Convergence, Divergence and a Complex Interplay: Chile and the International and Transnational Anti-Corruption Campaign

Malte Gephart
The GIGA Working Papers series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. Inclusion of a paper in the GIGA Working Papers series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. When working papers are eventually accepted by or published in a journal or book, the correct citation reference and, if possible, the corresponding link will then be included on the GIGA Working Papers website at <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers>.

GIGA Research Programme “Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations”
Copyright for this issue: © Malte Gephart
WP Coordination and English-language Copy Editing: Errol Bailey
Editorial Assistance and Production: Silvia Bücke

All GIGA Working Papers are available online and free of charge on the website <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers>.
For any requests please contact:
E-mail: <workingpapers@giga-hamburg.de>

The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this Working Paper; the views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21
20354 Hamburg
Germany
E-mail: <info@giga-hamburg.de>
Website: <www.giga-hamburg.de>
Convergence, Divergence and a Complex Interplay: Chile and the International and Transnational Anti-Corruption Campaign

Abstract

Several anthropological scholars have argued from an ethnographic viewpoint that local understandings of corruption vary around the world. Others who have critically analyzed the international and transnational anti-corruption campaign (ITACC) have argued that the ITACC is capable of covering up these differences, which creates misunderstandings about the aims in the fight against corruption. This article combines and advances both arguments by applying a post-development perspective and argumentative discourse analysis (ADA) to explore the local anti-corruption discourse in Chile – a country that is considered a success case in Latin America. This exploration shows that Chile’s anti-corruption activities are highly political and are deeply related to narratives in the country’s transition to democracy. By relating local narratives back to the ITACC the article reveals a complex interplay between local (and competing) corruption narratives that, at the same time, partially form discourse coalitions with the ITACC.

Keywords: corruption, anti-corruption, discourse analysis, narratives, Chile, Latin America, post development,

Dipl. Pol. Malte Gephart
is a member of the GIGA Doctoral Programme.
Contact:  <malte.gephart@giga-hamburg.de>
Website:  <http://staff.en.giga-hamburg.de/gephart>
Convergence, Divergence and a Complex Interplay: Chile and the International and Transnational Anti-Corruption Campaign

Malte Gephart

Article Outline
1 Introduction
2 Post-Development Theory, Argumentative Discourse Analysis and Constructionist Interviews
3 Corruption in the ITACC Discourse
4 Narrating Corruption and Narrating Chile
5 Convergence, Divergence and a Complex Interplay
6 Conclusion
Bibliography

1 Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, an international and transnational campaign to fight corruption has emerged. However, an increasing number of scholars have criticized the “international anti-corruption crusade” (Brown and Cloke 2004) due to, inter alia, definitional and methodological issues (i.e., the measurement of corruption). Others have argued that under the guise of...
fighting the “misuse of entrusted power for private gain”\(^3\) the international and transnational anti-corruption campaign (ITACC)\(^4\) has naturalized Eurocentric concepts of modernization and it has imposed neoliberal anti-corruption policies on the developing world (Polzer 2001; Brown and Cloke 2004, 2011; Bukovansky 2006; Johnston 2006; Harrison 2007).

Other scholars have put forward two related arguments, which are the starting point for this paper. First, Brown and Cloke (2011: 121) argue that the ITACC is dominated by “universalising assumptions” to a problematic extent. These assumptions include, for instance, the universality of the division between the private and the public realm, in which individuals in the private sector are “expected to seek personal profit and enrichment [...] A corrupt action is one which contravenes this model” (Polzer 2001: 19–20). Moreover, in the ITACC the fight against corruption is “reduced to a set of technical challenges and difficulties that can be dealt with via the development of new institutions, the steering through of appropriate administrative reforms or simply reducing the size of the state sector” (Brown and Cloke 2011: 119).

Anthropologists have explored the limits of such universalizing assumptions and have argued that the meaning of corruption varies depending on the cultural context. Several studies highlighting the particularistic interpretation of corruption in different local contexts have shown, for instance, that in some societies an incumbent’s personal (or family) gain is potentially acceptable as long as it is not perceived to be excessive (Lazar 2005). The term corruption, then, serves as “a benchmark of appropriateness” (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006: 133–134). Dominant social expectations in some contexts simply do not ask for the fulfillment of formal duties and “legally based restrictions on family obligations are not unequivocally accepted” (Ruud 2000: 274). However, meanings of corruption do not only differ from one cultural context to another, they are also contested on the local level; that which is called corruption in one situation might be interpreted as necessary and unavoidable networking and/or reciprocity in another (ibid.).

Second, several critical anti-corruption scholars argue that diverse actors such as local NGOs, transnational companies and export-oriented governments have formed the “new consensus that corruption is a global policy issue” by ignoring these varying meanings, underlying assumptions and different political agendas (Krastev 2004: 35). Krastev criticizes this consensus, stating that it has led to misunderstandings about what exactly is to be

---

3 Transparency International (TI) uses this definition of corruption, which has also been widely adopted in the field (TI 2010).

4 Such as the UN convention against corruption of 2003, the earlier anti-corruption convention of Organization of American States (OAS) of 1996, the OECD convention on bribery of foreign officials as well as the convention of the African Union to fight corruption of 2006. Erkkilä and Piironen speak of ‘anti-corruption global governance’ (2009: 129). However, I refer to it as the ITACC because I presume that international relations are not limited to relations between states but that they are also discursively produced and reproduced by transnational actors such as TI and by the academic anti-corruption community.
fought. Kalin Ivanov is similarly critical, claiming that “the vague and emotive term ‘corruption’ has masked the gap between global and local discourses” (Ivanov 2007: 28).

The anthropological argument has been made in a growing body of literature on divergent meanings of corruption in local contexts. However, these studies have not sufficiently focused on political struggles over meanings within the local context. Moreover, scholars who criticize the gap between global and local discourses either ask whether there are different understandings of corruption or whether an ignorance of these differences has led to a misleading discourse coalition. In this article, I combine both arguments and examine how they are related to each other; I assume that there is a complex interplay between local contexts and the ITACC, which I seek to explore in detail.

Chile is the local context in this article – a country depicted by the ITACC as having very low levels of corruption. In Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, Chile ranked 22nd out of 182 countries – two places higher (and thus less corrupt) than the United States (TI 2011a). Also, the World Bank’s World Wide Governance Indicators rank the country among the top 10 percent with regards to “control of corruption” (WB 2012a). In addition, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) asserts that “Chile is widely considered to be one of the least corrupt countries” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012: 27) and has taken “strong legal action” against corruption (ibid: 28).

Most (critical) corruption scholars focus on countries that are perceived to be confronted with high levels of corruption. This can be attributed to the fact that corruption seemingly matters more in contexts where it is perceived to be more prevalent, which are also contexts wherein understandings of corruption might vary fundamentally. Therefore, concentrating solely on countries with high levels of corruption results in the important observation that understandings of corruption differ – a point that has been made in several studies. However, contested meanings of corruption and anti-corruption are barely studied in “success cases.” If understandings of corruption differ in such cases, this would put the universalizing assumptions of the ITACC into further question. Thus, Chile is an interesting case with which to study the interplay between universalistic and particularistic conceptualizations of corruption.\(^5\)

As a theoretical point of reference, I combine critical anti-corruption scholarship with post-development theory. Similar to critical anti-corruption scholars, post-development theorists have highlighted the amoeba-like characteristic of the term “development,” which seeks to support developing countries, but serves, in fact, to discursively create the “underdeveloped” (Escobar 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; Sachs 1995; Ziai 2004). Post-developmentalist argues that the term “development” is conceptually blurry and can be filled with numerous, and at times, contradictory meanings (Ziai 2006). Like critical anti-corruption literature, it contests the global imposition of a universalistic and Eurocentric model of develop-

\(^5\) I have shown elsewhere, that the term “corruption” is heavily disputed in the German Parliament, which is why Germany has not yet ratified the UNCAC (Gephart 2009). This paper is related to Latin American studies and is part of a research project which conducts a contrasting comparison between Paraguay and Chile.
opment, which – despite all conceptual diversity – envisages an industrialized consumer society as the final goal of development. Post-developmentalism questions the existing development blueprints and focuses on local perspectives on desired social change. I argue that combining critical anti-corruption and post-development scholarship is fruitful because the latter has developed a nuanced normative-prescriptive stance that provides ethical orientation for critical anti-corruption scholarship. In turn, this combination provides post-developmentalism with a critical analysis of a policy field that has so far been largely ignored by post-development scholars.

By analyzing in detail the local anti-corruption discourse in Chile and comparing it to the ITACC, this article makes several contributions: First, it advances the aforementioned arguments in critical anti-corruption research by combining and empirically exploring them in detail. Second, it points at several significant blind spots of the ITACC. Third, it provides an innovative perspective on competing viewpoints on corruption and anti-corruption politics in Chile, which has so far been absent from the relevant literature.

This article is structured as follows: The first section outlines the theoretical and methodological approach of post-development theory and of argumentative discourse analysis (ADA). Applying ADA rather than classical policy analysis allows the combination of the analysis of concepts with the analysis of how such concepts are used by actors and how they are embedded into political dynamics – an aspect which both Ivanov’s and Krastev’s arguments highlight. Moreover, I apply constructionist interviews in order to gain access to social agents’ narratives and to methodically complement the combination of critical anti-corruption research and post-developmentalism. The second section briefly underscores several fundamental discursive structures of the ITACC in order to enable comparison to Chile – for instance, the division between the public and the private realm and the incentive based approach to corruption and to anti-corruption measures. The third and fourth sections concentrate on the corruption discourse in Chile. I first present the competing narratives and then discuss their convergences and differences as well as the possible interplay between the ITACC and Chile. In the fifth section, I conclude the article by summarizing the main findings and proposing further avenues for research.

2 Post-Development Theory, Argumentative Discourse Analysis and Constructionist Interviews

2.1 Combining Post-Development Theory and Critical Anti-Corruption Research

As seen above, critical anti-corruption research and post-developmentalism share several assumptions and both focus on local and particularistic perspectives in contrast to universalizing assumptions. Both have been confronted with severe, and strikingly similar, critiques from mainstream anti-corruption scholars and developmentalists.
Regarding critical anti-corruption literature, Syed Hussein Alatas (1990: 183) argues that those scholars who question the presupposed, unambiguously negative effects of corruption turn out to be “ideologists of corruption.” Daniel Kaufmann (1997: 117), who was until recently responsible for the World Bank’s anti-corruption work, labels critical anti-corruption scholars as “corruption apologists.” He suspects that those who emphasize the concept’s ambiguities and contradictions belong to a “fatalist camp,” unwilling to actually fight corruption (Kaufmann 1997: 123).

