

d·i·e

Deutsches Institut für  
Entwicklungspolitik



German Development  
Institute

Discussion Paper

10/2013

# With or Without Force?

## European Public Opinion on Democracy Promotion

*Jörg Faust*  
*Melody Garcia*

With or without force?

European public opinion on democracy promotion

Jörg Faust

Melody Garcia

Bonn 2013

Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik  
ISSN 1860-0441

Die deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

ISBN 978-3-88985-613-5

**Dr Jörg Faust**, German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Head of Department III: Governance, Statehood, Security

E-mail: [joerg.faust@die-gdi.de](mailto:joerg.faust@die-gdi.de)

**Dr Melody Garcia**, Researcher, Deutsches Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit/ German Institute for Development Evaluation

E-mail: [melody.garcia@DEval.org](mailto:melody.garcia@DEval.org)

© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH

Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn

☎ +49 (0)228 94927-0

☎ +49 (0)228 94927-130

E-mail: [die@die-gdi.de](mailto:die@die-gdi.de)

<http://www.die-gdi.de>

## Abstract

Against the background of the ongoing debate around European democracy promotion, we investigate the impact of European citizens' socio-economic backgrounds, political orientations and countries of origin on their support for democracy promotion in general and on democracy promotion via military means. Analysing survey data from 11 European Union (EU) member countries, we show that citizens with more extreme political orientations are less likely to support general democracy promotion. In contrast, particularly those citizens with extreme rightist orientations are more likely to support democracy promotion via military means. Regarding the impact of socio-economic background variables, higher education and working skills are positively associated with democracy promotion in general but make citizens less likely to support democracy promotion via military means. Finally, even if the majority of Europeans do not support democracy promotion via military means, the heterogeneity of country effects suggests that the assumption of a common European identity regarding democracy promotion needs to be refined.



## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Research gap and hypotheses</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Empirical evidence</b>	<b>7</b>
3.1	Data set and variables	7
3.2	Descriptive findings and estimation strategy	8
3.3	Results	9
<b>4</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>14</b>
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>17</b>
	<b>Appendixes</b>	<b>21</b>

## Figures and Tables

Figure 1 and 2:	Political orientation and democracy promotion (2005–2006)	11
Table 1:	Preferences for general democracy promotion 2005–2008 and 2005–2006	10
Table 2:	Preferences for democracy promotion via military intervention 2005–2006	12



## 1 Introduction

Over the last two decades, Western democracies increasingly have engaged in promoting the emergence and consolidation of democratic structures abroad.<sup>1</sup> In several cases, they also have used military means to remove authoritarian regimes from power and to back subsequent efforts in democratic state-building. Whether and when these efforts of democracy promotion have been successful is nevertheless a disputed issue among social scientists, even more in cases where there were military interventions. In the context of these debates, European actors are often said to have a more civilian or peaceful approach to democracy promotion than the United States (e.g. Manners 2002; Youngs 2004; Boerzel / Risse 2009). Yet, in principle, the EU also considers military interventions to be part of its foreign-policy portfolio, and European countries have participated in military interventions aimed at removing highly repressive regimes. Still, the legitimacy of military interventions such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya has been the source of permanent quarrels among European decision-makers, casting some doubts about whether there is a common European identity core value regarding the use of force as a legitimate means for democratic state-building.

In this article, we tackle the issue of democracy promotion from the perspective of the European citizenry. At least to our knowledge, the literature on democracy promotion has been impressively silent regarding the analysis of public support for this dimension of foreign policy. Little is known about the citizen characteristics that determine support for democracy promotion. This is in contrast to the substantial research on the relation between public opinion and the making of foreign policy as well as on the varying support for military intervention and its impact on the making of foreign policy (e.g. Aldrich et al. 2006; Eichenberg 2007; Gelpi et al. 2009; Knack / Paxton 2012). Existing polls on democracy promotion have only been interpreted in a descriptive manner, and there is little knowledge about the variance in citizens' support for building and shielding democracy elsewhere.

This paper is a first step towards filling the identified research gap. We provide evidence as to why some European citizens favour democracy promotion and others do not. Moreover, we differentiate between diffuse support for democracy promotion in general and specific support for military interventions as a means to remove authoritarian regimes and establish democracy elsewhere. We base our findings on the analysis of pooled survey data from the *Transatlantic Trends* surveys conducted between 2005 and 2008. By using the available survey information on socio-economic backgrounds, political orientations as well as cross-country data from military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, we identify factors that determine whether a citizen supports democracy promotion in general and whether she considers military intervention to be an appropriate tool for this purpose. Our empirical findings can be summarised as follows:

Firstly, there is a highly significant and curvilinear relation between citizens' overall political orientations on a left-to-right scale and their preferences for democracy promotion in general. Neither citizens who consider themselves to be on the extreme left

---

1 Research on European democracy promotion has increased steadily, especially regarding its neighbourhood policies (e.g. Youngs 2001; Pridham 2005; Kelley 2006; Magen et al. 2009; Schimmelfennig / Scholz 2008).



nor those on the extreme right are likely to support democracy promotion. In contrast, this curvilinear relation changes when citizens are asked about their preferences regarding military interventions as a means of promoting democracy. Then the relation becomes J-shaped, with citizens on the extreme right being more likely to support such an interventionist foreign-policy strategy.

Secondly, the impact of socio-economic background variables also reveals differences regarding the support of general democracy promotion and democracy promotion via military means. Although the age of the respondents is positively related to general democracy promotion, younger citizens are more likely to prefer democracy promotion via military means. Moreover, citizens with higher education levels and better working skills are more likely to object to democracy promotion via military means, while at the same time those citizens with better working skills are more inclined towards general democracy promotion.

Thirdly, there is an impact of casualties from the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq on citizens' support for democracy promotion, which is consistent with research on US military interventions (e.g. Mueller 1973; Gelpi et al. 2006). As expected, the death tolls of soldiers from the intervening country negatively affect the support for democracy promotion by citizens in that country in general over the full four-year period studied. However, this effect disappears for the two-year period for which we have data on citizens' support for democracy promotion via military intervention.

Overall, our results show that it makes a large difference whether people are asked about their diffuse and general support for democracy promotion or their particular support for democracy promotion via military intervention. Citizens' attitudes towards democracy promotion via military intervention are not only related to respondents' affinities for democratic governance but also to their attitudes towards armed conflict. Thus, when asked about their support for democracy promotion via military means, respondents might face a quandary in reconciling the objective of democracy promotion with the means of military intervention. Comparing the responses to the two different questions provides insights into citizens' (implicit) hierarchy of preferences. Here, our results suggest that the armed-conflict component of the question outweighs the democracy-promotion component.

Finally, we find strong country effects. On the one hand, a large majority of European citizens support democracy promotion in general but a similarly large majority reject military intervention as a means for this purpose. This provides some support for those who argue that there is a civilian norm endogenous to European democracy promotion. However, our analysis also clearly reveals that this overall pattern is not spread uniformly across Europe. Instead, a citizen's country of origin often influences her likelihood of supporting democracy promotion – a finding that highlights the importance of particular historic and political country settings.

In the next section, we review the relevant literature and identify the research gap before deducing a set of hypotheses regarding the support of democracy promotion in general and democracy promotion via military intervention (Section 2). Thereafter, we present our data and the findings from our econometric survey analysis (Section 3). In the last section (Section 4), we sum up our major findings and offer an outlook for further research.

## 2 Research gap and hypotheses

Western democracies increasingly have been engaged in external democracy promotion – a trend accompanied by a rising level of attention paid by academia to the issue. Different actors, strategies and instruments of democracy promotion have been studied by scholars of the social sciences. Goal conflicts between democracy promotion and other foreign-policy objectives have been a focus of research (e.g. Grimm / Leininger 2012) and scholars have begun to investigate whether autocracies also invest in promoting autocracy elsewhere (Bader et al. 2010). Moreover, the effectiveness of democracy promotion has been explored by ever more sophisticated methods: either at the aggregate level through econometric cross-country analysis or at the project level through experimental and quasi-experimental research designs.<sup>2</sup>

Most attempts to support democracy have been characterised by civilian means. Still, Western democracies have not limited their efforts to peaceful strategies of democracy support. In several cases they utilised military means, even if the effectiveness of such extreme measures continues to be highly controversial (e.g. Meernik 1996; Gleditsch et al. 2004; Bueno de Mesquita / Downs 2006; Grimm / Merkel 2008). Although many of the most prominent military interventions such as those in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq were responses to severe human rights violations or (perceived) terrorist threats, long-term military engagements in those countries were nevertheless legitimised by referring to the objective of democratic state-building. Particularly against the background of the democratic peace theorem and reinforced by an emerging norm for humanitarian intervention, military interventions in highly repressive regimes have therefore increasingly been connected to the cause of democracy promotion (Gleditsch et al. 2004).

