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Hooray for Global Justice? Emerging Democracies in a Multipolar World

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Abstract

Rising powers are fundamentally shifting the relations of power in the global economic and political landscape. International political theory, however, has so far failed to evaluate this nascent multipolarity. This article fills this lacuna by synthesizing empirical and normative modes of inquiry. It examines the transformation of sovereignty exercised by emerging democracies and shows that – in stark contrast to emerging democracies' foreign policy rhetoric – the "softening" of sovereignty has become the norm. The present paper assesses this softening of sovereignty on the basis of a "democratic-internationalist" conception of global justice. This conception holds that global justice demands the establishment of reasonably democratic transnational relations that enable people themselves to determine what else justice requires. Because we find that the exercise of soft sovereignty by emerging democracies contributes to the realization of reasonably democratic transnational relations, we conclude that this nascent multipolarity ought to be welcomed from the democratic-internationalist view of global justice.

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Hooray for Global Justice?
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Article Outline

1 Introduction[1]

Contrary to the expectations of prolonged unipolarity,[2] the hope in an evolving global state,[3] and the dystopias of a clash of civilizations or a global "superclass" of billionaires and multi-nationals,[4] rising powers from the Global South stand to challenge the Western monopoly on political and economic power in the early twenty-first century.[5] Most prominently, China has become the locomotive of global economic growth. India continues to struggle with poverty, internal turmoil and the stalemate of its conflict with Pakistan; yet its size, demographics,

nuclear capabilities and recent economic growth make it an important global player. Meanwhile, democratic consolidation and economic liberalization throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century in Brazil and South Africa went hand-in-hand with attaining regional power status and fulfilling increasingly vital roles in international negotiations on an assortment of issues (e.g., climate change, financial regulation, development aid and trade).

Curiously, although the emergence of rising powers marks a turning point in global politics, few efforts have been made to analyze this change from the point of view of global justice. Indeed, much global justice theorizing asks what citizens and governments of wealthy "developed" countries are obligated to do in response to "global poverty" in the "developing world," without at all considering the responsibilities of rising powers.[6]

We recognize, of course, that normative political theorizing needs to maintain a certain distance from the most immediate political and economic developments. Political theorizing that is too proximate to current affairs is in danger of being status quo biased.[7] Yet we believe that rising powers are altering the global economic and political landscape in such fundamental ways that practically relevant normative theorizing needs to reflect carefully upon this macrochange.[8] Therefore, our article explores from a normative point of view this increasingly multipolar constellation by addressing, albeit only in an exploratory manner, the basic question as to how one should assess the existence of rising powers from the point of view of global justice.

Within our focus on the normative aspects of the "rise of the rest,"[9] we concentrate on the role of emerging democracies as a subgroup of rising powers and focus especially on the case of Brazil.[10] This way of addressing the stated question is, of course, insufficient in providing a fully satisfying answer. Nevertheless, it is very helpful in clearly recognizing that (as we will argue) certain features of the novel multipolar constellation contribute significantly to the realization of a more just global sociopolitical order. This is the appropriate assessment to make, we believe, if the rise of relatively democratic states from the Global South is analyzed normatively on the basis of what we dub a "democratic-internationalist" conception of global justice, which views reasonably democratic arrangements (both domestic and international) as necessary conditions for fundamental global justice.[11]

If we were to fully assess the novel, increasingly multipolar constellation of global politics, then we would have to balance the global justice promoting forces of emerging democracies against the effects on global justice brought about by the nondemocratic rising powers. Unfortunately, our exploration of this new terrain of global justice theorizing does not provide such a full – and extremely complex – evaluation. Our assessment nevertheless delivers an important conclusion; namely, emerging democracies are drivers of global justice, and one should therefore welcome, at least in part, our more and more multipolar world.

The article proceeds as follows: The first half is descriptive. It outlines the rise of states from the Global South, focuses on emerging democracies and concentrates even more narrowly on the case of Brazil. It begins by briefly characterizing the central features of rising

powers and by explaining how they are shifting inter- and transnational relations of power. In particular, we analyze the transformation of sovereignty occurring in these states because it precisely captures the fundamental changes that are taking place both in the internal and external political relations of emerging democracies. For this analysis, we employ Stephen Krasner's fourfold distinction between domestic, interdependence, Westphalian and international legal sovereignty and consider current transnational processes of fragmentation and integration "from below" and "from above" the nation-state.[12] Our analysis ends with the conclusion that emerging democracies exercise what we call "soft sovereignty" – that is, a kind of sovereignty that is neither captured by the postmodern label of "European-style" shared sovereignty nor falls into the category of the "modern" understanding of sovereignty underlying the Westphalian state system.[13] Instead, soft sovereignty means that emerging democracies have a degree of effective, or positive, internal sovereignty that distinguishes them clearly from political societies with limited statehood. Yet they are not sovereign in the modern sense, because they are bound in various ways by inter- and transnational norms and power relations that affect the autonomy of the nation-state both from below and from above. The case of Brazil serves well to illustrate what the exercise of soft sovereignty means for the internal and external relations of an emerging democracy.

