). The relatively minor distribution of these types of participation also reveals, however, "that we must continue to assume that Europe is dominated by Taylorist production concepts, hierarchial organizational structures, central decision-making processes and a great degree of division of labour with a small degree of direct division of labour." (76) The slow distribution of direct forms of participation as well as the only gradual transformation of production concepts can chiefly be seen as a result of the dilemma in an industry that on the one hand strives for improved profitability, but on the other hand fears limitations to managerial power and control. Trade union reactions to forms of direct participation differ. They range from rejection to cautious acceptance (FR, GB, GER). By contrast, "the three national trade unions" in Italy, "due to their lack of company establishment, (have) lost the real qualifications for an adequate trade union reaction in this area of policy." (77)

The partial retreat of government from labour relations appears to let decentralized negotiations between the "social partners" take their own course. The government policy of promoting the flexibility of labour with active deregulating policy also seems to be lending the current developments a long-term quality. Expansion of collective negotiations to the corporate level, the breakdown in wage structures, new subject matter in sectoral negotiations and new forms of employee participation - these are apparently the important elements of future wage negotiations in the majority of the countries under study.

### **3.2. The effects of the 1992 Single Market on labour relations**

Realization of the Single Market project is taking place in the member states of the EC under varying circumstances and general conditions. In Germany these appear to be comparatively favourable. It is dealing with the economic and technological changes in structure comparatively well and, due to favourable economic developments, was able to further augment its position as a leading economic power in the EC during the nineteen-eighties. The German companies which intensified their positions by means of concentrative domestic processes and direct investments in the EC can take advantage of good starting positions. These initial circumstances also explain why the first reactions to the project "1992 Single Market" were heard relatively late. Doubts about the competitiveness of "the German location" serve as pressure to propel the deregulation of labour relations and force the trade unions further into the defensive. But, since the recognition of the trade unions as a force of order is not questioned in principle, their involvement in a "national modernization consensus" is strived for which aims at freezing the social standard, expanding the location advantages of German industry as social partners and preserving "social peace". A further deregulation of labour relations is expected to facilitate a symbiosis between wage agreement regulations on a sectoral level and a higher degree of flexibility on the company level. However, the topic "1992 Single Market" has been ignored considerably in political debate since German unification of 1989-90. The costs of the integration of eastern Germany will also be a burden to the power of the west German economy. These costs also serve as an argument for demanding wage-policy restraint ("solidarity contribution") of the trade unions. The political and social consequences of German unification will undoubtedly have a more long-term influence on labour relations in Germany than the EC Single Market project.

Since the beginning of the eighties, France has decisively taken a stand for progress in the integration process, largely in close agreement with Germany. For France, "Europe"

is the region whose economic and political upgrading is expected to strengthen its own role in world politics. This "integration-friendly" attitude of the political class in France, from which the PCF on the left distances itself, also embraces the Single Market project. It supports a broad social acceptance of modernization policy which is expected to secure the country's connection to structural change. Economic and social impulses for modernization are anticipated from market integration (as well as from the integration process as a whole). This should slow inflation, modernize production, balance out the deficit in trade and recapture a share of the world market. The negative effects of Single Market integration are intended to be made up for by an increased isolation of the EC. By contrast to the free trade rhetoric in Germany, France is hoping for an inward opening of the EC accompanied by further outward isolation. Selective protectionism would limit the structural problems of market integration to a regulative degree. The high status which "Europe" has achieved in France in the eighties must, however, also be seen before the background of French domestic policy. Imperative reforms are shifted from the national to the European level or made dependent upon progress in the integration process. At the same time the argument of competitiveness in the Single Market serves, as in Germany, as a means for rejecting trade union demands.

In Great Britain the Single Market project has revitalized the dispute on western European integration which runs through all the political parties. The neo-conservative equation of national deregulation with the liberalization of the Single Market initially eased Great Britain's access to the EC without accepting its "supranational" nature. The national deregulation of social and labour relations and the sustained weakening of trade union influence are expected to create the conditions necessary for the British economy to assert itself against international competition. Industrial or structural policy orientated to the Single Market project thus appears unnecessary. This policy, which is chiefly orientated to the interests of British finance, entered a crisis when the structural weaknesses of the industrial sector could no longer be ignored. The "location qualities" of Great Britain which have been used by Japanese and American groups in the course of Single Market orientation have not balanced out the massive de-industrialization process. The drop in economic growth rates also made the public consciousness more aware of the social consequences of neo-liberal economic policy. At the same time Great Britain was in the danger of becoming isolated within the EC by its negative attitude towards "positive" integration. Becoming a member in the ERM, the debate on the status of industrial and structural policy as well as the growing acceptance of institutionalized labour relations signalize, like the change at the head of government, a far-reaching transformation which brings the British system of social and labour relations closer to the continental European models.