Legitimising military interventions by referring to the objective of democracy promotion has been traditionally more pronounced in US foreign policy (Meernik 1996). Since the 1990s, however, it has also become a prominent line of argument among European governments, which increasingly have legitimised such engagements by referring to the objective of democratic state-building.<sup>3</sup> Yet, European governments have been far from uniformly endorsing military intervention as a means for democracy promotion. Instead, the effectiveness and legitimacy of a military intervention for democracy promotion has remained a highly controversial issue within and across European countries. This heterogeneity was prominently illustrated by the divided position of European governments over the military intervention in Iraq. In fact, the European division over the military intervention in Iraq and the subsequent intellectual debates (e.g. Habermas / Derrida 2003; Schuster / Maier 2006; Börzel / Risse 2009) have shed serious doubts about whether Europe can be considered a “normative power” (Manners 2002; 2006) with a civilian identity regarding democracy promotion.

---

2 For instance, cross-country statistical analyses have looked at the effect of democracy aid (e.g. Finkel et al. 2007; Kalyvitis / Vlachaki 2010; or Dietrich / Wright 2012). Other scholars have analysed the effect of political conditionality (e.g. Schimmelfennig / Scholz 2008). Alternatively, experimental and quasi-experimental research designs are increasingly used to identify the impacts of concrete projects aimed at fostering democratic participation and accountability (e.g. Garcia 2013).

3 Experimental studies show that military intervention is perceived as less illegitimate by the intervening country if the intervention is against a non-democratic country (Falomir-Pichastor et al. 2012).

Despite these vivid debates about a common European identity as well as mounting research on democracy promotion, little is known about the political attitudes of citizens towards this dimension of foreign policy. This research gap is also surprising because of a well-established literature relating to public opinion on foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> It is widely recognised that public opinion can have an impact on foreign-policy decisions of policy-makers. Yet, so far it has not been studied which social or political factors determine citizens' general support for democracy promotion.<sup>5</sup> Instead, the few polls asking for the attitudes of the broader public regarding democracy promotion have only been analysed with descriptive statistics (e.g. DeBartolo 2008). In a similar vein, some effort has been undertaken to identify what potential factors drive – particularly in the United States – public support for military intervention in general (Eichenberg 2005; Boettcher / Cobb 2006; Gelpi et al. 2009). Again, however, the literature has remained silent about individual determinants affecting Europeans' preferences for democracy promotion via military interventions and the extent to which these are different from those that drive a more general and diffuse support for democracy promotion. This is regrettable because – as in the case of foreign aid (Knack / Paxton 2012: 172) – insights about individual and contextual factors influencing the support of democracy promotion also can help to explain the varying efforts and strategies that governments employ.<sup>6</sup>

Against this background, we develop a set of hypotheses assuming that the variance in support from Europeans towards democracy promotion is caused by several socio-economic variables, political orientations and national-background variables.

*Socio-economic background:* Our first perspective on tackling the question why some citizens support democracy promotion while others do not is through the lens of modernisation theory. Our basic assumption is that those citizens who are inclined towards democratic values will also be more likely to support external democracy promotion. Therefore, based on modernisation theory and research on political culture (Lipset 1959; Almond / Verba 1963), one could argue that citizens with higher education levels and those living in urban or metropolitan areas should have a preference for democracy promotion because they are the ones who are also more likely to endorse democratic values. Urbanisation, higher education levels and higher levels of professional skills are associated with occupations that require more independent thinking and behaviour. These things better equip people to follow complex political processes, thus provoking political attitudes more inclined towards democratic values (e.g. Inglehart / Welzel 2009). Such democratic values could then translate into general and diffuse support for democracy promotion as a foreign-policy objective. At the same time, this socio-economic background does not necessarily imply a positive disposition towards utilising military means as the most interventionist form of democracy promotion. On the contrary: it is

---

4 Traditionally, most public opinion analysis on foreign policy has been focussed on the United States. However, research on Europeans' attitudes towards foreign policy issues has been increasing steadily in the last decades (e.g. Eichenberg 1989; Eichenberg 2007; Risse-Kappen 1991; Schön 2007).

5 For an overview on the responsiveness of Western democracies to public opinion regarding foreign policy issues, see Thiem (2013).

6 For instance, the allocation of foreign aid is said to be influenced not only by recipient countries' needs and merits but also by public opinion (Van Belle / Hook 2000; Rioux / Van Belle 2005). Similarly, the decision to spend aid bi- or multilaterally has also been influenced by perceptions of the citizenry (Milner 2006).

especially lower levels of education that are often said to lead to the likelihood of supporting armed conflict (e.g. Østby / Urdal 2010) or the likelihood of having militaristic attitudes (Shayo 2007). Arguments in support of education for generating tolerance and pluralist values draw on Aristotle, who stated that education produces a culture of peace (Lipset 1959, 79). An economic perspective (e.g. Collier / Hoeffler 2004) reaches a similar conclusion, as higher levels of education are said to increase the opportunity costs of violent conflict. Given these considerations, we formulate two hypotheses:

*H1: Citizens with higher education levels and working skills are more likely to support democracy promotion in general.*

*H2: Citizens with higher education levels and working skills are less likely to support democracy promotion via military intervention.*

Thus, the same socio-economic background that is supposed to lead towards support for democracy promotion in general is expected to be negatively associated with the use of force and military intervention. Empirical support for H2 would imply that the component of military intervention included in the question outweighs the component of democracy promotion.

*Political orientations:* Our second approach to our question relates to citizens' political orientations. We expect that citizens' positions on a political left-right scale affect their dispositions towards democracy promotion. Extremist political attitudes are said to be less compatible with democratic values. This holds for right-wing extremism (e.g. Lubbers et al. 2002, 365) and – even to a smaller extent – for the far-left on the political spectrum (e.g. McClosky / Chong 1985; Regta et al. 2011). Accordingly, we expect neither citizens on the extreme right nor those on the extreme left to support general democracy promotion, simply because they are less likely to be supportive of democracy in general.

However, when we ask about support for democracy promotion via military means, we expect to find different impacts, depending on the citizens' political orientations. We have hypothesised that citizens with less extreme political orientations will be more likely to support democracy promotion in general. At the same time, citizens with modest political orientations should be less likely to support military intervention as a means for achieving this goal. In general, citizens with extreme ideological positions are said to be more likely to accept the use of force as a means for achieving their political goals. For instance, right-wing extremism in Europe has often been associated with political violence (e.g. Hagtvet 1994; Sprinzaka 1995) and citizens at the right of the political spectrum are associated with being more supportive of military interventions.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, citizens who support revolutionary ideologies from the far left are also considered to be more likely to accept political violence as a means for accomplishing their political objectives. Prominent illustrations for the latter include terrorist and guerrilla movements such as Germany's Red Army Faction, the Shining Path in Peru and Naxalite rebels in India. Followers of extreme leftist ideologies also tend to legitimise military intervention, even if modest leftist internationalism is associated with non-interventionist positions and international solidarity movements.

---

7 For instance, in the US Republicans are more supportive of military interventions than Democrats (Gelpi et al. 2009, 85).

Accordingly, our third and fourth hypotheses predict a different curvilinear relationship between political orientations on a left-right scale and the support for general democracy promotion and democracy promotion via military means, respectively:

*H3: Citizens with more extreme political attitudes on a left-right scale are less likely to support democracy promotion in general.*

*H4: Citizens with less extreme political attitudes on a left-right scale are less likely to support democracy promotion via military interventions.*

*Casualties:* A third approach towards our research question relates to the casualties of military intervention (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2006; Koch 2011). The most prominent attempts of democracy promotion in recent years have been related to military interventions such as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. As research on US military interventions has shown since the Vietnam War, the number of US casualties had a negative impact on public support for those interventions (Mueller 1973; Gelpi et al. 2006). Particularly for the period under investigation, it is therefore plausible that the number of casualties of a given European country in the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq is negatively associated with citizens' support for democracy promotion in general and with democracy promotion via military means.