The second half of this article engages in the normative assessment of emerging democracies on the basis of a democratic internationalist conception of global justice. Therefore, it sketches this distinctive conception of global justice and argues that the political changes in the internal and external relations of emerging democracies are conducive to the pursuit of global justice. This is because the exercise of soft sovereignty, overall, positively affects the democratic quality of both the domestic relations within emerging democracies and the relations in which emerging democracies stand vis-à-vis other countries. To sum up, this article argues that recognizing processes of change from both below and above in emerging democracies makes visible a hitherto underappreciated perspective on global justice: emerging democracies are driving powers of global justice understood along the lines of democratic internationalism.

2   Rising Powers in a Multipolar World

Rising powers are defined as states that have recently gained veto-player status but do not yet possess agenda-setting capabilities in global politics.[14] The least disputed rising powers are represented in leader-level coalitions such as BRICS, IBSA and BASIC. Having invited South Africa to its ranks in 2010, BRICS today stands for a group of countries that share a sense of entitlement to global power and the objective of balancing transatlantic hegemony in global politics.[15] They often act together to realize this goal. The IBSA grouping unites the three emerging democracies India, South Africa and Brazil in a dialogue forum that aims at coordinating common positions in the United Nations (e.g., the issue of permanent member-

ship in the United Nations Security Council [UNSC]) and strengthening South-South cooperation in several other fields.[16] There is also the BASIC coalition of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, which – to the dismay of the established European powers – brokered the deal with the United States at the 2009 Copenhagen summit on climate change.[17]

The fundamental changes arising from these coalition's recent economic growth and political stability is perhaps best exemplified by the Brazilian case – a highly dependent debtor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s and an esteemed creditor to the same institution from 2009 onward. The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) most recent Human Development Report (HDR) was devoted to the "rise of the South" and noted how larger rising states, including the BASIC countries, advanced particularly rapidly.[18] Indeed, rising powers represent a growing share of the global economic output. For instance, the BRICS countries' share of the global gross domestic product (GDP) doubled from around 9 percent in 2000 to over 18 in 2010.[19] Accordingly, the G8 summits of industrialized nations look increasingly outdated. As the recent global financial crisis unfolded in 2008, leaders from the industrialized North turned to the G20 in order to negotiate the governance of global finance.

The rise of Southern powers also means that states and governments continue to shape global and domestic politics in very significant ways. Compared to most of the last century, rising powers are now in a better position to manage their internal affairs and to influence political and economic processes within and beyond their region. Thus while the idea of "governance without government"[20] may be appropriate to describe certain developments in transnational business, the importance of government is anything but on a steady decline in global politics.

In sum, then, rising powers are altering the global economic and political landscape.[21] They contribute to an increasingly multipolar constellation in which national governments play a key role. The following section analyzes emerging democracies by examining the transformation of sovereignty in these countries. It therefore introduces the concepts of fragmentation and integration in global transformations. Following this analytical framework and to a degree based on one of the authors' fieldwork, the empirical section exposes the transformation of sovereignty in Brazil as an example.[22]

3   The Transformation of Sovereignty in Emerging Democracies

We concentrate on the role of emerging democracies as a subgroup of rising powers. The term "emerging democracies" is not meant to imply that Brazil, India and South Africa are perfectly democratic. South Africa continues to expose a number of severe deficiencies in terms of its democratic system due to the centralization of power within a quintessential dominant party system. Political corruption in Brazil and the continued rule of India's political parties by family dynasties rather than party delegates raise doubts about both states'

democratic credibility. The severity of these concerns notwithstanding, from a democratic perspective, normatively important characteristics remain intact – or at least more intact than in clearly nondemocratic cases such as China or Russia.

When analyzing the changes in the internal and external relations of emerging democracies, it is useful to concentrate on the transformation of sovereignty in these states. This is because the concept of state sovereignty circumscribes different components of states' internal and external relations. Following Krasner, ideal-type state sovereignty consists in the state having, on the one hand, the capability to effectively regulate activities within (domestic sovereignty) and across national borders (interdependence sovereignty) and, on the other hand, internationally recognized (international legal sovereignty) domestic authority structures that are independent of external actors' decisions (Westphalian sovereignty).[23] An oft-made distinction in this context is that between negative and positive sovereignty – the former denoting the freedom from external interference, and the latter circumscribing the effective freedom to select from certain options.[24] Positive sovereignty as "self-mastery"[25] is congruent with domestic and interdependence sovereignty, while negative sovereignty refers to Westphalian and international legal sovereignty.[26]

Rising powers' foreign policy rhetoric on diverse issues (e.g., climate change and the responsibility to protect [R2P]) tends to underline the principle of nonintervention associated with Westphalian sovereignty when formulating opposition to "Western" propositions.[27] Accordingly, one may even hold that the rise of Southern powers marks the return to a fundamentally Westphalian global order in which states are the sole political authorities in their territories. This seems, prima facie, to be a sound position because rising power status itself is based in part on increasing positive sovereignty, which – in turn – is employed to defend the "sanctity" of negative sovereignty.

