




CONFLICT BAROMETER | 2012

Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research



disputes
non-violent crises
violent crises
limited wars
wars

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2012 ON NATIONAL LEVEL



■ : NO VIOLENT CONFLICT
■ : VIOLENT CRISIS
■ : LIMITED WAR
■ : WAR

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VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2012 ON SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

Analyzed Period
01/01/2012 - 12/31/2012

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg is a registered non-profit association. It is dedicated to research, evaluation and documentation of intra- and interstate political conflicts. The HIIC evolved from the research project »COSIMO« (Conflict Simulation Model) led by *Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch* (University of Heidelberg) and financed by the German Research Association (DFG) in 1991.

GLOBAL CONFLICT PANORAMA

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

In 2012, a total of 396 conflicts was counted, marking a rise by nine compared to 2011. Among these were eighteen wars and 25 limited wars, amounting to 43 highly violent conflicts. Another 165 conflicts were classified as violent crises. The number of wars compared to last year's all-time high of twenty decreased by two. However, the number of limited wars rose by six and the number of violent crises was extended by ten from 155 to 165. Overall, 208 conflicts, more than half of those observed, were conducted with the use of violence, thereby being the highest number of violent conflicts ever observed. In contrast, 188 non-violent conflicts were counted, subdivided into 105 disputes and 83 non-violent crises. The number of non-violent conflicts remained stable, marking only a slight change from 193 to 188. Of the eighteen wars observed, eleven remained on the same level of intensity compared to the previous year, among them four in Sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. Somalia (Islamist groups), Nigeria (Boko Haram), Sudan (Darfur), and South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence).

A further five wars remained at war level in the Middle East and Maghreb, namely Afghanistan (Taliban et al.), Iraq (Sunni militant groups), Turkey (PKK), Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia) and Syria (opposition groups). Similarly, one war continued in both the Americas as well as Asia and Oceania. [→ Mexico (drug cartels), Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. Seven conflicts escalated to wars in 2012, among them three former limited wars: Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State), Sudan (SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile) and Sudan - South Sudan, the last being the only highly violent interstate conflict. Mali (MNL, Ansar al-Din / Azawad) and Nigeria (farmers - pastoralists) accounted for the only two former violent crises to escalate by two levels to wars. Another two conflicts saw a steep escalation from a non-violent level to a war [→ India (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis), DR Congo (CNDP/M23)]. The most fatal of 2012's wars was the opposition conflict in Syria with approx. 55,000 fatalities, followed by the drug-related violence in Mexico, which caused the death of at least 12,000.

Of last year's wars, six saw a significant de-escalation by


two levels to violent crises, and two slightly de-escalated to limited wars. The war between the SPLM/A and the Sudanese government had already ended in 2011 with the secession of South Sudan. Of the 2011 wars associated with the Arab Spring, only the one in Syria continued on the same level of intensity. Egypt (opposition groups) and Yemen (opposition groups) de-escalated to violent crises, and Libya (opposition) de-escalated to a limited war. However, a new highly violent conflict closely connected to the Libyan opposition conflict erupted [→ Libya (inter-factional violence)]. Furthermore, the conflicts Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners) and Côte d'Ivoire (opposition), both having been closely related to national elections in 2011, de-escalated from wars to violent crises. Additionally, the war between different ethnic groups in the Sindh Province, Pakistan, de-escalated by one level, while the conflicts Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kaya State) and South Sudan (various militias) de-escalated by two.

Of the 25 limited wars observed, two were wars in the previous year, nine had already been on this level of intensity, and ten saw a significant escalation by two levels. Furthermore, four conflicts erupted in 2012 on the level of a limited war, i.e. Mali (Islamist groups - MNLA), Libya (inter-factional violence), Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakshan), and Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State).


The total number of conflicts rose by nine, since sixteen conflicts erupted in 2012 and seven were considered to have ended in 2011. A further two conflicts ended in 2012, namely Malawi (opposition) and Colombia - Venezuela (system). Six new conflicts erupted in the Americas, among them two between police personnel and the governments in Bolivia and Brazil, respectively. Honduras and El Salvador saw the eruption of one new violent conflict each, both involving organized crime [→ Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime), El Salvador (Maras)].

In addition, a new violent conflict between militant groups and the Nicaraguan government over the orientation of the

GLOBAL CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN 2012 COMPARED TO 2011



GLOBAL CONFLICTS OF LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH INTENSITY 1945 TO 2012



political system erupted, as well as one non-violent opposition conflict in Paraguay [→Nicaragua (militant groups), Paraguay (impeachment)].

In Europe, in demonstrations by the Romanian opposition, hundreds were injured, thus establishing a new violent crisis [→Romania (opposition movement)].

Another violent crisis over resources erupted in Myanmar, adding to the aforementioned limited war [→Myanmar (farmers et al. / Sagaing Region)].

In addition to the inter-factional violence in Libya, the Middle East and Maghreb accounted for three new conflicts with an autonomy conflict in Libya, an opposition conflict in Kuwait and a conflict between Kurds and the anti-Assad coalition in Syria [→Libya (Federalists / Cyrenaica), Kuwait (opposition movement), Syria (NC - KSC)].

Africa saw the eruption of two new conflicts in Mali. The first was Mali (coup plotters), which was then followed by the escalation of several conflicts and the likewise eruption of the other new conflict Mali (Islamist groups - MNLA).

In order to better analyze a long-term trend, the five intensity levels were categorized into three groups: The two non-violent levels were summarized as low intensity conflicts, while limited wars and wars as conflicts of high intensity. Violent crises were labeled medium intensity conflicts.

As the graph below shows, the number of conflicts observed rose more or less continuously from 83 in 1945 to 396 in 2012. However, this increase must be partly attributed to improved availability of information on current conflicts in recent decades. With regard to high intensity conflicts, their number increased almost constantly until 1992, when an all-time high was reached with 51 high intensity conflicts shortly after the decline of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Afterwards, its number dropped sharply, but then rose again until it reached 45 in 2003. In the following eight years, the number of highly-violent conflicts ranged between 31 and 41. While 2011 saw the highest number of wars, 2012 accounted for the highest number of highly violent conflicts since 2003 with a total of 43.


ANALYSIS INTRASTATE – INTERSTATE

The amount of intrastate conflicts increased from 303 to 314, while the number of interstate conflicts decreased by two from 84 to 82. While five intrastate conflicts had ended in 2011, sixteen new domestic conflicts erupted in 2012, thereby marking an increase by eleven. Thus, as in previous years, about 80 percent of all conflicts were domestic.


The escalation between Sudan and South Sudan resulted in the first interstate war since the confrontation between Russia and Georgia in 2008. In the aftermath of the 2011 secession of South Sudan, tensions over contested border areas and the oil-rich Higlig region led to heavy bombing campaigns and several ten thousands displaced, reaching a peak in April with intense fighting over Higlig [→Sudan – South Sudan]. The conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda over influence in the Kivu region constituted the second violent interstate confrontation in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Seven other interstate conflicts were conducted with the use of violence, with Syria accounting for violent conflicts with neighboring Turkey and Israel. Several cross-border incidents took place between the Syrian army and Israeli and Turkish troops in the course of intensified fighting in the ongoing Syrian opposition conflict [→Syria – Israel, Syria – Turkey] Pakistan also accounted for two violent interstate conflicts [→Afghanistan – Pakistan, Pakistan – India]. In the Americas, violence occurred in two border conflicts [→USA – Mexico (border security), Guatemala – Belize (territory)]. The crisis over the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan remained the sole violent interstate conflict in Europe. In spite of the cease-fire agreement, several clashes and sniper attacks killed at least eight people in the course of the year. The conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, extending to a limited war in 2011, decreased to a non-violent crisis [→Thailand – Cambodia (border)].

NUMBER OF INTRA- AND INTERSTATE CONFLICTS IN 2012 BY INTENSITY LEVEL



INTRA- AND INTERSTATE CONFLICTS OF HIGH INTENSITY 1945 TO 2012



The average intensity calculated for all domestic conflicts observed (2.63) was approx. one intensity level higher than that of interstate conflicts (1.57). Apart from the higher mean intensity, intrastate conflicts also preserved a higher total number of conflicts since the beginning of the long-term ana-

lysis of conflicts in 1945. The same long-term observation period, for which purpose both limited wars and wars were compiled in one group of high intensity conflicts, clearly shows that the intrastate dominance among the highly violent conflicts sustained.


REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Similar to previous years, Asia and Oceania ranked highest with 128 conflicts, accounting for about one third of all conflicts observed. These were followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 90, the Middle East and Maghreb with 69, Europe with 58, and the Americas with 51. In terms of highly-violent conflicts, Sub-Saharan Africa brought forth nineteen conflicts of the corresponding intensity, while ten were counted in Asia and Oceania, and nine in the Middle East and Maghreb. Accordingly, Sub-Saharan Africa had the most wars (nine). Europe and the Americas experienced no changes in the number of highly violent conflicts compared to 2011, counting one and three limited wars respectively, as well as one war in the Americas [→Mexico (drug cartels)]. The sum of highly violent conflicts decreased in the Middle East and Maghreb (from thirteen to nine), marking the only decrease. Meanwhile, the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Asia and Oceania saw a rise in high intensity conflicts, with an increase by six and two, respectively. In Asia and Oceania, 55 violent crises were observed, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 37 and the Middle East and Maghreb with 36. Concerning non-violent conflicts, 63 have been listed in Asia and Oceania, pursued by Europe with the second largest occurrence of non-violent conflicts (45).

Asia and Oceania accounted for 34 percent of all intrastate conflicts and 26 percent of all interstate conflicts observed. Regarding intrastate conflicts, the regions ranked as follows: Sub-Saharan Africa (24 percent), Middle East and Maghreb (18 percent), Europe, and the Americas (both 12 percent). Considering interstate conflicts, Europe came second with 23 percent, followed by the Americas with eighteen percent and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the Middle East and Maghreb (both 17 percent).

Relating the number of conflicts to the number of countries in a region, the Middle East and Maghreb has shown to be the most conflict-ridden, with a general average value of 3.2, and specifically for highly violent conflicts with 0.4 per state. Asia and Oceania ranked second regarding the overall average and third for highly violent conflicts (2.8 and 0.2 respectively). Sub-Saharan Africa was situated third with an overall average per state of 1.9, while sharing the first rank for highly violent conflicts with 0.4. This calculation underlines that the Americas and Europe were the most peaceful regions this year, in ascending order.

DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CONFLICTS IN 2012 BY REGION AND INTENSITY TYPE



DYNAMICS WITHIN INDIVIDUAL CONFLICTS

As in the preceding years, the intensity of about two thirds of all conflicts monitored, i.e. 261 out of 396, remained unchanged compared to 2011.

In total, 59 conflicts escalated, 42 of which by one, fifteen by two, and two by three levels.

60 conflicts de-escalated, 42 of which by one level and eighteen by two levels, while there were no de-escalations by more than two levels. More than half of the 59 conflicts which escalated, namely 33, turned from a non-violent level to either violent crises, or limited wars, or wars. Of the disputes, twelve escalated by two levels to violent crises. Among them were FYROM (Albanian minority), DR Congo - Rwanda, Tanzania (Uamsho), Mexico (opposition), Samoa (landowner protests), Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government), Saudi Arabia (opposition movement), and Syria - Turkey. Seventeen non-violent crises escalated by one level to violent crises, Kenya (MRC), Ethiopia (opposition), Venezuela (opposition), Indone-

sia (Muslims - Christians / Sulawesi), Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups), and Syria (Kurdish groups) being among them. Further two escalated by three levels to wars [→DR Congo (CNDP/M23), India (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis)].

Two violent crises, both in Sub-Saharan Africa, increased in intensity, escalating by two levels to wars. One was the secessionist conflict between the Tuareg group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and the Islamist group Ansar al-Din, on the one hand, and the Mali government, on the other [→Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)]. The other conflict was that over subnational predominance and resources between farmers and pastoralists in Nigeria.

Three limited wars escalated by one level to wars, i.e. Sudan (SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile), Sudan - South Sudan, and Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State).

Of the 60 conflicts which de-escalated, almost half, i.e. 29, turned non-violent.

Out of 28 violent crises, seventeen de-escalated by one level to non-violent crises, including Belarus (opposition groups), Brazil (MST), Myanmar (Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA / Rakhine State), Tajikistan (Islamist militant groups), Iraq (al-Sadr group, Shiite militant groups).

Eleven violent crises de-escalated by two levels to disputes. Among them were Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants), Angola (FLEC / Cabinda), Niger (opposition), Mexico (APPO), Papua New-Guinea (Highlanders - Lowlanders), Iraq (KRG - Kurdish opposition movement), and Oman (opposition movement). One conflict de-escalated by two levels from a limited war to a non-violent crisis, i.e. the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. The conflict remained tense although bilateral relations improved following the inauguration of the new government under Yingluck Shinawatra.

Six former wars de-escalated by two levels to violent crises. Among them were the oppositional conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria (Northerners - Southerners), Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State), Egypt (opposition groups), and Yemen (opposition groups). Sixteen new conflicts erupted, eleven of which were violent crises and four

limited wars. Half of the new violent crises were in the Americas, among them Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime) as well as police riots in Bolivia and Brazil.

One of the new limited wars was recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. Mali (Islamist groups - MNLA), and two in Asia and Oceania, i.e. Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State) and Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan), as well as another in the Middle East and Maghreb, i.e. Libya (inter-factional violence).

Change of intensity	Number
Escalation by four levels	0
Escalation by three levels	2
Escalation by two levels	15
Escalation by one level	42
No change	261
Deescalation by one level	42
Deescalation by two levels	18
Deescalation by three levels	0
Deescalation by four levels	0

CONFLICT ITEMS

As in previous years, the most frequent conflict item in 2012 was system/ideology, with 130 cases out of 396 conflicts. Conflicts with this item were conducted in order to change the political or economic system, or concerned ideological differences, e.g. striving for a theocracy, religious differences, seeking democracy in an autocracy, or striving for a socialist economic order. National power ranked second with 88, followed by resources with 81 cases. Since many conflicts centered on more than one item, a single conflict might occur twice or more times in this analysis. Frequent combinations of conflict items were system/ideology and national power, subnational predominance and resources, as well as territory and resources. System/ideology was the most frequent item in violent conflicts (83 out of 130), 64 of them being violent crises.


However, regarding highly violent conflicts, half of the 43 high intensity conflicts were fought out over subnational predominance, alone or in combination with other items.

Further frequent items in highly violent conflicts were system/ideology with nineteen cases, resources with fourteen cases, and national power with ten cases. Although ranking fourth in terms of frequency, the conflict item most prone to violence proved to be subnational predominance. In 74 percent of those conflicts, the use of violence was observed. Subnational predominance indicates attaining de-facto control over a territory or a population. In contrast, in only ten percent of cases demands for autonomy were pursued violently. The item autonomy indicates the aim of a group or region to gain more political, socioeconomic or cultural rights within an existing state. In 68 percent of all conflicts over national power, conflict parties employed violent means. System/ideology and secession, the latter meaning the motivation to separate a territory from an existing state in order to create a new state or to join another, closely followed with 64 and 63 percent violent cases, respectively. In comparison, 13 and 12 percent of the conflicts over territory or international power, respec-

tively, were carried out violently. Therefore, these conflict items, which exclusively occur in interstate conflicts, were less prone to violence than the other items.

The world regions differed considerably with regard to the frequency of conflict items, indicating different regional patterns of conflicts. System/ideology, the most frequent item in total, was prevalent in Asia and Oceania (42 cases out of 130 conflicts), in the Middle East and Maghreb (43 out of 68 conflicts), and in the Americas (21 out of 51 conflicts). In contrast, this item was of minor importance in Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa with 10 out of 59 conflicts, and thirteen out of 90, respectively. It is nevertheless noteworthy that its proneness to violence was visible in all regions, e.g. twelve out of the thirteen system conflicts in Africa were carried out violently, with five of them being highly violent. The second most frequent

GLOBAL FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2012 BY INTENSITY GROUPS



item on a global scale, national power, was prevalent in Africa (30 cases), followed by Asia and Oceania (22 cases) and the Middle East and Maghreb (22 cases). It was, however, comparatively rare in the Americas (seven cases) and Europe (seven cases). Equally, the item ranking third globally, resources, was prevalent in Africa (27 cases), and the Americas (21 cases), but rare in Europe (four cases), Asia and Oceania (eleven cases), and in the Middle East and Maghreb (seven cases). With regard to the item subnational predominance, regions also differed considerably. These conflicts were fought out primarily in Afri-

ca (23 cases) as well as Asia and Oceania (32 cases), whereas this item was almost not observed in Europe (two cases) and very rare in the Middle East and Maghreb (ten cases). In the Americas, it was not very frequent (twelve cases), but nevertheless important, as it accounted for eleven of the violent conflicts in this region. Conflicts over autonomy or secession, were dominant in Europe, constituting 46 percent of all conflicts, and common in Asia and Oceania (26 percent), Africa (20 percent), the Middle East and Maghreb (20 percent) but quite rare in the Americas (eight percent).

COUPS D'ÉTAT

In 2012, four cases of attempted coup d'états were reported, three of which were successful. Both Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and Oceania encompassed two.

