Delegation and Abdication?

The Appointment of European Commissioners and Its Policy Implications

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Editorial Note:

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Abstract

The European Commission is commonly portrayed as an actor constantly taking policy positions which, in EU legislative decision-making, fundamentally differ from those of the EU member states. That is, the European Commission is a (pro-integrationist) preference outlier. Yet, there are hardly any theoretical explanations, let alone systematic empirical evidence, which substantiate this common portrayal. Why should the Commission repeatedly take positions which fundamentally differ from those member states which at the same time appoint the Commission? By recourse to arguments of principal-agent theory, I argue that their right to (s)elect the Commission(ers) provides member state governments with valuable means to influence the policy preferences of the Commission. Member state governments can nominate candidates who share their party affiliation and thus can be expected to share basic policy preferences. In addition, the nomination of candidates who previously occupied “highly visible” posts in the political arena, allows governments to assess the respective candidate’s reliability. Thus, from this article’s theoretical perspective it seems rather unlikely that the Commission constantly acts as a preference outlier in EU decision-making.

The data set used to test the theoretical arguments developed in this paper was generated for this purpose and covers the relevant information for all Commissioners who were appointed to the Commission between January 1958 and March 2004 (N=185). The empirical tests confirm the paper’s basic hypotheses: Member state governments do try to influence the European Commission’s actions in EU policy-making by nominating Commissioners who share their party affiliation and who prior to their nomination have proven their reliability in other, “highly visible” political positions - mainly in national political arenas.
I. Introduction

The European Commission's main task in European Union (EU) legislative decision-making, is to open the EU's legislative procedures by introducing policy proposals (Art. 211 TEC). Although the Commission's central role in EU legislative decision-making is widely acknowledged, the EU literature still lacks conceptualizations, which systematically investigate the motives and internal decision-making mechanisms which determine how the Commission performs this task. Large parts of the literature still portray the Commission as a technocratic bureaucracy whose actions are guided by expert deliberations rather than political decisions (cf. Majone 2001). An image which closely fits Jean Monnet's post World War II ideal of the European Coal and Steel Community's (ECSC) High Authority (Duchene 1994, Pollack 2003: 78). In terms of its policy preferences, the majority of analysts characterizes the Commission as “supranationalist”, i.e. as a, compared to the member states, pro-integration preference outlier (cf. Tsebelis/Garrett 2000, Pollack 2003). However, Brehm and Gates rightly claim that “[a]n assumption of divergent preferences, even when cloaked in theological robes, constitutes neither a demonstration of the presence of those differing preferences, nor proof that those preferences are consequential” (1997: 20). Accordingly, I have serious doubts whether the commonly used concept of the Commission’s strongly outlying pro-integrationist preferences are correct in empirical as well as conceptual terms. These doubts are nurtured by the fact that the common conception of the Commission, both, in terms of its character as an actor, i.e. technocratic bureaucracy, as well as in terms of its preferences, namely pro-integrationist preference outlier, neither seem to reflect the institutional development and the changes in the regulatory scope which the EU in general and the Commission in particular experienced during the last 53 years, nor does it incorporate considerations on the member states likely adaptations and reactions to these developments in their behaviour vis-à-vis the Commission.

By recourse to analytical and theoretical tools provided by principal-agent theory (cf. Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991, Brehm/Gates 1997), I argue in this paper that the appointment process provides member states (principals) with considerable means to influence the Commission’s (agents) future actions (cf. Crombez 1997, Hug 2003). Member state government’s do have the possibility to nominate a candidate Commissioner with similar policy preferences and thus exert influence on the policy preferences of the Commission as a whole. The empirical analysis of this paper and its focus on

1 I would like to thank Dirk DeBièvre, Andreas Dür, Thomas Gschwend, Björn Hörl, Franz Urban Pappi, Roland Vaubel, Andreas Warntjen, the participants of the UACES Student Forum 5th Annual Regional Conference at Cambridge University, Cambridge, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on different aspects of this paper.

2 The term “European Community” designates the Commission of the European Community founded by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which in 1967 was merged with the European Coal and Steel Community’s High Authority and the Euratom Commission.

3 In line with the Maastricht version of the Treaties, the label “EU” includes the European Community (EC) Treaty, which forms the legal basis for the Commission’s competences in EU legislative decision-making.
the nomination and appointment of the Commission do not directly lend themselves to substantial statements about the actual decision-making behaviour of Commissioners inside the Commission as well as the actual position which the Commission takes during the inter-institutional bargains in EU policy-making. However, they provide powerful theoretical arguments, which cast considerable doubt on the commonly held assumption of the antagonism between the member states’ national and the Commission’s pro-integrationist preferences in EU legislative decision-making.

The paper is structured as follows: The theoretical arguments will be brought forward in section two and three of this paper. The hypotheses formulated in the theoretical sections will be tested empirically in section four with a data set I generated for this purpose. The data set contains information on the political profile of all Commissioners who represented the EU member states in the 12 consecutive Commissions between 1958 (Hallstein I) and present (Prodi-Commission) as well as the partisan composition of those member state governments who nominated the Commissioners.

II. The changing political nature of the European Union – and the static image of the European Commission

Simon Hug (2003: 52) rightly claims that “[a] common assumption in the literature is that the Commission, compared to the member states, is a preference outlier”. As the article’s frequent citation indicates, the reason for the assumption of the Commission being a preference outlier might be found in Art. 213 II TEC, which states that “[t]he members of the Commission shall, in the general interest of the Community, be completely independent in the performance of their duties. In the performance of these duties they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or any other body”. However, since there hardly is an answer to the question what the “general interest of the Community” is4, Art. 213 II TEC tells us little about the likely motives which guide the Commissioners’ actions in their decision-making inside the European Commission and thus about the resulting (aggregated) preference of the European Commission as one of the most important actors in EU decision-making.