A closer look at political developments in emerging democracies throughout the past decade reveals, however, that processes of political fragmentation and integration have had a severe impact on their exercise of sovereignty. The upshot of these processes for emerging democracies is what we term "soft sovereignty." Soft sovereignty is neither the "postmodern" European-style of shared sovereignty[28] nor the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty. It is also clearly separable from the kind of vacuum of domestic sovereignty found in areas of limited statehood, because emerging democracies are by and large capable of managing their internal affairs. Instead, soft sovereignty denotes a potentially stable form of partially diffused sovereignty that combines the persistence of some ideal-type sovereignty's attributes with several sovereignty-compromising domestic, international and transnational processes. In foreign policy, it entails a diffusion of power to a variety of new actors, including line ministries, civil society organizations (CSOs), inter- or supranational institutions and subnational governments. Domestically, it recognizes the relevance of an array of dynamics, such as claims to indigenous autonomy and the diffusion of increasingly global legal norms and formats of political representation and their sovereignty-compromising effects.[29]

Transnational processes of integration affect sovereignty in two ways: from above and from below. From above refers to international organizations on the global and regional levels limiting their members' sovereignty by imposing certain standards and inducing the development of common policies and norms. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) regulation, for instance, profoundly affects emerging democracies' trade policies. In addition, emerging democracies' regional agendas within South America, (southern) Africa and South Asia have been transformed – to differing degrees – from independence, negligence and dominance to integration, commitment and cooperation, respectively. All these forms of regional integration go along with sovereignty-compromising norms even if they are – primarily due to the persistence of intergovernmentalism as the modus operandi – anything but impressive when compared to EU-style integration.

From below refers to citizens and CSOs in emerging democracies increasingly grounding their demands on governments and administrative bodies in a global legal language. Ethnological fieldwork on "globalization from below" and the "juridification of protest" observes a transformation of political practices on the local level and across emerging democracies toward common transnational legal principles.[30] Indian tribal activists, for instance, seek to protect themselves from state intrusion by making use of the international legal human right to culture, and South African women alter male-dominated local institutions via references to the fundamental right of gender equality. Moreover, the human right to health was a key discursive resource in the struggle for affordable antiretroviral HIV/Aids medication in India, Brazil and South Africa.[31]

In fact, according to some opinion polls, global attitudes are coevolving toward more tolerance and greater equality (e.g., gender equality).[32] This is in accordance with examples of transnational networks of CSOs that codefine each other's strategies and demands. Territorial borders have also become less relevant for many individuals at both the bottom and the top of the social strata.[33] All of these processes of integration are softening ideal-type sovereignty by challenging the domestic, interdependence and Westphalian aspects of sovereignty via infusing substantial and procedural normative principles that restrict national governments' sets of choices. Moreover, they redirect the focus of attention from the defense of national autonomy to the solution of common and/or global problems, such as climate change, health and human security.

Throughout the 1990s, processes of integration from above and below dominated the public imagination and the social scientific discourse.[34] Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, parallel processes of transnational fragmentation have become ever more prevalent – they too affect ideal-type sovereignty from above and from below. In terms of fragmentation, from above concerns the emerging multipolarity in global politics that is providing foreign-policy makers with a new menu of potential partners (e.g., IBSA and BRICS). This is not necessarily a sovereignty-compromising or sovereignty-strengthening factor, as recent BRICS summits exemplify; instead of restricting cooperation to intergov-

ernmental summitry, member states decided to establish a common 100 billion USD support fund, a common bank and a business think tank to ostensibly function as alternatives to the Bretton Woods Institutions dominated by Northern states.[35] While such innovations may improve emerging democracies' bargaining positions vis-à-vis the latter, these new institutions will likewise codefine their members' foreign policy options – once they come with financial or political commitments – and thus alter their independence and Westphalian sovereignty.

Moreover, despite the fact that rising powers – in principle – coalesce around the desire to counter the hegemony of established powers in international affairs, they are by no means undivided on specific issues of global governance (e.g., military intervention, climate change, financial regulation and currency policies). Hence, fragmentation from above not only implies the differentiation between rising and established powers, but also "issue-specific divergences, multiple potential coalition partners, and the absence of a hegemon."[36] Moreover, the advent of soft sovereignty means that emerging democracies may gain Westphalian sovereignty in some respects and allow for its diffusion in many others.