No other western European country received as much support from Western European integration after 1945 as Italy. The political class of Italy is highly willing to turn sovereignty over to the EC and share competencies with European institutions. This willingness is based on the attitude that Italy can better deal with the problems of internationalization, the structural change and the domestic regional differences with EC support. The EC elevates Italy's status in world politics and at the same time is recognized as a framework for containing Germany's power - a motive that is an even larger determining factor for France's positive attitude to western European integration. Italy was able to handle the structural changes of the eighties with relative success, increase the world market orientation of large corporations and gain economic strength. However, neither the contrast between the north and south could be overcome nor the high national debt. Political orientation to Europe and comparably successful

modernization have created a basically positive attitude towards market integration. The Single Market's lack of social aspects is criticized. Since the large trade union federations have lost power and influence, the government and trade associations are urging a redefinition of labour relations and cooperative trade union policy. Central emphasis is placed on lowering labour costs, making employment relationships more flexible and regulating labour disputes.

Spain is among the less developed countries within the EC despite its continuous economic growth. At the time of its entry to the EC the gross national product amounted to 70 percent of the European average. The difference has decreased by five percent since then. Spain initially hoped that its membership in the EC would stabilize the process of transformation from a dictatorship to a democracy. Now it expects support from the EC and the Single Market in the rapid modernization of the country. The Spanish PSOE government also works for social regulations in the EC as long as these do not raise the national labour costs. For this reason, an increase in the Regional and Development Funds of the EC was a condition for Spain's agreement with the Single Market project. Tripartite treaties aimed at achieving trade union concessions on wage demands and their consensus to the flexibilization of employment. In return the government promised social reforms and promotional employment measures. These treaties were, however, unable to guarantee long-term stability in labour relations because - also due to the weakness of the trade unions - the development of the social state lagged behind that of the economic developments. Although the corporatist approach of the trade unions failed to a great extent, they continue to encourage dialogue with the government.

For Ireland, as for Spain and Greece, the objective formulated in the EEA as the "economic and social cohesion" of the EC also is of central importance. Hopes are placed in it for surmounting the dual economic structure. This objective - along with the social changes in eastern Europe - also makes Ireland's neutrality, which long slowed its political integration, less critical. The economic impulses emitting from Single Market integration for the Irish economy are positively estimated. Nevertheless the government, trade associations and trade unions demand expansion of the Community budgets and an increase in expenditure for EC industrial, social and regional programmes. In late 1988 Ireland was able to conclude a "new partnership" with the EC Commission. Community and national policies will be increasingly coordinated to develop the Irish economy. The EC makes means available from the Structural Fund for the Irish government's "National Development Plan" which are intended to contribute towards the revitalization of the Irish economy. On the national level, the plan is orientated to rigid financial policy, additional incentives for foreign investment, the promotion of domestic industry and expansion in the educational sector and social services. Weakened by mass unemployment, the trade unions were able to achieve no more than concessions to employment policy.

In the nineteen-eighties, a broad consensus to membership in the EC was reached in Greece. Withdrawal from the EC is no longer a means of foreign policy pressure or a topic for domestic election campaigns. Instead, membership in the EC is viewed as a guarantee for the stabilization of the crisis-bound political system. Like Spain and Ireland, the Structural Fund is an important source of finances for the development of Greece. Discussion about the Single Market initially reaped a relatively modest echo although the prospects of the Greek economy in a liberalized market are viewed pessimistically. From the point of view of domestic policy the Single Market is tied to the

objective of strengthening political forms with a spirit of partnership which would make the modernization of the political and social systems possible. In order to overcome the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy it is expected to be confronted with more competition on the world market through a decrease in protectionism. The initial agreement to the Single Market has been replaced by greater public skepticism. After a shift in the balance of power in labour relations to the advantage of capital which allowed for far-reaching flexibilization of employment and wage structures as early as the eighties, the Greek trade unions and left-wing parties are demanding social policy regulations within the EC framework to compensate for their national weakness.

Because of the different circumstances and general conditions in the member states of the EC the reactions of the governments, trade associations and trade unions to the realization of the Single Market project have not been uniform. In Germany the conservative-liberal coalition government was initially able to portray the deregulation approach of the Commission, which wished to avoid extreme social difficulties, as a continuation of national deregulation policy in western Europe. It did not begin to consider the consequences of the Single Market project until the trade associations began discussing "location qualities" and the trade unions pointed out the dangers of "social dumping". In order to avoid endangering European policy consensus and social peace in Germany, the Federal government increasingly emphasized the social aspects of the Single Market without answering the trade union demand for the creation of a social framework for market integration. It sees no need for political action beyond the necessity of social supportive measures. The basic structures of west German labour relations will be upheld as an element of competitiveness for the German industry and to ensure public acceptance of the western European integration process. The French government orientated itself to the "social dimension" of the Single Market to a much greater degree. In addition to the demands, also of the Federal government, for binding minimum social regulations, the liberalization of national markets will be mitigated by the expansion of Community social policy. The emphasis on social policy and the regulation of labour relations has been understood by the governing socialists in France and Spain as an alternative to the radical market deregulation course taken by the British government.

The conservative Thatcher government perceived the Single Market project first and foremost as a continuation of its deregulation policy in the EC. Even though its course was an impediment to social policy advances on the EC level the Thatcher government also foundered on the fears of its political opponents that after years of coming closer, the political and social incompatibilities with the continental EC member states would increase further. In particular, the stability and efficiency of the labour and social relations in Germany have such an appeal that the political formations in Great Britain can hardly escape it. The "German model" has a similar appeal in Italy. The Italian government is making attempts to stabilize labour relations before the backdrop of the Single Market - in part in legislation as in France - by coupling them with an increase in state administrative and public service effectiveness.