In January, President Malam Bacai Sanha, then-president of Guinea-Bissau, died of natural causes. Subsequently, Raimundo Pereira, former Speaker of Parliament, became interim president. On April 12, shortly before the presidential run-off, military coup plotters under the leadership of Army Chief Antonio Indjai ousted Pereira, which was followed by shootings and grenade explosions [→Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)]. In an alleged counter-coup, on October 21, gunmen led by Captain Pansau N'Tchama attacked army barracks near the capital's airport.

In Mali, soldiers under the command of Captain Amadou Sanogo staged a coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré on March 21, six weeks before the presidential elections [→Mali (coup plotters)]. They suspended the constitution and took control of the capital Bamako. The coup was preceded by numerous civil protests in February against the government's

lack of action against the Tuareg attacks in the north and the insufficient equipment of the army [→Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)]. After two days of fighting between the soldiers loyal to the government and the presidential guard, on the one hand, and the mutinying soldiers, on the other, the latter took control of Bamako. Following the coup, MNLA quickly gained control of all three northern regions.

In early February, following increasingly violent protests in the Maldives, parts of the police and the military turned against President Nasheed. He resigned on February 7, claiming that it was a coup d'état.

In Papua New Guinea, mutinying soldiers loyal to former prime minister Michael Somare took hostage three officers loyal to President Peter O'Neil, demanding Somare's reinstatement. O'Neil had been appointed prime minister during Somare's hospital stay in Singapore in 2011. The insurgency ended after several hours and Colonel Yaura Sasa, leader of the coup, was arrested.

MEASURES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATIES

Throughout the year, numerous conflict actors negotiated and signed treaties, affecting the course of the respective conflicts in different ways. For instance, in Myanmar, the government and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), an Indian nationalist group, signed a ceasefire agreement in April with the objective to grant autonomy to the NSCN-K in three Burmese districts [→India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)]. After President Thein Sein's call for dialog in mid-2011, ceasefire agreements were reached with several rebel groups, among them the Chin National Front in January and the National United Party of Arakan as well as the Arakan Liberation Party in April. While the November 2011 ceasefire agreement with the United Wa State Army continued to hold ever since, ceasefire agreements with the Karen National Union and the Karen National Liberation Army broke down. The government held several rounds of talks with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), which remained without agreement [→Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)]. In response to the war between KIA and the government following the breakdown of a sixteen-year old truce in June 2011, the United Nationalities Federal Council, a merger of different rebel groups, stated it would review the peace process including ceasefire agreements reached with the government if military offensives in Kachin State would not stop. In the Philippines, the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued to negotiate, which eventually led to the signing of a framework agreement on the Bangsamoro in October [→Philippines (MILF / Mindanao)]. Under the agreement a new autonomous political entity, the Bangsamoro, would be established and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao replaced. There were no reports of clashes between MILF militants and soldiers. However, clashes between MILF and a breakaway group intensified [→Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)].

In Colombia, President Juan Manuel Santos confirmed exploratory peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) [→Colombia (FARC)]. The conflict parties held preparatory talks in Norway in October, and after talks in Cuba in November, FARC declared a unilateral ceasefire. However, the government continued military offensives against FARC militants in December. In El Salvador, the Mara Salvatrucha and the Barrio 18 announced to stop inter-gang violence following a truce mainly brokered by the Catholic Church [→El Salvador (Maras)]. Initially refusing to enter direct talks with the gangs, the government later supported an informal peace deal, granting improved conditions to detained gang leaders. Subsequently, the country's murder rate dropped significantly. In December, the government and the gangs agreed on the creation of special zones free of crime.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the government and the rebel group M23 negotiated under the mediation of the Ugandan government in Kampala in late November, following M23's seizing of the cities of Goma and Sake [→DR Congo (CNDP / M23)]. Following the talks, M23 pulled out of the two cities in

December under the provision that further talks would be held. Negotiations were stopped in late December but re-scheduled for January 2013. In South Sudan, the government signed peace agreements with several militant groups, planning their reintegration into the army. For instance, the government reached a peace treaty with the SSDM leader Peter Kuol Chol Awan on February 27, leading to a significant decrease in rebel activities. While parts of the SSDM rejected this peace deal, choosing John Olony as their new leader, approx. 1,800 SSDM fighters joined the demobilization and reintegration process [→South Sudan (various militias)]. In Somalia, the National Constituent Assembly approved a new constitution in late July [→Somalia (Islamist groups)]. Accordingly, a new parliament, elected by elders, was installed in Mogadishu in August. On September 10, the new parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the first President of the Federal Government of Somalia, ending the transitional period. In the course of the conflicts in northern Mali, ECOWAS mediator Blaise Compaoré repeatedly met with representatives of Ansar al-Din and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad on to find a political solution to the crisis. However, negotiations were ineffective, since the military intervention remained scheduled for the beginning of 2013.

UN-backed negotiations between the Cypriot government and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus under its leader Dervis Eroglu resumed in January [→Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)]. However, Eroglu declared an end to all negotiations when Cyprus assumed the EU presidency in July.

In February, the UN and the Arab League appointed former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as special envoy to mediate in the conflict between the opposition and the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad over national power and the orientation of the political system [→Syria (opposition groups)]. In early August, Annan resigned due to a lack of consensus in the UN Security Council, the violation of a ceasefire, and ongoing militarization. That month, former Algerian minister of foreign affairs, Lakhdar Brahimi, replaced Annan and established a four-day ceasefire in October, which, however, both sides violated. After Iran had expressed its willingness to talks, new rounds of negotiation between Iran and the five members of the UN Security Council and Germany took place between April and July [→Iran - USA, EU (nuclear program)]. IAEA envoys also met with government officials in Tehran, ultimately reaching no agreement. Additionally, Iran denied IAEA access to a military facility, which prompted the USA and the EU to impose new sanctions. In Afghanistan in early 2012, Taliban ruled out negotiations with the government of President Hamid Karzai, but agreed to meet US officials in Doha, Qatar [→Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. However, these negotiations failed in March. In late December, several leaders of militant groups, including Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami, and members of the Higher Peace Council of the Afghan government met in Paris to hold talks.

AUTHORITATIVE DECISIONS BY THE ICJ

By the end of 2012, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had twelve disputes on its list of pending cases. Throughout the year, the Court closed four proceedings, one of which was announced to be appealed.

On January 23, the ICJ fixed time limits for the filing of the initial pleadings in the dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica concerning Costa Rica's construction of a highway close to the Río San Juan River [→Nicaragua – Costa Rica (Río San Juan)]. On April 27, Guatemala and Belize agreed to hold simultaneous referenda on whether they should take their territorial dispute to the ICJ on 10/06/13 [→Guatemala – Belize (territory)].

On November 19, the ICJ came to a ruling regarding the maritime border between Nicaragua and Colombia in their dispute over the waters surrounding the Archipelagos of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina [→Nicaragua -

Colombia (sea border)]. The court granted Colombia sovereignty over the uninhabited islands of Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla. It fixed the parties' maritime border, granting an exclusive economic zone to Nicaragua that extended 200 nautical miles from its coast. In reaction, Colombia withdrew from the pact of Bogotá, under which the countries of the Americas agreed to settle boundary disputes in using the ICJ. On December 13, Colombia announced to appeal against the ruling.

Japan rejected China's requests to allow the ICJ an examination of their conflict on the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands [→Japan - China (Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands)]. Japan proposed South Korea to refer their dispute over the Liancourt Rocks to the Court but South Korea declined the proposal [→Japan - South Korea (Takeshima / Dokdo)].

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The United Nations administered twenty-nine missions in 2012. Seventeen of these were peacekeeping operations, including one special political mission in Afghanistan (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the other twelve being political missions led by the Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). In comparison, only three political missions were conducted in 2008. One year later, they already amounted to ten. In total, by the end of December, 112,735 personnel served in peacekeeping missions, among them 79,508 troops, 12,359 police and 1,947 military observers. In the civilian-led political missions, including the mission in Afghanistan, 4,283 personnel served by the end of November. With respect to financial and personnel resources, the missions in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) constituted the two biggest. The African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) had a budget of 1.4 billion US dollars and comprised 25,248 personnel. The budget of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) amounted to 1.3 billion US dollars and its personnel totalled 25,248. The main providers of military and police personnel to peacekeeping operations by December 2012 were once again found in Asia and Africa. Pakistan supplied 8,967 personnel, Bangladesh 8,828, India 7,839, Ethiopia 5,857, and Nigeria 5,441. The total budget of peacekeeping operations was approx. 7.33 billion US dollars. The top ten financial contributors were, as in the previous years, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, China, Canada, Spain and the Republic of Korea. The United States' contribution amounted to 27 percent of the budget. The UN General Assembly assigned the expenses based on a scale taking into account the member states' relative economic wealth, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share in line with their special responsibilities. The largest share of peacekeeping was conducted by the Global South, while the Global North mainly funded and controlled the operations.