Analogous to critical anti-corruption research, post-development theory has faced critiques from several commentators, which Aram Ziai (2006) summarizes as follows: First, post-developmentism tends to uncritically romanticize local communities and cultural traditions (Kiely 1999). Second, due to its general rejection of modernity, post-development theory tends to ignore the most basic achievements of Eurocentric concepts, such as basic individual rights or democracy (Corbridge 1998: 145). Third, the post-development perspective tends towards a complete normative cultural relativism; the limits of such relativism are obvious in the face of severe human rights violations (Knippenberg and Schuurmann 1994: 95). Fourth, post-developmentalism criticizes development practices, but it refrains from delivering practical solutions to problems of “underdevelopment” (Nederveen Pieterse 1998: 366).

Several post-developmentalists have rejected these critiques, arguing that representatives of mainstream development literature have ignored the large variety of post-development studies (Escobar 1995: 170; Rist 1997: 244; Brigg 2002: 434; Nustad 2001: 489). Ziai has identified a considered stance in post-developmentalism, which he labels “sceptical post-development,” that takes into account these critiques (Ziai 2006: 207). In this variant, scholars focus on local contexts and local traditions without uncritically romanticizing them. Furthermore, they critically question modernity and existing concepts of desirable social change without rejecting the idea of progress as a whole.6 Both aspects imply an anti-essentialist approach that avoids ascribing static characteristics to either an entire local context or to “the West.” Ziai also argues that global blueprints for development can be avoided, while still contributing to research on “good social change” (ibid.).

This normative-prescriptive stance, (i.e., this ethically preferred approach to development-related scholarship) is well suited to informing a skeptical stance in critical anti-corruption research. This requires the acknowledgement of the problematic existence of corruption – something most critical anti-corruption authors refrain from doing. This also necessitates the avoidance of romanticizing ways of using power merely because they are labeled as traditional, local or culturally embedded – as do some anthropological studies. A critical perspective on the current ITACC entails questioning contemporary forms and possibilities of knowledge production and related practices. This skeptical stance is the mindset for the following exploration of local anti-corruption discourses in Chile.

---

6 In a similar line of argument, Torfing (referring to LaClau) defends “postmodernism” as not being “a celebration of irrationality, schizophrenia, fluidity, or chaos. Rather, it involves a recognition of the flaws and limits of the modernist beliefs in the reconciling force of reason” (Torfing 2005: 12).
2.2 Argumentative Discourse Analysis

To provide a coherent research framework, I combine skeptical post-development theory with ADA; this “draws attention to the contingent formation of social phenomena” and adopts a relationist and a contextual perspective (Torfing 2005: 22). Several theoretical developments in the widely differentiated field of discourse analysis apply a deductive approach – that is, they seek to explain empirical cases by applying a theoretical framework (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; LaClau and Mouffe 2001; Nonhoff 2010). In contrast, ADA applies an inductive approach by generating hypotheses from empirical data. I argue that ADA’s inductive notion is important because deduction and related “theorization destroys meanings of the world as it exists for social agents” (Pouliot 2007: 364). This inductive approach makes ADA highly compatible with both post-developmentalistism and critical anti-corruption scholarship, because it allows for the focus on local perspectives and on social agents’ discursive constructions. Thus, the main research focus of this paper is not the causal explanation of how the anti-corruption consensus (or hegemony) comes about, but an open comparison of narratives and a focus on their interplay, which is precisely what ADA allows for.

Utilizing ADA as a methodological tool rather than as an explanatory theoretical framework, I define discourse as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer 2005: 300). While Hajer remains largely silent on epistemological matters, I argue that ADA alongside post-development requires two fundamental, explicit claims:

1) an anti-essentialist ontological claim
2) an anti-foundationalist epistemological claim

The anti-essentialist ontological claim implies that the meaning of objects and actions is given by “historically specific systems of rules” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 2) – that is, “meaning depends on the orders of discourse that constitute its identity and significance” (ibid.: 3). This also implies that there is no transcendent “essence that is capable of determining and ultimately fixing all other identities within a stable and totalizing structure” (Torfing 2005: 13). However, although meaning is never objective and cannot be timeless fixed, it is “provisionally anchored” within relational systems (ibid.).

The anti-foundationalist epistemological claim states that “while the world exists out there, truth does not” (ibid.: 13). There is no truth outside of a discourse and no instance that would be able to safeguard truth or science. “Truth is always local and flexible, as it is conditioned by a discursive truth regime which specifies the criteria for judging something to be true or false” (ibid.: 13–14).

Based on these assumptions, ADA goes beyond the “linguistic turn” in that it seeks to combine the “analysis of the discursive production of reality with [the] analysis of the sociopolitical practices from which social constructs emerge and in which actors are engaged” (Hajer 2002: 62). ADA is compatible with Ivanov’s and Krastev’s assumptions because it ex-
plores how people position one another in a given discourse and how an overarching discourse positions them. ADA does not limit itself to a structuralist perspective but seeks to include agency into its analysis (ibid.) – an approach which Jon Lie (2008: 60) calls for from a “more nuanced” post-development stance.

Hajer’s approach relates ADA to narratives that function as the principle “ordering device” in a discourse (Hajer and Laws 2006: 260). Narratives thus “fulfil an essential role in structuring relations, in determining whether [discursively created] groups turn into opponents rather than collaborators, whether a confrontation leads to joint governance or to conflict” (ibid.: 261). Narratives consist of stories, which are constituted by a chain of statements. These stories classically have a beginning, a middle part and an end. They are essential because they are “in fact a political mechanism in themselves: without stories no consensus” (Hajer 2002: 62). Usually, actors tell stories neither in their chronological order nor in full length, but rather in short storylines that presuppose specific background knowledge of the respective narrative (Hajer 2005: 301-302). Narratives exist via actors, institutional routines and publications that tell and thus produce and reproduce a story.

Within a given discourse, different actors can unite via discourse coalitions, which are defined as a “group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the usage of a particular set of storylines over a particular period of time” (Hajer 2005: 302). These discourse coalitions enable actors to attribute meanings to ambiguous and elusive social phenomena; they also facilitate collective action on a certain phenomenon. Actors strategically use discourse coalitions in order to promote political agendas, which, in turn, are connected to different narratives.

According to Hajer, there is a constant struggle regarding the dominance of a discourse. In his approach, a discourse can be subject to structuration, which means that a “discourse starts to dominate the way a given social unit (a policy domain, a firm, a society – all depending on the research question) conceptualizes the world” (ibid.: 303). The institutionalization of a discourse might also take place, which is manifested in certain institutional arrangements (e.g., a phenomenon made visible through systems of measurement and reacted on through policy measures) (Hajer 2008: 213–219). If both criteria (structuration and institutionalization) are fulfilled, Hajer speaks of the “dominance of a discourse” (Hajer 2005: 303).

However, Hajer seems to be inconsistent regarding his level of analysis. At first he refers to “competing narratives,” but subsequently switches to “discourse.” In order to avoid this issue, I refer to the dominance of a narrative within a discourse, which occurs once a narrative structures the discourse and once a narrative is institutionalized.

---

7 In line with a focus on local perspectives of the post-development approach, of critical anti-corruption research and the inductive approach of ADA, I leave the structure of narratives deliberately open and seek to reconstruct them (and their structure) from the local discourse itself.

8 Other discourse-theoretical approaches refer to “hegemony” in this case, which reflects, however, not the research interest of this paper.
2.3 Constructionist Interviews

Although Hajer includes interviews into his research framework and despite post-developmentalist’s interest in local perspectives, neither makes their methodological approach to interviews explicit. Therefore, they both overlook the fact that a positivist expert interview includes epistemological assumptions (being able to know truth) which run diametrically against this anti-essentialist and post-foundational approach. I argue that constructivist interviews, as described by Silverman (³2007), serve post-developmentalist and critical anti-corruption scholarship and are the adequate method for research that focuses on local perspectives and refrains from filling sharply defined knowledge gaps, as mainstream anti-corruption research would do. Constructionist interviews serve to understand “how interview participants actively create meaning” (Silverman ³2007: 127). They seek to provoke the interviewee to engage in a broader discourse and to narrate their respective story of a given issue. This approach requires that interviews are conducted as openly as possible and that the interviewer interferes as little as possible through affirmative or dissentient interruptions or even through too many questions.

I processed interviews with MAXQDA, a program that supports the analysis of large amounts of interview material. The reconstruction of narratives was oriented towards grounded theory, which seeks to inductively create hypotheses (i.e., on narratives) from the empirical material, rather than explaining an empirical case through theory (Titschler et. al. 1998: 94). Interviews were coded line by line in a combination of open coding, axial coding and selective coding, resulting in the specific narratives once internal saturation was reached. Thus, a narrative emerged from the material as a coherent story.

Supplementing Silverman’s claim, Hajer states that interviews can be used to learn about the concrete political dynamics around a given policy (e.g., anti-corruption legislation) (Hajer 2008: 221). However, while Hajer seems to understand interviews as a source to gain knowledge about actual political dynamics, I understand – in accordance with the aforementioned ontological claims – references to concrete political dynamics in interviews (e.g., crisis) to be part of the respective narratives rather than indicators of causal factors.

2.4 Universe

This article focuses on the corruption discourse in the ITACC and in Chile. The ITACC is represented here by selected documents from the World Bank, by the United Nations Convention against Corruption, by the Convention against Corruption of the Organization of American States (OAS) and by TI. Although this analysis of the ITACC is not comprehensive, this

---

9 All of the following interview citations and the citations taken from the Chilean literature in Spanish have been translated by the author. I would like thank the Graduate School of the Faculty of Economy and Social Sciences (University of Hamburg) for generously supporting the transcription of the interviews.
paper’s focus on several assumptions and aspects of the ITACC is suitable for the comparison of narratives in Chile.

The empirical exploration of narratives in Chile includes policy papers, official commission reports and publications from local NGOs. Moreover, it includes local academic literature, which is an important source because it condenses a wide range of corruption narratives into compact storylines.

I conducted 26 interviews with a variety of experts in the broader field of transparency and anti-corruption in Santiago, Chile between 13 October 2010 and 14 December 2010. Among others, the interviewees were comprised of:

- high-ranking parliamentarians involved in anti-corruption legislation;
- high-ranking members of public institutions related to the topic – for example, the Contraloría General (General Comptroller’s Office), the Consejo de Defensa del Estado (State Defense Council), and the Consejo para la Transparencia (Council for Transparency);
- high-ranking staff from left-wing and right-wing think tanks, such as Chile 21 and Libertad y Desarrollo;
- academics involved in formulating concrete recommendations and in implementing policy measures; and
- high-ranking staff from NGOs and local media related to the discourse – Chile Transparente (the Chilean Chapter of TI), Pro Acceso, and the online newspapers CIPER and El Mostrador.