The economic and social risks of the Single Market are determining factors for the orientation of the governments in Spain, Ireland and Greece. For although they pursue a chiefly supply-orientated policy in order to increase the international competitiveness of their national economies, they also demand compensation to economic openness in the EC. In exchange they require regional and social-policy support. In view of the weakness of the trade unions this double strategy promotes the formation of national



modernization coalitions. In Ireland these, on the one hand, are intended to secure the inclusion of the trade unions and thus unburden domestic policy; on the other hand this strengthens the position of the government in the EC. Whether the trade unions will be successful with the "political transaction" of acceptance of modernization policy in exchange for social and economic measures cannot yet be said. In Spain and Greece, at least, the trade unions hardly possess good prospects for asserting their demands made on the governments. It is also unknown to what extent increased dependency of the recipient countries on the EC can result from the transfer of finances in regional and social policies.

Like most of the governments, the majority of the employers associations strive for a new consensus with the trade unions. For example, the trade associations in Germany are placing their hopes in a modernization pact aimed towards social partnership which would follow in the path of national competitiveness. The demand for restraint in wage and social policies as well as the acceptance of the modernization and flexibilization strategies is linked to their offer of cooperation on a social-partnership basis. Their interest in the preservation of stable labour relations reflects the relative strength of the German trade union movement just as much as the interest of industry inefficient structures for the negotiation of collective agreements. The trade associations do not have a general negative attitude towards binding regulations on the EC level as long as their freedom to act in terms of wage-policy remains intact. In France, the trade associations are also endeavouring to place a limit on the magnitude of regulations passed by the EC. "Upward" harmonization of social regulations is rejected as a result of the competitive weakness of French industry. Many companies evaluate the risks of the Single Market project as higher than the chances it offers and are making an effort to avoid higher labour and social costs and to improve their competitiveness by taking steps toward more flexibility.

In Great Britain the employers' associations have welcomed the Single Market as a continuation of national deregulation on a European scale. The financial and banking sectors in particular are also hoping to improve their position in the Single Market whilst the core industrial sectors will come under more pressure. To a large extent industry is adhering to a strategy of non-cooperation with the trade unions. Social or wage-policy regulations on the EC level are rejected in order to prevent the position of the trade unions being again strengthened "via Europe". Even more than the British, the Italian employers' associations emphasize the competitiveness of European industry as a whole. They support the expansion of regional and technological EC policies and place their hopes in cooperation with companies from other member states. At the same time, Italian industry demands further steps from the government towards deregulation and flexibilization of labour relations whilst demanding further wage restraint from the trade unions.

Improved competitiveness is also at the core of the demands of the Spanish employers' associations. They are however more orientated to active economic and structural policy and concerted social action based on wage restraint from the trade unions and a decrease in government taxes, on an increase in the flexibility of employment relationships and in the effectiveness of the educational system. Their call for social and economic cohesion in the EC is also a demonstration of their willingness to negotiate with the government and the trade unions. Membership in the EC has also brought chiefly positive results for Irish industry. Hopes for growth in the economy and employment are laid in the Single Market project. However, according to the Irish trade association it will be necessary to

secure the attractiveness of the island as an international investment location through free access to the Single Market. The trade association also urges a decrease in wages and incidental wage costs. The Greek trade association also has a primarily positive view of the Single Market project. It is seen as an opportunity for Greek industry. The Greek companies want to look beyond the limited national market to the international market. Restriction of government economic activities, which would accompany the abolishment of minimum wages and a decentralization of wage negotiations, is seen as a requirement for Greek industry's self-assertion in a liberalized market.

The trade unions belonging to the ETUC also support the Single Market project. They criticize, however, the negative consequences of market integration on national labour and social relations. Their demands are primarily linked to the realization of the "social dimension". But the trade unions began dealing with the Single Market project relatively late. They had no influence on the conceptional phase. The trade unions in Germany did not react until they were confronted with the location debate and the fears of social dumping began to grow. They call for the "social dimension" to balance out the social risks of Single Market integration. It should cover binding minimum social regulations, the preservation of co-determination and an EC economic policy orientated towards social and employment aspects. But while the German DGB trade unions were still working on their position towards the Single Market they saw themselves confronted with the task of establishing trade union representative bodies in the five new Federal States in the east. The necessary "surplus" political and organizational powers of the west German trade unions are hence largely exhausted.

The French trade unions - with the exception of the CGT - also support the western European integration process. They advocate the Single Market, but wish to see it supplemented by an expansion of EC social policy and binding high social standards. The British TUC also assumes that the predicted growth and prosperity-increasing effects of the Single Market can be realized less through the elimination of trade restrictions, but largely through measures of structural and industrial policy. The "social dimension" should result in as few additional costs for British industry as possible; instead the competitiveness of British industry should be improved by means of formalized and institutionalized rights for the dependent employees. The three Italian trade union federations support the Single Market project as well. They combine their criticism of the lack of social aspects in market integration with criticism of the undemocratic development of the integration process and with the formulation of new social demands on the EC.