Regarding fatalities, 110 died in DPKO-led missions in

2012. From 1948 to 2012, altogether 3,080 personnel died in DPKO-administered missions.

One mission, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) came to an end after six years in December 2012. However, a new but only short-lived mission in Syria was established. On April 21, the UN Security Council established the Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) by resolution 2043 in order to monitor the conflict and the implementation of the six-point plan of the former Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan [→Syria (opposition groups)]. Due to intensifying violence, the mission was suspended. On July 20, the Security Council extended the mission for 30 days under the condition that violence would end. As those conditions were not met, the mandate came to an end on August 19. On December 20, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).

As in the previous years, the region with the highest number of missions was Sub-Saharan Africa. Seven peacekeeping operations (see table below) and seven political missions were in place, namely the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), and the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). In the Middle East and Maghreb, the four peacekeeping missions UNDOF, UNIFIL, MINURSO, and UNTSO continued, while the newly established UNSMIS in Syria came to an end after four months. UNDPA maintained three political missions in the region: the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), and the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL). Despite the high number of conflicts in Asia and Oceania, the region was left with only one military mission, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan, after the end of UNMIT in 2012. The political mission UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplo-

macy in Central Asia (UNRCCA) remained in place. In Europe, DPKO maintained UNFICYP in Cyprus and UNMIK in Kosovo (Serbia). As in previous years, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was the only UN mission in the Americas. No political missions were administered in Europe or the Americas.

The international community also applied non-military measures, such as sanctions. By the end of 2012, UN maintained thirteen sanction committees, one more than in 2011. The sanctions concerned seven states of Sub-Saharan Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Guinea-Bissau), another six of the Middle East and Maghreb (Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, and Afghanistan), and an arms embargo against North Korea since 2006. A further sanction committee targeted the transnational network of al-Qaeda as well as associated individuals and entities. After the coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau, the Security Council imposed a travel ban on the perpetrators of the putsch on May 18.

Aside from the UN, several regional organizations maintained field missions in 2012. The OSCE maintained missions in the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, employing about 3,000 staff in a total of seventeen missions and field operations. Among these were six field missions in the Balkans, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Skopje (FYROM), and the OSCE presence in Albania, one mission to Moldova, field offices in Minsk (Belarus), Baku (Azerbaijan), Yerevan (Armenia), and Tajikistan, project coordinators in Ukraine and Uzbekistan, OSCE Centers in Ashgabad (Turkmenistan), Astana (Kazakhstan), and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), as well as a Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference [→Armenia - Azerbaijan]. In Kosovo, UNMIK und OSCE worked together to secure and monitor the parliamentary elections. Kosovo's supervised independence ended on September 10.

The Council of the European Union, as part of its Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP), administered fourteen missions. Three military operations were administered together with eleven civilian missions. The latter were located in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, DRC, the Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Furthermore, the military missions encompassed European Union Force – Operation Althea (EUFOR Althea) in Bosnia and Her-

zegovina, the European Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR Atalanta) off the coast of Somalia as well as in the Indian Ocean, and the European Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in Uganda. Three civilian missions started in 2012, namely EUCAP Nestor, which encompassed 29 personnel and was intended to improve maritime security in Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Tanzania. EUCAP Sahel Niger, comprising 26 personnel, commenced in August 2012 and aimed at strengthening Nigerien security forces. EUAVSEC's aim was to enhance aviation security at South Sudan's Juba international airport, consisting of 13 personnel. In total, 2,514 troops and 3,421 civilian personnel worked in the EU-administered missions.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintained the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in the Mediterranean Sea, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), as well as the counter-piracy Operation Ocean Shield around the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

Some 110,000 military personnel operated in NATO-led missions across three continents. With regard to the withdrawal of ISAF in 2014, the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan authorities continued in 2012. On November 21, Turkey requested NATO to deploy patriot missiles on its border with Syria. The member states Germany, the Netherlands, and the US confirmed in December to station two missiles each in Kahramanmaraş, Adana, and Gaziantep, southern Turkey [→Syria - Turkey].


Furthermore, the African Union (AU) continued the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Regional African organizations also maintained military missions. The Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) under the responsibility of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) deployed additional troops to combat the Sé-léka rebellion in December, but was unable to stop their advance [→Central African Republic (rebel groups)]. MICOPAX was financed by the EU through the African Peace Facility (APF) within the framework of the Africa-EU partnership. Similarly, on November 11, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed to deploy 3,300 soldiers to end the crisis in northern Mali.

CURRENT UN MISSIONS LED OR SUPPORTED BY DPKO

Mission Acronym	Name of Mission	Start	Country
Europe	—	—	—
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	1964	Cyprus
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	1999	Serbia
Sub-Saharan Africa	—	—	—
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	2011	South Sudan
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	2007	Sudan
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei	2001	Sudan
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	2010	Congo (Kinshasa)
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	2004	Côte d'Ivoire
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	2003	Liberia
The Americas	—	—	—
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	2004	Haiti
Asia and Oceania	—	—	—
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	2002	Afghanistan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	2006	Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP	UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	1949	India, Pakistan
The Middle East and Maghreb	—	—	—
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	1991	Morocco
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	1974	Syria, Israel
UNIFIL	United Nations Truce Supervision Force in Lebanon	1978	Lebanon
UNSMIS	Supervision Mission in Syria	2012	Syria
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	1948	Middle East

EUROPE

EUROPE



The number of conflicts observed in Europe remained the same, with a total of 58. The conflict between Norway and Russia (Barents Sea) ended in 2011, while a new violent opposition conflict erupted in Romania. It grew out of mass demonstrations against austerity measures, with protesters being violently dispersed by the authorities.

As in the years before, Europe remained the region with the highest share of non-violent conflicts, which accounted for 76 percent of the region's conflicts. Only thirteen conflicts were conducted violently, with one of them being a limited war over secession and system/ideology between Islamist militants and authorities in the Russian Northern Caucasus Federal District (NCFD), embracing the republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Karbadino-Balkaria, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia [→Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)]. The change in the number of conflicts in Northern Caucasus compared to the Conflict Barometer 2011 was a result of a methodological revision, merging six conflicts involving Islamist militants in NCFD. A large share of the Islamist militants strove with the same means for the establishment of an independent Sharia-ruled Caucasus Emirate in NCFD. This necessitated a merger due to a high resemblance of the conflict actors, items, and dynamics. In South Caucasus, the opposition conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia remained violent, whereas the conflict between the Armenian opposition and the government further de-escalated.

Autonomy and secession were Europe's most frequent conflict items, accounting for fourteen conflicts each. All conflicts over autonomy remained on the lowest level of intensity, except for one that escalated to a violent crisis [→FYROM (Albanian minority)]. In contrast, six conflicts concerning secession were carried out violently, two of them in Western European democracies [→France (FLNC / Corsica), United Kingdom (Nationalists / Northern Ireland)]. The second most common conflict item was international power, which was prevalent in twelve non-violent interstate conflicts, followed by territory and system/ideology, each amounting to ten. The two crises concerning subnational predominance both decreased to the lowest level of intensity [→Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahha-

bi militants), Russia (Ingush minority / North Ossetia-Alania)]. Europe's sole violent interstate conflict was also the only violent one over territory [→Armenia - Azerbaijan].

Southeast Europe, including the Balkans, formerly Europe's most violent area, featured 43 percent of the region's conflicts. However, only four of them were judged as violent crises [→Romania (opposition movement), Greece (social protests), FYROM (Albanian minority), Serbia (Kosovo)].

Although non-violent, both conflicts concerning Cyprus witnessed lasting tensions due to its EU presidency and the halt of UN-backed negotiations [→Cyprus - Turkey, Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)].


In Middle and Eastern Europe, the system and power conflict in Belarus de-escalated to a non-violent crisis [→Belarus (opposition)]. In the context of the Russian presidential elections, which resulted in the reinstatement of Vladimir Putin as president, the opposition conflict continued on a violent level [→Russia (opposition groups)].

In West and South Europe, two conflicts over secession remained violent [→France (FLNC / Corsica), United Kingdom (Nationalists / Northern Ireland)]. Europe's largest demonstration was staged in the context of the Catalan secession conflict with up to 1.5 million protesters gathering in the Catalan capital of Barcelona [→Spain (Catalan nationalists / Catalonia)].


The European Union obtained the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for its work over six decades of promoting peace, reconciliation, democracy, and human rights. However, four out of the thirteen violent conflicts in Europe were fought within EU member states. Among them were the conflicts concerning deteriorating socio-economic conditions and austerity measures in Greece and Romania in the context of the Euro debt crisis [→Greece (social protests), Romania (opposition movement)].

With 39 conflicts within states, twice as many intrastate conflicts as interstate conflicts were observed, with the latter counting twenty conflicts. However Europe accounted for the highest percent-share of interstate conflicts. In contrast to Sub-Saharan Africa (sixteen percent), in Europe 33 percent of all observed conflicts were between states.

CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN EUROPE IN 2012 COMPARED TO 2011



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2012 IN EUROPE BY INTENSITY GROUPS



CONFLICTS IN EUROPE IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Armenia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2003	↘	1
Armenia – Azerbaijan	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	territory	1987	•	3
Azerbaijan (Nagorno - Karabakh)*	Nagorno Karabakh vs. government	secession	1988	•	3
Azerbaijan (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2003	•	3
Azerbaijan - Iran	Azerbaijan vs. Iran	international power	2011	↗	2
Belarus (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1994	↘	2
Belarus–Poland*	Belarus vs. Poland	international power	1994	•	1
Belgium (N-VA / Flanders)	N-VA vs. government, Walloon parties	autonomy	2007	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs / Republic of Srpska)	Republic of Srpska vs. central government, Bosniak - Croat Federation	secession	1995	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat parties / Herzegovina)*	Croat parties vs. central government, Bosniak-Croat Federation, Bosniak, parties	autonomy	1992	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants)	Wahhabi militants vs. government	system / ideology, subnational predominance	2008	↓	1
Croatia (Croatian Serbs / Krajina, West and East Slavonia)*	Croatian Serbs vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)	TRNC vs. government	secession	1963	•	2
Cyprus - Turkey	Cyprus vs. Turkey	territory, international power, resources	2005	•	2
Denmark - Canada (Hans Island)*	Denmark vs. Canada	territory	1973	•	1
Estonia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
France (FLNC / Corsica)	FLNC vs. government	secession	1975	•	3
FYROM (Albanian minority)	Albanian minority vs. ethnic Macedonians	other	1991	↑	3
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Abkhazian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	3
Georgia (Armenian minority)*	Armenian minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	1
Georgia (Azeri minority)*	Azeri minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	1
Georgia (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2007	•	3
Georgia (South Ossetia)*	South Ossetian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Greece (social protests)	leftwing militants, other civic protest groups vs. government	system / ideology	1973	•	3
Greece - FYROM (official name of FYROM)*	Greece vs. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	other	1991	•	1
Hungary–Romania (minority)*	Hungary vs. Romania	international power	1990	•	1
Hungary–Slovakia (minority)*	Hungary vs. Slovakia	international power	1993	•	1
Italy (Lega Nord / northern Italy)*	Lega Nord vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Italy (Red Brigades)*	Red Brigades vs. government	system / ideology	1970	•	2
Latvia (Russian-speaking minority)	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Moldova (AEI–PCRM)*	AEI vs. PCRM	system / ideology, national power	2009	•	1
Moldova (Transdniestria)*	Transdniestrian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Romania (Hungarian minority / Transylvania)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1
Romania (opposition movement)	opposition movement vs. government	national power, other	2012	NEW	3

CONFLICTS IN EUROPE IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Russia (Ingush minority / North Ossetia-Alania)*	Ingush minority vs. government, Ossetians	subnational predominance	1992	↓	1
Russia (Islamist militant groups / Northern Caucasus)	Islamist militants vs. government	secession, system / ideology	1989	•	4
Russia (opposition groups)	government vs. opposition groups	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	3
Russia–Estonia*	Russia vs. Estonia	territory, international power	1994	•	1
Russia–Georgia*	Russia vs. Georgia	international power	1992	↘	1
Russia–Kazakhstan et al. (Caspian Sea)*	Russia vs. Kazakhstan vs. Azerbaijan vs. Turkmenistan vs. Iran	territory, international power, resources	1993	•	1
Russia–Latvia*	Russia vs. Latvia	international power	1994	•	1
Russia–Norway et al. (Arctic)*	Russia vs. Norway vs. United States vs. Canada vs. Denmark	territory, resources	2001	•	1
Russia–Ukraine*	Russia–Ukraine	territory, international power, resources	2003	•	1
Serbia (Albanian minority / Presevo Valley)*	Albanian minority vs. government	autonomy	2000	↗	2
Serbia (Bosniak minority / Sandzak)*	Bosniak minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Serbia (Kosovo)	Kosovar government vs. central government	secession	1989	•	3
Serbia (Vojvodina)	regional parties vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1
Serbia (Wahhabi militants / Sandzak)*	Wahhabi militants vs. government	secession, system / ideology	2007	•	1
Slovakia (Hungarian minority / southern Slovakia)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1993	•	1
Slovenia–Croatia (border)	Slovenia vs. Croatia	territory	1991	•	1
Spain (Catalan nationalists / Catalonia)	CiU, ERC, Catalan government vs. central government	secession	1979	•	1
Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)	ETA, PNV vs. government	secession	1959	•	2
Spain–United Kingdom (Gibraltar)*	Spain vs. United Kingdom	territory	1954	•	1
Turkey–Armenia*	Turkey vs. Armenia	international power, other	1991	•	1
Turkey–Greece (border)*	Turkey vs. Greece	territory	1973	•	2
United Kingdom (Nationalists / Northern Ireland)	Sinn Féin, RAAD, RIRA, The IRA vs. DUP, Alliance Party, SDLP, UUP, UDA, UVF, government	secession	1968	•	3
United Kingdom (SNP / Scotland)*	SNP, Scottish regional government vs. central government	secession	2007	•	1
USA–Russia (missile system)*	USA vs. Russia	international power	2007	•	2

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

ARMENIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: *opposition vs. government*
Conflict items: *national power*

The conflict over national power between the opposition and the government of President Serge Sarkisian further de-escalated. Ahead of the parliamentary elections on May 6, the opposition was in conflict with the government over the electoral law. On January 3, Sarkisian announced amendments to the Electoral Code to guarantee free and fair elections. The opposition doubted the sincerity of these pledges and called for more radical changes, including voting on a party-list basis. On April 16, the four major opposition parties agreed to form the Inter-Party Center for Public Oversight of Elections (ICPOE). The Republican Party (HHK) of Sarkisian won the absolute majority in the May elections. The Armenian National Congress (HAK) of former president Levon Ter-Petrosian gained 5.3 percent of the vote. OSCE called the elections competitive and largely peaceful. ICPOE reported numerous procedural violations, such as the dismissal of voters' complaints by election commissions, vote-buying by HHK and its coalition partner Prosperous Armenia, which included for instance the distribution of 500 tractors. Two days after the elections, approx. 5,000 HAK supporters protested in the capital Yerevan, demanding judicial review of the ballot. On December 25, Ter-Petrosian announced that he would not run for president in February 2013. lw

ARMENIA - AZERBAIJAN

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: *Armenia vs. Azerbaijan*
Conflict items: *territory*

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory but predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians, continued. Throughout the year, both parties frequently violated the 1994 ceasefire agreement. For instance, on January 14, according to official Azerbaijani sources, Armenian security personnel opened fire at Azerbaijani positions at the Line of Contact (LoC) close to the villages of Chayli and Yarymdzha, Tartar district. Clashes at the LoC in early June left five Azerbaijani and three Armenian soldiers dead and several wounded in the district of Qazakh. On June 11, a mine blast injured two Azerbaijani officers at the LoC. Sniper attacks killed one Armenian and one Azerbaijani soldier in Tavush province, Armenia, in March. On January 23, Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev met for negotiations in Sochi, Russia, mediated by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

On December 17, Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian and his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov held separate meetings with EU representatives over Nagor-

no-Karabakh in Brussels, Belgium. In the meetings, Nalbandian demanded a referendum over the final status of the disputed territory, while Mammadyarov stressed that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan. mto

AZERBAIJAN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: *opposition vs. government*
Conflict items: *system / ideology, national power*

The system and power conflict between oppositional groups and the government went on. Throughout the year, most rallies were held mainly in the capital Baku in spring. Police repeatedly arrested and injured activists, oppositional journalists, and bloggers. Five non-parliamentary parties formed the Resistance Movement for a Democratic Society on January 12. On March 1, approx. 1,000 people demanded the resignation of the local governor in Quba, Quba district. Some protesters torched his house and damaged administrative buildings. Police dispersed the crowd by using rubber bullets and tear gas. Three police officers and one journalist were injured. On March 17, police beat up and detained three political activists at a demonstration staged by youth organizations in Baku. In the forefront of this year's Eurovision Song Contest in Baku, several rallies repeatedly gathered some thousand people in April and May. On October 20 and November 17, police arrested 60 attendants of oppositional rallies in the capital. The opposition called for civil liberties, social and democratic reforms and the release of political prisoners, as well as early parliamentary elections and a new constitution, facing the upcoming presidential elections in 2013. lw, ld

AZERBAIJAN - IRAN

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *Azerbaijan vs. Iran*
Conflict items: *international power*