In addition, while – except for the replacement of the term “High Authority” by the term “Commission” – the content of Art. 213 II TEC is an unaltered part of the EU Treaties since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the institutional environment in which this principle is meant to be applied has changed drastically. Both in terms of the successively growing competences with which the member states equipped the EU (König 1996, Nugent 2003: 57-105) and in terms of the EU’s qualities as a political system, for example through the successive empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) and the resulting parliamentarisation of the EU (Hix 2002, Rittberger 2004). The consequences of the changes in the EU’s institutional make-up and its maturation as a
political system are well reflected in recent studies on the make-up of the political space in which the actors involved in EU decision-making contest. As a recent study on the EU’s political space asserts: “[A]s the EU has broadened its legislative ambit, acquiring authority in a broader range of policy areas, issues have arisen that cannot be subsumed under the Integration-Independence dimension” (Thomson/Boerefijn/Stokman 2004: 238). A growing number of studies show that today there is relatively little difference in national and European political parties’ attitude towards the EU, given that the parties of the main party families (Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Social Democrats, Greens) all take up positive positions towards the general project of European integration (Hix 1999: 87, Schmitt/Thomassen 2000: 329, Hooghe/Marks/Wilson 2002: 968-970).5 However, this apparent consensus on the general value of the project of European integration between and within the main European party families does not necessarily imply a consensus on the content of EU policies and as a consequence a lack of political tension in EU decision-making. The most obvious reason for this being that the different parties’ positions on the classical socio-economic left-right dimension differ considerably (cf. Schmitt/Christiansen 2000: 329), thereby pointing at this for party competition classic dimension’s salience in EU decision-making and its analytical and theoretical value for research on EU legislative decision-making. Thus, I argue that the analytical and theoretical potential of both, the EU’s (changing) institutional make-up and the structure of the EU’s political space, constitute a formidable basis to formulate and empirically test hypotheses about the motives which guide the member state governments’ choice of their candidate Commissioner and the appointment of the Commission as a whole (cf. Thomson/Boerefijn/Stokman 2004: 238).

III. (S)electing the European Commission – member state motives and EU appointment rules

Until recently, each EU member state was entitled to nominate at least one Commissioner (Art. 213 I TEC), with the “big five” – France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK – being entitled to two Commissioners. The Nice Treaty, which came into force in February 2003 now prescribes that each member state shall only nominate one Commissioner. When making their choice on whom they nominate as their candidate Commissioner and when voting in the Council on the appointment of a nominated

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4 Is it, as intergovernmentalists have it, the common denominator on which the member states can agree or, as the neo-functionalists have it, a supranational interest transcending the sum of the member states’ interests.

5 In addition, a recent study by Robert Thomson, Jovanka Boerefijn and Frans Stokman (2004), analysing 70 Commission proposals on which there was considerable controversy among the member states, corroborates the above raised conjecture that the more or less integration dimension in EU politics – and accordingly the question of the EU Commission’s policy-supranationalism - is not as relevant as it is often suggested by EU integration researchers: Only 23 per cent of the 70 proposals’ 174 policy issues dealt with questions of more or less harmonization, i.e. integration, while the remaining issues concerned “regulatory versus marked based solution”, i.e. socio-economic issues (2004: 251). For the argument in this paper the importance of Thomson and his colleagues’ findings as well as the general increase of the importance of the left-right dimension is highly relevant, as it is likely to have an effect on the member state governments’ reasoning of which person they select as the candidate they should nominate as their Commissioner.
Commission, I assume that the EU member states – more precisely: the member state government which is in power at the time of the nomination and appointment process – are well aware of the Commission’s powers of monitoring the member states’ compliance with the EU Treaties, implementing measures delegated to it by the Council and EP through secondary legislation and setting the EU’s (legislative) policy agenda (Art. 211 TEC). They are also aware of what the designated Commission’s general policy objectives are. Thus, when nominating and appointing a new Commission, the member states compare the legislative status quo in the different policy areas where the Commission is competent with the legislation that would presumably prevail in the different policy areas, in case the designated Commission was appointed.

However, member states do not have full information on all policy issues that will be brought forward by any future Commission. The reason for the member states’ uncertainty considering the to-be-appointed Commission’s policy initiatives is simple: due to the lack of an unchangeable EU medium-term strategy and because it is impossible to control external factors such as for example the setting of the EU policy agenda by a member state government which holds the Council Presidency or the generation of public pressure for political action through the spread of a disease like BSE, it is impossible for any member state (as it is for the prospective Commission) to anticipate all issues to be brought forward by a prospective Commission within its four, respectively five year term. I therefore assume that each member state government invests considerable effort in choosing the candidate Commissioner it considers appropriate to represent the respective member state government in the Commission. However, what are reasonable criteria for a member state to assess a candidate’s appropriateness? Principal-agent theory provides valuable means to tackle this question.

Given the member states’ awareness of the Commission’s power as well as the scope of “integrated” policy areas and taking into account the fact that the Commission has considerable influence on EU policy outcomes (Tsebelis et. al 2001), member states should have a strong incentive to make sure that the Commission’s policy preferences do not deviate too much from their own. The reason for this is that a marked deviation of the Commission’s policy preferences from the member states’ policy preferences, would ultimately lead to constant negative interferences of EU policies with an increasing number of domestic policies and politics in the EU member states. The material and political consequences, i.e. (political) costs, of these negative interferences have to be fully borne by the member state governments in their respective domestic political arena. Be it in form of electoral defeat

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6 Especially since the appointment of the Prodi Commission this seems to be a realistic assumption, as the future Commission President (before the European Parliament’s (EP) plenum) as well as the Commissioners (before the EP’s competent committee) have to outline their policy objectives, thus giving the member states easy access on extensive information and forcing the prospective Commission members to publicly reveal their policy objectives.

7 I will not discuss the different decision-making procedures in EU legislation and the likely effect they have on the Commission’s success in influencing the outcome, because it does not affect my overall argument that the member states choose their Commissioner being aware of the fact that, in general, the Commission has considerable impact on EU policy outcomes (Tsebelis et. al 2001).
and as a consequence of the governments loss of office, or in the form of constraints on the realization of policies, which the government highly values. For a member state government, a straightforward way to influence the policy preferences of the Commission, is to nominate a Commissioner who shares its policy preferences. However, how can the government arrive at an assessment of their potential candidate’s general policy preferences? It is here where political parties come into the picture. Political parties can be interpreted as organizations which reduce the transaction costs and the collective action problems inherent in politics (Cox/McCubbins 1994, Müller 2000). Political parties allow voters to make a reasoned choice by providing them with (technically and cognitively) easily accessible information about their political objectives and they help to reduce the complexity of voting in legislatures, by aggregating the votes of individual MPs with relatively similar policy preferences into coherent voting blocks. When choosing their candidate Commissioner, member state governments can profit from these classic functions of parties. Instead of looking for a candidate Commissioner outside the political arena, parties can scan their own membership files for an “appropriate” candidate, i.e. a candidate who shares the governments goals and policy preferences. This leads me to my first hypothesis on the candidate Commissioners’ “party inclusiveness”.