The Spanish trade union federations also do not have a negative attitude towards the Single Market project in principle. They criticize its radical market features and call for more social and economic cohesion in the EC. Their criticism applies particularly to the non-commitment of the Social Charter which does not set down minimum requirements but only makes recommendations. The Irish trade union federation made an issue of the consequences of the Single Market project for the Irish labour and social relations relatively early. The further development of social and economic cohesion and the social dimension of the Single Market are of central importance. The ITCU fears that the Single Market project will have particularly detrimental effects on the peripheral regions of the EC. In the Greek trade unions, discussion on the possible effects of the Single Market for Greek wage-earners began relatively late. Not until discussion on the Social Charter did the trade unions submit their own position paper which called for the contents to be put

in concrete terms, for a fixed time schedule as well as for resolutions on pragmatic support.

### **3.3. On the re-definition of trade union European policy**

The project "1992 Single Market" forces the trade unions to reconsider the coordination of their transnational policy. On the one hand, the European trade union movement must confront the shift of power within labour relations to the advantage of capital and economically liberal governments, on the other hand, economic and political internationalization processes demand for a redetermination of trade union programmes, strategies and levels of action. This requires a new way of tying together national and transnational problem constellations. Modernization orientated to the global market within the national framework and the internationalization processes in politics and economics have converged the problems and the make-up of trade union work without making them congruent. This tendency towards convergence is an important prerequisite for the transnationalization of trade union policy. Transnational coordination and cooperation can supplement the national level and thus help to deal with the challenges of internationalization. But it cannot happen automatically. Agreement on the necessity for the transnationalization of trade union policy, levels of employee representation and bargaining structures are also dependent on the yet numerous differences in national labour and social relations and their internal power structures, which in turn are rooted in national traditions, cultures and balances of power. The questions remain as to how far the trade unions recognize the necessity of adapting their programmatic objectives transnationally, to what extent they are willing to cooperate, coordinate strategies and also institutionalize transnational policy in certain aspects.

The "hard contours" of ideological-political differentiation in the western European trade union movement, which have their roots in the splitting of the western European labour movement in 1917, are softening more and more. With the collapse of communism they have become almost obsolete. The differences between class autonomous and social-partnership-orientated or between conflictory and cooperative fundamental orientations have, however, not yet been eliminated. Nonetheless, cooperative policy patterns have had an increased influence on the European trade union movement. The de-ideologization of trade union policy has contributed to the viewpoint of nearly all of the western European trade unions today - perhaps with the exception of the French CGT - that western European integration should serve as the political framework and field of social disputes. The last large umbrella organization to fundamentally change their position in this sense was the British TUC in 1988.

The western European trade unions - despite their many individual scopes of emphasis - are largely unanimous in their demands for obligatory minimum social regulations. This includes legally codified minimum social rights for all dependent employees in the EC, such as the right to organize in trade unions, to wage-agreement and social securities; equal opportunities for men and women as well as the right to occupational training and further training; the harmonization of legislation on the regulation of workinghours, on work organization, health and safety in the workplace as well as regulations on hiring and dismissal; employees' freedom of movement and the progressive convergence of living standards. This is also combined with the call for an economic policy orientated towards social and employment aspects and for a "social dialogue" with negotiable elements. Finally, the demand for minimum formational rights which would regulate the

establishment of informational, consultative and negotiating bodies in European or transnational company groups is accepted by nearly all of the trade unions.

In addition to these common programmatic trade union objectives developed for the Single Market there is also a range of concepts which are determined by specific national situations as well as the political ideologies of the trade unions. The Italian CGIL developed concepts on a comprehensive "Europeanization" of labour relations in the form of negotiable trade unions and trade associations and a political person acting as a supranational mediator. The Irish ITCU formulated a comparatively sober demand, based on an analysis of the profit and costs of the Single Market, which calls for supplementing market integration and making use of discussion on the "social dimension" with a Community employment-promoting growth strategy in order to give new strength to the positions of the trade union. Statements made by national trade unions on European policy are, however, also determined by the specific social-economic situations in which they find themselves. They can be divided into three groups:

- The main fear of the trade unions in Germany and France is that political, social and economic pressure will be put on the comparatively high standard of living. This is supplemented by Germany with its demand for safeguarding co-determination. The significance of national social standards is reflected in France's comparatively good and Germany's exceptional economic position.

- In Italy and Great Britain the possible negative effects of more intense competition on the employment situation are emphasized. This results in the call for European industrial and structural policies and the expansion of research and technological policies. In Italy the trade unions also demand that measures be taken towards the economic and social cohesion of the EC.

- In Spain, Greece and Ireland the trade unions stress the regional-policy aspects of Single Market integration and the problem of economic and social cohesion more than the first two groups. The increase in the Structural Fund is viewed as insufficient for even coming close to compensating for the negative regional effects of the Single Market.