I presume that none of the above-mentioned sources can exist outside of discourse and that all necessarily engage in specific narratives; this is why I deliberately conflated these different types of sources and treated them entirely as primary sources (i.e., as part of discourse). The constellation of interviews was mainly the product of controlled snowball sampling; this means that I acquired interview partners primarily through local networks, then analyzed the selection and expanded it where necessary by approaching networks with different backgrounds (e.g., groups with politically opposite viewpoints) in order to capture a broader spectrum within the anti-corruption discourse in Chile. This approach resulted in a public-centered, expert and elite discourse on anti-corruption. After presenting the methodological framework, the following chapter briefly discusses several underlying concepts and assumptions of the ITACC.

10 It is important to bear in mind this timeframe, because massive protests that came about in 2011, albeit largely revolving around the education sector, might have influenced notions of the narratives.
11 While I envisaged a variety of political standpoints I do not claim to have included all potential standpoints or to have reached a perfectly balanced representation of political currents and parties.
12 Thus, this leaves out other possible narratives of corruption (such as popular or rural) which are not within this paper’s scope of analysis. All interviews have been made anonymous in order to support the openness of interviewees.
3 Corruption in the ITACC Discourse

3.1 Rational-Legal Authority and the Public-Private Divide

Max Weber’s concept of rational-legal authority is central to the ITACC’s understanding of corruption. According to Weber, rational-legal authority is a central premise for the realization of modern statehood (Weber 1978: 217-219). This type of authority presumes that law entails a “consistent system of abstract rules which have normally been intentionally established” and is generally valid for anybody within its frame of reference. Law is characterized by the absence of arbitrariness regarding its application. Moreover, the authority which is exercised through the public administration in this ideal type is based on an “impersonal order” (ibid.).

Rational-legal authority presumes the principles of “complete separation of the organization’s property (respectively, capital), and the personal property (household) of the official” (ibid.: 219) and the “complete absence of appropriation of his official position by the incumbent.” Moreover, the rights attached to an office serve to secure “the purely objective and independent character of the conduct of the office so that it is oriented only to the relevant norms” (ibid.). In short, rational-legal authority requires abstract rules which are applied in a nonarbitrary manner.

The ITACC refers to Weber’s characterization of rational-legal authority in several central documents. For instance, the UN Convention against Corruption of 2003 states that corruption shall be fought because it jeopardizes “the rule of law” (Preamble). Moreover, it seeks to overcome “embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official,” as well as the “abuse of functions” and “illicit enrichment” (Articles 17, 19 and 20).

The anti-corruption convention of the OAS also refers to rational-legal authority when it mentions the “proper fulfilment of public functions” and the proper “use of resources entrusted to government officials in the performance of their functions” (OAS 1996: Article 3). Moreover, the World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (WB 2007: Summary).

The ITACC’s reference to rational-legal authority acknowledges the division between the public realm and the private realm, a characteristic stressed by several authors (Polzer 2001; Nuijten and Anders 2007). TI also stresses the importance of this division, arguing that “at its most extreme, [corruption] can even lead to the capture of the state itself, whereby powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups use corruption to shape a whole nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to serve their own private interests” (TI 2011b: 7).

TI, like many other proponents of anti-corruption, envisions “a world in which government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption” (ibid.: 11). In short, the ultimate goal of anti-corruption efforts is the full realization of rational-legal authority and the division between the public and the private.

---

13 The World Bank refers to itself as the “leading donor globally in providing support for strengthening public sector management” (World Bank 2009).
3.2 A Rational-Choice Conception of Corruption

Apart from rational-legal authority and the public-private divide, the ITACC conceptualizes corruption in rational-choice theoretical terms.14 Robert Klitgaard, who has developed one of the theoretical foundations of this narrative, sums up the fundamental orientation of the ITACC when he states that “corruption is a crime of calculation, not of passion” (Klitgaard 1998: 4). He has created a compact storyline of the causes of corruption, by summarizing them in a single formula: Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability (C=M+D−A) (Klitgaard 1988: 75). The economic narrative unsurprisingly brings forward remedies against corruption that “concentrate on incentive systems in tackling these problems” (Bardhan 2006: 344). Accordingly, the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report states that in order to fight corruption one needs to “reduce the opportunities for officials to act corruptly, by cutting back on their discretionary authority” (WB 1997: 105). Moreover, “enhancing accountability by strengthening mechanisms of monitoring and punishment” is a central tenant of a successful fight against corruption (ibid.). In addition, “any reform that increases the competitiveness of the economy will reduce incentives for corrupt behaviour” (ibid.: 105–106). The 2007 anti-corruption strategy also seeks to “reduce excessive regulatory burden, and promote competition” (WB 2007: ii); the 2012 update continues to focus on “incentives that either create or curtail rent-seeking opportunities for civil servants” (WB 2012b: 10).

The incentive-based approach to corruption is combined with the claim that engaging in anti-corruption can potentially be apolitical. For instance, the World Bank acknowledges that governance refers to the “form or nature of the political regime.” However, according to the World Bank, this part of governance needs to be (ergo, can be) ignored because it is “outside the Bank’s mandate” (ibid.: 9). The World Bank shares TI’s apolitical engagement with corruption, which seeks to be “politically non-partisan” in its work (TI 2011b: 11). Apart from being apolitical, the idea that corruption is caused by incentive structures implies that the causes or the meaning of corruption “despite claims to the contrary, are not culture specific” (WB 1997: 8).

Anwar Shah, a lead economist and head of the Governance Program at the World Bank Institute in Washington, DC states that the apolitical and economist approach to corruption achieved “wide acceptance in public policy circles and served as a foundation for empirical research and policy design to combat administrative, bureaucratic, and petty corruption” (Shah 2007: 237). This economic understanding of corruption is, according to Rothstein, the “most established idea of how to understand corruption” (Rothstein 2011: 230).

These few, briefly described conceptualizations of the ITACC (i.e., the division between public and private, the economist approach to fighting corruption and the apolitical and noncultural approach) serve as the background to which the local discourse in Chile is compared. However, this comparison is not symmetric, since in Chile an entirely different (local) angle on corruption and anti-corruption has become visible. Corruption in Chile does not only relate to such conceptual issues, but also to the story of successful anti-corruption legislation.

---

14 For a slightly more detailed analysis of the rational-choice foundations of the ITACC also see Gephart 2012: 12–16.
4 Narrating Corruption and Narrating Chile

The dominant anti-corruption narrative states that Chile has been a successful case of anti-corruption legislation and has generally low levels of corruption. This narrative is divided into two subnarratives that are partially oriented along political lines (i.e., left wing and right wing). The left-wing subnarrative includes a variant, which is closely related to Chile’s human rights movement. However, a fundamentally contesting narrative has emerged, which questions the dominant interpretation of Chile’s success story. The structure of the reconstructed narratives is as follows:

- main narrative: success narrative
  - subnarrative: left wing (Concertación)
    - variant of the left-wing subnarrative (human rights)
  - subnarrative: right wing
- main narrative: contesting narrative

4.1 Chile as a Success Case and an Example in Latin America

A wide range of political and civil society actors, from the Far Right to the Left, as well as state technocrats share a dominant narrative of corruption in Chile, which sees several waves of corruption scandals as having triggered anti-corruption legislation. After the transition to democracy, which saw Patricio Aylwin of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Democratic Christian Party) and the Concertación (left-wing coalition) elected as president, public debate towards the end of the presidential term was dominated by corruption cases – namely, “caso ENAP” involving the national petroleum company, “caso CODELCO” involving the state-owned national copper company and “innumerable accusations of corruption in municipalities, companies and public services” (Rehren 2008: 5).

The second president, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (also from the Concertación), called together the Comisión Nacional de Ética Pública (National Commission of Public Ethics) in 1994, which resulted in a report that contained numerous recommendations on how to curb corruption and improve probity in the Chilean public sector (CNEP 1995). One of the results of the report is Law No. 19.563 on administrative probity (1999), which includes, among other things, regulations regarding traffic of influence, the illicit use of privileged information, conflicts of interests, illicit enrichment and a reformed penal code that explicitly sanctions acts of corruption (Rehren 2008: 5, 15).

---

15 It is important to note that I do not claim that this chapter is comprehensive regarding the anti-corruption discourse in Chile. Discourses “can never be grasped in its entirety” and discourse analysis always remains fragmented (Kajetzke 2008: 109). However, the following sections serve to demonstrate the wide variety of competing anti-corruption narratives that exist in Chile.
In 2002, several corruption scandals once again erupted during the tenure of President Ricardo Lagos (the third president of the Concertación) (Muñoz 2008: 118). One case in particular, the “caso MOP-Gate,” “provoked great commotion in public opinion” according to an interviewee from the Partido Socialista de Chile (Socialist Party of Chile [PS]) (Interview PS1).16 The case revolved around the use of public funds for electoral campaigns by the Concertación and the payment of extra wages to civil servants of the Ministerio de Obras Públicas (Ministry of Public Works, [MOP]) and other high-level members of the government.17 However, the public outcry following these corruption scandals was evidence of a “healthy society” according to one interviewee (Interview Transparency Expert 2;18 also Rehren 2008: 5–6).

Once more, the reaction of the public and media to these and other scandals led to anti-corruption initiatives like the Acuerdos Político-Legislativos para la Modernización del Estado, la Transparencia y la Promoción del Crecimiento (Political-Legislative Agreements for the Modernization of the State, Transparency and the Promotion of Growth). Among other things, this agreement led to the establishment of the Sistema de Alta Dirección Pública (Senior Public Management System, SADP) an independent commission that is in charge of hiring high-level public servants on a competitive, depoliticized basis (Law 19.882 of 2003). Moreover, probity and transparency in the public sector were given constitutional status. Other measures included the regulation of political campaign financing and the implementation of ChileCompra, a computerized national system for public tenders.