Fragmentation from below is most visible in the increased recognition of autonomous legal spheres that, in unprecedented ways, limit the freedom in domestic legislation and thereby domestic sovereignty exercised on the nation-state level. The number and influence of sub- and transnational groups claiming political autonomy and/or legal recognition have increased over the past two decades, while the consolidation of emerging democracies has gone hand in hand with the formal recognition of pluralism in their domestic contexts. Fragmenting tendencies can be seen in

a) the proliferation of diverse legal systems such as India's personal law and South Africa's legal pluralism,

b) claims for subnational autonomy and recognition by ethnic, linguistic and religious communities, and

c) the growing role of subnational governments in both domestic and foreign policy.[37]

Ostensibly, legal fragmentation[38] and the "invention of tradition"[39] via sub- and transnational identity politics are truly global phenomena interrelated with the transnational discourse on international legal human rights. Perplexingly, these fragmenting sovereignty-compromising processes occur at the same time they themselves are subject to substantively integrating tendencies.[40]

4 Soft Sovereignty in Brazil

For a long time, nationalism has been a key component of both leftist and rightist developmental projects in Brazil, and the term *soberania* (sovereignty) has been their focal point. Brazil's historical role as a provider of natural resources to Europe and North America[41] and its colonial past reinforced the desire for independence in both economic and political terms. It

is no surprise, then, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (commonly referred to as Itamaraty) is renowned for its pronounced focus on safeguarding Brazil's Westphalian sovereignty.[42]

Today, the very status of Brazil as a rising power implies that it enjoys not only more domestic and interdependence sovereignty but also more Westphalian sovereignty. Accordingly, in international negotiations, Brazil insists on the maintenance "of domestic policy space in the face of norms and rules that had been too often developed without their participation."[43] Furthermore, partaking in the process of international rule creation is of utmost importance.[44] In a similar vein, neither Brasilia's deep-seated skepticism about the motivations of established powers from the Global North nor its bid for membership in the UNSC are surprising.[45]

Against the background of a seemingly steady increase of domestic, interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty, the remainder of this section shows that attention to empirical findings reveals a far more complex picture. Several examples illustrate how integration from above (regionalization) and below (inclusion of civil society) as well as fragmentation from above (multipolarity) and below (indigenous autonomy) has had sovereignty-compromising effects in the Brazilian context. They also show that soft sovereignty emerged in Brazil in the early twenty-first century and has continued until today. Hence, seemingly paradoxically, Brazil both gained and lost sovereignty in the period in which it was increasingly recognized as a rising power.

4.1   Integration from above

Brazil under military rule was characterized by a profound and historically evolved negligence of its relations to its Latin America neighbors.[46] The end of military rule in Brazil and Argentina in the mid-1980s allowed for the fast establishment of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), including Uruguay and Paraguay as founding members. Throughout the 1990s, Brazilian foreign policy elites sought to dispel any notion of a particularistic agenda by highlighting South American cooperation and consensus vis-à-vis the alternative, more market-driven US initiative.[47] As a result, a set of regional bodies developed, facilitating cooperation in a variety of areas beyond mere market integration (e.g., defense, infrastructure and health) under the umbrella of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).[48] Moreover, regional integration – however shallow from a European perspective – includes a MERCOSUR parliament (Parlasur), significant nonreciprocal financial mechanisms in the form of a MERCOSUR development fund (FOCEM)[49] and the Permanent Review Tribunal tasked with settling disputes among members states.[50]

The prioritization of regional relations in institutionalized settings has become a consensual aspect of Brazilian foreign policy despite the fact that intergovernmental decision making has remained the norm, MERCOSUR's institutional structure has stayed relatively minimal,[51] and the extent of regional integration is contested. This has seen new actors (e.g., line ministries, CSOs, subnational governments and businesses) partake in foreign-policy making

and thus contribute to the erosion of Itamaraty's traditional foreign policy monopoly[52] – an unintended consequence. As a result, sovereignty compromises in specific issue areas have become more likely.

4.2 Integration from below

Leftist or "progressive" Brazilian CSOs contributed considerably to the end of military rule. Today, the systematic inclusion of CSOs into political decision making in Brazil is unmatched in regional comparison. At the same time, the CSO ecology has been "tamed" over the past decades. "Professional" rather than radical organizations are the preferred partners when making and implementing policies on behalf of the state. Federal employment has become an attractive alternative for career-oriented activists – thus blurring the distinction between state and civil society.[53] The Brazilian state has promoted this trend by considerably increasing federal and municipal funding for the third sector, which roughly quadrupled between 2002 and 2009.[54]

Tangential to these developments, forms of protest on a variety of issues (e.g., health care, the environment and indigenous claims) have converged toward a common language of human rights. As in other emerging democracies, the latter has become visible in an increasing willingness among activists to go through the courts to pursue certain sociopolitical objectives.[55] Global models of CSO management and philanthropic engagement have spread through a more globalized Brazilian middle and upper class. New domestic sources of funding from the private sector, the state and large parastatals (e.g., Petrobras) have emerged, while hitherto crucial foreign funding has been reduced – not least due to Brazil's new status as a middle income country and consolidated democracy. The Brazilian commitment to participatory democracy and the continuing vocal activism of CSOs diffuses domestic sovereignty toward nonstate actors.[56]