The trade unions in Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain reveal similarities and differences in their strategic orientations as well. After the "Social Charter" failed, the trade unions in Germany expanded their attempts to influence the Federal government by strategically initiating more close cooperation by the trade unions on the company level in transnational groups. For example, the German IG Metall pursues a double strategy. Exertion of influence on European legislation will be supplemented by company-level cooperation of trade union representative bodies in transnational group companies. At the same time, they reject offers made by the employers's associations to conclude a "national modernization pact". However, the German trade unions do not necessarily act unanimously. For example, the German IG Chemie reveals a willingness to assent to such a modernization pact. Other forces in the trade unions, by contrast, emphasize the "pacemaker role" of the German trade unions in the social development of the EC. In this sense, they place their hopes in a new understanding of international solidarity. Since the Federal Republic will be among the "winners" in the Single Market project and no change of course in economic policy can be expected, "high" wage agreements are intended to increase mass purchasing power and thus contribute to the stabilization of the economy. Both the strength of German industry and the comparative relative stability and fighting strength of the German trade unions compel them to become the "engine for

wage-policy progress and social structuring". This is expected to create leeway for the European trade union movement which would allow it to assert its demands.

By comparison, the French CFDT is placing its hopes in "social dialogue" as long as it is equipped with a greater degree of reliability. It, too, actively calls for the establishment of employee committees in transnational group companies. The CFE-CGC, orientated towards social partnership, and the Christian trade union CFTC also support the EC Commission in its efforts to politically enhance the status of "social dialogue". This is contrasted with the principles behind the CGT's European concept: a "Europe of cooperation, of social progress, of democracy, of peace, of national independence and of the sovereignty of peoples" as the consequence of voluntary cooperation between sovereign nations. The economic and social achievements of each individual country would be defended. The assertion of this European concept requires the establishment of joint demand programmes of the trade union federations as well as joint campaigns. For this reason the CGT petitions for more active relations between the trade unions and works for the intensified partnership of all trade unions. The autonomy of each organization should be respected. The CGT also calls for its inclusion in the ETUC under these conditions.

By comparison, the Italian CGIL speaks out unconditionally for transnational cooperation. It regards the EC as a "region of strategic identity" to which trade union representation of interests must adapt. In view of the degree of internationalization already achieved, it considers the nationally-orientated options of trade union policy as obsolete. The trade unions must perceive themselves as a European subject of collective bargaining, on the side of capital a European wage party must be formed and ultimately a political pole of power must exist. For trade union campaign orientation this would involve a greater shift to the European level. For this reason the ETUC must develop to become a transnational trade union federation with negotiatory competencies. The trade unions, according to the CGIL, should have a greater influence on the Western European integration process. The expansion of "social dialogue" between industry and the trade unions should serve the purpose of harmonizing macroeconomic interests and developing a joint strategy for economic and social cohesion. The CISL also considers closer cooperation between western European trade unions necessary. The UIL pursues two strategic approaches. Firstly, it emphasizes the necessity of a further modernization of Italy which would be achieved with the help of an opening of the trade unions to new employment stratas. Secondly it stresses the necessity for cooperation with European trade unions. The priority of the national level must be given up for the sake of intensified European cooperation. The British TUC also supports the establishment of European macro corporatism. Within the ETUC the TUC - going beyond a call for "social dialogue" - calls for the establishment of more tripartite bodies parallel to the EC Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC). At the same time it pursues the transformation of national labour relations which would bring it closer to the continental European models.

The trade unions therefore pursue a multi-dimensional strategy. On the European level, closer cooperation with other trade unions is sought - especially the ETUC and the European Trade Union Committees. Here, they seek to broaden and steady the "social dialogue" with trade associations and the Commission. At the same time approaches are promoted - or at least tolerated - for direct negotiations on company level in transnational company groups. The main emphasis of trade union policy, however, lies on the national level. The European trade unions show very little initiative, not least due

to this incongruity, to consolidate their demands and jointly bring them before EC institutions and EC governments. The dispute about the Social Charter was more an exception to the rule, since the trade unions in the ETUC were able to agree to central demands. However, it also served as a lesson, because it revealed that without the assertive powers of the trade unions it was degraded to a non-binding recommendation.

Trade union willingness for cooperation and coordination on the European level has apparently increased. Although the trade unions perceived the scope of the intentions, effects and consequences of the Single Market project two to three years too late, their large degree of consensus on European policy and their convergence on the most important demands will facilitate cooperation on the European level. The conditions for this cooperation will undoubtedly also be improved by the adaptation of the trade unions in some countries to "more successful" models of labour relations, in particular the German model. Nevertheless, it cannot be anticipated that the establishment and institutionalization of trade union counter-forces on the European level will be a rapid process. With the exception of the Italian trade union federation CGIL, hardly any union shows the willingness to turn important competencies over to a European trade union authority. A uniform European trade union movement in the form of a transnational or supranational "European Trade Union" will not come to exist in the near future.

#### **4. Perspectives of transnational cooperation**

##### **4.1. The Europeanization of trade union opportunities for action**

In the EC member states the Single Market project is equated by governments and employers' associations with a "reality" which necessitates the extensive deregulation of national labour and social relations. The objective is to accelerate modernization of the national economies, which are orientated to the conditions of global competition. The political and social balance of powers in the member states are hence doubly "over-determined". On the one hand, the "mute compulsion" of the economic competitive battle on the world market has an effect on national structures. On the other hand the mode of world-market orientated modernization develops from the political disputes on the realization of the Single Market project. For although the basic structures of labour and social relations are not principally threatened by the realization of the Single Market, the erosion of existing structures will be accelerated. The socio-economic structural transformation which "passed by" the trade unions in the past years and weakened them will be carried on during the course of market integration and make the generalized defense of the interests and rights of dependent employees more difficult (78). The European trade union movement has not yet found a connection to the project "1992 Single Market". Intensification of the European aspects of their policies has only just begun. There is still broad uncertainty on the economic, political and social consequences of an intensified market integration or the outcome of an economic or monetary union with fixed exchange rates. The calls for the creation of social regulations for the Single Market can hardly cover these weaknesses.