*H5: Citizens' support for democracy promotion and for democracy promotion via military means is negatively affected by military casualties suffered during interventions to remove authoritarian regimes.*

Finally, we do not expect that European citizens' attitudes towards democracy promotion are similar in different countries, particularly when it comes to military intervention. On the one hand, Europe is often said to have a civil identity in favour of peaceful democracy support, even if European governments try to embed several of their military interventions within a context of democratic state-building. On the other hand, there are several reasons to expect significant variance among citizens in different European countries that cannot be explained by the discussed socio-economic or political variables, but rather by particular country contexts. For instance, among major European powers, France and the United Kingdom have utilised the military to intervene on a regular basis, whereas Germany has remained a much more cautious actor when it comes to the deployment of military force (Miskimmon 2009). Emerging democracies in Eastern Europe have also been identified as engaging in democracy promotion, but at the same time tend to be more reluctant to participate in military interventions (Jonavicius 2008). Finally, the military intervention in Iraq and subsequent civil-military engagement for democratic state-building has remained a highly controversial issue among European governments and has produced a "rift" in European foreign policy (e.g. Schuster / Maier 2006). Overall, we therefore expect that even in Europe the concrete country context of respondents still exerts a significant impact on individuals regarding their attitudes towards democracy promotion.

### 3 Empirical evidence

#### 3.1 Data set and variables

The data used in the following analysis are culled from four series of *Transatlantic Trends* annual surveys, which are conducted to gauge general attitudes on foreign policies in Europe and the United States. The sample consists of 42,173 respondents from 11 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, United Kingdom. Approximately 1,000 respondents of at least 18 years of age were randomly selected and interviewed in each of the 11 countries.<sup>8</sup>

In contrast to other surveys on foreign policy, the *Transatlantic Trends* surveys conducted in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 contained questions concerning respondents' attitudes towards democracy promotion in other countries. The responses are used as dependent variables in this study.<sup>9</sup> Between 2005 and 2008, respondents were asked about their general attitude regarding democracy promotion of the EU. More concretely, they were asked whether it should be "the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries". Moreover, in 2005 and 2006, the survey also contained a question regarding the opinions of respondents on potential EU military interventions to remove authoritarian regimes. Among the several alternative means for democracy promotion, citizens were asked concretely about whether they would support the EU in helping to build democracy in an authoritarian regime through "sending military forces to remove authoritarian regimes".

Unfortunately, those two questions did not ask respondents about their preferences for democracy promotion as a topic as such; instead both questions were linked to the particular role of the European Union. Thus, the responses could also be a reflection of citizens' attitudes towards the EU in general or towards the role of the EU in the international system. Fortunately, however, the survey also contained particular questions about citizens' sympathies towards the EU in general and about their attitudes towards the international role of the EU in world affairs. Concretely, respondents were asked the following two questions:

- 1) "How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?"
- 2) "I'd like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people [*in this case, the European Union*], with 100 meaning very warm, favorable feeling and 0 meaning a very cold unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly cold or warm."

---

8 In 2005, Romania and Bulgaria were not included in the survey. In total there are 29,970 valid observations. The reduced number of observations is because of the following: (i) respondents refused to answer; (ii) respondents did not know the answer; and (iii) the question was not applicable. The survey was conducted using either Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews or conducted face-to-face in countries where response rates using telephones tend to be low. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Turkey in 2008 and 2006; Poland and Slovakia in 2005.

9 For instance surveys such as the European Values Study, the Eurobarometer and the New Europe Barometer do not ask questions pertaining to democracy promotion in particular but rather about respondents' general perceptions of democracy within their respective countries.

The information from those two questions allows for coping with the abovementioned problem. Using the responses regarding the two questions on attitudes towards the EU as independent variables, we are confident to absorb the proportion of variance in our dependent variable that is generated by citizens' attitudes towards the EU. Moreover, during the whole survey period, citizens were also asked about their feelings towards Iran – one of the most prominent Islamist autocracies. We include this information as an independent variable because citizens with lower levels of sympathy for the Iranian regime might associate democracy promotion as a means to counter Islamist influence in the Middle East.<sup>10</sup>

To investigate the impact of socio-economic background variables on citizens' support for democracy promotion, we differentiate between gender, age, household size, education level, rural respectively urban origins and highly skilled vs. other types of workers. In order to capture the impact of political attitudes on citizens' support for democracy promotion, we include a question in which citizens were asked about their political orientations on a left-right scale.

“In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means the extreme left and 7 means the extreme right?”

Finally, we analyse whether the amount of casualties suffered by military forces of Western allies fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have had an impact on respondents' preferences for democracy promotion. We obtained these data from Casualties.org (downloaded April 13, 2011), which provided detailed information such as the soldier's name, date of death, nationality, age, rank, cause of death and place of death. For this analysis, we consider all types of troop casualties – from hostiles and friendly fire to accidents. We count the number of deaths six months before (short-term) and one year before (long term) the respective surveys of *Transatlantic Trends* were conducted.<sup>11</sup> Differentiating between short- and long-term horizons allows for analysing whether perceptions towards democracy promotion and troop casualties tend to change over time.

### 3.2 Descriptive findings and estimation strategy

According to a descriptive analysis of the data (see Appendix), out of 29,970 valid observations, about 76 per cent of the respondents thought that it should be the role of the EU to establish democracy in other countries. In contrast, only 29 per cent of the population thought that it should be the role of the European Union to use military means for democracy promotion. From a country perspective, again, most respondents are geared towards democracy promotion (ranging from 59 per cent to 90 per cent). In terms of sending military forces to promote democracy elsewhere, only 16 to 37 per cent of the

---

10 Concretely, citizens were asked to respond to the following question: “I'd like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people [in this case, Iran], with 100 meaning very warm, favorable feeling and 0 meaning a very cold unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly cold or warm.”

11 Given the fact that the surveys took place approximately between June 1 and June 30, we counted casualties for each country between January 1 and May 30 of the same year. For the long-term horizon, we counted casualties between June 1 of the previous year and May 30 of the current year.

respondents were in favour of such interventions, notably with the United Kingdom having the highest number of respondents being in favour and Bulgaria having the lowest.

At first glance, this descriptive snapshot supports the claim that Europeans – on average – are very much in favour of democracy promotion but not through military means. However, this information should be taken cautiously because descriptive statistics cannot account for the potential EU bias of the information presented above. To better assess the effects of socio-economic background variables, political orientations and casualties on public support for democracy promotion, we therefore adopt the following specifications:

$$Democ = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PolOrient + \alpha_2 PolOrient^2 + \alpha_3 Deaths + \sum_i \beta_i IndChars_i + \sum_j \delta_j Leader / Feeling_j + \sum_{k-1} \lambda_{k-1} Countries_{k-1} + \sum_{l-1} \mu_{l-1} Years_{l-1} + \varepsilon$$

The dependent variable is either a citizen's general attitude towards democracy promotion or her attitude towards democracy promotion via military means. In both cases, the variable is a (0/1) dummy reflecting the citizens' responses. The estimation for democracy promotion in general was conducted for the complete sample period between 2005 and 2008. A separate estimation was conducted for the period between 2005 and 2006, allowing us to compare the results between general democracy promotion and democracy promotion via military means during the same period.

The matrix of regressors includes political orientation and its squared term, troop deaths in either six-month or one-year periods, the individual's socio-economic background, the respondent's view about the EU's role in world affairs as well as their feelings towards the EU and Iran. Additionally, the vector of controls includes country and year dummies to account for country and time effects. All regression estimates are weighted according to the size of the population. Due to the non-panel nature of the data, the determinants of democracy promotion were estimated using pooled annual samples (2005–2008) of 11 European countries.

### 3.3 Results

Table 1 presents the marginal effects of our estimations for the full model regarding the support for democracy promotion in general.<sup>12</sup> The first two rows of Table 1 present the results for the whole four-year period. The last two rows only take into account the 2005–2006 period, which allows for a direct comparison with the results of citizens' attitudes regarding democracy promotion via military intervention.

The impact of the *socio-economic variables* offers some support for our first hypothesis (H1) but not without ambiguities. Age and professional skills are statistically significant


---

12 To check the consistency of the estimates, the Appendix provides the results, when the variables are introduced gradually. Here, one model consists only of socio-economic characteristics. Hereafter, variables on international orientation are introduced, whereas a third model contains the full model, including variables on political orientations and troop deaths. Marginal effects were calculated only for the full models presented in the main text.