The conflict over international power between Azerbaijan and Iran increased but remained non-violent. In mid-January, Azerbaijani authorities detained three men, suspected of carrying out Iran-backed plans to assassinate public figures in Azerbaijan, as well as illegally acquiring and transporting firearms, military supplies, and explosives. On January 16, a cyber-attack blocked about a dozen official Azerbaijani websites, including those of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party, the Constitutional Court, and the Interior and Communications Ministries. A similar attack obstructed access to Iranian websites one day later. Two groups calling themselves the AzerianCyberArmy and Pirates Crew claimed responsibility. A meeting between the countries' foreign ministers and their Turkish colleague scheduled the same day was canceled. After Israel had sold drones, anti-aircraft and missile defense systems to Azerbaijan on February 27, Iran repeatedly accused the country of allowing Israeli intelligence activity on its territory [→Armenia

– Azerbaijan]. In February, Azerbaijani police detained 22 persons suspected of planning attacks on the embassies of the USA and Israel in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku and of having links to Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Police confiscated AK-47 rifles, guns, and explosives. A court sentenced the suspects to jail terms ranging from ten to fifteen years on October 9. During a two-day meeting with Iran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in order to soothe tensions, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev stated on March 12 that Azerbaijani territory was not to be used for a military attack on Iran. However, Iran withdrew its ambassador on May 21, following a visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman to Baku on April 23 and anti-Iran demonstrations on May 11 [→Iran - Israel]. He was reassigned one month later. Likewise, Azerbaijan summoned its ambassador for consultations on May 30. Iranian authorities arrested two alleged Azerbaijani spies in May, in the city of Tabriz, but released them on September 4. Also in May, Azerbaijani authorities arrested four Azerbaijani citizens suspected of plotting attacks on the eve of the Eurovision Song Contest in Baku and of having ties to members of the IRGC. They were sentenced to prison terms varying between twelve and fourteen years. *ld*

BELARUS (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: **opposition groups vs. government**
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The system and national power conflict between opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent level. The government continued to repress the opposition systematically. Throughout the year, authorities arrested about 70 activists and journalists on charges of hooliganism and public indecency, evicted them from their homes, or expelled them from university. Authorities impeded or prohibited protest rallies and public gatherings. However, on March 25, which is Belarus’ Freedom Day, about 5,000 protesters in Minsk staged the first sanctioned rally since the crackdown on 12/19/10.

Following cyber attacks on oppositional websites at the end of 2011, a law was passed on January 6, restricting access to foreign and anti-government websites. Another law, passed on June 6, allowed the Committee for State Security (KGB) to break into people’s houses without a warrant. Furthermore, the government authorized KGB to ban Belarusians from traveling abroad on its own discretion on July 6.

On January 19, the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD) was again denied registration as a political party. On February 2, an alliance of four opposition parties threatened to withdraw their candidates from parliamentary elections unless all political prisoners were liberated. Belarusian authorities announced on June 25 to allow OSCE observers to monitor parliamentary elections. Several opposition groups boycotted parliamentary elections held on September 23. The voting process was denounced as fraudulent by the EU, OSCE, and the Belarusian opposition. *jdr*

BELGIUM (N-VA / FLANDERS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: **N-VA vs. government**
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between the nationalist party New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and the government continued. On March 11, N-VA accused Francophone Socialists’ (PS) Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo of not taking Flemish demands into account in the 2012 budget. On September 10, N-VA leader Bart De Wever expressed optimism about his party’s prospects regarding the 2014 federal elections and called on the Francophones to prepare for confederalism. In mid-October, local elections were held all over the country. N-VA won the municipal elections in Flanders’ important city of Antwerp, gaining 37.7 percent of the votes. Following the victory, De Wever urged Di Rupo to reshape the federal system. On October 19, Di Rupo demanded the European leaders to tackle the economic crisis in order to fight against the rise of separatist movements. On October 27, unknown persons placed a chopped pig’s head in front of De Wever’s house in Antwerp. In his traditional Christmas address, King Albert II warned of populism, drawing an analogy to the rise of fascism in the 1930s. In reaction, De Wever accused the King of having politicized his role and demanded his resignation. *fmb*

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BOSNIAN SERBS / REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **1995**

Conflict parties: **Republic of Srpska vs. central government, Bosniak-Croat Federation**
Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict between the Republic of Srpska (RS) and the central government continued. In the forefront of celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of the founding of RS, a large amount of weapons and ammunition was found at the designated venue in Banja Luka, RS, on January 8. RS boycotted Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) 20th anniversary of independence on March 1. RS President Milorad Dodik called the date an event only for Bosnians. On October 4, Dodik announced an initiative for the abolition of the federal armed forces. During her visit to Sarajevo on October 30, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized Bosnian Serb leaders for challenging the territorial integrity of BiH and stressed the importance of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement. Before the UN Security Council on November 13, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Valentin Inzko warned about secessionist rhetoric used by RS leaders, in particular by Dodik. The Council extended the mandate of the EUFOR Althea operation until November 2013. *mmu*

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (WAHHABI MILITANTS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: ↓ | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: *Wahhabi militants vs. government*
 Conflict items: *system/ideology, subnational predominance*

The conflict over ideology and subnational predominance between Wahhabi militants and the government decreased. On January 21, Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BiH) Security Minister Sadik Ahmetovic announced measures to prevent Islamist attacks, in reaction to the one against the US embassy in the capital of Sarajevo on 10/28/11. In an operation on January 30, police forces raided five Wahhabi-inhabited houses in Brcko. Authorities arrested Nusret Imamovic, leader of the largest Wahhabi community in BiH, as well as two others and found a sniper rifle, allegedly used in the US embassy attack. On April 23, Bosnian prosecutors charged three assumed Wahhabi militants with the attack. One of the suspects, Mevlid Jasarevic, said he was inspired by Imamovic. On December 6, the court sentenced Jasarevic to nineteen years in prison while acquitting the others. *mmu*

CYPRUS (TRNC / NORTHERN CYPRUS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: *TRNC vs. government*
 Conflict items: *secession*

The secession conflict between the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the government continued on a non-violent level. The UN-backed negotiations, mainly concerning governance, individual property claims, and territorial issues between TRNC leader Dervis Eroglu and the president of the Republic of Cyprus, Dimitrios Christofias, were resumed on January 4. In the first half of the year, the parties held several meetings until Cyprus took over the EU presidency on July 1. Eroglu declared that day the end of all negotiations. Additionally, TRNC's motherland Turkey ceased all contact with Cyprus in the second half of the year [→ Cyprus – Turkey]. While the government blamed TRNC of not pursuing a solution on the agreed basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, Eroglu perceived the first meetings as positive. Following a two-day meeting between the parties and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in Greentree, New York, having started on January 22, Ban announced to call an international conference to end the conflict if main differences could be overcome. On January 25, the government criticized Alexander Downer, Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus, after he had called Cyprus' approaching EU presidency the "Presidency of the Greek Cypriots". A week later, the Greek Cypriot parliament adopted a resolution which rebuked Downer for perceived bias. Throughout February and March and under the auspices of UN officials, Eroglu and Christofias repeatedly discussed property issues at the UN residence, located in the buffer zone. On April 4, TRNC representative

Kudret Ozersay suggested to re-open the uninhabited town of Varosha, allowing for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live under Turkish Cypriot rule. Christofias responded by referring to UN Resolution 550, which stated that Varosha should be under UN administration before the inhabitants could return. On April 21, Ban called off his plans for an international summit and announced to no longer host the meetings of Cypriot leaders due to their failure to narrow lasting differences. On July 19, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 01/30/13. *fmb*

CYPRUS–TURKEY

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: *Cyprus vs. Turkey*
 Conflict items: *territory, international power, resources*

The conflict over international power, territory, and resources between Cyprus and Turkey continued. Cyprus repeatedly demanded Turkey to withdraw its troops from northern Cyprus and to abide by UN resolutions. On March 4, Turkey's Minister of European Affairs, Egemen Bagis, stated that he considered annexing northern Cyprus in case reunification talks failed [→ Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)]. As of July 1, Turkey abstained from Cyprus-led meetings during the latter's EU presidency, however, it continued collaboration with the EU. On October 15, Cyprus canceled this year's Nikiforos military exercise. Similarly, Turkey called off its military exercise Toros on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) five days later. On December 10, Cyprus' Defense Minister Demetris Eliades urged to strengthen the country's defense forces as long as Turkish troops were deployed in the north of the island.