In the 1980s the objective of state politics was to restore the shattered priority of capital and increase profits. This prepared the way for a "new model" for the development of capitalism - "on the basis of an appropriately altered social 'compromise' in western industrialized nations". (79) This new model made a new period of economic prosperity

possible. Capital profitability, which experienced a drop in the seventies, has risen continually since 1982 and in 1990 attained almost 90 percent of the 1961 average (80). This was the result of a reduction of unit labour costs and an increase in capital productivity. Mass unemployment weakened the negotiatory powers of the trade unions to such an extent that real wage gains remained below the growth rate of work productivity; unit wage costs dropped and profit shares grew. "In 1990 the real unit wage costs reached only 95 percent of the average of the nineteen-sixties." (81) One contributing factor to increased capital profitability was the growing capital productivity. "The improvement in these two important variables for the profitability of capital utilization is of particular significance insofar as this is a change in trend after 25 years of continual decline." (82) This turn-around was the result of the lessened necessity to replace human labour with capital and of the capital-saving character of the new technologies.

The EC Single Market project was decided at a point in time when general production conditions were improving. Market integration and profitability dynamics have overlapped and intensified each other since then. The economic developments, the employment-intensity of growth and the demographic changes hint at another reduction of mass unemployment in the EC. Trade union negotiatory powers will increase again and the wage gain rates will be able to achieve the level of productivity growth. This also applies to a lesser extent for the less developed member states. Due to their comparatively greater growth dynamics "there is a chance that the trade unions will overcome their period of weakness through the decrease in unemployment in these countries." (83)

If the predictions are correct, the European trade unions will be the decisive factors for either "social dumping" or social progress. They must strengthen the organizations in the less developed member states in order to drive social progress forward. An improved position of the trade unions in Spain, Ireland and Greece is a prerequisite for the positive effects of economic growth rates on wage growth and the improvement of living standards. They could gradually move closer to the higher standard in the more developed member states. In this way the social dimension of the Single Market could be realized "from below". "The objective prerequisites for the achievement of this goal are extremely good; high national product growth rates and decreasing unemployment lastingly improve the negotiatory powers of the trade unions." (84)

Nevertheless the trade unions have not yet been able to make an issue of the "social dimension" of the EC in all member states. This also reflects the fact that when the trade unions are in a position of weakness and defensiveness on the national level the far-reaching consequence is a lack of trade union influence on the European level. The shift in power to the advantage of the capital factor - which was already expressed in the conception of the Single Market - could not be compensated for by the trade unions on the European level.

Economic internationalization and continued EC development leave the European trade unions no choice. They will have to establish a system of trade union counter-forces within the framework of the EC. One of the main problems in the development and assertion of demands as well as in the implementation of the results will be to learn to deal with the different national modalities and to develop a better understanding for unlike structures and cultures (85). Even if the trade associations and governments politically block the way to Europeanized labour relations, the conditions for the expansion of trade union cooperation on the European level due to the pressure of the

Single Market project still appear better than in the years following the 1974-75 world economic crisis.

One central task of the trade unions continues to be helping European social policy to its feet. This requires the support of political forces in the national and European institutions which are not for deregulation but for a re-regulation of labour and social relations. (86) Implementation of the Social Action Programme and annual reports on the implementation of the Social Charter could serve as starting points. The issue of minimum social standards will remain a contested terrain in the coming years (87), since labour and social relations must be adapted to the conditions of a broader market. Industry also requires calculable forms and institutions of regulation. A process can be introduced via EC social policy and its legislative practice "which will lead - through processes of diffusion and imitation as well - not to a harmonization, but to intensified coordination and also to a growing closeness". (88) The topic of "safeguarding social security" will therefore "be determined to a great degree by Europe in the future and have to be secured in and by Europe." (89) Social progress is made possible by economic growth and advancements in productivity - stimulated by the Single Market programme. With the advancement of Single Market realization "room for movement is made available which should be put to use." (90) This will chiefly involve a regional structural policy dedicated to the harmonization and humanization of working and living conditions.

In order to take advantage of such opportunities the gradual "Europeanization" of the trade union landscape, which is already in the stages of harmonization with respect to programme goals and recognition of the need for transnational coordination and cooperation, must also encompass the increased willingness for transnational institutionalization. There is still a long way to go before all-European wage agreements are made. In view of the variety of wage agreement structures it is legitimate to ask "whether European wage policy is even possible." (91) However, agreement on wage-policy contents, mutual help in labour disputes and joint campaigns are possible (92). Such cooperation can be set up within existing trade union institutions on the European level (93). In the long term these approaches to a "European trade union strategy" (94) can be intensified. It can be summarized in four points: Europe-wide basic rights (coalition rights and the right to strike, the right to wage negotiations and written employment agreements); minimum social rights (holidays including education holidays, working hours including overtime); the safeguarding of nationally valid wage agreements and co-determination regulations; the creation of new European rights (expansion of co-determination) (95).