Democracy Promotion	2005–2008				2005–2006			
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error
Male	0.005	(0.006)	0.005	(0.006)	0.024 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)	0.024 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)
Age	0.001 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	0.001 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	0.001 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	0.001 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)
Household size	-0.004	(0.003)	-0.004	(0.003)	-0.006	(0.004)	-0.006	(0.004)
Elementary school or less	-0.008	(0.008)	-0.008	(0.008)	-0.024 <sup>b</sup>	(0.011)	-0.025 <sup>b</sup>	(0.011)
Metropolitan	-0.005	(0.007)	-0.006	(0.007)	-0.016 <sup>c</sup>	(0.010)	-0.016	(0.010)
Highly skilled workers	0.013 <sup>b</sup>	(0.006)	0.013 <sup>b</sup>	(0.006)	0.018 <sup>b</sup>	(0.009)	0.018 <sup>b</sup>	(0.009)
EU leadership	0.083 <sup>a</sup>	(0.007)	0.083 <sup>a</sup>	(0.007)	0.070 <sup>a</sup>	(0.010)	0.069 <sup>a</sup>	(0.010)
EU feeling	0.002 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	0.002 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	0.002 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	0.002 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)
Iran feeling	-0.001 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	-0.001 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.000)
Political orientation	0.034 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)	0.034 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)	0.031 <sup>b</sup>	(0.013)	0.031 <sup>b</sup>	(0.013)
Political orientation sq.	-0.004 <sup>a</sup>	(0.001)	-0.004 <sup>a</sup>	(0.001)	-0.003 <sup>c</sup>	(0.002)	-0.003 <sup>b</sup>	(0.002)
Deaths half year	-0.01 <sup>b</sup>	(0.005)			0.023	(0.019)		
Deaths one year			-0.007	(0.005)			0.005	(0.007)
Year 2006	-0.032 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)	-0.033 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)	-0.038 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)	-0.034 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)
Year 2007	-0.024 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)	-0.024 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)				
Year 2008	-0.043 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)	-0.039 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)				
Germany	0.081 <sup>a</sup>	(0.013)	0.085 <sup>a</sup>	(0.013)	0.155 <sup>a</sup>	(0.028)	0.133 <sup>a</sup>	(0.022)
France	0.069 <sup>a</sup>	(0.013)	0.072 <sup>a</sup>	(0.013)	0.096 <sup>a</sup>	(0.022)	0.098 <sup>a</sup>	(0.022)
Spain	0.232 <sup>a</sup>	(0.015)	0.231 <sup>a</sup>	(0.015)	0.322 <sup>a</sup>	(0.030)	0.304 <sup>a</sup>	(0.025)
Italy	0.062 <sup>a</sup>	(0.014)	0.063 <sup>a</sup>	(0.014)	0.053 <sup>b</sup>	(0.026)	0.066 <sup>a</sup>	(0.023)
United Kingdom	-0.022	(0.018)	-0.028	(0.019)	-0.055	(0.039)	-0.027	(0.027)
Netherlands	0.053 <sup>a</sup>	(0.013)	0.053 <sup>a</sup>	(0.013)	0.121 <sup>a</sup>	(0.029)	0.102 <sup>a</sup>	(0.022)
Portugal	0.174 <sup>a</sup>	(0.015)	0.175 <sup>a</sup>	(0.015)	0.264 <sup>a</sup>	(0.031)	0.244 <sup>a</sup>	(0.025)
Poland	0.061 <sup>a</sup>	(0.014)	0.062 <sup>a</sup>	(0.014)	0.132 <sup>a</sup>	(0.026)	0.115 <sup>a</sup>	(0.022)
Slovakia	0.005	(0.014)	0.008	(0.014)	0.065 <sup>b</sup>	(0.029)	0.045 <sup>b</sup>	(0.022)
Bulgaria	-0.018	(0.015)	-0.016	(0.015)	0.023	(0.032)	-0.003	(0.024)
Observations	29970		29970		14624		14624	

Notes: Marginal effects of full model, 2005–2008. Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
<sup>a</sup> significant at the 1 per cent level; <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5 per cent level; <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10 per cent level.



throughout all models: older citizens and highly skilled ones are more likely to support democracy promotion. As expected, a low level of education (elementary schooling or less) impacts negatively and is statistically significant, yet only in the two-year period from 2005 to 2006. Hence, higher education levels and working skills – classical variables from modernisation theory – impact positively on attitudes towards democracy promotion.

Table 1 also strongly supports hypothesis 3 (H3). There is a highly significant curvilinear relation between citizens’ *political orientations* and support for democracy promotion. Both the original variable on political orientations and its squared term are highly significant – the first having a positive sign and the latter a negative sign. Figure 1 depicts that citizens who have more extreme political orientations are less likely to support democracy promotion, whereas those with moderate orientations are more likely to do so; the peak of the inverted u-curve is slightly to the right of the centre.

Finally, our test for the impact of casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq over the full four-year period shows that the variable on the number of casualties (log) six months prior to the respective survey is negative and highly significant. As we expected (H5), citizens are sensitive to the most serious costs of democracy promotion. However, when a longer time period (one year) is taken into account, the variable on casualties loses its statistical significance. These results suggest that the impact of the number of casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq have an impact on Europeans’ support for democracy promotion, but only regarding short-term information. When only considering the 2005–2006 period in Table 1, both variables – while still having the same direction – are not statistically significant anymore, which might be due to the reduced time span.

Do these results on general democracy promotion hold when it comes to supporting the most interventionist means of democracy promotion, namely removing authoritarian regimes via military means? The results in Table 2 clearly depict that this is not the case. In Models 1 and 2, whereas the variables on international orientations have a similar impact

<b>Table 2: Preferences for democracy promotion via military intervention 2005–2006</b>								
Send military force	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error
Male	0.015 <sup>c</sup>	(0.009)	0.015 <sup>c</sup>	(0.009)	0.009	(0.009)	0.010	(0.009)
Age	-0.004 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	-0.004 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	-0.004 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	-0.004 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)
Household size	-0.001	(0.005)	-0.000	(0.005)	-0.004	(0.005)	-0.004	(0.005)
Elementary school or less	0.076 <sup>a</sup>	(0.012)	0.076 <sup>a</sup>	(0.012)	0.077 <sup>a</sup>	(0.012)	0.078 <sup>a</sup>	(0.012)
Metropolitan	-0.032 <sup>a</sup>	(0.010)	-0.033 <sup>a</sup>	(0.010)	-0.031 <sup>a</sup>	(0.011)	-0.031 <sup>a</sup>	(0.010)
Highly skilled workers	-0.038 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)	-0.038 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)	-0.040 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)	-0.040 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)
EU leadership	0.019 <sup>c</sup>	(0.012)	0.020 <sup>c</sup>	(0.012)	0.013	(0.012)	0.013	(0.012)
EU feeling	0.001 <sup>b</sup>	(0.000)	0.001 <sup>b</sup>	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Iran feeling	-0.002 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	-0.002 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	-0.001 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)	-0.002 <sup>a</sup>	(0.000)
Political orientation	-0.045 <sup>a</sup>	(0.016)	-0.046 <sup>a</sup>	(0.016)	-0.048 <sup>a</sup>	(0.016)	-0.048 <sup>a</sup>	(0.016)
Political orientation squared	0.010 <sup>a</sup>	(0.002)	0.010 <sup>a</sup>	(0.002)	0.010 <sup>a</sup>	(0.002)	0.010 <sup>a</sup>	(0.002)
Democracy promotion					0.149 <sup>a</sup>	(0.012)	0.149 <sup>a</sup>	(0.012)
Deaths half year	-0.017	(0.020)			-0.018	(0.020)		
Deaths one year			-0.005	(0.008)			-0.005	(0.008)
Year 2006	-0.080 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)	-0.083 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)	-0.090 <sup>a</sup>	(0.009)		
Germany	-0.084 <sup>b</sup>	(0.035)	-0.068 <sup>b</sup>	(0.029)	-0.116 <sup>a</sup>	(0.035)	-0.080 <sup>a</sup>	(0.008)
France	0.039	(0.029)	0.039	(0.029)	0.012	(0.029)	-0.099 <sup>a</sup>	(0.030)
Spain	-0.042	(0.035)	-0.029	(0.030)	-0.086 <sup>b</sup>	(0.035)	0.013	(0.029)
Italy	-0.124 <sup>a</sup>	(0.033)	-0.132 <sup>a</sup>	(0.031)	-0.141 <sup>a</sup>	(0.034)	-0.073 <sup>b</sup>	(0.031)
United Kingdom	0.118 <sup>a</sup>	(0.045)	0.099 <sup>a</sup>	(0.034)	0.115 <sup>b</sup>	(0.046)	-0.150 <sup>a</sup>	(0.031)
Netherlands	0.042	(0.035)	0.056 <sup>c</sup>	(0.029)	0.014	(0.035)	0.097 <sup>a</sup>	(0.035)
Portugal	-0.009	(0.035)	0.005	(0.030)	-0.045	(0.036)	0.029	(0.030)
Poland	-0.055 <sup>c</sup>	(0.032)	-0.043	(0.030)	-0.081 <sup>b</sup>	(0.033)	-0.031	(0.030)
Slovakia	-0.191 <sup>a</sup>	(0.037)	-0.176 <sup>a</sup>	(0.031)	-0.205 <sup>a</sup>	(0.038)	-0.068 <sup>b</sup>	(0.030)
Bulgaria	-0.163 <sup>a</sup>	(0.043)	-0.142 <sup>a</sup>	(0.037)	-0.170 <sup>a</sup>	(0.044)	-0.189 <sup>a</sup>	(0.032)
Observations	14089		14089		13658		13658	

Notes: Marginal effects of full model, 2005–2006. Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors.  
<sup>a</sup> significant at the 1 per cent level; <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5 per cent level; <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10 per cent level.

as in the case of general democracy promotion, the results exhibit highly relevant differences with regard to socio-economic backgrounds and political orientations. These differences remain, even if controlling for support for general democracy promotion, as is depicted in Models 3 and 4.