4.3 Fragmentation from above

Enthusiasm for alternative cooperation schemes (such as UNASUR, BRICS, IBSA, BASIC and Lula's Africa strategy) excluding established powers emerged as a key characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy in the twenty-first century.[57] The description of rising powers as sovereign in the Westphalian sense finds most support on this level of analysis. Indeed, behind the Brazilian consensual regional leadership model, in South-South cooperation and in global fora such as the G20 or the WTO, foreign policy scholarship identifies the "priority of maintaining the pre-eminence of the international norm of sovereignty as a device for protecting national autonomy"[58] and achieving global great power status.[59]

Notably, however, a number of unintended consequences accompany the choice of such an approach to sovereignty – as exemplified by Brazilian foreign aid. For instance, although trying hard to avoid the sort of "tutoring" associated with Northern countries' aid policies,[60]

Brazil itself froze aid to Guinea Bissau following democratic ruptures there.[61] A further example is the Brazilian agency for development cooperation ABC promoting Brazilian digital voting-machine technology in Africa – a project that involves not only the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court as a center of competence, but also the Brazilian Bar Association. Examples such as these illustrate the decline of the noninterventionist foreign policy orthodoxy tied to the traditional approach to sovereignty employed by the foreign ministry. A global role, it seems, does not go well with noninterventionism and the unconditional respect for national sovereignty.

Another case in point is Brazil's engagement in the debate on R2P.[62] In November 2011, foreign minister Antonio Patriota proposed an amendment to the original concept of R2P in the UNSC.[63] His notion of "responsibility while protecting" (RWP) includes formal mechanisms and a more rigid chronologization of legitimate intervening acts as safeguards against its instrumentalization on behalf of UNSC members. While RWP would primarily serve as a means to curtail intervening states' autonomy in the interpretation of a given UNSC resolution, the proposal explicitly includes a reference to legitimate intervention in principle.[64] Claiming a stronger role in the UN incentivized compromising the hitherto sacrosanct principle of nonintervention.

4.4 Fragmentation from below

Prior to democratization, the military expressed their pronounced hostility toward indigenous autonomy in *nações indígenas* (indigenous territories) in terms of the defense of national sovereignty and the securitization of its borders.[65] In the absence of border disputes, indigenous nations' aspirations for self-determination represented a straw man threat to national integrity and repeatedly resulted in clashes over self-determination, border security, national development and sovereignty.[66]

Democratization in the 1980s therefore sparked considerable enthusiasm among indigenous activists and defenders of minority rights. The transition allowed for a new discourse including the recognition of historical discrimination and the legitimacy of minority activism and identities.[67] The 1988 Constitution granted indigenous peoples with the right to self-representation, the group right to culture and the right to the exclusive use of ancestral lands. No longer treated as "relatively unable" subjects under state tutelage, indigenous groups became legally recognized groups – a development that "opened up the way for the conquest of a political voice on the international scene, until then held for them by the Brazilian state."[68] The military's hostility toward legal pluralism and indigenous autonomy has largely been replaced by a more open and inclusive understanding of Brazilian citizenship. Instead of insisting on the exclusive sovereign authority of the state, indigenous Brazilian citizens gained an entirely new status in democratic Brazil, including more pronounced subnational autonomy. While this is laudable, new threats to their livelihoods emerged from an accelerated state-led development agenda.

5   A Global Justice Assessment of Emerging Democracies

Empirical research into the transformation of sovereignty in emerging democracies reveals a whole series of sovereignty-diffusing processes. It shows that the emergence of new centers of state power is not to be confounded with a linear increase along the four dimensions of ideal-type sovereignty or the return to a Westphalian model of international relations (however hypocritical in the first place).

How is one to assess these developments from the point of view of global justice? An answer to this question depends, of course, on the particular kind of conception of global justice that one endorses. But which one of the various alternative conceptions of global justice in the literature should one endorse? We cannot answer this latter question here. Thus we will merely situate, outline and employ the specific conception of global justice that we find especially compelling – namely, a democratic internationalist one.

6   A Democratic Internationalist Conception of Global Justice

The question as to whether some egalitarian standard of distributive justice is valid only among cocitizens of states or among all individuals globally has been at the center of the debate on global distributive justice in contemporary normative political theory throughout the last decade. Globalists like Darrel Moellendorf and Simon Caney have argued that the egalitarian requirements of distributive justice have global validity.[69] While Moellendorf has suggested that the existence of global social and economic arrangements with profound influence on morally relevant interests of individuals gives rise to egalitarian requirements of distributive justice,[70] Caney has claimed that morally relevant characteristics shared by all individuals trigger such requirements.[71] By contrast, statists like Thomas Nagel and Michael Blake have disagreed and claimed that it is only the special kind of coercive social practices within the state that generate demands of egalitarian distributive justice and that outside the state only certain sufficiencitarian requirements (of either justice or humanity) are valid at most.[72]

Therefore, statists and globalists endorse very different views on the role of states and state sovereignty within the global political order.[73] According to statists, states are the basic unit of the global political order and theories of global justice principally concern their relationship. States are meant to maintain most of their sovereignty unless they freely decide to give up parts of it by entering into a binding international contract with other states or lose their legitimacy either by starting a war for reasons other than self-defense or violating human rights domestically.