#### **4.2. The nineties: Changed conditions for transnational trade union cooperation**

The trend towards more convergence of trade union issues and of labour relation structures, but also the economic perspectives connected to the Single Market project, the melting down of ideological barriers and increased sensitivity to internationalization processes have all improved the prerequisites for transnational coordination and cooperation of the trade union movement in western Europe. Whether these improved conditions can be used towards intensified "Europeanization" of the trade union landscape in the EC will depend on how the trade unions adjust to the central social processes of change in the nineties. In particular, changes in the relationships between



Western European integration, nation-state and region, the new geographical and political dimensions of the European integration process and the multinationalization of labour markets will characterize the conditions of trade union policy in the coming years to a greater extent than before.

Free movement of goods, capital, services and labour in the Single Market without institutions for social and structural policy will increase the socio-economic disparities in the EC and lead to a new division of labour between the regions. The catching-up process in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland which was uninterrupted from the early seventies to the mid-eighties will be able to continue in the Single Market in the nineties. The developmental disparities between the northern countries - with the exception of Ireland - and the southern countries in the Community will be able to decrease further due to the higher growth rates in these countries. The fringe countries "have good chances, due to many factors (wage-profit ratio, capital coefficient, imitation of product and technology know-how) to gradually eliminate the existing distance to the more developed countries through above-average development dynamics." (96) At the same time, however, regional disparities will increase within the EC. Empirical studies show that the peripheral regions of an economic area are structurally disadvantaged in the course of economic integration (97). The regions in which historically-related development deficiencies, structural problems and unemployment overlap do not automatically take part in higher national growth-rates and catch up with more developed regions.

In liberalized markets the most highly developed regions are able to expand their role as economic centers of gravity at the cost of the periphery. The settlement of companies is "linked with the minimization of transactional and informational costs ... . The resulting higher diversification of production structure also improves the employment chances and, due to the attraction of higher wages, leads to a net immigration of workers. The peripheral regions often lose their most mobile and dynamic people in this way." (98) Without political intervention the regional disparities will be heightened in both the less developed and more developed member states. The national increases in regional disparities and the formation of new disproportionate interdependencies between regions in the course of the Western European integration process will not only affect the regions themselves, but will also change the political relations between region, nation-state and EC.

In those regions whose economic strengths are used by the government for the purpose of transferring resources into less developed areas or in which development deficiencies, economic exhaustion and functional changes in economic structure come together, the political consequences for the relations between region, central government and EC is already being felt before completion of the Single Market. For example, the orientation of populist "Leagues" in prosperous Northern Italy, which build upon their own regional economic strength and advocate separation from central and southern Italy, are turning from the central government to the EC. The "radical nationalists" in nearly unindustrialized Corsica, who are fighting against a functional incorporation in the Single Market as a tourist region, propel national state disintegration. Emphasizing western European integration and the own region weakens the framework of central governmental and its participants. This national disintegration process does not pass by the trade unions. Hence the Corsican workers' and salaried employees' trade union STC (Sindicatu di Travagliadorie corsi) and teachers' trade union SCI (Sindicatu corsu dil' Insignamentu), which were not founded until 1984, have been able to establish themselves in the region at the cost of the national trade unions CGT, CFDT and FO.

"Particularly in the private sector the STC appears to be well on its way to becoming the strongest force; the nationalist trade unions achieved between 70 and 100% in employee council elections." (99) The Corsican trade unions, among the most important member organizations in the "Unita Naziunale" which strives for Corsica's independence, have become important competitors of the French trade unions. Similarly to the CGT they are against an expansion of EC competencies and instead demand a "Europe of peoples". Politically they reject European renewal of the old French categorization as "a tourism region, a zone of mere consumerism." (100) Since it is no longer the French government, but the EC which carries the direct financial burden for compensation of historical underdevelopment and of integration debts, the EC and its advocates in parties, associations and trade unions have become the targets of criticism about Corsican living and working conditions (101).

The radical changes in Eastern Europe confront transnational trade union cooperation with new questions. The end of the east-west conflict dramatically transformed the political sphere of the EC. The collapse of "Real Existing Socialism" and social transformation in eastern Europe has put the integration of Western and Eastern Europe on the agenda. The EC appears to be a zone of political stability and economic prosperity in Europe. The surrounding countries ear themselves to this "core of stability" and its inner dynamics. The pull of the EC Single Market project has already brought the EFTA free trade zone to the brink of dissolution and triggered broad discussion in all EFTA states on membership in the EC. At the same time the EC has taken up a major role in the coordination of western aid for Eastern Europe and intensified the inclination in these countries and their regions to get close to the EC as rapidly as possible. It can, however, hardly be assumed that either a direct (association) or indirect expansion of the EC (membership) by Eastern European countries would be without negative effects for the western European integration process. Even the northern and southern expansions of the EC in the 1970s and 1980s increased its heterogeneity and intensified the problems of structural integration. Another expansion would make questionable any attempts at making the EC an economic, monetary and social union, or indeed a political union. It is therefore not supported by all member states. For although Germany and Great Britain in particular advocate an "open" EC they meet resistance, primarily that of the French government. France's political class considers the economic, social and political problems of the eastern European states better off in a confederation of European states than in the EC. This is also a result of their fear that French influence could decrease in a larger EC, whilst unified Germany would have much less constraint in a larger and hence inevitably looser integrated federation (102).