First of all, citizens' socio-economic backgrounds are again an important factor in explaining support for democracy promotion via military means, but citizens with higher education levels and working skills are less likely to support such interventionist policies of the EU. This support for H2 suggests that citizens – when asked about their attitudes towards democracy via military intervention – consider the military component of the question to be more important than the democracy-promotion component.

Similarly, political orientations also matter, but now the original curvilinear relation turns upside down. The upward-sloping convex curve (J-shaped) confirms hypothesis 4. In other words, people with more extreme political orientations are more likely to support democracy promotion via military means because such political orientations make it more probable that those people will support violent means to achieve a political goal. However, as depicted in Figure 2, the angular point of this non-linear relation is located left of centre; those orientated more to the left are more likely to oppose military intervention compared to those more on the right – with the exception of relatively extreme positions on the left. Again, this finding suggests that Europeans consider the military component of the question to be more important than the democracy-promotion component.

Both short-term and long-term variables on casualties – while still being negative – are not statistically significant anymore. An interpretation for this phenomenon could be that those who consciously express their support or opposition for military interventions to promote democracy are maintaining their position, irrespective of the number of casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. Citizens have firmer preferences when asked about the most extreme form of democracy promotion, wherein the level of casualties does not reach an upper (for supporters) or lower (for opponents) threshold to change their respective positions. However, due to the short time span of two years, this interpretation should be taken with caution. As has been demonstrated in Table 1 with regard to support for general democracy promotion, the statistical significance of the variable vanishes when using the shorter two-year period.

Finally, Tables 1 and 2 reveal strong country effects. Thus, despite the relevance of socio-economic variables or political orientations across European countries, country-specific factors also shape Europeans' attitudes towards democracy promotion. When compared against a reference country (Romania), many country coefficients are statistically significant – a result that holds if the reference country is changed. This finding is of particular relevance in the case of democracy promotion via military means. Here, only the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France display positive coefficients, with the UK coefficient being statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficients of Bulgaria, Germany, Italy and Slovakia are negative and statistically significant.

Taking the example of two major European players in democracy promotion – the United Kingdom and Germany – shows the relevance of these differences. As Table 2 reveals, compared to Romania, the probability that a comparable UK respondent has a positive attitude towards democracy promotion via military means increases by 11.8 per cent,

whereas it decreases by 8.4 per cent if the respondent is from Germany. This example illustrates that there is still much variance among citizens from different European countries when it comes to their preferences for democracy promotion and its most interventionist form. Still, it could be argued that those differences were the results of respondents' attitudes of loyalty towards their respective government's foreign policies, which were markedly different during the intervention in Iraq. However, such an interpretation seems to be misleading if one considers the country effects of Italy, France, Poland or Spain, where citizens' attitudes did not correspond to the positions of their governments towards Iraq. Apparently, ongoing quarrels among European governments about when and how to intervene to remove highly repressive regimes are at least partly rooted in particular country contexts. Against this background, assumptions about Europe's common civilian identity for peaceful democracy promotion should be approached with some caution.

#### **4 Conclusions**

The instruments, strategies and effectiveness of European democracy promotion have gained increasing amounts of attention from scholars in the social sciences. However, research has put little attention on European citizens' preferences for democracy promotion. This lack of knowledge regarding European citizens' varying levels of support for democracy promotion in general and for democracy promotion via military means stands in stark contrast to the increasing interest in European democracy support and its underlying normative dimensions.

Against this background, our empirical analysis has carved out several factors at the individual level that have significantly influenced Europeans' support for democracy promotion in general and democracy promotion by military intervention. Our results show the systematic effects of socio-economic background variables and political orientations on the likelihood that citizens will support democracy promotion. Interestingly, these variables impacted differently on attitudes regarding democracy promotion via military means. Whereas socio-economic background variables such as higher professional skills and education levels showed a positive impact on Europeans' support for democracy promotion in general, those factors were negatively related to democracy promotion via military force. Regarding citizens' political orientations, neither citizens on the extreme left nor those on the extreme right were likely to support democracy promotion. Yet, when asked about the support of democracy promotion via military means, the relation became J-shaped, with citizens on the extreme right being most likely to support such measures. Overall, it made a large difference whether Europeans were asked about their support for democracy promotion in general or democracy promotion via military intervention. Facing a potential goal conflict between the objective of democracy promotion and the means of military intervention, our results suggest that the issue of military intervention has tended to be of superior importance.

While these individual-level effects are far from negligible in size, our analysis also reveals the existence of strong country effects. Thus, the impact of contextual factors relating to the respondent's country of origin often influences her attitudes towards democracy promotion. These country effects are also highly relevant when explaining the varying support of citizens for democracy promotion via military means. Accordingly, the

assumption about a common and civilian European identity regarding democracy promotion has to be taken with caution, even though a large majority of Europeans has not been in favour of democracy promotion via military means.



## Bibliography

- Aldrich, J. et al. (2006): Foreign policy and the electoral connection, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, June
- Almond, G. A. / S. Verba (1989) [1963]: The civic culture. Political attitudes and democracy in five nations, Newbury Park, CA: Sage
- Bader, J. / J. Grävingholt / A. Kästner (2010): Would autocracies promote autocracy? A political economy perspective on regime-type export in regional neighborhoods, in: *Contemporary Politics* 16 (1), 81–100
- Börzel, T. / T. Risse (2009): Venus approaching Mars? The European Union's approaches to democracy promotion, in: A. Magen / T. Risse / M. McFaul (eds.): Promoting democracy and the rule of law. American and European strategies, Houndmills Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 34–60
- Boettcher, W. A. / M. D. Cobb (2006): Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty framing and public success and failure in Iraq, in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (6), 831–854
- Boix, C. / S. C. Stokes (2003): Endogenous democratization, in: *World Politics* 55, 517–49
- Bueno de Mesquita, B. / G. W. Downs (2006): Intervention and democracy, in: *International Organization* 60 (3), 627–649
- Burnell, P. (2011): Promoting democracy abroad : policy and performance, Transaction
- Cameron, A. C. / P. K. Trivedi (2009): Microeconometrics using STATA, United States: STATA Corp LP
- Carothers, T. (1999): Aiding democracy abroad : the learning curve, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- (2009): Democracy support and development aid : the elusive quest for synthesis, in: *Journal of Democracy* 21 (4), 12–26
- Collier, P. / A. Hoeffler (2004): Greed and grievance in civil war, *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4): 563–595
- DeBartolo, D. (2008): Perceptions of US democracy promotion part two : American views, Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stiftung
- Dietrich, S. / J. Wright (2012): Foreign aid and democratic development in Africa, UNU-WIDER Working Paper No. 2012/20, Helsinki
- Eichenberg, R. (1989): Public opinion and national security in Western Europe, Cornell: Cornell University Press
- (2005): Victory has many friends : the American public and the use of military force, 1981–2005, in: *International Security* 30 (1), 140–177
- (2007): Citizen opinion on foreign policy and world politics, in: R. J. Dalton / H.-D. Klingemann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of political behavior, New York: Oxford University Press
- Falomir-Pichastor, J. M. et al. (2012): Democracy as justification for waging war, in: *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 3 (3), 324–332
- Finkel, S. E. / A. Pérez-Liñán / M. A. Seligson (2007): The effects of US foreign assistance on democracy building, 1990–2003, in: *World Politics* 59 (3), 404–439
- Garcia, M. M. (2013): Innovations in governance : evaluations and research studies on electoral accountability, corruption, and multidimensional peacekeeping, Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (Discussion Paper 2/2013)
- Gelpi, C. G. / P. D. Feaver / J. Reifler (2006): Success matters : casualty sensitivity and the war in Iraq, in: *International Security* 30 (3), 6–47
- (2009): Paying the human costs of war : American public opinion and casualties in military conflicts, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press