Considerations of statist justice provide only very limited reasons for restricting states' sovereignty. Since statists believe that only certain sufficiencitarian requirements of distributive justice are valid among states, the latter need only give up relatively insignificant areas

of sovereignty. For instance, states may be asked to establish and uphold international institutions like the World Bank in order to organize collective action in a way that is effective for fulfilling global sufficiencitarian requirements.

For globalists, however, individuals are the primary bearers of rights and duties of global justice (such as political rights, civil rights and socioeconomic rights). Since globalists believe that egalitarian requirements of distributive justice are valid worldwide, states will arguably maintain little political autonomy. After all, states will have to organize themselves internally in a way that does not violate the egalitarian entitlements of any individual globally and thus have to carefully coordinate their internal decisions with other states. According to this perspective, it seems very likely that states will have ceded a substantial degree of sovereignty to inter- or supranational institutions in order to avoid committing a global distributive injustice.[74]

It is no surprise, then, that although globalists reject the claim that they would have to, implausibly, call for the erection of a world state, they do not believe that states necessarily have a right to maintain significant parts of their sovereignty. Rather, globalists remain agnostic on the question of which actors (e.g., states, international institutions and regional organizations) would exercise political authority in a world that complied with the former's understanding of global justice.[75]

An increasingly dominant "third wave"[76] of theories of global justice, however, moves beyond the statist-globalist dichotomy.[77] These third wave theories hold that requirements of global distributive justice are not properly captured by some minimum threshold to be realized globally or by global egalitarian requirements among individuals.

Some internationalist theorists of global justice, for instance, argue that while domestic requirements of distributive justice are more stringent than those beyond the state, there are nevertheless duties of distributive justice that are more robust than some sufficiencitarian demand. This is because, they argue, one important role of fulfilling duties of distributive justice is to avoid oppressive and dominating relationships. And since many global relations carry the danger of becoming oppressive and dominating even if certain global sufficiencitarian requirements are met, global distributive justice is more demanding than statists think. However, achieving global equality among individuals is not necessary to avoid oppression and domination in global social relations. Thus, globalists' account of global distributive justice is also flawed.[78] An illustration of this point would be workers in the textile industry in poor countries, who need not enjoy the same chances or level of affluence as people in rich countries in order to avoid exploitation by multinational corporations. However, they require more effective freedoms than those ensured by a sufficiencitarian minimum (e.g., the freedom to form labor unions) in order to be powerful enough to influence how multinational corporations behave toward them.

Democratic internationalism belongs to these third wave theories. It questions statism's claim that beyond the state only certain sufficiencitarian principles of justice are valid and

globalism's claim that some egalitarian standard of distributive justice is valid among all individuals worldwide. Democratic internationalism adopts the insight of a discourse theory of justice that places the question about fundamentally just structures of justification prior to the question about just distributions of holdings. In this way, it shifts the emphasis from directly asking what a just global distribution of holdings would require to querying the social, political and economic conditions under which questions about global distributive justice could be properly answered.

Democratic internationalism claims that global distributive justice requires the establishment of reasonably democratic structures on both the intra- and international level. These requirements are viewed as the necessary minimum conditions to enable appropriately structured political discourses that can generate further principles of global distributive justice. By concentrating only on these two structures of justification, democratic internationalism aims at determining only certain necessary conditions of global (distributive) justice. More specifically, democratic internationalism holds the view that at least two conditions have to be met on the international and domestic levels.

First, on the international level, all representatives of reasonably democratic states ought to be granted a sufficient degree of justificatory power in the international processes of opinion and will formation that affect the lives of their members. These representatives of reasonably democratic states must also be able to realistically codetermine the internationally valid and substantive principles of justice – upon which the specific shape and contours of just international social and political orders are to be erected.[79]

With respect to the globally just distribution of holdings, this means that the democratic internationalist account does not argue for the implementation of a certain ideal of global distributive justice. Rather, it urges that those affected by such distributive principles have to provide the justifications that establish the normative validity of these principles themselves, even if only through their state officials. Notably, though, in order to afford all representatives of reasonably democratic states sufficient justificatory power, it is essential to avoid excessive power asymmetries among states. Consequently, socioeconomic inequalities, inter alia, among states are to be curbed by devising regulatory mechanisms to that effect at the international level.[80]

In contrast to the traditional view in international law that legitimate law is generated by the consent of states,[81] then, democratic internationalism holds that international law may only count as fundamentally just to the extent that it is the result of reasonably democratic processes of opinion and will formation among the representatives of internally fundamentally just states. Arguably, to hold the view that fundamentally just international legal orders have to originate from states that are internally fundamentally just is not at all a novelty, given that the international community nowadays increasingly recognizes that all states have to fulfill certain rights vis-à-vis their citizens and be minimally (or formally) democratic.[82]

It is important to note, therefore, that democratic internationalism necessarily requires that the international power asymmetries do not become excessive, otherwise it would be inconceivable that all state representatives would be capable of reasonably codetermining international processes of opinion and will formation.