Throughout the year, the countries were in conflict over oil and gas drillings in disputed waters off Cyprus. On February 17, Cyprus rejected Turkish claims on its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), demanding Ankara to stop provocative actions in regard to Cyprus' exploratory drillings. Turkey's state-run Turkish Petroleum Corporation launched oil and natural gas drillings in the TRNC at the end of April. The Cypriot government condemned the move as illegal. However, the drilling was abandoned in October after the search had yielded no results. On May 18, Cyprus accused Turkey of pursuing an expansionist agenda in the region after Turkey had threatened with reprisals against companies that were bidding for Cypriot drilling projects. Turkey conducted military exercises within the EEZ in mid-July, which were denounced by Eliades as an infringement of the freedom of navigation at sea. On July 31, Turkey warned fifteen countries, among them Russia, China, France, UK, and Norway, against participating in a licensing round for drilling blocks in the EEZ. *fmb*

FRANCE (FLNC / CORSICA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: ***FLNC vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***secession***

The secession conflict between the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) and the central government remained violent. Corsica witnessed several bomb attacks and assaults throughout the year. Although the FLNC did not officially claim responsibility for all actions, in most cases government officials attributed the violence to FLNC or its subgroups. Between May 11 and 19, unknown perpetrators carried out a total of 24 attacks during which five unoccupied holiday homes of French and foreign owners were bombed without causing any victims. Responsibility for the attacks was uncertain, but two FLNC inscriptions were found on walls in Giuncheto. On July 2, militants bombed the mansion of retired Parisian banker Alain Lefèbvre in Balistra. In the night from September 9 to 10, small bombs exploded in front of seven supermarkets across the island causing minor material damage but no injuries. FLNC claimed responsibility for the attacks. Another wave of violence on December 7 included 26 private holiday homes bombed. While no one claimed responsibility for the attacks, one of the residences was tagged with the symbol of an FLNC faction.

Meanwhile, the French judiciary delivered judgments against leading nationalist figures. On April 13, the special Assize Court of Paris sentenced Dominique Pasqualaggi, head of the group FLNC of October 22, to thirteen years in prison for committing ten attacks between 2004 and 2006. On July 6, the court sentenced twenty Corsican nationalists, called the FLNC Youth, charged with bomb attacks in 2007 and 2008 to penalties ranging from three months with probation to twelve years. On July 11, the Court of Cassation rejected Yvan Colonna's appeal, thus confirming his lifelong sentence for the assassination of Corsican prefect Claude Érignac in 1998. In October, the government announced new measures to restore order on the island after former Corsican nationalist Yves Manunta and Corsican lawyer Antoine Sollacaro had been killed on July 9 and October 17, respectively, indicating FLNC's increasing involvement in organized crime. *ado*

FYROM (ALBANIAN MINORITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↑ | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: ***Albanian minority vs. ethnic Macedonians***
 Conflict items: ***other***

The autonomy conflict between the Albanian minority and ethnic Macedonians escalated to a violent level. Throughout the year, several incidents of ethnically motivated violence between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians were reported. On January 31, unknown perpetrators torched an Orthodox church in the village of Labuniste, Struga. On March 10, four

ethnic Albanians attacked three Macedonians in the capital Skopje. Five people were injured. In the village of Kondovo, Saraj, on March 22, five unknown perpetrators stopped the car of former Democratic Party of Albanians' deputy leader Valon Bela and beat him up. On April 14, five Macedonians were found executed near Creshevo, Aerodrom. Subsequently, protests erupted and inhabitants of the village threw stones at houses of Albanians. Interior Minister Gordana Jankulovski called on the citizens to remain calm. On April 17, an organization calling itself Army for the Liberation of Occupied Albanian Lands threatened to launch attacks throughout the country. The same day, some thousand Macedonians protested in front of the government building in Skopje against the murder of the five men on April 14. Police arrested ten people who chanted nationalistic slogans and threw stones. On May 11, after the detention of five Albanian suspects regarding the April 14 murder, several thousand protesters gathered again in front of the government building. On July 10, two ethnic Albanians killed a Macedonian in Tetovo. On November 25, about 30 ethnic Albanians beat up several Macedonians in Skopje. *fpb*

GEORGIA (ABKHAZIA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: ***Abkhazian separatists vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***secession***

The secession conflict between the breakaway region of Abkhazia and the government continued. On May 28, two policemen and one civilian were killed as two men opened fire with AK-47 rifles in a coffee shop in Gali, Gali district. Abkhaz authorities blamed Georgian intelligence for the attack. On August 13, Abkhaz police officers reportedly killed one and arrested three persons in the village Primorsk, accusing them of having links to Georgian authorities which instructed them to carry out attacks.

On March 10 and 24, Abkhazia held its first parliamentary elections since the war in 2008 [→Russia – Georgia]. In the course of the year, Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia held four rounds of internationally mediated negotiations in the framework of the Geneva talks without making significant progress [→Georgia (South Ossetia)]. Abkhazia repeatedly accused the head of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) of having shown disrespect to Abkhazia and called for his replacement. Subsequently, Abkhazia refused to participate in regular meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. On September 14, EU extended EUMM's mandate for another twelve months. *mak*

GEORGIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: ***opposition groups vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***system/ideology, national power***

The system and power conflict between oppositional parties,

mainly represented by the newly formed Georgian Dream coalition, and the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili remained violent. On April 19, Bidzina Ivanishvili founded the Georgian Dream–Democratic Georgia, which formed the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition two days later and comprised, among others, Our Georgia-Free Democrats, the National Forum, and the Republican Party. In the run-up to the elections, tensions between the conflict parties rose. Authorities repeatedly imposed fines on GD members and supporters. For instance, on June 11, a court fined Ivanishvili USD 45.4 million, for violating electoral and political funding laws. On May 27, up to 100,000 people attended a mass rally in the capital Tbilisi marking the start of GD's election campaign. Between June 21 and July 22, police seized over 300,000 satellite dishes distributed throughout the country by the opposition broadcasters Global TV and Maestro TV. In June and July, violence erupted in the region of Shida Kartli. For instance, GD activists and supporters of Saakashvili's ruling United National Movement (UNM) clashed in the village of Mereti on June 26 and in Karaleti on July 11. The latter left a dozen people injured. On September 29, ten thousands of opposition supporters took to the streets in Tbilisi. On October 1, parliamentary elections were held. GD won the elections, securing 54 percent of the vote, while UNM gained 40.3 percent. The elections marked the first democratic transfer of power since independence. Parliament approved Ivanishvili as Prime Minister on October 25, after Saakashvili had restored his Georgian citizenship of which he had been deprived in 2011. After the elections, the new government declared its intentions to re-establish relations with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but ruled out their recognition [→Georgia (Abkhazia), Georgia (South Ossetia)]. On November 22, Ivanishvili signaled his readiness to meet Russian officials, though he would not visit Russia [→Russia – Georgia]. Despite an agreement on cooperation, Ivanishvili and Saakashvili split over several issues, including the 2013 state budget and the arrests of several former senior officials. For instance, former Minister of Internal Affairs Bachana Akhalaia was charged with abusing his authority and condoning torture in prisons as well as former Energy Minister Aleksandre Khetaguri and former Justice Minister Nika Gvaramia with evading taxes. Saakashvili, as well as NATO, EU, and the US, criticized the arrests. *jd*

GREECE (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: *leftwing militants, other civic protest groups vs. government*
 Conflict items: *system / ideology*

The system and ideology conflict between left-wing militants and other civic groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violent level. Throughout the year, protests against the government's austerity measures in reaction to the financial and economic crisis had led to the arrest and injury of several hundreds. During most of the protests, black-masked youths and police clashed. Masked pro-

testers threw petrol bombs and stones while police used tear gas and stun grenades. On January 17, 12,000 demonstrated against austerity measures in Athens during EU and IMF talks on a second aid package. Between February 10 and 19, violent clashes took place throughout the country. At least 125 people were injured in Athens, among them up to 50 policemen, 67 rioters arrested and 135 detained. From February 10 to 12, black-masked youths clashed with police during demonstrations including 80,000 protesters in Athens, after the parliament had passed new austerity measures. Protesters torched 45 buildings with Molotov cocktails. In Thessaloniki, Macedonia, police and protesters clashed when 20,000 demonstrated on February 12. Further clashes reportedly took place on the islands Corfu and Crete. Another demonstration in Athens led to heavy clashes on February 19. On March 25, anti-austerity protests in Athens sparked further clashes. In Patras, Achaia, about 50 protesters attacked policemen with stones and bottles. Policemen used tear gas in Heraklion and Chania on Crete. That day, at least 39 people were detained throughout the country. On April 5, after a suicide in front of the parliament in connection to the severe economic situation, minor clashes between police and protesters erupted in the capital. The day after, protesters threw flares at policemen and attacked them with clubs. On September 27, up to 100,000 protested against new austerity measures. Riot police clashed with several hundred protesters and detained 120 people. In the context of a visit by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on October 9, 40,000 demonstrated, ignoring the government's ban on protests. Police allegedly used a female protester as a human shield. On October 18, during a general strike against the austerity measures around 70,000 demonstrated in Athens. Protesters again clashed with the police, several people were wounded. Police arrested seven people and detained around 100. During strikes and massive demonstrations in Athens on November 6 and 7, several hundred protesters clashed with the police. *kwu*