**Hypothesis 1:** To influence the policy preferences of the Commission in their own interest, member state governments have a strong incentive to appoint Commissioners who share the party affiliation of one of the parties represented in the government (*Party inclusiveness of Commissioners*).

As discussed in section II above, the EU experienced significant changes in its institutional and regulatory qualities during the last decades. Especially through the Single European Act (SEA), which entered into force in 1987, the European Union’s competences have been formally extended to cover a relatively broad range of socio-economic issues (König 1996). Recent work on the dimensionality of the EU’s political space shows that the socio-economic left-right dimension is of considerable salience in national and European political parties’ competition for their preferred EU policies (cf. Thomson et. al 2004). Taking into account the fact that the extension of the EU’s policy competences at the same time extends the potential policy areas in which the EU is formally in the position to impose materially and politically costly policies on its members, member state governments, over time, have stronger incentives to send “party inclusive” representatives to the Commission. Hypothesis 2 captures this dynamic element of the changing of politics in the European Union (as opposed to politics about the EU).

**Hypothesis 2:** Due to the increase in potential (political) costs for member state governments inherent in the EU’s successive regulatory expansion and institutional maturation, Commissioners’ party inclusiveness has increased over time.

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8 Thus, “[i]deally, principals should appoint agents who share their policy preferences, but this may be impossible or too costly” (Majone 2001: 103).
However, how can a member state government arrive at a credible assessment of its candidate’s reliability as a partisan representative who in the end does not pursue policies which inflict high costs on the respective government? Put in the language of principal-agent theory: How can member states avoid the “adverse selection” problem (Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991: 29-31, Strøm 2000: 271-273, Lupia 2003) when choosing their candidate Commissioner? For a member state government it is of fundamental importance to have extensive information on its candidate. An effective ex-ante way to obtain this information is the screening of activities which the respective candidate performed in prior positions which he or she occupied in the political arena, i.e. party posts, parliamentary seats or ministerial posts (Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991: 31, Lupia 2003: 47-48). Through the actions which the respective candidate performed in these positions he or she gained a high “political visibility”, since the candidate’s performance in prior political positions generated extensive information, which the nominating governments can use as signals to evaluate their respective candidate Commissioners’ reliability (Kiewiet/McCubbins 1991: 31, Müller 2000: 327-328).

**Hypothesis 3:** From the candidate Commissioners’ earlier performance in the political arena governments can, at low costs, obtain extensive information on the candidate’s reliability. Commissioners should thus exhibit a high “political visibility” due to former positions in the political arena (Screening of the candidate Commissioner).

Yet, although the importance of ex-ante screening of potential agents is acknowledged throughout the principal-agent literature, the effectiveness of ex-ante mechanisms in influencing or containing an agent’s actions is debated by principal-agent theorists (for a critical perspective, see Strøm 2000). It therefore seems reasonable to complement the ex-ante perspective on the member states’ means to exert influence on the Commission’s actions by the ex-post perspective: What means do member state governments dispose of to exert influence over their respective Commissioners after they appointed the Commission? Yet, before directly turning to means of control, a short discussion of the conditions that allow an ex-post control of Commission seems to be appropriate.

A necessary pre-condition for the member states’ ex-post control of the Commission is that they have information on the actions and upcoming decisions inside the Commission. The large scale inclusion of interest groups with strongly heterogeneous interests into the Commission’s policy-making process via stakeholder conferences, specialized working groups and informal contacts between interest groups and the Commission’s bureaucracy (Larsson 2003) generates an enormous amount of publicly available information. The heterogeneous interests represented by those interest groups makes the interest groups’ co-optation by the Commission, and the Commission’s co-optation by any one interest group unlikely. In addition interest groups’ strategic public “voicing” of these interests (Beyers 2004) adds to the “publicity” of Commission politics. Member state governments can use this information for their own purpose to oversee the Commission’s actions (Schwartz/McCubbins 1984). Another important source of information on the Commissioners actions are situations in which different Commissioners and their Directorates General have conflicting views on the appropriate form and content of Commission policy proposals. At least the directly involved Commissioners have to promote
their favourite solution and seek alliances with private and public actors to enhance its chances of being realized. This gives the member state governments the possibility of observing the Commissioners preferences and eventually turn to their Commissioner in order to agree on further actions.

Let me now turn to member state government’s means of ex-post control of the Commission. One, albeit not the only means of ex-post control of Commissioners, which member state governments dispose of is the nomination of a Commissioner on whose future career they have some influence. A government can for example threaten not to re-nominate a Commissioner if his input in decision-making inside the Commission repeatedly failed to reflect the interests of the government. Alternatively, the governing parties can refuse a Commissioner any promising re-entrance into the national political arena’s job market, if the Commissioner’s actions failed to satisfy the respective government’s expectations.

**Hypothesis 4:** To complement their ex-ante means of control, governments nominate Commissioners who have a perspective of being nominated to an attractive political post *after* they completed their term as Commissioner (*Ex-post means to discipline Commissioners*).

As the theoretical arguments set forth in the previous paragraphs made clear, I doubt the general validity of George Tsebelis’ and Geoffrey Garrett’s claim that “a series of filters and self-selection mechanisms enables the Commission to take pro-integrationist positions. National delegates of real political power will likely prefer to stay in their country of origin” (Tsebelis/Garrett 2000: 16). Hypothesis 1-4 will be tested empirically in Section IV. As I argued earlier, member states have an interest in avoiding the imposition of costs which result from the Commission’s actions. Thus, and contrary to the implications of Tsebelis’ and Garrett’s argument cited above, they have strong incentives to carefully pick a person as candidate Commissioner whose preferences they know and whose reliability they trust.