- Gleditsch, N. P. / L. S. Christiansen / H. Hegre* (2004): Democratic Jihad? Military intervention and democracy, World Bank Working Paper Series 4242, Washington, DC: World Bank
- Grimm, S. / J. Leininger* (2012): Not all good things go together : conflicting objectives in democracy promotion, in: *Democratization* 19 (3), 391–414
- Grimm, S. / W. Merkel* (2008): War and democratization : legality, legitimacy and effectiveness, in: *Democratization* 15 (3), 457–471
- Habermas, J. / J. Derrida* (2003): What binds Europeans together : a plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in the core of Europe, in: *Constellations* 10 (3), 291–297
- Hagtvet, B.* (1994): Right-wing extremism in Europe, in: *Journal of Peace Research* 31 (3), 241–246
- Inglehart, R. / C. Welzel* (2005): Modernization, cultural change, and democracy : the human development sequence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- (2009): How development leads to democracy. What we know about modernization, in: *Foreign Affairs* (March / April), 33–48
- Isernia, P. et al.* (2006): Transatlantic Trends Survey 2006, computer file ICPSR20302-v1, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2008-01-07, doi:10.3886/ICPSR20302
- Jonavicius, L.* (2008): The democracy promotion policies of Central and Eastern European states, FRIDE Working Paper 55, Madrid
- Kalyvitis, S. / I. Vlachaki* (2010): Democratic aid and the democratization of recipients, in: *Contemporary Economic Policy* 28 (2), 188–218
- Kelley, J. G.* (2006): New wine in old wineskins : promoting political reforms through the new European neighborhood policy, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44 (1), 29–55
- Kennedy, C. et al.* (2005): Transatlantic Trends Survey 2005, computer file, ICPSR04605-v1, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2007-02-28, doi:10.3886/ICPSR04605
- King, G. / M. Tomz / J. Wittenberg* (2000): Making the most of statistical analyses : improving interpretation and presentation, in: *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2) (April), 347–361
- Knack, S. / P. Paxton* (2012): Individual and country-level factors affecting support for foreign aid, in: *International Political Science Review* 33 (2), 171–192
- Knack, S. / A. Rahman* (2007): Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients, in: *Journal of Development Economics* 83 (1), 176–197
- Koch, M. T.* (2011): Casualties and incumbents. Do the casualties from interstate conflicts affect incumbent vote share?, in: *British Journal of Political Science* 41, 795–817
- Lipset, S. M.* (1959): Some social requisites of democracy : economic development and political legitimacy, in: *American Political Science Review* 53 (March), 69–105
- Lubbers, M. / M. Gijsberts / P. Scheepers* (2002): Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe, in: *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (3), 345–378
- Long, J. S. / J. Freese* (2006): Regression models for categorical dependent variables using STATA, second edition, United States: STATA Corp LP
- Magen, A. / T. Risse / M. McFaul* (eds.) (2009): Promoting democracy and the rule of law. American and European strategies, Houndmills Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan
- Manners, I.* (2002): Normative power Europe : a contradiction in terms?, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2), 235–258
- (2006): Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads, in: *Journal of European Public Policy* 13 (2), 182–199

- McClosky, H. / D. Chong (1985): Similarities and differences between left-wing and right-wing radicals, in: *British Journal of Political Science* 15 (3), 329–363
- Meernik, J. (1996): United States military intervention and the promotion of democracy, in: *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (4), 391–402
- Milner, H. (2006): Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems, in: D. G. Hawkins et al. (eds.), *Delegation and agency in international organizations*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 107–139
- Miskimmon, A. (2009): Falling into line? Kosovo and the course of German foreign policy, in: *International Affairs* 85 (3): 561–573
- Moehler, D. (2010): Democracy, governance, and randomized development assistance, in: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 628 (30), 30–46
- Mueller, J. E. (1973): *War, presidents, and public opinion*, New York: Wiley
- Nielson, R. / D. Nielson (2010): *Triage for democracy : selection effects in governance aid* (mimeo)
- Østby, G. / H. Urdal (2010): *Education and civil conflict : a review of the quantitative, empirical literature, background paper prepared for the Education for all Global Monitoring Report 2011 : the hidden crisis : armed conflict and education*, New York
- Page, B. (2006): *The foreign policy disconnect. What Americans want from our leaders but don't get*, Chicago: Chicago University Press
- Paldam, M. / E. Gundlach (2012): The democratic transition : short-run and long-run causality between income and the Gastil Index, in: *European Journal of Development Research* (2012) 24, 144–19
- Pridham, G. (2005): *Designing democracy : EU enlargement and regime change in post-communist Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Regta, S. de / D. Mortelmans / T. Smits (2011): Left-wing authoritarianism is not a myth, but a worrisome reality. Evidence from 13 Eastern European countries, in: *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 44 (4), 299–308
- Rioux, J.-S. / D. A. Van Belle (2005): The influence of Le Monde coverage on French foreign aid allocations, in: *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (3), 481–502
- Risse-Kappen, T. (1991): Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal democracies, in: *World Politics* 43 (July), 479–513
- Schimmelfennig, F. / H. Scholtz (2008): EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood. Political conditionality, economic development and transnational exchange, in: *European Union Politics* 9 (2), 187–215
- Schimmelfennig, F. et al. (2009): EU promotion of democratic governance in the neighbourhood, in: *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (6), 917–936
- Schön, H. (2007): Identity, instrumental self-interest, and institutional evaluations. Explaining public opinion on common European policies in foreign affairs and defence, in: *European Union Politics* 9 (2008), 5–29
- Schuster, J. / H. Maier (2006): Explaining Europe's divergent Iraq policies in the run-up of the American-led war on Iraq, in: *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2 (3), 223–244
- Shayo, M. (2007): *Education, militarism and civil wars*, Jerusalem: The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel (Discussion Paper 07.03)
- Sprinzaka, E. (1995): Right-wing terrorism in a comparative perspective : the case of split delegitimization, in: *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7 (1), 17–43
- Thiem, A. (2013): *Public opinion and foreign policy. Responsiveness in Western democracies* (mimeo)
- Transatlantic Trends* (2005–2008), online: <http://www.transatlantictrends.org>
- Van Belle, D. A. / S. W. Hook (2000): Greasing the squeaky wheel : news media coverage and US development aid, 1977–1992, in: *International Interactions* 26 (3), 321–346

- Wooldridge, J.* (2002): *Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data*, London: MIT Press
- Youngs, R.* (2001): *The European Union and the promotion of democracy. Europe's Mediterranean and Asian policies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- (2004): Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU's external identity, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42 (2), 415–435

# **Appendixes**



Questions from the *Transatlantic Trends Survey*

Dependent Variables: Survey response to the following questions:

a) *“Do you think it should or should not be the role of the European Union to help establish democracy in other countries?”*

b) *“Let’s imagine an authoritarian regime in which there is no political or religious freedom. To help democracy, would you support the following actions by the EU?”*

1) *Monitoring elections*

2) *Supporting independent groups such as trade unions, human rights associations, and religious groups*

3) *Imposing political sanctions*

4) *Imposing economic sanctions*

5) *Sending military forces to remove authoritarian regimes”*

Independent variables: Survey response to the following questions:

a) *“How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?”*

b) *“I’d like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people [in this case, the European Union], with 100 meaning very warm, favorable feeling and 0 meaning a very cold unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly cold or warm.”*

c) *“I’d like you to rate your feelings toward some countries, institutions and people [in this case, Iran], with 100 meaning very warm, favorable feeling and 0 meaning a very cold unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly cold or warm.”*

d) *“In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means the extreme left and 7 means the extreme right?”*

<b>Appendix 1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics</b>						
Variable name	Variable definition	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Democracy promotion	1=if respondent thinks that it is the role of the EU to help establish democracy in other countries; 0=otherwise	29970	0.7598599	0.4271755	0	1
Send military troops for democracy promotion	1=if respondent would support sending military forces to remove authoritarian regimes; 0=otherwise	14089	0.2973951	0.4571281	0	1
Male	1=if male; 0=if female	29970	0.4857524	0.4998053	0	1
Age	Age of respondent	29970	46.44244	16.45637	18	99
Household size	No. of people living in the respondent’s household, including him/her	29970	2.29019	1.069528	1	14
Elementary school	1=if respondent completed elementary school or less; 0=otherwise	29970	0.2053053	0.4039313	0	1