More anti-corruption legislation was initiated shortly after Michele Bachelet took office in 2006. Following the Contraloría General’s detection that funds for the national sport institute had been redirected towards campaign activities for the 2005 parliamentarian elections (“caso Chiledesportes”), Bachelet issued a decree that implemented so-called active transparency, which aims to actively and regularly disseminate relevant information to the public (Gobierno de Chile 2006). In addition, Bachelet asked “Chile Transparente, the center for public studies [...] and a few other persons to propose an agenda for transparency and probity” (Interview Transparency Expert 1).19 A member of Chile Transparente agreed that “the initiative came out of corruption scandals” (Interview CT).20 The group’s work resulted in a report which proposed 31 measures to foster probity and transparency in the public sector (Ferreiro et al. 2006). “The country, both opposition and government, were capable of launching a

16 Interview with former left-wing member of Congress, Partido Socialista (Socialist Party [PS]), Santiago de Chile, 16 November 2010 (Interview PS1).
17 By metaphorically referring to the so called “Watergate” scandal in the USA in 1974 the severity of the case is underlined.
18 Interview with lawyer – formerly high level member of TI Chile, involved in Bachelet’s Transparency Agenda, Santiago de Chile, 04 November 2010 (Interview Transparency Expert 2).
19 Interview with academic – formerly TI Chile, involved in Bachelet’s Transparency Agenda, Santiago de Chile, 21 October 2010 (Interview Transparency Expert 1).
20 Interview with staff of Chile Transparente, Santiago de Chile, 04 November 2010 and 09 November 2010 (Interview CT).
package of legal measures” (Interview CDE).\textsuperscript{21} The most important outcome of this report was Law No. 20.285\textsuperscript{22} on the access to public information, which triggered a “radical change” (Interview Consejo M1).\textsuperscript{23} Again, the legislation was facilitated via an all-party initiative, primarily led by Jaime Gazmuri (PS) and Hernan Larrain of the Far-Right party Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union, UDI). Among other things, the law created a council for transparency, which had the aim of guaranteeing “the right to access to public information, watching over its accessibility, legal enforcement and availability” (CPT 2012).

Interviewees from all political currents evaluated this law and the resulting council as a groundbreaking step in Chile’s anti-corruption legislation: “This law is one of the most pro-citizen in the world […]. We have a vanguard law” (Interview Consejo M1). It was “wonderful, […] it certainly denotes a ‘before’ and ‘after’ in anti-corruption matters” (Interview Transparency Expert 2). It is “the most important step that has come about in state modernization” (Interview CDE). One interviewee even argued the law signified a “revolution” between 2006 and 2010 with regard to transparency in the public sector (Interview Transparency Expert 2).

In short, in Chile “there is an intolerance towards corruption cases, and when there have been important scandals there has been a quick reaction in terms of improving the rules to prevent further acts of corruption” (Interview Transparency Expert 3).\textsuperscript{24} Or as another interviewee puts it, “since the 90s onwards, generally when there is a crisis, the system works well to solve it” (Interview Transparency Expert 1). The law on transparency took effect on 20 April 2009 and was, together with the creation of the Consejo para la Transparencia, the last major step in Chile’s anti-corruption legislation.

\textbf{Pending Issues: The Incomplete Story}

“There is a significant way to go” (Interview PS2)\textsuperscript{25} despite this success story; several interviewees and Chile Transparente have mentioned pending issues. For instance, institutional independence for the Consejo para la Transparencia is required because “maintaining our budget requires us to cackle and scream every year that we need more money” (Interview Consejo M2).\textsuperscript{26} Financial independence is equally needed for the Contraloría General (Inter-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Interview with high-level member of Consejo de Defensa del Estado (State Defence Council), Santiago de Chile, 17 November 2010 (Interview CDE).
  \item \textsuperscript{22} The law was passed by both chambers of the parliament in January 2008, taking effect as of 20 April 2009.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Interview with high-level member no. 1 of the Consejo para la Transparencia (Council for Transparency), Santiago de Chile, 2 November 2010 (Interview Consejo M1).
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Interview with public servant, closely involved in Bachelet’s Transparency Agenda, Santiago de Chile, 17 November 2010 (Interview Transparency Expert 3).
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Interview with former left-wing member of Congress, Partido Socialista, Santiago de Chile, 21 October 2010 (Interview PS2).
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Interview with high-level member no. 2 of the Consejo para la Transparencia (Council for Transparency), Santiago de Chile, 23 November 2010 (Interview Consejo M2).
\end{itemize}
view Consejo M1). Another transparency expert argues that it would also “be preferable to have fewer discretionary mechanisms for the waiver of a civil servant” (Interview Transparency Expert 3). Other pending issues include legislation on the “blind trust fund,” declarations of wealth of incumbents, revolving-door legislation and political campaign financing (e.g., Moya and Urcullo 2009). One member of the Consejo para la Transparencia summarizes the remaining issues by stating that they revolve around “promiscuity between the private and the public” (Interview Consejo M2).

Lobbying is another debated pending issue and is perceived by some as indispensable. In “the modern world, all public decisions have to take into account the opinion of the sectors involved; be it social, cultural, private” (Interview Lobby Expert).27 The lobbyist’s primary function is “to present in an adequate manner the viewpoints of a company or of a sector toward a legislative project” (Interview Lobby Expert). However, the law on lobbying is pending, while one legislative project was vetoed by Bachelet in 2008 due to “serious deficiencies” regarding the conceptual delineation of lobbying (CT 2010: 19).

All three waves of corruption scandals concern the improper fulfillment of public offices, illicit enrichment, the misappropriation of public funds and the violation of the division between the public and the private spheres. Equally, all countermeasures sought to strengthen transparency, improve accountability and regulate the division between the public and the private spheres. Moreover, all mentioned pending issues that revolve around reducing room for discretion and either deepening the division between the public and the private spheres or regulating the interference of particularistic interests into the public realm.

Therefore, the success narrative outlined above fully converges with the ITACC in terms of the qualification of certain practices as corrupt and the adoption of countermeasures. In Hager’s terms, the narrative is highly institutionalized given that the ITACC principles are translated into legislation and institutions.

Chile, a Country of Low Levels of Corruption

Despite these numerous scandals, the narrative does not depict Chile as being corrupt – an observation shared by interviewees across all sectors and political currents: “Generally speaking, Chile is a country with low corruption” (Interview Journalist 3)28 and with “a public administration that is not corrupt” (Interview Analyst/ExLyD).29 This is consistent with Chile’s exceptionally good rating in the ITACC. Several interviewees made reference to TI’s CPI, such as a member of the Constitutional Court: “In general, I think if one applies a com-

27 Interview with lobby expert, Santiago de Chile, 28 October 2010 (Interview Lobby Expert).
28 Interview with journalist, online newspaper El Mostrador, Santiago de Chile, 21 October 2010 (Interview Journalist 3).
29 Interview with political analyst/formerly Libertad y Desarollo, Santiago de Chile, 18 October 2010 (Interview Analyst/Ex-LyD).
parative standard, like Transparency International does, Chile is a principled country, that is, a country where there is little corruption” (Interview MCC, also CT 2009: 14).30

While the success narrative has so far converged with the ITACC, there is a remarkable difference regarding the causes of low levels of corruption in Chile. Far from being the result of applying ITACC measures (such as transparency, control and reduced discretionary power), probity in Chile’s public sector is based on entirely different reasons according to this narrative.

The Comisión Nacional de Ética Pública’s 1995 report states that Chile has a “long and solid tradition of public integrity” (CNEP 1995: 202) and “a national ethos, that is, a Chilean way of being which involves values that have been minted over time. The national identity, like a moral and historical heritage, forms part of the public ethic” (ibid.: 206-207). This public ethic corresponds to “the conscience of the public servants to do their work well,” “for the good of their country” (Interview UDI 1).31 As a result of this ethos, politicians traditionally do not gain financially via public offices. According to one high-level employee in the Contraloría General, “it is really common that a president of the republic ends his/her term and goes back to the same house” (Interview GCO).32 A right-wing parliamentarian also agreed with this observation, arguing that incumbents “usually leave [public service] poorer than when they entered; that is, nobody becomes rich with power” attached to public office (Interview UDI 2).33

Apart from the well-functioning and responsible elite, Chile’s population “has very little tolerance towards corruption” (Interview Transparency Expert 1), which can be attributed to cultural factors (Interview Transparency Expert 3). One interviewee explained that “the Argentines laugh a bit about us because we make a scandal of a situation that represents a value of, I don’t know, maybe five thousand or ten thousand dollars” (Interview CDE). Moreover, the Chilean ethos is closely related to its tradition as a “legalist country” (Interview UDI 2). This tradition is specific to Chile where “in the streets you can find the laws on sale and the people buy them” (Interview CDE).

In this narrative, these cultural specificities are related to Chile’s state-building processes. One interviewee suggested that Chile had “exchanged obedience to the king of Spain with obedience to the law” (Interview LyD).34 Another interviewee said that the public ethos in

30 Interview with Minister of the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court), Santiago de Chile, 29 November 2010 (Interview MCC).
31 Interview with right-wing Member of Chilean Congress, Union Democrática Independiente (Independent Democratic Union, [UDI]), Santiago de Chile, 25 October 2010 (Interview UDI 1).
32 Interview with high-level staff of the Contraloría General de la República de Chile (General Comptroller’s Office), Santiago de Chile, 13 December 2010 (Interview GCO).
33 Interview with right-wing Member of the Chilean Congress, Union Democrática Independiente, Santiago de Chile, 22 November 2010 (Interview UDI 2).
34 Interview with staff of a right wing think tank, Libertad y Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile, 18 October 2010 (Interview LyD).
Chile “comes from the epoch of the colonies” (Interview Minister/Lagos). A staff member from the Contraloría General explained that:

the issue is very historic, this isn’t about 2005, this is about 1836 [...]. In reality this is owed to a minister of the interior who was Diego Portales [...]. The “Portalian” ethos is to act according to rights, juridical principles and includes a toughness when you find an offence which today would give the impression of a corrupt act.

(Interview GCO)

From the start, Chile was “a state that was very oligarchic but a state under the rule of law” (Interview PS1) and “there was a constitutional order from the beginning of Chile’s Independence” (Interview PS2).

Contrary to the ITACC’s assumption that a lack of transparency would lead to corruption (and strengthening transparency would help to curb it), none of the interviewees related Chile’s low levels of corruption to transparency. In fact, “till the year 2006 there was little transparency” (Interview Transparency Expert 1). According to this narrative, Chile does not have low levels of corruption because it has good countermeasures in place, but rather because it has a tradition of the absence of corruption, a cultural public ethos and a responsible elite. In terms of diverging understandings of corruption, this is a remarkable combination of adapting universalistic ITACC conceptualizations and the particularistic embedding of the ITACC.

4.2 Subnarratives: Left Wing and Right Wing

The above-mentioned storylines and the underlying narrative are shared across the political landscape. However, there are two partially opposing subnarratives, which generally pertain to specific political groups. One subnarrative relates to the Concertación coalition and includes a human rights variant. Another subnarrative relates to the currently ruling right-wing coalition (and more specifically to the Far Right UDI).36

4.3 Concertación

Several members of the Concertación state that the agenda for probity was backed by Bachelet’s great political will:

the president, to the delight and surprise of some, said “Well, this needs to be done, we’ll do it completely” and she did it. And then many people in the Concertación said,

---

35 Interview with minister of the government of Patricio Lagos (Concertación), Santiago de Chile, 25 November 2010 (Interview Minister/Lagos).