Yet, it is impossible and also not desirable for member state governments to appoint a Commission which exactly represents each member state government’s policy preferences. Member state governments have different interests and thus diverging policy preferences in different policy areas and, as a consequence, diverging preferences on many policy issues. As a consequence, it is highly unlikely that there is an interest basis for all member state governments to agree on a Commission, which perfectly mirrors all these diverging interests. In other words, for reasons of diverging interests alone, member states have to make compromises when nominating their Commissioner and appointing the Commission. In addition, in view of the decision-making mechanism inside the Commission, member states should be well aware of the fact that their functional reasoning for delegation in the first place – the reduction of transaction costs of decision-making and policy implementation (Moravcsik 1993, Pollack 1997) – would be endangered, if each would nominate a Commissioner with an inflexible scope of action and extremist preferences which are not reconcilable with the Commissioners nominated by the other member state governments when it comes to taking decisions inside the Commission. As a consequence, the dichotomous conceptualisation of the
Commission’s extremist preferences sustained by neo-functionalists as well as intergovernmentalists seems to be theoretically misguided. However, as I argued above, this does not mean as Giandomenico Majone (1996: 69) argues that the member state governments completely refrain from exerting control over the Commission. It rather means that the member states are forced to give the Commission a degree of freedom that allows it to efficiently fulfil its task in formulating legislative proposals which build a useful, i.e. transaction cost reducing, basis for the subsequent legislative decision-making processes.

The institutional rules governing the Commission appointment process facilitate the effects of the member states’ functional reasoning for equipping Commissioners with discretion in Commission decision-making. From 1957 until 1993, the appointment of the Commission proceeded in a two-stage process which largely followed an intergovernmental logic: In the first stage, bargaining among the member states lead to an (informal) agreement on each member state’s prospective Commissioner and the prospective Commission president. In the second stage, the Council (formally) voted on the Commission as a whole. For the successful appointment of the Commission unanimous agreement was required in the Council (Graph 1, next page). In the course of the Maastricht treaty amendments, which entered into force in 1993, the member states extended the appointment process of the Commission to a three-stage process. They gave two new actors the formal power to influence the Commission appointment process, namely the prospective Commission president and the EP (Graph 1). With the entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty the Commission appointment rules prescribe that the member states in a first stage agree on a Commission president. Until the coming into effect of the Nice Treaty in 2003, unanimous agreement between the member states was required. Yet, the Nice version of the EC treaty reduced the Council majority requirement for the appointment of a Commission president to qualified majority, thus taking away the veto power of every single member state government in the appointment of the Commission. In addition, the Amsterdam Treaty equipped the EP with the formal power to vote on the member state governments’ candidate for Commission president. In the second stage, every member state proposes its candidate Commissioner to the prospective Commission president, who has – since 1998 – the power to veto any candidate. In the third and final stage of the appointment process, the Council and the European Parliament vote on the Commission as a whole, i.e. the prospective Commission president and the candidate Commissioners. For a successful appointment of the Commission, the EP has to accept the Commission by simple majority. Until 2003 all member states in the Council had to agree to the prospective Commission.

What are the likely effects of the institutional design of the Commission appointment process on a member state’s choice of its candidate Commissioner and thus ultimately on the Commission’s policy preferences in EU legislative decision-making? The most important effect is that due to the institutional structure of the appointment process a member state’s choice of its Commissioner is restricted by the other member states’ policy preferences. In the Rome period of Commission appointment (Graph 1), the unanimity requirement in the Council equipped every member state with an effective veto. Thus, the most pro-integrationist member was prevented from nominating an, from the least integrationist
The figures defining the different periods indicate the year in which the Treaty amendments came into effect.

Stage 1: Member States agree on Commission
- Member States agree to (UN)
- Commission (President + Commissioners)

Stage 2: Member States propose Commissioners to Commission President
- (Individual) Member State
- Designated Commission President (OP)
- Commissioner
- Commission (President + Commissioners)

Stage 3: Council and European Parliament vote on Commission
- European Parliament (SM)
- Council (UN)
- NEW COMMISSION

Note: Shaded area indicates change. OP = opinion, CN = consent, UN = unanimity, SM = simple majority, QM = qualified majority.

Based on the theoretical considerations above, the commonly used assumption of the Commission having an outlying policy preference compared to the member states seems to be unfounded and hardly sustainable: The first reason which speaks against this assumption is the member state governments’ reasoning on the kind of person they shall nominate as their candidate Commissioner. The second consideration which speaks against the “outlying-preference”-hypothesis is the institutional structure of the Commission appointment process, which puts the member state governments into the position to block the appointment of “extremist” Commissioners. However, the change in the majority requirement from unanimity to qualified majority
in the Council with the introduction of the Nice-Treaty took away the individual veto power of every single member state. These changes in the institutional rules of Commission appointment are hardly reconcilable with the image of an unconstrained, supranationalist Commission. If indeed the member states were heavily concerned about how to get a better grip on the Commission, they hardly would have unanimously agreed to change the majority needed for a successful appointment from unanimity to qualified majority, thus effectively abandoning each member state’s individual veto power.

Rather then assuming the Commission as a preference outlier, one should expect the Commission’s preferences to be contained by the preferences of the member states which appoint it. Unfortunately, there is a lack of empirical data on the Commission’s policy position in EU policy-making relative to the EP and the member states in the Council. However, the expectation that the Commission’s policy position is close rather than far away from the member states ideal positions’, is generally confirmed by Simon Hug’s (2003) empirical research on the Commission’s preferences in the Amsterdam IGC and the study by Robert Thomson and his colleagues discussed above (2004).