The western European trade unions are also affected by the radical social changes in eastern Europe. In Germany the problems of unification have clearly superseded the topics of the Single Market and transnational trade union cooperation. Harmonization of working and living conditions and the rebirth of the "old" social issue - embodied in problems such as job security, social rights and collective representation of interests - preoccupy trade union policy in all of Germany. The trade unions in other EC member states must adapt to changed political conditions of transnational cooperation as well. For they must assume at first that Germany, which carried the most important integration policy initiative along with France in the past years, "will probably pay less attention to the problems of the European integration process in the upcoming years due to concentration of their political forces on its internal conflicts." (103)

The destabilization of labour relations in Germany resulting from the crisis and conflict-filled course of German unification may strip it of its European "exemplary character". Rising unemployment, wage-dumping and social dumping, deteriorating working conditions could lead to social conflicts which exhaust institutionalized regulative capacities. Together with the lower productivity of eastern German industry, this can lead to a weakening of West German competitiveness before unification it was able to "face the Single Market with relative composure" (104) on the world market. Pressure for deregulation and flexibility would grow and meet with a reduction of trade union assertive powers (105). On the whole, we can anticipate that approaches towards transnational trade union policy will be pushed into the background and that re-nationalized trade union policy will be given priority.

A re-nationalization of trade union policy is also promoted by the processes of migration in the EC. Industrialization, growing living and wage standards and the expansion of a mobility-inhibiting underground economy in less developed regions have nearly brought the migration movements from Spain, Portugal and Greece to more developed member states to a standstill. The Single Market project will not trigger a spectacular migration, but migration processes from outside states to the EC have increased (106).

The magnitude of the future north-south and east-west migration can only be speculated - the spectrum of figures for eastern European countries ranges from a few hundred-thousand to as many as 25 million people (107). Nonetheless it can be assumed that regular and irregular immigration from eastern Europe and other less developed "turbulent zones" outside of the OECD region will continue to increase. The EC states react with massive isolationism which also promotes ethnocentric, nationalist and racist ideologies of supremacy in politics and the media (108). But the more developed member states of the EC in particular have already long become de facto immigration countries. And predictions of a future shortage of workers suggest that foreign workers will be increasingly necessary in the future (109).

The multinationalization of labour markets linked with migration processes confronts the trade unions' conditions for action and organization with new challenges. For example, in the trade unions of the German DGB which represent foreign employees to the same extent as domestic workers there exists "a contradiction between self-set claims of universal representation and particular consideration of native employees who are plagued by fears for their jobs, claiming for possession and nationalist reservations." (110) The ethnic segmentation of the labour market, the increased number of unorganizable, precarious employment relationships prompted by immigration and new varieties of underground economics, spreading nationalism and racism, in particular among dependent employees who become the "victims of modernization" can all grow to become a mountain of problems which could endanger the "new internationalism" propagated by the trade unions.

These roughly sketched changes in social conditions will make transnational trade union cooperation more difficult. Although they are closely linked to today's processes of internationalization and transnationalization, within a national framework they are areas of political conflict and contradiction. In the nineties, this national framework will be even less suitable than in the past two decades for appropriately dealing with these social problems. A new orientation of policies is therefore necessary, in the European trade unions as well. The central areas of trade union disputes of the past two decades can be labelled as "social justice" in the seventies and "flexibility of the work force" in the eighties. The topic of flexibility will remain acute in the nineties under pressure from the

"realities of the global market". We can hope for a renewed upgrading of social justice, supplemented by the issues of democracy and the environment, individualization and gender, development and multicultural society. And a great deal speaks for the assumption that the transnationalization of problems, structures and persons will carry on in the coming years. The three-fold topics "flexibility - justice - transnationalization" are on the agenda for Europe's trade unions.

## Notes

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50. Vgl. Stöckl, Ingrid, Gewerkschaftsausschüsse, *ibid*, p. 33 ff; Lecher, Wolfgang, Konturen europäischer Tarifpolitik, *ibid*
51. Kaelble, Hartmut, Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft, *ibid*, p. 153 f
52. cf. *ibid*, p. 134 ff; Baglioni, Guido, Industrial Relations in Europe, *ibid* p. 1 ff; as well as in the country profiles in part II.
53. Kaelble, Hartmut, Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft, *ibid*p. 138.
54. Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Zusammenfassung der vergleichenden Studie über die Regelung der Arbeitsbedingungen in den Mitgliedstaaten, KOM(89) 360 end., p. 15. See also extensive version: Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Vergleichende Studie über die Regelung der Arbeitsbedingungen in den Mitgliedstaaten. Ein Überblick, SEK(89) 1137.
55. When not mentioned otherwise the statements make use of the country profiles in part II. Abbreviations are as follows: Bundesrepublik Deutschland - BR, Frankreich - FR, Großbritannien - GB, Italien - IT, Spanien - SP, Irland - IR und Griechenland - GR.
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70. cf.p. 34.
71. Vgl. Baglioni, Guido, *Industrial Relations in Europe*, a.a.O., S. 29 f.
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74. cf. *ibid* p. 27 ff.
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