36 These political groups clearly have complex internal structures and differentiation, which in this context I cannot address.
“Well, this is crazy this lady is going to lose the election by getting a lot of transparency and is currently implementing a law very quickly, without having prepared it.”

(Interview Consejo M1)

Some interviewees acknowledged that the “support from the president was strong” (Interview MCC) and “the government committed itself a lot to the project” (Interview PS1). One parliamentarian explained that, generally speaking, “the Concertación had a strong commitment with the democratization of the country, and this also meant a strong commitment with the quality of the democratic institutions, and, among others, transparency” (Interview PS1).

Legitimizing the Past: Rigid Regulations as the Cause for Practices at the Margins of the Law

While the Concertación interviewees did not openly deny the corruption scandals which had subsequently resulted in successful legislation, some did attempt to contextualize and relativize them. The MOP-Gate corruption case was labeled by a well-known socialist parliamentarian as “administrative practices that were completely at odds with modern and transparent administrative practices” (Interview PS1). However, “there was not a corruption issue initially [...] it had to do with trying to solve problems in a state that had many restrictions and in governments that did not have a parliamentary majority” (Interview PS1). Another member of the PS also preferred to speak of “anomalous situations in terms of the existing legislation” rather than use the term “corruption” (Interview PS2). The actual cause for the extra income for high-level members of the coalition and incumbents were rigid regulations, which did not allow the government to formally raise salaries. “One looked for a solution that has to do with the use of reserved expenses, which is a part of the budget that also exists in other parts of the world, doesn’t it?” (Interview CDE). The use of reserved expenses for incumbents “was an open secret” (Interview PS1).

One high-level public official in Lagos’s government, under which the MOP-Gate case occurred, argued that the amount of money involved was not very significant, claiming that they only “reached one million dollars in six years” (Interview Minister/Lagos). Regarding Bachelet’s term, one interviewee stated that the corruption cases revealed “were very marginal” (Interview MCC).

While the interviewees referred to the corruption cases as the background against which the political class reacted successfully, they reinterpreted these cases from a pragmatic point of view (i.e., such rigid rules required bending). This interpretation is similar to what critical anti-corruption scholars such as Shore and Haller (2005: 6) and Robertson (2006) have argued. Robertson (2006: 9) claims that “every office drudge knows that it’s the ‘grey area’, not the rules, which actually makes bureaucracy work, for better and for worse.” On the one hand, this perspective on corruption cases in the governments of the left-wing coalition seems obvious. After all, who would not legitimize their own political conduct? On the other, this perspective adds to the manifold viewpoints on such cases and how Robertson’s ‘better’
and ‘worse’ is interpreted by the specific political actors. It reveals an understanding of corruption that goes beyond its legal definition and includes the intentionality of “bending rules” as the decisive aspect for a practice to qualify as corruption.

**Chile’s Small and Exclusive Elite**

Several interviewees pertaining to the Left concurred with the idea that Chile has a responsible and well-prepared elite. However, one of the authors of Bachelet’s transparency agenda stated that Chile has “a very small elite in a country of great inequalities. For that reason, the elite is very powerful in the eyes of the society” (Interview Transparency Expert 1). Another member of the coalition self-critically added that “nobody would recognize themselves as the privileged,” but “we are those who have the responsibility to guide the country. That is why you generate behavioral mechanisms that allow the elite to reproduce itself” (Interview Minister/Lagos). Another prominent player in the anti-corruption field explained that:

> in fact, the social networks are really strong and it is very difficult to compete and it is very difficult to access these networks. Moreover, in the higher segments, I think there is a strong dependence on the family networks, on personal contacts, on certain ties of friendship and trust.

(Interview Transparency Expert 3)

Although acknowledging the existence of this exclusive elite, its presence was both excused and normalized: “Which country in the world is not closed?” (Interview MCC). Moreover, this exclusive social structure is explicitly delineated from corruption:

> I do not much associate this with corruption. That is, I imagine the elite is so small. I know five or six ministers because they are my friends; I also know businessmen, I also know academics. That is to say, one knows the entire world.

(Interview Transparency Expert 1)

Completely separating legitimate personal social relations from illegitimate relations is described as impossible: “Where do you draw the line? It means that [a] minister cannot talk to anyone anymore, that he has to go home from work and be with his wife and his kids and cannot go to a party anymore” (Interview Consejo M1).

Thus, while the success narrative converges with the ITACC in that it seeks to strengthen the separation of the private and public realms, this subnarrative clearly diverges in that there is a largely uncontested understanding that this separation cannot be fully realized from a certain societal level upwards. Within the Concertación, however, this is not interpreted as a corruption-related issue that must be dealt with. Remarkably, it would appear that neither the ITACC interprets this as corruption-relevant given Chile’s good anti-corruption rating.
The Political Right: Reasons for Cooperation and the Lack of Division between Public and Private

Explicit othering has emerged consistently in all interviews. In the Concertación subnarrative of the success narrative, this has most notably targeted the political Right, despite the political agreements reached between the two.

When asked why the Right had cooperated in the anti-corruption agreements, several interviewees stated that the law for transparency was a means of regaining democratic legitimacy:

“The UDI, which is the party most akin to Pinochet, needed to whitewash itself, that’s the reason. Now we’re all democrats; that’s the idea.”

(Interview Social Scientist 1)

The member of the Consejo de Defensa del Estado added that the Right had no choice but to vote for the political agreements:

“Sometimes the Right joined grudgingly, sometimes because there was no other choice, because it didn’t want to be perceived badly by the public.”

(Interview CDE)

While the left-wing elite is part of a lamentable but not fundamentally questioned exclusive social structure, conflicts of interest in the current right-wing government of Sebastián Piñera are depicted as much more problematic in this subnarrative. One difference between both elite groups is that while the Left’s elite is limited to the political realm, the Right’s elite combines politics with “the world of business, of trade, of banking, of industry” (Interview PS1). Accordingly, Piñera’s wealth is assessed to be “very disturbing because […] the relationship between politics and money has become much narrower during the last years” (Interview PS2).

From a Concertación perspective, it is the current right-wing government rather than the left-wing elite that lacks the proper division between the public and the private realm. Even the lobby-expert interviewee lamented that “there are many ministers and authorities that now regulate activities in which they had been involved up until three months ago” (Interview Lobby Expert). A member of the socialist party explained that “in all relatively advanced democracies [the concept] exists that between business and politics there has to be a wall and Piñera doesn’t have this concept” (Interview PS1). The minister in Lagos’s government agreed: “In his conduct there hasn’t been a separation between the public and the private or between the public and business” (Interview Minister/Lagos). The above-quoted so-

37 Interview with social scientist - Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago de Chile, 04 November 2010 (Interview Social Scientist 1).

38 Interviewees related to the Concertación mentioned numerous conflicts of interest in the current government (e.g., the president’s shares in the Chilean flight company LAN). Others included the stocks the president had in the Colo Colo football club, the assignation of public contracts for reconstruction after the earthquake in
cialist parliamentarian added that this lack of consciousness of the requirement for a division between the public and the private shows that the current president “has a very, very weak sense of a democratic culture” (Interview PSI). In sum, this subnarrative understands corruption as an illegitimate connection between the political and the economic sector.

According to the lobbying expert, the lack of clear boundaries between the private and the public is due to the right-wing elite’s provincialism: “I think that our Right is still so uneducated and noncosmopolitan, so provincial” (Interview Lobby Expert). He refers to the Left as the middle and lower classes, whereas the Right is depicted as the real elite:

The military dictatorship persecuted our people and there was a worldwide diaspora; after returning, the middle and lower classes nowadays turn out to be more cosmopolitan than the upper class. [The Right] know Europe, but they only go there on vacation.

(Interview Lobby Expert)

Thus, there is a simultaneous acknowledgement and normalization of a closed elite system in this subnarrative. However, there is a much stronger negative assessment of the conflict of interest on the part of the political opponent.

4.4 Human Rights

One variant of the subnarrative is closely related to the Concertación, but more specifically it is related to Chile’s human rights movement. From this perspective, the Chilean transparency “revolution” would not have been possible without the enduring engagement of human rights activists as part of the larger transition process to democracy.

One of the activists, a human rights lawyer, explained the initial motivation to engage in the transparency discourse in the 1990s: “For many of us the fundamental work during those years consisted of the defense of human rights; ‘human rights of the very first generation,’ that’s how it’s referred to. That is, civil and political [...] life and physical integrity (Interview Human Rights 2).”

The overarching aim of this engagement was to restore democracy “to the best possible extent” (Interview Human Rights 2); a phrase used in Chile, the lawyer said, “to characterize [...] the entire democratic reconstruction” (Interview Human Rights 2). Referring to the military and the political right, he explained that “first it had to be negotiated with the military and afterwards with those who weren’t military but who were not 100 percent democrats” (Interview Human Rights 2).

---

2010 (thereby initially circumventing ‘Chile Compra’) and television licenses which were held by Piñera and subject to regulation by his government.

39 Interview with former high level-member of Chile Transparente/human rights lawyer, Santiago de Chile, 20 October 2010 (Interview Human Rights 2).
The process of democratization is the fundamental background into which this variant of the Concertación subnarrative is embedded. Explicitly engaging in transparency as a vehicle to defend human rights and to strengthen democracy was reasoned by relating it to the dictatorship: “The issue of information was a terrible issue for us because there was not only secrecy, but there was a total monopoly on information” (Interview Human Rights 2). Thus, the importance of transparency in relation to information is fundamental in the human rights context. To underline this point, the interviewee related transparency to the deaths of more than one thousand people and the “disappearing” of many more during the Pinochet regime: “One could have prevented almost a thousand deaths of detainees, of the disappeared, if the courts at the time had answered to the demands for protection made by the families of the disappeared” (Interview Human Rights 2).

Chile Transparente was initiated in 1994, partially by human rights activists in order to professionalize and to institutionalize the task of advancing democracy from a human rights perspective: “A group of friends, all of them very preoccupied with the issue, created the chapter and started to position the topic” (Interview Transparency Expert 2).  

The storyline of the human rights and the transparency agenda refers to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (ICHR) ruling on the Claude Reyes et al v. Chile case in 2006, which is seen as the height of the human rights movement’s influence on the anticorruption discourse. The case was brought in 1998 following the request from a group of petitioners for information on the environmental impact of a Forestal Trillium project in southern Chile. From a human rights perspective, soliciting the information was “a pretext, this was a formality” (Interview Human Rights 2). The information given out by the responsible committee41 was perceived to be incomplete by human rights groups, but subsequent court appeals for more information were rejected (Muñoz 2008). The responsible court, “following its tradition, said ‘no’” (Interview Human Rights 2). The case was then presented to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights,42 which ruled against the Chilean state, arguing that it had violated Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the “Freedom of Thought and Expression.” In short, the commission argued that the access to publicly relevant information is part of the right to freedom of expression (Muñoz 2008: 126).