How does the change in the sequential order and the formal inclusion of two new actors as well as the change in the Council majority requirements affect the member states’ choice of their Commissioner and thus the Commission’s policy preferences? Obviously, the inclusion of an additional actor means an additional veto player in the nomination process whose preference has to be taken into account by all other actors. In general, I would argue that in terms of the influence on the Commission’s policy preferences, the EP’s equipment with a (formal) vote in the Commission appointment seems to be more decisive than the Commission President’s right to veto an individual member state’s candidate Commissioner. The reason for the latter is straightforward: the Commission President is nominated by the member states. This gives the member states the possibility to make sure that the prospective Commission President is “moderate” with respect to his policy preferences and “domesticated” in that he is very likely to accept their respective choice of candidate Commissioner. Yet, the change from the unanimity to the qualified majority voting requirement in the Council brought about by the Nice Treaty (Graph 1), could alter this situation. If a qualified majority of right/left governments existed in the Council and if they agreed on a Commission President and nominated him or her against the minority of left/right governments, then this “majoritarian” Commission President could influence the “minority” governments’ nomination of Commissioner by threatening to veto their nominees. It is an empirical question, whether such “party-cohesive” Council majorities will exist in the future to appoint a “majoritarian” Commission President. From the theoretical perspective outlined in the previous paragraphs it is however questionable, whether the conflict-laden a priori politicization of the Commission through a “majoritarian” President would be in accord with the member states’ interests in safeguarding the Commission’s functional role in EU decision-making.

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9 Since the EP and the Commission president did not have formal voting rights during the Maastricht period, I will restrict my considerations to the Amsterdam and Nice periods (Graph 1).
Taking Hug’s (2003) empirical results on the EP’s institutional preferences in the Amsterdam IGC as an empirical point of reference, the EP’s participation in appointing the Commission adds a more pronounced pro-integrationist position to the whole nomination process, since his study shows that the EP’s preferences deviate more strongly from the member state governments’ preferences, than does the Commission. Thus, the EP could threaten the member states to veto their candidate for Commission President, if he or she does not represent a credible “European” candidate. In addition, the EP strengthens the partisan aspect of Commission appointment. As the recent nomination of the Portuguese Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso as Commission President showed, the EPP as the largest Political Group in the EP was able to get a conservative candidate accepted by credibly threatening to refuse the approval of another party group’s candidate in its plenary vote of acceptance (see Graph 1). However, when taking such a strong position, the EPP must act in close coordination with the governing or oppositional conservative and Christian democratic parties in the EU member states. The close coordination between the EP’s Political Groups and the national party organizations which constitute them is examined in detail by Hae-Won Jun and Simon Hix’s recent roll call analysis of the appointment of Jacques Santer (September 94) and his Commission (January 95) as well as Romano Prodi (May 1999) and his Commission (September 1999). The study shows that national delegations in the EP vote with their national parties and against the preference of the political group to which they belong in cases where there are conflicting preferences between the EP political group and the national party delegations. This shows that in the appointment of the Commission, at least recently, there is a strong coordination between the voting behaviour of MEPs and their party organizations back home.

Under the current appointment rules the EP’s ability to move the Commission into its own direction, is restricted by qualified majority requirement in the Council and thus by that member state’s preference who represents the qualified majority pivot in the decision on the appointment of the Commission. In addition, each member state government still is an agenda setter when it comes to the nomination of its respective Commissioners. Thus the member state governments are able to nominate the candidate they prefer most and who still gets approved by the majority of the members of the European Parliament (MEP).

To summarize the theoretical arguments discussed in this section, it can be said that the member state governments’ interests in delegating authority to the Commission, as well as the institutional rules which govern the nomination and appointment of the European Commission clearly favour the appointment of “moderate” Commissioners, i.e. Commissioners with policy preferences that allow agreements between Commissioners in Commission decision-making and agreements of the Commission with other EU actors, i.e. EP and Council, in EU legislative decision-making. On the other hand, however, member state governments make sure to avoid that a Commission with considerably different policy preferences repeatedly imposes high political costs on them, through its influence in legislative decision-making. They do this by nominating Commissioners with similar policy preferences, i.e. individuals with the same party membership, and whose trustworthiness they can reliably assess on the basis of extensive information made available in “highly visible” positions which
the candidate held in the political arena prior to his or her nomination, i.e. as a minister or as an MP or MEP. Taking these arguments into account, there is no reason to assume that individual Commissioner’s moderate policy preferences aggregate into a Commission position, which, compared to the member states, represents a supranationalist “preference outlier”.


The data to test the hypotheses formulated in the previous section, was taken from my data set which I compiled for that purpose and which covers the 12 consecutive Commissions which were in office between 1958 (Hallstein I) and 1999 (Prodi). The data set contains information on the portfolios of all Commissioners between 1958 and 1999 (N= 185) as well as the Commissioners previous occupations, their party affiliation and the party composition of the member state governments which appointed them. The information which is most relevant in the context of this paper is the party composition of the member state governments during the nomination and appointment of the Commission and the jobs which the respective Commissioner held prior to his or her nomination and after he or she left the Commission. Since the nomination and appointment starts well before the Commission’s actual office-taking, the data which entered into the data set reports the party composition of the member states exactly two months before the actual office-taking by the Commission.

The four hypotheses presented in Section III formulate expectations on the Commissioners’ characteristics, based on theoretical considerations drawn from the principal-agent literature. Hypothesis 1 (p. 5) expresses the expectation that governments have an incentive to appoint Commissioners who share the respective member state government’s party affiliation in order to influence the Commission’s policy preferences and contain eventual (political) costs resulting from EU legislation. The second hypothesis (p. 6) adds a temporal element by expecting that the “party inclusiveness” of the Commissioners should correlate positively with the maturation of the EU’s institutional qualities and with the expansion of the EU’s regulatory scope. The basic idea behind the temporal hypothesis is that an expansion of the EU’s regulatory scope increases the potential costs which EU regulation can impose on the member state governments.

The data set contains all 185 Commissioners (including Commission Presidents and Vice-Presidents) who worked in the 12 consecutive Commissions between 1958 and 1999. It shows for all Commissions that the proportion of Commissioners who share their government’s party affiliation (“Party In”) is higher than the proportion of Commissioners who do belong to a party which is not represented in the government at the time of Commission appointment (“Party Ex”). 62.2 per cent out of all Commissioners who served in these Commissions were members of a party which was represented in the member government at the time of appointment of the respective Commission, i.e. were “Party Ins”. 21.6 per cent of the Commissioner belonged to an oppositional member state party
at the time of Commission appointment ("Party Ex") and 13.5 per cent of all Commissioners had no party affiliation at all. Graph 2 shows that the empirical data supports both hypotheses.