Metropolitan	1=if respondent resides in metropolitan area; 0=otherwise	29970	0.2240574	0.416967	0	1
Highly skilled workers	1=if respondent is currently employed/self-employed and highly skilled; 0=otherwise	29970	0.4504838	0.4975504	0	1
EU leader	1=if respondent finds it desirable that the European Union exerts strong leadership in world affairs; 0=otherwise	29970	0.795629	0.403248	0	1
EU feeling	Respondent's rating towards the European Union. It ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 meaning very warm, favourable feeling; 0 meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling.	29970	69.35279	23.20229	0	100
Iran feeling	Respondent's rating towards Iran. It ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 meaning very warm, favourable feeling; 0 meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling	29970	28.99239	22.50379	0	100
Political orientation	Respondent's political orientation where he/she places himself/herself on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means the extreme left and 7 means the extreme right	29970	3.960093	1.340422	1	7
Political orientation, squared	Political orientation, squared	29970	17.47901	11.08519	1	49
Death, long horizon ln	Death of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, one year before survey starts. In logarithms.	29970	1.274537	1.178565	0	4.477
Death, short horizon ln	Death of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, six months before survey starts. In logarithms.	29970	0.6638711	0.9707091	0	3.611
2005	1=if year is 2005; 0=otherwise	29970	0.2320654	0.4221575	0	1
2006	1=if year is 2006; 0=otherwise	29970	0.2558892	0.4363671	0	1
2007	1=if year is 2007; 0=otherwise	29970	0.2569903	0.4369813	0	1
2008	1=if year is 2008; 0=otherwise	29970	0.2550551	0.4358994	0	1
Germany	1=if country is Germany; 0=otherwise	29970	0.1185853	0.3233052	0	1
France	1=if country is France; 0=otherwise	29970	0.1138805	0.3176714	0	1
Spain	1=if country is Spain; 0=otherwise	29970	0.1148815	0.3188843	0	1
Italy	1=if country is Italy; 0=otherwise	29970	0.0990324	0.2987105	0	1
United Kingdom	1=if country is United Kingdom; 0=otherwise	29970	0.0991658	0.2988895	0	1
Netherlands	1=if country is Netherlands; 0=otherwise	29970	0.1184852	0.3231871	0	1
Portugal	1=if country is Portugal; 0=otherwise	29970	0.0920921	0.2891607	0	1
Poland	1=if country is Poland; 0=otherwise	29970	0.0746747	0.2628701	0	1
Slovakia	1=if country is Slovakia; 0=otherwise	29970	0.0762429	0.2653908	0	1
Bulgaria	1=if country is Bulgaria; 0=otherwise	29970	0.0509176	0.2198331	0	1
Romania	1=if country is Romania; 0=otherwise	29970	0.042042	0.2006884	0	1

<b>Appendix 2: Political orientation, by country</b>								
Political Orientation	Extreme Left	Left	Centre Left	Centre	Centre Right	Right	Extreme Right	Total
Germany	3.2 %	7.0 %	29.1 %	36.8 %	16.7 %	4.1 %	3.0 %	3,554
France	3.6 %	8.0 %	27.8 %	30.4 %	21.7 %	5.8 %	2.7 %	3,413
Spain	4.0 %	8.2 %	30.2 %	34.0 %	16.3 %	3.3 %	4.1 %	3,443
Italy	3.7 %	10.7 %	28.5 %	20.8 %	22.6 %	9.3 %	4.2 %	2,968
UK	3.3 %	3.9 %	21.6 %	40.1 %	20.7 %	5.2 %	5.2 %	2,972
Netherlands	1.9 %	7.3 %	24.0 %	32.7 %	22.0 %	8.2 %	3.9 %	3,551
Portugal	3.4 %	11.6 %	19.4 %	37.3 %	16.3 %	7.6 %	4.3 %	2,760
Poland	3.3 %	11.6 %	11.2 %	24.2 %	16.9 %	26.3 %	6.4 %	2,238
Slovakia	2.2 %	11.8 %	17.9 %	41.6 %	16.4 %	8.4 %	1.8 %	2,285
Bulgaria	4.1 %	25.2 %	8.5 %	30.0 %	15.1 %	15.2 %	1.9 %	1,526
Romania	1.7 %	18.4 %	13.5 %	19.3 %	22.7 %	20.6 %	3.8 %	1,260
Total	3.2 %	9.9 %	22.9 %	32.4 %	19.0 %	8.9 %	3.8 %	29,970

<b>Appendix 3: Democracy promotion, individual countries</b>							
Support for general democracy promotion, by country average (2005–2008)				Support for democracy promotion via military means (average 2005–2006)			
	No	Yes	Total		No	Yes	Total
Germany	20.7 %	79.3 %	3,554	Germany	75.0 %	25.0 %	1,762
France	23.7 %	76.3 %	3,413	France	65.0 %	35.0 %	1,747
Spain	10.1 %	89.9 %	3,443	Spain	70.5 %	29.5 %	1,646
Italy	23.8 %	76.2 %	2,968	Italy	77.6 %	22.4 %	1,423
UK	40.7 %	59.3 %	2,972	UK	62.6 %	37.4 %	1,440
Netherlands	25.1 %	74.9 %	3,551	Netherlands	64.7 %	35.3 %	1,763
Portugal	13.4 %	86.6 %	2,760	Portugal	64.7 %	35.3 %	1,350
Poland	24.8 %	75.2 %	2,238	Poland	69.9 %	30.1 %	1,102
Slovakia	30.7 %	69.3 %	2,285	Slovakia	81.6 %	18.4 %	1,070
Bulgaria	32.3 %	67.7 %	1,526	Bulgaria	84.3 %	15.7 %	452
Romania	30.1 %	69.9 %	1,260	Romania	72.2 %	27.8 %	334
Total	7,193	22,777	29,970	Total	9,899	4,190	14,089



<b>Appendix 4: Logit model: preferences for general democracy promotion 2005–2008</b>								
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
Democracy Promotion	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error
Male	0.0182	(0.03)	0.0084	(0.03)	0.0308	(0.03)	0.0309	(0.03)
Age	0.0036 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)	0.0046 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)	0.0049 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)	0.0049 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)
Household size	0.0004	(0.01)	-0.0181	(0.02)	-0.0228	(0.02)	-0.0224	(0.02)
Elementary school or less	-0.0898 <sup>b</sup>	(0.04)	-0.0606	(0.04)	-0.0478	(0.05)	-0.0483	(0.05)
Metropolitan	-0.0184	(0.04)	-0.0401	(0.04)	-0.0319	(0.04)	-0.0333	(0.04)
Highly skilled workers	0.1147 <sup>a</sup>	(0.03)	0.0739 <sup>b</sup>	(0.03)	0.0791 <sup>b</sup>	(0.04)	0.0790 <sup>b</sup>	(0.04)
EU Leadership			0.5143 <sup>a</sup>	(0.04)	0.4838 <sup>a</sup>	(0.04)	0.4842 <sup>a</sup>	(0.04)
EU feeling			0.0105 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)	0.0108 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)	0.0108 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)
IRAN feeling			-0.0026 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)	-0.0030 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)	-0.0030 <sup>a</sup>	(0.00)
Political orientation					0.2002 <sup>a</sup>	(0.06)	0.2008 <sup>a</sup>	(0.06)
Political orientation sqrd					-0.0256 <sup>a</sup>	(0.01)	-0.0256 <sup>a</sup>	(0.01)
Deaths half year					-0.0648 <sup>b</sup>	(0.03)		
Deaths one year							-0.0427	(0.03)
Year 2006	-0.1881 <sup>a</sup>	(0.04)	-0.1940 <sup>a</sup>	(0.04)	-0.1876 <sup>a</sup>	(0.05)	-0.1931 <sup>a</sup>	(0.05)
Year 2007	-0.1080 <sup>b</sup>	(0.04)	-0.1535 <sup>a</sup>	(0.05)	-0.1402 <sup>a</sup>	(0.05)	-0.1381 <sup>a</sup>	(0.05)
Year 2008	-0.1966 <sup>a</sup>	(0.04)	-0.2130 <sup>a</sup>	(0.05)	-0.2530 <sup>a</sup>	(0.05)	-0.2269 <sup>a</sup>	(0.05)
Germany	0.5790 <sup>a</sup>	(0.06)	0.5531 <sup>a</sup>	(0.07)	0.4744 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)	0.4985 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)
France	0.3438 <sup>a</sup>	(0.06)	0.4527 <sup>a</sup>	(0.07)	0.4029 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)	0.4221 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)
Spain	1.3983 <sup>a</sup>	(0.07)	1.4399 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)	1.3614 <sup>a</sup>	(0.09)	1.3555 <sup>a</sup>	(0.09)
Italy	0.4194 <sup>a</sup>	(0.06)	0.3762 <sup>a</sup>	(0.07)	0.3623 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)	0.3694 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)
United Kingdom	-0.4713 <sup>a</sup>	(0.06)	-0.2302 <sup>a</sup>	(0.07)	-0.1313	(0.11)	-0.1630	(0.11)
Netherlands	0.2848 <sup>a</sup>	(0.06)	0.3617 <sup>a</sup>	(0.07)	0.3105 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)	0.3129 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)
Portugal	1.1092 <sup>a</sup>	(0.07)	1.1268 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)	1.0171 <sup>a</sup>	(0.09)	1.0272 <sup>a</sup>	(0.09)
Poland	0.2395 <sup>a</sup>	(0.06)	0.3052 <sup>a</sup>	(0.07)	0.3560 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)	0.3620 <sup>a</sup>	(0.08)
Slovakia	0.0243	(0.06)	0.1175 <sup>c</sup>	(0.07)	0.0288	(0.08)	0.0444	(0.08)
Bulgaria	0.0256	(0.06)	0.0383	(0.07)	-0.1055	(0.09)	-0.0915	(0.09)
Constant	0.6907 <sup>a</sup>	(0.09)	-0.3421 <sup>a</sup>	(0.11)	-0.5949 <sup>a</sup>	(0.16)	-0.5962 <sup>a</sup>	(0.16)
Observations	38013		34326		29970		29970	
Log	-20899.43		-18614.95		-16549.67		-16551.90	
Wald	1425.17		1688.43		1513.67		1506.34	
P-value	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	

Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Years 2005–2008. <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1 per cent level; <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5 per cent level; <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10 per cent level.