The final ruling of the ICHR in September 2006 (CIDH 2006) coincided with the corruption scandals at the beginning of Bachelet’s term. From a human rights perspective, the ruling was an additional, if not decisive, factor that influenced transparency legislation not only in Chile, but also beyond: “Most of the legislation in Latin America has been issued in light of that ruling and, therefore, the approach we have regarding laws on access to information

---

40 Other NGOs in Chile who are engaged in human rights issues and transparency are “Pro Acceso” and “Fundación Pro bono.”
41 Responsible was the Comité de Inversion Extranjera (Committee of Foreign Investment).
42 Several international organizations, such as the “Open Society Justice Initiative,” “ARTICLE 19,” “LiMAC” and “IPYS” joined the case as amicus curiae (Pro Acceso 2008).
and transparency is closely related to the world of human rights, directly or indirectly” (Interview Human Rights 1). According to one of the lawyers involved in this case, the ruling “fundamentally changed the panorama regarding this immense right to information” (Interview Human Rights 2).

Several human rights activists have underlined the potential importance of this discourse coalition for the future. For instance, three international meetings (in 2004, 2009 and 2012) at the University of Chile’s center for human rights, comprised of both anti-corruption activists and human rights advocates, explored the possibilities of deepening the cooperation between both areas. It concluded that “there was a consensus that connecting the issue and the movements for human rights and anti-corruption opens interesting possibilities for analysis and action” (Lauzán and Toro 2009: 34). The unifying basis for the cooperation between both movements is seen in the “principles of transparency, participation, accountability, equality and non-discrimination” (Gonzales and Nash 2012: 48).

The human rights variant is related to and is highly compatible with the Concertación subnarrative. An opposing interpretation of Chile’s history is presented in a competing subnarrative, which is related to the right wing. Notwithstanding the stark differences, it forms part of the overarching success narrative and the anti-corruption discourse coalition.

4.5 Right Wing

The currently governing right-wing coalition Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile) is comprised of the Renovación Nacional (National Renewal, RN) and the extreme right-wing party UDI. Similar to the human rights activists, interviewees from this coalition (more specifically from the UDI) made numerous references to Chilean history in order to explain the progressive anti-corruption legislation, albeit from a contrary perspective.

Reasons for Chile’s Success: Responsible Right-Wing Government

While the Left refers to the Concertación governments’ political will to explain the successful anti-corruption legislation, the right-wing subnarrative refers to periods before the transition to democracy. According to one UDI parliamentarian, the military regime “laid the ground for the economic development of the country” after the coup (Interview UDI 1). He referred to the so-called Chicago Boys, a group of neoliberal economists whose ideas were implemented in the 1970s, which resulted in widespread privatization in numerous sectors (e.g., education, health and pensions). The military had implemented these reforms with “a sense of organization [...]”; a group of economists brought them this economic model and they said ‘yes, this needs to be done’ and they did it in an ordered and systematic way and from that point of view they completely changed the country” (Interview Analyst/ExLyD).

---

43 Interview with high-level member of Pro Acceso, local NGO Transparency/Human Rights, Santiago de Chile, 25 November 2010 (Interview Human rights 1).
Apart from founding the basis for Chile’s current economic well-being, the right-wing government (referred to as an “authoritarian government” and not a “dictatorship” or “military regime”) was respectful of Chile’s political institutions and thereby paved the way for an orderly transition to democracy devoid of the violence witnessed in the majority of other South American countries (Interview UDI 1).

The history of the military regime serves as the background story to explain the successful political pacts for anti-corruption legislation in Chile after the transition. According to this subnarrative it was precisely the military’s respect for institutions which supported these agreements: “I think returning to democracy institutionally helped a lot to achieve political agreements afterwards” (Interview UDI 1).

**Legitimizing the Past: The Left as the Cause of Tyranny**

While the Left’s subnarrative relativizes corruption cases since the 1990s, the Right’s attempts to legitimize the past reach back into their period in power before the transition to democracy. According to this subnarrative, the Left is ultimately responsible for the 1973 coup – which saw the elected left-wing president, Salvador Allende, overthrown – since it tended towards political extremism and induced political violence in the country: “They were the ones that brought hate and violence as a method and as political action to Chile” (Interview Analyst/ExLyD). According to this interviewee, “if one releases the lion, the lion bites and claws. The guilt lies with the ones that untied the lion” (Interview Analyst/ExLyD).

**The Political Left: Reasons for Cooperation and Excessive Concentration of Power**

The Left’s cooperation in implementing such sensible policies is attributed to the fact that they had learned their lesson not to indulge in extremism anymore. With regard to Chile 21, a left-wing think tank, the political analyst explained that “many of them went into exile and started to do a ‘mea culpa,’ saying ‘it was our fault and we led the country to a degree of confrontation that ended in this and this cannot happen again’” (Interview Analyst/ExLyD). “The people learned their lesson” (Interview Analyst/ExLyD).

While the left-wing subnarrative laments the current right-wing government’s concentration of power and related conflicts of interest, the Right’s subnarrative paints a similar picture of the Concertación governments: “The governments of the Concertación, after twenty years of accumulating a lot of power, began to make the civil servants corrupt” (Interview Analyst/ExLyD). The public sector had been largely exploited and the Left has “manipulated the entire state apparatus for political purposes” (Interview UDI 1).

In short, the Right’s subnarrative of the overarching success narrative depicts the Right as respecting Chile’s institutions and the Left as having captured the state for political purposes. This interpretation of the country’s history could not be more clearly opposed to the left-wing’s subnarrative. The related understanding of corruption focuses on the excessive accu-
mulation of power within the public sector rather than on the illegitimate connection between the private and public sectors.

The storyline of a corrupt left-wing government is supported by the liberal, right-wing think tank Libertad y Desarollo, which publishes annual corruption reports. These are based on opinion polls among “businessmen” because “they are the ones that have the closest relationships with or experience of corruption cases” (Interview LyD). In 2009, Libertad y Desarollo published its annual corruption report and observed an “alert signal” (von Baer and Igor 2009). The report stated that is was “preoccupying that 64 percent of those interviewed think that there is ‘more’ or ‘much more’ corruption compared to one year ago” (ibid.: 22). However, one year after the election of a right-wing government, the new report stated that the perception of corruption among business people had dropped “to a historic minimum” (Bellolio and Muñoz 2011).

Some of the statements made in this section do not represent the political parties’ official position on the transition to democracy, nor does this short chapter reflect the numerous nuances of this subnarrative that exist within different parts of the Right. However, there is a shared tendency among the right-wing interviewees to relativize the period of military rule and to connect the neoliberal reforms of the 1970s, the military’s supposed respect for institutions, the orderly transition to democracy and the successful anti-corruption legislation under the Concertación governments.

4.6 End of the Discourse Coalition

In 2009, several politically opposing organizations – the Centro de Estudios Públicos (Center for Public Studies), Centro de Políticas Públicas (Center for Public Policies), Chile 21 and Libertad y Desarrollo, among others – published a report on the modernization of the Chilean state (CPRE 2009). It called for a “better state for Chile” and put forward “proposals for modernization and reform.” Surprisingly, it barely highlighted any of the above-mentioned pending issues regarding anti-corruption or transparency legislation. The report only mentioned the Sistema de Alta Dirección Pública, which has to be improved. When asked about the absence of almost all remaining legislative issues from this report, one of its authors argued that “it wasn’t included, because the reform was successful between 2006 and 2009; the book was written last year, so we left it out on purpose” (Interview Transparency Expert 1).

Chile Transparente monitors pending regulatory issues and provides updates on their progress in the legislative process (CT 2012). Their website states that none of the pending issues on the transparency agenda receive more than “low legislative priority” at the moment (ibid.). In light of this lack of legislative progress and the absence of these topics in the aforementioned publication, one might argue that the anti-corruption discourse coalition has ended.

44 From February 2010 till July 2011 Ena von Baer was Ministry General Secretariat of Government in Piñera’s government. After her resignation she was designated as senator for the ‘UDI’. 
4.7 The Contesting Narrative

While all subnarratives of the success narrative interpret Chile’s anti-corruption efforts differently, there is one narrative in particular that is fundamentally at odds with the all the previously discussed (sub-)narratives. This contesting narrative provides an entirely different interpretation of the wider historical context since 1973 and the immediate anti-corruption success story; it even questions whether Chile has low levels of corruption.

Not a Success Case: Chile’s Weak Democracy

According to the left-wing subnarrative (and its human rights variant), transparency is closely related to the strengthening of democracy – and important steps have been taken. However, the contesting narrative argues that Chile’s democracy is in a rather unhealthy condition. Regarding political participation of the population, one interviewee stated that “one of the weakest countries regarding participation is Chile. […] We have neither schemes nor models of participation” (Interview Human Rights 1). Similarly, a high-level staff member of the left-wing think tank Chile 21 stated that “Chilean civil society is weakened to the ground. [...] we have a weak state and a weak civil society and this is in my view the situation. It’s the worst of all possible worlds” (Interview Chile 21).45 Some argue that the focus given to anti-corruption legislation and enhancing transparency mechanisms has distracted from more important problems. “I’d love to see this commitment with other things” (Interview Chile 21), “I don’t mean that transparency is bad, but I would like to see it balanced with a concern, for example, for citizen participation” (Interview Chile 21).

One interviewee explained that the technical focus on transparency is problematic and that there are other ways of approaching the topic, because “in Latin America there are definitions that do not always have to do with what you know” (Interview Human Rights 1). He mentioned Bolivia as an example: “Although Bolivia is a country with many problems, it also has a lot to teach to Latin America regarding the logic of transparency” (Interview Human Rights 1). He argued that “Bolivia has a much more participatory culture” (Interview Human Rights 1) and offers an alternative conceptualization of transparency in nontechnical terms:

They define transparency as a social dialogue, not like a technique. [...] For them transparency is a mechanism of social dialogue which prevents those who have greater advantages from failing to bear responsibility for those who have less advantages in the society. And that’s an entirely different definition and I find it brilliant.”

(Interview Human Rights 1)

Proponents of this contesting narrative also question the ability of Chile’s media to effectively serve as an independent watchdog, which is interpreted as a decisive factor for successful an-

45 Interview with high-level staff of the Contraloría General de la República de Chile (General Comptroller’s Office), Santiago de Chile, 13 December 2010 (Interview GCO).
ti-corruption legislation in the dominant success narrative. One interviewee argued that although “there is no official censorship, what we have here is self-censorship, in a media market that is very concentrated on the right, in the Mercurio” (Interview Chile 21, also Nef 2003: 22). Against the background of this biased media, one lawyer doubted whether the mainstream media would follow up on corruption cases in the current government: “I’d love to know how the media would react if there were cases” (Interview Transparency Expert 2).