Graph 2: Commissioners’ Party Inclusiveness

Note: In each category the positive, negative and missing values add up to 100%. The graph reports only positive answers.

The 8th Commission (Graph 2) which was in office from 1985 until 1989 marks an intensification of the Commissioners’ “party inclusiveness”. In 1986, shortly after the appointment of the 8th Commission, the member state governments adopted the Single European Act (SEA), which ended the Luxemburg compromise and triggered an active phase of EU regulation. The marked increase in the Commissioners party inclusiveness by that time is in line with Hypothesis 2’s expectation that an extension of the regulatory scope of the EU should lead to a higher degree of Commissioners’ party inclusiveness, due to an increase in potential (political) costs of EU regulations for the member state governments. While the mean value of party inclusiveness for the first to the seventh Commission is 52.5 per cent (SD 10.8), the mean value for the eighth to the 12th Commission is 72.2 per cent (SD 7.6).10 At the same time, the number of non-party-affiliated technocrats (“No party”) dropped to a

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10 Student’s t-test shows that the difference of the degree of Commissioners’ party inclusiveness between the two periods (pre- and post-SEA period) is significant at the .01 level. Thus the null hypothesis that the observed difference in the Commissioners’ party inclusiveness between the two periods is due to chance processes can be rejected.
continually low level, indicating that it is questionable, to say the least, to categorize the European Commission as a technocratic bureaucracy.

When differentiating between the delegation patterns of large and small member state governments, the above interpretation of the hypotheses needs to be refined. The average level of party inclusiveness of large member states’ Commissioners during the post-SEA period (59.4, SD 13.3) is not considerably higher than during the pre-SEA period (51.0, SD 9.7). Small member states which are entitled to nominate only one Commissioner on the other hand show a higher general proneness than large member states to nominate “party inclusive” Commissioners (Graph 3). This trend is stable over time, since it holds for all 12 Commissions which were appointed between 1958 and 1999, except for the second (1962-1967) and the fourth (1970-1973). In addition, while for the pre-SEA period, the differences between the small and large member states’ delegation patterns is relatively small (and statistically not significant), small member states nomination of party inclusive Commissioners increases considerably with the nomination of the 8th (SEA-) Commission. This increase in party

Graph 3: Party Inclusiveness Commissioners (Large and Small Member States)

Note: In each category the positive, negative and missing values add up to 100%. The graph reports only positive answers. The bracketed numbers in the caskets showing the successive accession of EU member states, denote the number of Commissioners to which the respective country is entitled.

The point denoting the delegation patterns of small member states to the third Commission which was appointed in 1967 (Graph 3) represents a single country, namely Luxemburg. This is due to the one-time enlargement of the respective (first post-EEC-Euratom-merger) Commission, which allowed all member state governments, except Luxemburg’s, to nominate two, respectively three Commissioners.
inclusiveness is stable over the whole post-SEA period. While the mean value of the party inclusiveness of small member states’ Commissioner for the pre-SEA period is 63.3 per cent (SD 28.0), the mean for the post-SEA era is 87.4 per cent (SD 12.6).\textsuperscript{12} When comparing the mean value of large member states’ Commissioners party inclusiveness for the post-SEA period (59.4 (SD 13.1)) with the respective value for small member states, the empirical differences in the delegation patterns of small and large member states becomes obvious.\textsuperscript{13}

The empirical finding that small member states’ governments show a higher proneness to nominate party inclusive Commissioners does not run counter to the theoretical argument of member states’ party control of Commissioners (Section III): In order to make sure that its interests are represented in Commission decision-making, a member state government which is entitled to nominate only one Commissioner should have a stronger incentive to nominate a person with similar preferences, i.e. the same party affiliation, than governments which are entitled to nominate two Commissioners. The reason for this is that the governments of large member states which are entitled to nominate two Commissioners can make sure that their interests are represented inside the Commission by one of the two Commissioners they nominate. Because small member states lack this opportunity, the relative costs of nominating a “party exclusive” Commissioner are considerably higher for small member states than they are for large member states. Accordingly, large member states have a lower price to pay, when they transfer their right to nominate a second Commissioner to their domestic opposition. Such a transfer could eventually help the respective government to improve its political situation in the domestic arena, for example by trading the post of one Commissioner against the opposition’s support in an important domestic decision. In addition, nominating a candidate Commissioner from an oppositional party could provide the government with the support of the EP’s party group to which the opposition is affiliated and which is needed for the successful appointment of the Commission later on in the appointment process (Graph 1) as well as during upcoming legislative procedures. Yet, with the entering into force of the Nice Treaty, every member state government, irrespective of its size, is entitled to nominate only one Commissioner. According to the theoretical considerations outlined above and based on the empirical trends as depicted in Graph 3, this should lead to a generally high level of future Commissioners’ “party inclusiveness”, because the above discussed cost differentials between large and small member states’ nomination of oppositional candidates will disappear.

Let me now turn to the Commissioners’ “political visibility”. As argued in Section 3 (Hypothesis 3, p. 6), in order to an “adverse selection", member state governments need extensive information on their candidate Commissioners’ reliability as a representative of their interests. A straightforward way to acquire this information is by screening the candidate’s record which he or she piled up during earlier

\textsuperscript{12} Student’s t-test shows that the result is significant at the 0.1 level.
\textsuperscript{13} The difference in the mean values is significant at the 0.05 level, according to a (paired) Student’s t-test.
performances in the political arena, i.e. as a member of the respective member state legislature or the European Parliament or as a minister in the member state’s executive. Thus, if member state governments do select their candidate Commissioners carefully, they should have a high “political visibility” due to former jobs in the political arena.

Graph 4: Commissioners’ Prior Political Visibility

Source: Munzinger Archiv.
Note: In each category the positive, negative and missing values add up to 100%. The graph reports only positive answers for each category. One individual could however, appear in more than one of the categories, i.e. he or she could have served as a minister and in the national legislature.