<b>Appendix 5: Logit model: democracy promotion via military intervention 2005–2006</b>								
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
Send military force	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error	Coeff.	St. Error
Male	0.0447	(0.04)	0.0617	(0.04)	0.0759c	(0.04)	0.0766c	(0.04)
Age	-0.0172a	(0.00)	-0.0180a	(0.00)	-0.0194a	(0.00)	-0.0194a	(0.00)
Household size	-0.0013	(0.02)	-0.0078	(0.02)	-0.0027	(0.02)	-0.0025	(0.02)
Elementary school or less	0.3789a	(0.05)	0.3852a	(0.06)	0.3885a	(0.06)	0.3897a	(0.06)
Metropolitan	-0.1502a	(0.05)	-0.1546a	(0.05)	-0.1643a	(0.05)	-0.1672a	(0.05)
Highly skilled workers	-0.1755a	(0.04)	-0.1982a	(0.04)	-0.1969a	(0.05)	-0.1966a	(0.05)
EU leadership			0.0897	(0.05)	0.0986c	(0.06)	0.1016c	(0.06)
EU feeling			0.0025b	(0.00)	0.0026b	(0.00)	0.0026b	(0.00)
Iran feeling			-0.0080a	(0.00)	-0.0079a	(0.00)	-0.0079a	(0.00)
Political orientation					-0.2329a	(0.08)	-0.2342a	(0.08)
Political orientation sqrd					0.0503a	(0.01)	0.0505a	(0.01)
Deaths half year					-0.0884	(0.10)		
Deaths one year							-0.0240	(0.04)
Year 2006	-0.4036a	(0.04)	-0.4308a	(0.04)	-0.4123a	(0.05)	-0.4267a	(0.04)
Germany	-0.3454a	(0.11)	-0.4223a	(0.13)	-0.4330b	(0.18)	-0.3493b	(0.15)
France	0.1647	(0.10)	0.1170	(0.12)	0.1988	(0.15)	0.2016	(0.15)
Spain	-0.1383	(0.10)	-0.1887	(0.12)	-0.2137	(0.18)	-0.1494	(0.15)
Italy	-0.7216a	(0.11)	-0.7886a	(0.13)	-0.6335a	(0.17)	-0.6779a	(0.16)
United Kingdom	0.4141a	(0.10)	0.4368a	(0.13)	0.6048a	(0.23)	0.5056a	(0.18)
Netherlands	0.3267a	(0.10)	0.2691b	(0.13)	0.2152	(0.18)	0.2876c	(0.15)
Portugal	0.1075	(0.10)	0.0044	(0.13)	-0.0453	(0.18)	0.0266	(0.15)
Poland	-0.1453	(0.11)	-0.1488	(0.13)	-0.2845c	(0.16)	-0.2198	(0.15)
Slovakia	-0.7715a	(0.11)	-0.8870a	(0.14)	-0.9811a	(0.19)	-0.9003a	(0.16)
Bulgaria	-0.8350a	(0.14)	-0.8303a	(0.16)	-0.8344a	(0.22)	-0.7302a	(0.19)
Constant	0.2164c	(0.13)	0.3211c	(0.17)	0.4352	(0.27)	0.3784	(0.25)
Observations	17575		15956		14089		14089	
Log	-10339.8		-9434.5		-8463.6		-8463.8	
Wald	657.88		639.87		672.74		672.45	
P-value	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	

Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Years 2005–2006. <sup>a</sup> significant at the 1 per cent level; <sup>b</sup> significant at the 5 per cent level; <sup>c</sup> significant at the 10 per cent level.



## Publications of the German Development Institute

### Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft

- Liebig, Klaus*: Internationale Regulierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte und Wissenserwerb in Entwicklungsländern: Eine ökonomische Analyse, 233 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-2379-2 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 1)
- Schlumberger, Oliver*: Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt: Ursachen, Trends und internationale Demokratieförderung, 225 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-3114-8 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 2)
- Qualmann, Regine*: South Africa's Reintegration into World and Regional Markets: Trade Liberalization and Emerging Patterns of Specialization in the Post-Apartheid Era, 206 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-2995-4 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 3)
- Loewe, Markus*: Soziale Sicherung, informeller Sektor und das Potenzial von Kleinstversicherungen, 221 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2009, ISBN 978-3-8329-4017-1 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 4)
- Loewe, Markus*: Soziale Sicherung in den arabischen Ländern: Determinanten, Defizite und Strategien für den informellen Sektor, 286 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, ISBN 978-3-8329-5586-1 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 7)
- Faust, Jörg / Susanne Neubert* (eds.): Wirksamere Entwicklungspolitik: Befunde, Reformen, Instrumente, 432 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, ISBN 978-3-8329-5587-8 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 8)
- Vollmer, Frank*: Poverty Revisited: The Capability Approach Operationalised in Mozambique, 366 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2013, ISBN 978-3-8487-0060-8 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 12)
- Faust, Jörg / Katharina Michaelowa* (eds.): Politische Ökonomie der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, 274 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2013, ISBN 978-3-8487-0428-6 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 13)

### Book Series with Routledge

- Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen*: Poverty Orientated Agricultural and Rural Development, 342 p., Routledge, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-36853-7 (Studies in Development and Society 12)
- Krause, Matthias*: The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation, 282 p., Routledge, London 2009, ISBN 978-0-415-99489-7 (Studies in Development and Society 20)
- Lundsgaarde, Erik*: The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid, Routledge, 250 p., Abingdon 2013, ISBN 978-0-41565-695-5

[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.]

## Studies

- 76 *Loewe, Markus et al.*: Which Factors Determine the Upgrading of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)?: The case of Egypt, 288 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-583-1
- 75 *Mallik, Vidyadhar*: Local and Community Governance for Peace and Development in Nepal, 179 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-582-4
- 74 *Brandi, Clara et al.*: Sustainability Certification in the Indonesian Palm Oil Sector: Benefits and challenges for smallholders, 258 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-581-7
- 73 *Klingebiel, Stephan*: Entwicklungszusammenarbeit – eine Einführung, 86 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-580-0
- 72 *Ashoff, Guido et al.*: Análisis de impacto del Fondo Contravalor Perú-Alemania, 198 p., Bonn 2012, ISBN 978-3-88985-509-1
- 71 *Leiderer, Stefan et al.*: Efficiency of Local Service Provision in Zambia's Health, Education and Road Sectors: Implication for decentralisation and the effectiveness of budget support, 304 p., Bonn 2012, ISBN 978-3-88985-508-4

[Price: 10,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.]

## Discussion Paper

- 11/2013 *Johnson, Oliver*: Exploring the Effectiveness of Local Content Requirements in Promoting Solar PV Manufacturing in India, 35 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-614-2
- 9/2013 *Negre, Mario / Niels Keijzer / Brecht Lein / Nicola Tissi*: Towards Renewal or Oblivion?: Prospects for post-2020 cooperation between the European Union and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group, 54 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-612-8
- 8/2013 *Faust, Jörg / Jörn Grävingholt / Sebastian Ziaja*: Foreign Aid and the Fragile Consensus on State Fragility, 19 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-611-1 (only online version)
- 7/2013 *Berger, Axel*: Investment Rules in Chinese Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements: Is China following the global trend towards comprehensive agreements?, 34 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-629-6
- 6/2013 *Grittner, Amanda Melina*: Results-based Financing: Evidence from performance-based financing in the health sector, 53 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-628-9
- 5/2013 *Stürmer, Martin*: 150 Years of Boom and Bust – What Drives Mineral Commodity Prices?, 63 p., Bonn 2013, ISBN 978-3-88985-626-5

[Price: 6,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.]

A complete list of publications available from DIE can be found at:

<http://www.die-gdi.de>