No True Political Will

While the Concertación subnarrative states that there has been true political will on the part of left-wing governments, this narrative argues that anti-corruption issues simply have “become a bit of a fashion” (Interview Journalist 2).46 Even one early proponent of the dominant transparency agenda agreed and illustrated this view with an anecdote:

I was once received by a minister of state, and the moment I entered his office he asked me: “How long are you going to mess around with this transparency?” But immediately he called the press and we took a photo together.

(Interview Transparency Expert 2)

Instead of being progressive and advanced, “legislation is heavily lagging behind [...] and you noticed that basically there was no interest in moving forward” (Interview Chile 21). Bresnahan agrees and argues that “the Concertación’s lack of political will is at least as great an obstacle to progressive change in Chile as objective conditions and an unfavourable correlation of forces” (Bresnahan 2003: 14).

Criticizing the Past: Incomplete Transition to Democracy

Similar to all interviewees, proponents of the contesting narrative make reference to the country’s transition to democracy as the background of the current status on democracy and corruption in Chile. While the success narrative assesses the process of transition as successful, the human rights variant of the Concertación subnarrative speaks of a transition “to the best possible extent.” However, according to the contesting narrative, Chile’s history has been characterized by neoliberal shock therapy since the 1973 coup. The implementation of neoliberal reforms was backed by the military, with Pinochet and the armed forces ensuring “that labor and all other dissidents were silenced. Pinochet presented to Chile a program of policy without politicians, only technocrats” (Fernandez and Vera 2012: 9). Also, the macroeconomic growth that has been credited to the neoliberal reforms “cannot be separated from its dark side: the destruction of democracy, persistent violations of human dignity, induced pauperization, and state terrorism” (Nef 2003: 17).

46 Interview with journalist, online newspaper CIPER, Santiago de Chile, 18 November 2010 (Interview Journalist 2).
While the Concertación subnarrative argues that the Right participated in the anti-corruption pacts to support their democratic rehabilitation, the human rights variant ascribes this to their engagement in several human rights related cases. In contrast, the Right argues it was their respect for institutions that enabled the anti-corruption consensus. However, the contesting viewpoint argues that the culture of political agreements during and after the transition between the Right and the Left was based on “the ability of the right to manufacture consent” (ibid.: 29). The underlying agreement was that “the right-wingers would not call out the military to squelch the return to democracy provided that the Concertación did not call the workers to strike” (Fernandez and Vera 2012: 9).

Far from being “to the best possible extent” as the human rights variant states, the agreed transition effectively helped “to safeguard the economic and political project of Pinochet” (Rindejall 2009: 187, also Barton 2002: 372), which some see as a “neo-liberal elite pact that has privileged accumulation over both inclusion and distribution” (Barret 1999: 24). The interviewee from Chile 21 confirmed this view, stating that “there have not been any structural changes for 20 years” (Interview Chile 21).


The dominant success narrative states that Chile has very low levels of corruption. However, the contesting narrative argues that corruption in Chile is a bigger issue than might appear at first sight. For instance, a journalist agreed with the assessment that bribing is not perceived to be a widespread practice in Chile and that the country has a legalist culture, “but behind that it’s thriving” (Interview Journalist 3). Whether Chile is perceived as relatively free from corruption or not “always depends on how you look at it” (Interview Journalist 2). One interviewee explained that the assessment of Chile’s level of corruption:

> depends a lot on the definition that one wants to ascribe to corruption, because there are corrupt practices that from a legal point of view are not corruption as such. But they, nonetheless, create areas and bubbles, administrative environments which are conducive to corruption, which are practices that are very, very permanent in the state.

(Interview Journalist 3)

He further clarified this by referring to the popular term “the Chilean way” (always said in English), which is commonly used to describe something as typically Chilean: “‘the Chilean way’ of corruption does not necessarily have to do with a direct bribe, but with the famous juridical principle of ‘I give so that you’ll give’” (Interview Journalist 3). This creates “complex networks, including the issue of relationships and of conflicts of interests, which is the most potent issue […] but it is very difficult for people to pursue them and to prove them” (Interview Human Rights 1).
The Other Elite

Another interviewee, who works for an investigative online newspaper, related the complex networks to a lack of consciousness regarding the division between the public and private spheres: “Is there a lot of corruption? I don’t know whether there is a lot of corruption, but they are not adequately upholding the barrier that you’d wish to find” (Interview Journalist 2). This is not limited to the Right or the Left, but it is problematic throughout “the political class.”

The interviewees mentioned numerous conflicts of interest and gave several examples of connections not only between the economy and politics, but also between the different political currents, such as the following:

José Antonio Viera Gallo, a current member of the Constitutional Court, former minister of [left-wing] President Bachelet, former brother-in-law of German Chadwick, his wife is María Teresa Chadwick, who – in turn – is a relative in this line with the [current right-wing] president of the republic. You can do this systematically [...]. Well, they’re all relatives.

(Interview Journalist 2)

Another journalist agreed: “It doesn’t matter in which political party they have been active historically because in the end they are cousins or nephews or siblings” (Interview Journalist 1).47 Journalist 2 further elaborated that “the oligarchization of politics, in the Left, the Center and the Right is fundamentally related to the access to privileges, and is part of a last name or a social relation” (Interview Journalist 3). Thus in this contesting narrative, the understanding of corruption is related to the impermeable elite and refers to both the illicit relations between the public and the economic sector on the one hand, and excessively accumulated power in the Concertación government on the other.

The Elite Responding to Public Demand?

The contesting narrative clearly disputes the notion that the broader population asked for anti-corruption and transparency measures: “It is not an issue that is a concern of the general population; it is quite an elite topic” (Interview Journalist 1). Thus, from this perspective, (limited) transparency is a topic that is superficially promoted by the elite, which itself remains largely opaque and impermeable.

Another interviewee agreed and explained that transparency-related instruments are accessible for the elite only: “It is associated with a certain cultural elite that handles certain codes” (Interview Human Rights 1). He also explicitly opposed the storyline of “people buying law books in the street,” which had been put forward in the overarching success narra-

47 Interview with academic, University of Chile, Instituto de Communicación e Imagen (Institute for Communication and Image), Journalist and specialized in public policy, Santiago de Chile, 09 November 2010 (Interview Journalist 1).
tive to demonstrate a widespread legalist culture among the Chilean population: “It’s a myth, it is part of Chilean chauvinism” (Interview Human Rights 1).

The focus on a (limited) anti-corruption agenda and on transparency measures, which are designed by and for the elite, has effectively covered up fundamental issues that require changing in order to reach a more profound transition and deeper democratization. The numerous references in this narrative as well as in the other narrative to “the elite” demonstrate that each (sub-)narrative has a specific understanding of what actually constitutes the elite. While the Left sees the Right in combination with the economic sector as the true elite, the contesting narrative understands the elite to consist of the entirety of the public and economic sectors, regardless of political affiliation. However, it is narrated by interviewees who themselves have studied and who work, for instance, as academics or lawyers and, therefore, might themselves be understood as part of the elite.

Thus, despite a discourse coalition of actors from the political Left to the political Right that refers to the dominant success narrative, this contesting narrative fundamentally questions the dominantly established success story – specifically, the widely held belief in Chile’s positive and successful transition, well-functioning democracy and low levels of corruption. Consequently, it is articulated outside of the grand anti-corruption coalition.

5 Convergence, Divergence and a Complex Interplay

When contrasting the ITACC with local corruption and anti-corruption narratives (and its subnarratives) in Chile, several similarities, divergences and a complex interplay become visible. Anti-corruption efforts in Chile are deeply embedded in the country’s history and in competing local (sub-)narratives. The dominant success narrative comprises the plot of emerging corruption scandals and the appropriate reactions of the elite, who design and implement reasonable anti-corruption legislation in response to public demand. This narrative is shared by a large discourse coalition and is highly institutionalized. It converges greatly with the ITACC with regard to implemented countermeasures against corruption and the mentioned pending countermeasures (i.e., the reduction of discretion and the strengthening of the division between the private and public spheres or, at least, the regulation – with certain limits – of the relationship between them).

There are a couple of noticeable deviations from the ITACC in the dominant success narrative: First, the Concertación subnarrative acknowledges the existence of the small, exclusive and impermeable elite and openly questions the complete divisibility between public and private from a certain societal level upwards. This is contradictory to the principle of the public-private divide in the ITACC. However, the ITACC seemingly applies this principle in a selective manner in its assessments of Chile via the relevant corruption indices. Second, although Chile is regarded by the ITACC to be one of the success cases in Latin America in curbing corruption, the low levels of corruption in Chile are attributed to reasons other than
anti-corruption efforts – namely, several cultural traits related to a strong republican and legalist tradition.

The contesting narrative provides a far more critical interpretation of Chile’s corruption situation and fundamentally questions the dominant success narrative (and, thus, the ITACC). The transition to democracy and the fight against corruption are depicted as being far from successful. The transition is characterized by a consolidation of Pinochet’s neoliberal reforms. This narrative perceives the supposedly inevitable elite and its inherent lack of division between the public and the private as problematic and as a source of corruption. Terms like the “fight against corruption” and “transparency” are interpreted as fashionable buzzwords in a context where there is an absence of political will to effectively advance anti-corruption measures and introduce the necessary democratic reforms in areas that might harm the elite. Moreover, this contesting narrative suggests that the implemented anti-corruption legislation – technical rather than substantive – has had limited impact on this problematic elite structure. Specifically, the pending countermeasures might have tackled existing practices and “issues of promiscuity” (e.g., revolving-door legislation, political-party financing, lobbying, etc.) within the elite. However, those have not been further pursued. From this perspective, the ITACC plays out in Chile as an elite-friendly discourse, which does not seek to change existing elitist social structures. Moreover, this contrast implies that the ITACC largely excludes critical and alternative conceptualizations of corruption.

Contrasting these (sub-)narratives clearly illustrates, that “whether or not a situation is perceived as a political problem depends on the narrative in which it is discussed” (Hajer 2002: 62). The convergences and divergences in the success narrative and the locally competing (sub-)narratives result in a complex interplay between the ITACC and the local context of Chile.