The analysis of the Commissioners’ prior jobs in the political arena, i.e. their political visibility, shows that member state governments rely extensively on candidates which have a high political visibility. More than half of the Commissioners in the sample (53.6 per cent) held a post as a government minister in their respective member state before they were nominated as Commissioner. For these Commissioners, the government which nominated him or her had extensive information on the candidate’s competences in heading an executive bureaucracy and dealing with fellow ministers in the cabinet. Information which can be beneficially used by the respective government to infer their candidate’s ability of leading a Directorate General in the Commission and dealing with his fellow Commissioners when it comes to taking decisions in the college of Commissioners.

\[\text{Source: Munzinger Archiv.}\]
\[\text{Note: In each category the positive, negative and missing values add up to 100%. The graph reports only positive answers for each category. One individual could however, appear in more than one of the categories, i.e. he or she could have served as a minister and in the national legislature.}\]

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In addition, almost two thirds of the Commissioners (62.5 per cent) were elected to their country’s legislature before they were nominated as Commissioners. During their term in the legislature they repeatedly had to reveal their political positions. Either in plenary debates, committee discussions or discussions in their respective parliamentary party. In addition, when it came to voting, these parliamentarians had to reveal their preferences and in cases were the party line and their personal preferences diverged, also their degree of loyalty towards the party. The same is true for the 19.6 per cent of Commissioners who previously were a Member of the European Parliament (MEP).

Finally, one fifth of the Commissioners (20.5 per cent) previously occupied a post in their party’s executive, either in the party’s executive board or as secretary general. It is safe to assume not only that these persons have extensive knowledge on their party’s policy positions, but also that their loyalty towards their party is beyond doubt. Otherwise, they hardly were elected to a position in the party leadership of their party.

Over time, the share of Commissioners who previously served as ministers in their member states and who therefore are experienced in exercising political leadership over a large executive bureaucracy increased from a value around 45 per cent for the first eight Commissions to a share of ex-ministers around 70 per cent for the 9th to the 12th Commission. Another interesting finding is that the share of former national parliamentarians is constantly higher than the share of Commissioners who formerly held a seat in the European Parliament. Thus, Tsebelis’ and Garrett’s hypothesis that a (presumably integrationist) self-selection mechanism among Commissioners leads to the Commission’s allegedly pro-integrationist position seems to be empirically unfounded (2000: 16). If this self-selection mechanism indeed existed, one should expect the share of former MEPs to be considerably higher than the share of former national MPs, because the self-selection mechanism should also work with respect to the candidates’ choice of legislature, i.e. national or supranational, to which he or she seeks to be elected. Thus, at least since the EP gained considerable power through the introduction of the cooperation (SEA) and especially the co-decision (Maastricht, Amsterdam) procedure the integrationist self-selection mechanism should have attracted these MPs to the European Parliament, since this institution has more influence on the EU’s legislative development than any of the member state’s parliaments does. However, such a trend is empirically not observable. Another interesting development over time is the increase in the share of Commissioners who were part of their party’s executive. While for the first seven Commissions the share of former “party executives” ranged around 10 per cent, for the five most recent Commissions this share rose to an average of around 30 per cent (Graph 4).

The empirical information on the Commissioners political visibility is in line with the expectation formulated in Hypothesis 3: Commissioners do show a high degree of political visibility. This indicates that member state governments make extensive use of the information that can be obtained from the track record which a potential candidate Commissioner left during his or her occupation in previous jobs in the political arena. Taking into account this information, member state governments should be
able to decrease the likelihood of an adverse selection considerably, thus avoiding the nomination of a Commissioner who repeatedly acts contrary to the respective member state government’s interests.

In addition, the increase in the share of Commissioners who formerly exposed themselves in their member state’s political arena (cf. Graph 4) shows that over time the political profile of Commissioners becomes more accentuated. Just as the drop and recently continually low level of Commissioners who do not have any party affiliation (cf. Graph 2), the more accentuated political profile of Commissioners nurtures the conjecture that the Commission should be treated as a political rather than a bureaucratic actor in EU legislative decision-making.

Graph 5 shows the proportion of Commissioners who, prior to their nomination to the European Commission, neither were elected to their respective national or the European Parliament, nor served as a cabinet minister in their member state’s executive or the party leadership of the respective party they (eventually) belong to (c.f. graph 4). A minority of Commissioners were politically non-visible prior to their nomination, i.e. held none of the jobs in the political arena discussed above. For the last five Commissions the share of politically non-visible Commissioners remained on a steady low level. The information of graphs 4 and 5 confirm the expectation formulated in Hypothesis 3: EU member state governments do exhibit a strong tendency to nominate Commissioners whom they have plenty of information on due to their visibility in the political arena in earlier jobs.

Graph 5: Politically Non-Visible Commissioners

![Graph 5: Politically Non-Visible Commissioners](image-url)

Source: Munzinger Archiv.

Hypothesis 4 (p. 7) states that member state governments are likely to nominate Commissioners on whose career they have influence after they completed their term as Commissioner. Yet, it is difficult
to assess this hypothesis empirically, because the Commissioners’ post-Commission career is often hard to track down. While information on pre-Commission careers was “missing” for only 5 per cent of the Commissioners, the information on the post-Commissioner career for 11 Commissions (the current Prodi-Commission excluded) is missing for 25 per cent of Commissioners. In addition, while the pre-Commission careers seem to be documented consistently in the Munzinger Archiv, from which this part of the data set was generated, the post-Commissioner careers seem to be documented incompletely. Thus, due to the relatively high number of missing values and the apparently incomplete documentation of Commissioners’ post-Commission careers, the empirical assessment of Hypothesis 4 is subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty.

The Commissioners of the Prodi-Commission were not considered in the empirical assessment of Hypothesis 4, because the term of the Prodi-Commission is not completed yet. In addition to the exclusion of the Prodi-Commissioners, the attributes of Commissioners who served more than one term were counted only once to avoid the bias of double-counting the same individual’s attributes. This leaves me with N=95 cases.\textsuperscript{15} The results show that 17 (17.9 per cent) of the N = 95 Commissioners re-entered into national politics by taking a seat in their country’s legislature. Eleven, or 11.6 per cent, of Commissioners re-entered the national political game by holding a ministerial post in their member state’s government. These figures show that Commissioners active role in the political game is not necessarily over, once they leave the Commission. Drawing on these findings, the threat of refusing Commissioners the re-entrance in the domestic political arena and on an attractive political post provides member state governments with some ex-post whip to influence their respective Commissioners actions. However, the data presented above also shows that Commissioners do have outside options when it comes to their post-Commission career. A finding which is likely to weaken the strength of a governments ex-post whip of refusing a Commissioner the re-entrance into the national political arena.