Second, the principles of international justice meant to regulate international social and political orders must be ultimately justifiable to the states' members. To ensure that state officials properly represent their citizens, the democratic internationalist account also calls for reasonably democratic structures on the domestic level. Here, the basic political structures must enable all members to contribute to and contest the selection of both the domestic and international principles of justice that shape their domestic and international social and political orders.

7   Assessing Emerging Democracies

The assessment of emerging democracies will be carried out in two steps. The first step will focus on how the emerging democracies' exercise of soft sovereignty impacts upon the realization of the domestic conditions of democratic internationalism. The second step will deal with soft sovereignty's effect on the achievement of the international conditions. Both analyses not only consider those aspects of emerging democracies that are directly related to their status as rising powers (i.e., their increase in positive sovereignty), but also take into consideration the sovereignty softening processes of integration and fragmentation.

Given the well-known problem of second best,[83] however, we refrain from arguing that the realization of some of the "ideal"[84] conditions of democratic internationalism constitutes an approximation or gradual realization of global justice. Rather, our assessment is based on our judgments as to whether emerging democracies are conducive to realizing the conditions of democratic internationalism in the long run.[85] Put differently, we attempt to identify whether emerging democracies should be regarded as a political force that steers toward eventually achieving democratic internationalism and whether these democracies should thus be considered to support the transition from the status quo toward the direction of fundamental global justice. The fact that one state has become democratic, for example, cannot by itself be regarded as a gradual realization or approximation of democratic internationalism. After all, such a state could start dominating other states in ways not used before its democratization.

Since the remaining gap between the status quo and the realization of the conditions of fundamental global justice means that current conditions are "nonideal," assessing emerging democracies in terms of global justice requires a relatively high degree of moral and political judgment.[86] This explains why our thesis (i.e., that emerging democracies are drivers of global justice) is rather broad and the analysis that follows necessarily controversial.

7.1 Domestic conditions

Perhaps most obviously, the increase of domestic sovereignty in emerging democracies contributed positively to their capacities to install democratic orders domestically. As the above-cited improvements in emerging democracies' human development record suggest, it facilitated the introduction of social policies designed to enable citizens to partake in democratic deliberations in the first place. Since emerging democracies are, at least partially, willing to employ this capacity in order to promote the democratic cause of their societies, this development should be welcomed from the point of view of democratic internationalism.

Beyond this almost tautological notion, however, processes of fragmentation and integration affected the domestic conditions of emerging democracies in a similarly positive way. The inclusion of CSOs and their tactics (described under the heading of integration from below) suggests that the rule of law is increasingly recognized in emerging democracies. Moreover, given that an influential civil society promotes the realization of basic rights, this process thereby supports various enabling conditions for a well-functioning democratic order. The recognition of a human right to an adequate level of health or education, for instance, fosters a potentially alert citizenry capable of participating actively in domestic democratic processes. Although we recognize that civil society's influence need not necessarily be justice or democracy enhancing, its inclusion into democratic procedures overall increases the attentiveness of governments to its citizens' needs.

Moreover, the increasingly common official recognition of pluralism (referred to above under the heading fragmentation from below) suggests that emerging democracies conform to a more liberal understanding of national sovereignty than previously the case. Indeed, the acceptance of a plurality of ways of life is an important component of an internally just society. After all, given what Rawls terms "the burdens of judgments,"[87] democratic orders that grant civil liberties like freedom of conscience and political liberties like freedom of association cannot assume a homogenous culture in which all societal disputes can be settled.

7.2 International Conditions

Regarding emerging democracies' impact on the international conditions necessary for fundamental global justice, it seems that there is a relatively clear sense in which emerging democracies' status as rising powers is conducive to global justice. This is because emerging democracies' position as veto-players vis-à-vis established powers in international negotiations reflects a significant reduction of international power asymmetries. Emerging democracies are powerful enough to threaten established powers with the rejection of a certain policy proposal and can thereby effectively shape the result of the negotiation outcome. In some areas of global policy, moreover, they have already become major norm creators.[88]

This reduction of international power asymmetries may be further promoted by emerging democracies' establishment of international financial and development institutions parallel

to functionally similar older institutions created by Northern states. These new institutions (mentioned earlier under the rubric of fragmentation from above) enable emerging democracies to defect from these older institutions when they disagree with the established powers. This is at least the case when emerging democracies can realize their goals by pursuing them within new institutions.