6 Conclusion

The theoretical framework used in this paper is a combination of post-development theory, ADA and of constructionist interviews. This valuable framework facilitated an openness in the analysis of the empirical material and prevented the “overtheorizing,” as Pouliot would say, of possible interpretations of local (sub-)narratives. However, if ADA is applied from a critical perspective, it needs to be combined with an ethical stance, such as post-development. It would be fruitful to further refine the conceptualization of narratives in ADA in order to grasp in more detail how these narratives are structured and how they could be compared in a more structured manner. Moreover, the question of what exactly holds together a (sub-)narrative needs be elaborated on further. In this paper, I pragmatically addressed Hajer’s slight inconsistency regarding the level of analysis (i.e., the relationship between narratives and discourse). However, it is important to clarify more precisely the exact relationship between the “dominance of a narrative,” the “dominance of a discourse” and
the theorem of “structuration.” Also, I made two brief remarks on ontology and epistemology in this paper, but ADA would clearly gain from a more thorough connection to a metatheoretical debate in order to acquire a framework that is epistemologically more consistent. In this sense, the relationship between actor and discourse, on the one hand, and possible changes and alterations in discourse and in discourse coalitions, on the other, need to be further explored.

However, using this framework, several important insights have been revealed. Regarding the ITACC, its dominant rational-choice approach to conceptualizing corruption mainly leads to technocratic solutions, while its ahistorical and apolitical conceptualization results in two blind spots: First, curbing corruption in Chile (and perhaps elsewhere) is deeply rooted in metanarratives of Chile’s history. Second, anti-corruption discourse is necessarily played out in local political dynamics, wherein competing groups of actors oppose each other, form discourse coalitions or are largely excluded. The ITACC is currently incapable of fully grasping (or does not seek to do so) the nature of corruption and anti-corruption in Chile or in other countries.

With regards to the initially stated assumptions of critical anti-corruption research, this paper shows that there is no single, locally specific understanding of corruption in Chile, but rather multiple competing understandings. Accordingly, each (sub-)narrative relates to the ITACC in a specific way: The Left and human rights movement interpret transparency as a means to deepen democracy, while the Right’s participation in political pacts with the Concertación is seen as evidence of the Right’s rehabilitation after the transition to democracy. While the contesting narrative does not oppose transparency as such, it does not form part of the anti-corruption coalition and thus has not been able to utilize parts of the ITACC discourse for the purpose of deeper democratization.

Thus, the way the ITACC relates to Chile largely depends on the local discursive configuration – that is, who interprets parts of the ITACC, for what purposes and for whom the ITACC provides possible discourse coalitions. It provides possible discourse coalitions for anyone who aligns with the technocratic countermeasures and its inherent presumptions, but it excludes social movements that fundamentally question the dominant approach to transparency and other aspects of the ITACC from such discourse coalitions.

Thus, the anti-corruption discourse coalitions in Chile correspond to Krastev’s and Ivanov’s assumption that the ITACC is capable of covering many different understandings. This is possible by focusing on technical measures which are capable of adapting to competing local narratives simultaneously and which can be easily reinterpreted according to different political goals.

However, while critical anti-corruption research and post-development criticize the development campaign and the ITACC for their conceptual arbitrariness, I argue that these covered differences effectively enable a complex interplay, both within the local context as well as between Chile and the ITACC. This interplay contradicts the idea of a mere imposi-
tion of a Western discourse, as a neopopulist variant of post-developmentalism would argue. These discourse coalitions and the complexity of the interplay between international, transnational and local perspectives entail strategic adaptations, translations and reinterpretations of international narratives according to local circumstances and, therefore, provide remarkable emancipatory and progressive potential.

Accordingly, a necessary avenue for further steps in critical anti-corruption research is to explore how different aspects of the ITACC play out for different competing groups in other local contexts. Including countries or communities that are less compatible with the ITACC might be fruitful for exploring explicit alternative conceptualizations of corruption and of related countermeasures.

Regarding post-development theory, it is necessary to refine its skeptical variant in the sense of maintaining a focus on local narratives while developing the capability of ethically differentiating between progressive and, for instance, racist or nationalist narratives. Moreover, a post-development approach needs to take into account and further conceptualize this complex interplay, which seemingly holds both excluding and enabling potential for local actors at the same time. Both aspects are crucial for post-developmentalism in order to be well distinguished from neopopulist rejections of modernity, progress and development.
Bibliography


Chile Transparente (CT) (2009), Evolución de Chile en el Índice de Percepción de la Corrupción, Documento de Trabajo, 6, online: <www.probidadytransparencia.gob.cl/assets/files/documentos/evolucion_de_chile_en_el_idepc_ti.pdf> (08 September 2012).

Chile Transparente (CT) (ed.) (2010), Transparencia en el ámbito público y privado: Balance y desafíos pendientes, Santiago: Chile Transparente.
Chile Transparente (CT) (2012), Observa, online: <wwwobserva.cl> (25 July 2012).


Consejo para la Transparencia (CPT) (2012), Nuestros Objetivos, online: <wwwconsejotransparenciaclnuestrosobjetivosconsejo20090408115623html> (09 August 2012).

Consorcio para la Reforma del Estado (CPRE) (ed.) (2009), Un mejor estado para Chile: Propuestas de modernización y reforma, Santiago: Consorcio para la Reforma del Estado.


González Saux, Marianne and Claudio Nash Rojas (2012), Transparencia, lucha contra la corrupción y el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos: Informe de la tercera reunión regional de especialistas. 7 y 8 de noviembre de 2011, Santiago: Universidad de Chile.


Moya Díaz, Emilio José, and Luis Gonzalo Urcullo Cossio (2009), Control del financiamiento y el gasto electoral en Chile, Santiago: Chile Transparente.

Muñoz Wilson, Alex (2008), Transición a la democracia, políticas de probidad y mecanismos internacionales de protección de derechos humanos: El caso de Chile, in: José Zalaquett, and Alex Muñoz Wilson (eds), Transparencia y probidad pública. Estudio de caso en América Latina, Santiago: Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Derecho, 113–130.


Pro Acceso (2008), *Corte Interamericana de DD.HH. cierra caso que condenó al Estado de Chile*, online: <www.proacceso.cl/noticia/corte_interamericana_de_dd_hh_cierra_caso_que__conden_al_estado_de_chile> (12 August 2012).


Interviews Cited (conducted by the author)

Academic – Formerly TI Chile, Involved in Bachelet’s Transparency Agenda, Santiago de Chile, 21 October 2010 (Interview Transparency Expert 1).

Academic, University of Chile, Instituto de Communicacion e Imagen (Institute for Communication and Image), Journalist and Specialized in Public Policy, Santiago de Chile, 09 November 2010 (Interview Journalist 1).

Former High Level-member of Chile Transparente/Human Rights Lawyer, Santiago de Chile, 20 October 2010 (Interview Human Rights 2).

Former Left-wing Member of Congress, Partido Socialista (Socialist Party [PS]), Santiago de Chile 16 November 2010 (Interview PS1).

Former Left-wing Member of Congress, Partido Socialista, Santiago de Chile, 21 October 2010 (Interview PS2).

High-level Member no. 1 of the Consejo para la Transparencia (Council for Transparency), Santiago de Chile, 02 November 2010 (Interview Consejo M1).

High-level Member no. 2 of the Consejo para la Transparencia (Council for Transparency), Santiago de Chile, 23 November 2010 (Interview Consejo M2).

High-level Member of ProAcceso, Local NGO Transparency/Human Rights, Santiago de Chile, 25 November 2010 (Interview Human rights 1).

High-level Member of Consejo de Defensa del Estado (State Defence Council), Santiago de Chile, 17 November 2010 (Interview CDE).

High-level Staff of Chile 21, a Left-wing Think Tank, Santiago de Chile, 18 November 2010, (Interview Chile 21).

High-level Staff of the Contraloría General de la República de Chile (General Comptroller’s Office), Santiago de Chile, 13 December 2010 (Interview GCO).

Journalist, online newspaper CIPER, Santiago de Chile, 18 November 2010 (Interview Journalist 2).

Journalist, online newspaper El Mostrador, Santiago de Chile, 21 October 2010 (Interview Journalist 3).

Lawyer – Formerly High Level Member of TI Chile, Involved in Bachelet’s Transparency Agenda, Santiago de Chile, 04 November 2010 (Interview Transparency Expert 2).

Lobby Expert, Santiago de Chile, 28 October 2010 (Interview Lobby Expert).

Minister of the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court), Santiago de Chile, 29 November 2010 (Interview MCC).

Minister of the Government of Patricio Lagos (Concertación), Santiago de Chile, 25 November 2010 (Interview Minister/Lagos).

Political Analyst/formerly Libertad y Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile, 18 October 2010 (Interview Analyst/Ex-LyD).
Public Servant, Closely Involved in Bachelet’s Transparency Agenda, Santiago de Chile, 17 November 2010 (Interview Transparency Expert 3).

Right-wing Member of Chilean Congress, Union Democrática Independiente (Independent Democratic Union [UDI]), Santiago de Chile, 25 October 2010 (Interview UDI 1).

Right-wing Member of the Chilean Congress, Union Democrática Independiente, Santiago de Chile, 22 November 2010 (Interview UDI 2).

Social Scientist – Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago de Chile, 04 November 2010 (Interview Social Scientist 1).

Staff of a Right Wing Think Tank, Libertad y Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile, 18 October 2010 (Interview LyD).

Staff of ChileTransparente, Santiago de Chile, 04 November 2010 and 9 November 2010 (Interview CT).
Recent Issues

No 223  Stephan Rosiny: Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon’s Experience, May 2013
No 222  Alexander De Juan and André Bank: The Effects of Regime Cooptation on the Geographical Distribution of Violence: Evidence from the Syrian Civil War, May 2013
No 221  Kerstin Nolte: Large-Scale Agricultural Investments under Poor Land Governance Systems: Actors and Institutions in the Case of Zambia, April 2013
No 220  Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and Riccarda Flemmer: Why is Prior Consultation Not Yet an Effective Tool for Conflict Resolution? The Case of Peru, April 2013
No 219  Hanspeter Mattes: Politische Transformation und Gewalt in Tunesien, Ägypten und Libyen seit 2011: Ein Forschungsauftritt, April 2013
No 217  Birte Pohl and Peter Mulder: Explaining the Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technology in Developing Countries, March 2013
No 216  Joachim Betz: The Reform of China’s Energy Policies, February 2013
No 214  Nele Noesselt: Microblogs in China: Bringing the State Back In, February 2013
No 213  Pascal Abb: China’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Changing Roles and Structural Conditions, January 2013
No 212  Christian von Soest and Michael Wahman: Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era, January 2013
No 210  Lena Giesbert: Subjective Risk and Participation in Micro Life Insurance in Ghana, December 2012
No 209  Georg Strüver: What Friends Are Made Of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with China, November 2012

All GIGA Working Papers are available free of charge at <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers>. For any requests please contact: <workingpapers@giga-hamburg.de>. WP Coordinator: Errol Bailey