In addition, an important whip is a member state government’s threat to refuse its current Commissioner the re-nomination for another term. Thus, if a Commissioner acts contrary to the interests of the government which nominated him or her, the government can replace him by another candidate. The re-nomination rate for the Commissioners lies at an intermediate level. 49 of the 112 individuals who were nominated as Commissioners (43.8 per cent) were nominated for a second term.\textsuperscript{16} Out of these 49 individuals another 19 (38.8 per cent) were nominated for a third term. Four out of these 19 individuals (21.1 per cent) were nominated for a fourth term. Finally, the German SPD

\textsuperscript{15} As stated in the paragraph above, on 24 of the 95 Commissioners, no information on their post-Commission career was available (25.3 per cent missing values).

\textsuperscript{16} As one of the reviewers pointed out, the reappointment, or the refusal of reappointment, of Commissioners needs further analysis in order to be able to discriminate between different theoretically possible reasons for a Commissioners non-reappointment. Thus, while, for example, a change in a member state government’s party composition and the empirical finding of non-reappointment would lend support to Hypothesis 1, the non-reappointment of a Commission by the same government would lead support to Hypothesis 4. These aspects will be analysed in future analyses.
member and trade unionist Wilhelm Haferkamp managed to get re-appointed four times and is the only individual who served five terms as a Commissioner. Just as the Commissioners’ party inclusiveness (Graphs 2 and 3), the moderate rate of Commissioners who serve more than one term, i.e. 43.8 per cent, clearly demonstrates that member state governments do make choices when it comes to the nomination of Commissioners and that Commissioners cannot take it for granted that they will self-evidently get re-appointed to the Commission for another term. However, by doing a “good job” in the eyes of their governments, their chances of getting re-appointed can be expected to grow. Thus, if a Commissioner would like to get re-appointed for another term, either because he enjoys being a Commissioner or because domestic job alternatives are not open or attractive to him, the right to nominate their Commissioner provides member state governments with an effective whip to discipline their Commissioner’s actions inside the Commission.

So summarize the findings on member state governments ex-post control of Commissioners, one should emphasize that governments do seem to make use of the control instruments which were discussed above. However, as the empirical evidence shows, governments’ reliance on the whip provided by appointments to post-Commission jobs in the national political arena seems to be moderate at most. This result can be interpreted in at least three directions: First, it might indicate that the ex-ante means of influence on Commissioners actions, contained in Hypotheses 1 and 3, are effective so that member state governments do not resort to those instruments of ex-post control which were discussed above. Second, it might indicate that governments do not rely on these forms of ex-post control, because they consider them as ineffective, for example due to Commissioners’ exit options into other jobs. Or because neither the government, nor the Commissioner know whether the government will still be in power at the time when the term of the respective Commission ends and Commissioners are looking for new job appointments. And finally, member state governments could refrain from using future job appointments as a means of Commissioners’ ex-post control, because after the appointment of Commission they have more direct means of ex-post influence on Commissioners’ actions. For example at the very beginning of the legislative decision-making process through direct interactions during different stages of decision-making and proposal formulation inside the Commission. To be able to better discriminate between these different interpretations of the above results, further analyses and additional research are needed. I will now turn to the conclusion, which summarizes the main findings of this paper and in a further paragraph sketch how this additional research will look like.

V. Conclusion

In this paper I argued that EU member state governments carefully choose the person, whom they nominate as their candidate Commissioner. A major rationale for governments to do so is that they are fully aware of the European Commission’s power in EU legislative decision-making and the growing areas in which the EU can “legislate” into its member states’ domestic affairs. Thus, in order to avoid the repeated imposition of (politically) costly EU regulations on themselves, member state
governments have a strong incentive to appoint a Commission which has preferences similar to their own.

I demonstrated empirically, that member state governments show a strong inclination to nominate Commissioners who share their party affiliation and on whom they have considerable information due to earlier performances in the political arena. While I took the former to be an indicator of similar preferences, the latter was used as an indicator of a person’s reliability. Generally, the empirical findings fit the theoretical story outlined in Sections II and III. As a consequence, I would argue that, based on these findings, it seems theoretically as well as empirically unjustified to a priori assume that the Commission is a pro-integration preference outlier in EU legislative decision-making, unless one convincingly argues that the changes in the EU’s overall institutional structure, the member states’ interests and incentives vis-à-vis the Commission and the fact that delegation to the Commission is not done once, but up to renewal every four, respectively five years do not have any effect on the Commission’s behaviour in EU legislative decision-making. In addition, the decreasing and for the last two decades constantly low level of technocratic Commissioners indicates that the Commission should be conceptualized as a political actor instead of a technocratic bureaucracy.

However, while the analysis carried out in this paper is a useful way to map the Commission’s basic political characteristics, it is not sufficient to show how these characteristics translate into actual decisions by the Commissions. That is, how does the Commission arrive at its decisions internally? How many decisions inside the Commission are actually taken in the college of Commissioners, which is the equivalent to cabinets in parliamentary democracies? How much discretion does an individual Commissioner have in determining the policy outcome of his Directorate General? How does she, i.e. the Commissioners and their respective DG, act vis-à-vis other actors, interest groups and actors from within the Council and the European Parliament? Are there, for example, stable working relationships between Social Democratic and Christian Democratic Commissioners and the Social Democratic, respectively Christian Democratic Political Group in the EP? While a number of case studies have been compiled which look at very specific aspects of the behaviour of mostly one DG, studies which give answers to the more general questions raised above are still lacking. However, such studies could help us to further improve our understanding of both, the actor characteristics of the Commission and the preferences it pursues in EU legislative decision-making, questions which are of central interest to research on legislative decision-making in the EU and the research on the systemic and institutional qualities of the European Union. It is the above questions, which will be tackled in the next steps of my research and for which, as I would argue, the analysis and argument outlined above constitutes a valuable basis.
VI. Literature


European Commission (several years). Organigramme C.C.E., Bulletin CEE.