Conversely, multipolarity seems problematic in that it may undercut the very possibility of effective international decision making and thereby destroy the hope in reasonably democratic arrangements beyond the state. Arguably, the danger exists that emerging democracies may eventually place too much emphasis on their international legal and Westphalian sovereignty and thereby undermine efforts by the international community to solve common problems equitably.

For two reasons, this danger should not encourage one to believe that the emerging democracies' exercise of soft sovereignty poses an obstacle, in principle, to realizing greater global justice along the lines of democratic internationalism. First, the rhetorical insistence of emerging democracies on their Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty does not match the actual political behavior of these countries. This is evident when taking into account the sovereignty softening effects of the integration processes from above. Emerging democracies' engagement in regional regimes, for instance, goes along with several international political and legal commitments. Foreign policy strategies in all emerging democracies take care to dilute any sense of hegemonic ambition within their respective regions, albeit imperfectly. Regional leadership efforts reflect a cooperative, consensual understanding of leadership. Embracing interdependence rather than securing autonomy has become the norm underlying emerging democracies regional relations.

In addition, the discussion of fragmentation from above also reveals that rising powers are quite often in conflict with each other. Rather than expecting an everlasting conflict between new and old powers, it is more likely that the former group's diverse interests combined with their desire for more influence within the existing global institutional order[89] will allow for selective sovereignty compromises. According to Philip Nel:

> [IBSA] states' visions and tactics are formulated by a generation of post-decolonization leaders who share the general distrust of their predecessors toward the way in which the global order operates, but they have much more confidence than their predecessors in their own ability to reform and exploit this order to meet their domestic and global visions.[90]

The Brazilian proposition to amend the concept of R2P is an example in this regard. Indeed, one can argue that the "perception and identity of each of the three IBSA states is fundamentally linked to multilateralism" and, for that matter, the democratization of international politics.[91]

Second, from the point of view of instrumental reason alone, international cooperation is simply too important for all states, such that emerging democracies will certainly want to uphold it. Even as emerging democracies are more powerful today than they have been

throughout the past century, they are nevertheless dependent upon the established powers' cooperative behavior in areas such as climate change and trade. In the meantime, integration from below strengthens the ability of domestic actors to argue in an increasingly global legal language focused on specific issue areas. The relative loss of power of the traditional foreign policy elite with its historically evolved focus on safeguarding national sovereignty at all costs is among the consequences. Partaking in rather than defecting from global rule making is in emerging democracies' expressed interest.

8   Conclusion

Current international affairs are characterized by two megatrends:

1) the rise of new powers onto the world stage and

2) national sovereignty-compromising processes of fragmentation and integration.

While the latter of these two trends has already captured political theorists' and philosophers' attention with regard to its effects on established powers' sovereignty,[92] the former has not yet been addressed properly at all. It has been the central aim of this article to explore a global justice assessment of rising powers and the corresponding new multipolarity of global politics.

For this purpose, this article began by delving into the empirical findings on emerging democracies, which represent one large group of the rising powers. It found that, on the one hand, emerging democracies have indeed gained a substantial degree of positive sovereignty. On the other hand, however, transnational processes of fragmentation and integration cause the substantive softening of emerging powers' interdependence and domestic sovereignty, eventually also impinging on their Westphalian sovereignty.

Following the empirical section, the present article situated a democratic-internationalist conception of global justice in between the statist and globalist understandings of global justice and then sketched the particular requirements of this discourse-theoretic approach. Democratic internationalism aims at establishing the political, social and economic conditions under which people themselves can properly determine any further requirements of global justice. Therefore, it calls for the furthering of reasonably democratic social and political arrangements within and beyond the state – that is, on both the domestic and the international levels.

Thereafter, the second section argued that the exercise of soft sovereignty by emerging democracies positively affects the democratic quality of domestic and international relations. Emerging democracies facilitate democratic international decision making by reducing international power asymmetries, without threatening the continuance of international cooperation as such. They also contribute domestically to democratic arrangements by improving the rule of law, recognizing pluralism and respecting the transnational movement for the realization of human rights. We therefore concluded that emerging democracies should be viewed as drivers of global justice.

1   We are grateful for the questions we received from Robert Goodin, Markus Patberg and other members of the audience of the panel "Justice, Legitimacy and Democracy in International Political Theory" in Section 22 "International Political Legitimacy: Normative Theory for Real World Politics" of the ECPR General Conference in Bordeaux on 5 September 2013. We would like to thank especially the discussant of our panel, Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, for his thoughtful comments. We are also grateful for critical comments from Wolfgang Hein.

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6   See the introductions of Laura Valentini, *Justice in a Globalized World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), and Nicole Hassoun, *Globalization and Global Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

7   See, e.g., Andrew Mason, "Just Constraints*", British Journal of Political Science*, 34 (2004), 2, 251–268 at p. 254.

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9   Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York, London: Norton, 2008).

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