LATVIA (RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: *government vs. Russian-speaking minority*
 Conflict items: *autonomy*

The conflict between the Russian-speaking minority and the government concerning autonomy and ethnic minority rights went on. The Latvian population rejected the referendum on Russian as a second state language, set by the Russian minority, on February 19. On May 14, over 3,000 signatures were collected in favor of granting citizenship to all local, mainly Russian-speaking, non-citizens. On June 12, the security police raided the homes of two leaders of a pro-Russian language movement. On October 25, Vladislavs Rafalskis, activist of For Human Rights in United Latvia and a teacher of Russian language at Riga Secondary School No 40, who had made a disloyalty statement earlier, received a written reprimand. The same day, lawmakers rejected the proposal to restore people's optional right to indicate their ethnic origin in their passports that had been raised by the ruling National Alliance party. *vhu*

ROMANIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: **opposition movement vs. government**
 Conflict items: **national power, other**

A new conflict concerning national power and socio-economic conditions emerged between oppositional civic and political groups, on the one hand, and the government of President Traian Basescu, on the other. Throughout the year, protests against the government's austerity measures and decreasing living standards had left several hundreds injured. On January 10, Deputy Health Minister Raed Arafat resigned criticizing the new healthcare reform bill. Two days later, demonstrations in support of Arafat began taking place across the country. The largest demonstration took place in Targo Mures, Mures County, with about 3,000 participants. On January 14, more than 1,000 protested against the government and Basescu in University Square in the capital Bucharest. Some torched cars, looted shops, and threw stones, injuring one camera man and four policemen. Police responded by using tear gas and water cannon injuring around a dozen protesters and detaining about 30. Opposition parties joined the protests on January 16, resulting in more than 20,000 people demonstrating in several cities across the country in the following three days. Police detained dozens.

On February 6, Prime Minister Emil Boc, Democratic Liberal Party, announced the government's resignation. One month later, the newly formed Social Liberal Union (USL) of former opposition leader and new Prime Minister Victor Ponta won the parliament's approval, which was eventually confirmed in parliamentary elections on December 9. On July 6, parliament suspended Basescu from office, paving the way for a referendum on his impeachment. On July 27, over 15,000 people attended a rally in Bucharest, urging Basescu to resign. Although 87 percent of the constituents voted against Basescu in the referendum on July 29, it was declared invalid as the voter turnout fell short of the 50 percent required. On August 22, the Constitutional Court reinstated Basescu. map

RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANTS / NORTHERN CAUCASUS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: **Islamist militants vs. government**
 Conflict items: **secession, system / ideology**

The system and secession conflict between Islamist militants of the Caucasian Front (CF), led by self-proclaimed Caucasian Emir Dokka Umarov, on the one hand, and the central as well as regional governments, on the other, continued on a highly violent level. The CF aimed at establishing a Caucasus Emirate ruled by Sharia law and spanning over the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) comprising the Federal Republics of Chechnya (RoC), Dagestan (RoD), Ingushetia (RoI), Kabardino-Balkaria (RoKB), Karachay-Cherkessia (RoKC), and North Oss-

etia-Alania (RoNOA), as well as the region Stavropol Krai (SK).

Several local militant groups operating in the republics supported the CF, such as the Ingush Jamaat, the Yarmuk Jamaat in RoKC, Kataib al-Khoul aka the Ossetian Jamaat, and the Shariat Jamaat.

Shootings, bombings, and ambushes against security forces, government authorities, and civilians occurred at times on a daily basis. Responsibility for the attacks was uncertain in many cases but usually attributed to CF-aligned Islamist militants by officials. Throughout the year, the conflict claimed approx. 600 lives, among them at least 379 insurgents and 211 servicemen, including 149 police officers.

The situation further escalated in RoD, where 232 insurgents and 130 servicemen had been killed, therefore accounting for two thirds of the total number of deaths in NCFD. According to the republic's Interior Ministry, at least twelve groups made up of nearly 300 militants operating in RoD. In the course of the year, government forces significantly increased their efforts against militant Islamist activities. Russian authorities started deploying Interior Ministry personnel as military reinforcements. After relocating two divisions from Chechnya consisting of more than 20,000 personnel in March, military forces in Dagestan exceeded 60,000. Additionally, more than 17,000 police officers were active in the region. On January 13, security forces destroyed an insurgent's base near the village of Bolshaya Oreshevka, confiscating equipment and munitions. In February, during a four-day operation close to the Chechen border, at least 20 rebels and seventeen security forces were killed. Among the casualties was Ibragim-Chalil Daudow, the suspected leader of the Islamist militants in Dagestan. Dokka Umarov announced Amir Abu Muchammad to be Daudow's successor. On May 3, suspected Islamist militants conducted a bomb attack on a police station in the Dagestani capital Makhachkala, killing at least thirteen people and wounding more than 120. On May 15, during an operation in the same city, Russian forces killed Gusein Mamaev, another suspected leader of the Islamist insurgency. On November 20, Russian Special Forces killed Taimas Taimasov, an alleged leader of an Islamist militant cell, in the eastern village of Gubden. Islamist militants also targeted several moderate Muslim leaders, among them Said Afandi, leader of a Sufi Muslim brotherhood on August 28.

In Chechnya, frequent attacks and combat actions between security forces and militants caused at least 90 deaths and numerous injuries. On August 6, the anniversary of the city's storming by Chechen militants in 1996, a suicide attack left four people dead in the Chechen capital Grozny. Casualties included two officers, one soldier, and one civilian, while three others were injured. Unknown assailants attacked a police vehicle near the village of Alkhan-Kala on August 18, killing four officers. On September 6, another police officer was killed in Grozny when a bomb detonated under his car. Until September, approx. 30 militants and 40 servicemen were killed and more than 50 servicemen injured in special operations. Four Russian soldiers and four militants were killed in a shootout on January 8 in the Vedensky district, leaving sixteen other servicemen wounded. In a similar incident in the Gudermes district, two insurgents and two police officers died on April 22. Two militants, allegedly ordered by Dokka Umarov to assassinate Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, were killed in Grozny on June 15, according to official sources. At least four militants and two police officers were killed in a special operation against an armed militant group led by Muslim Gakayev in the mountainous area of Vedensky district on September 20. After government forces had captured rebel leader Emir Mukharbi Isaev on September 18 in

Vedeno district, further operations were conducted in the area. In a series of clashes beginning on September 20, four suspected militants and four government forces were killed with the military using helicopters, artillery, and heavy mortars to shell forest areas.

In Ingushetia, gunfights, bomb attacks, and assassination attempts on local officials and security forces frequently took place. Two policemen died in a bomb explosion in Malgobek on April 28. In June and July, five security forces and one civilian were killed. On August 13, attackers shot dead two Russian servicemen in their car near the border to North Ossetia-Alania. On August 19, a suicide bomber killed eight people and injured at least fifteen during the funeral of a killed police officer in Sagopshi. The attempt was attributed to a militant group led by Artur Getagadzhev, a Dokka Umarov lieutenant. A group of ten to twelve militants killed four policemen in an armed clash near the village of Dattukh on October 3. A suicide bomber killed one policeman at a checkpoint near the border to North Ossetia on October 23. From October onwards, Russian security forces were supported by Russian army troops for the first time since 2006. On January 27, security forces killed Dzhamaileyl Mutaliyev, alleged senior leader of the Caucasus Emirate and two other militants in Nazranovskiy district. In August and September, Kadyrov informed about the killing of eight militants in special operations near the Chechen border, while Ingushetian officials denied Chechen involvement.

In Kabardino-Balkaria, the conflict remained violent. On February 2, attackers shot and wounded an official of the Urvansky district and killed his driver near Shitkhala. In Baksan, an officer of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was killed in a car explosion on June 10. According to Interior Minister Kazbek Tatuyev, more than 70 militants had been killed in Kabardino-Balkarian. For instance, security forces killed two militants in the Baksanskiy district on January 12. Another six insurgents were killed in the village of Mir on March 12. On March 27, Russian forces killed Alim Zankishiyev, aka Ubaida, in Nalchik, leader of a militant group operating in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. Two militants died and four policemen were injured in a shootout in Baksan on June 10. Later federal forces killed a suspected coordinator of assaults on June 26. Police forces killed eight militants on September 20 in Nalchik. Among them were four leading figures of the insurgency, two of whom were identified as Ruslan Batyrbekov, aka Emir of Kabardino-Balkaria, and Shamil Ulbashev, so-called Emir of Nalchik. Around November 17, security forces killed five militants during a search operation near the village of Baksanenok.

In Karachay-Cherkessia, the number of violent incidents decreased. On June 12, security troops and local police killed several militants, including Umar Baichorov, who was suspected for masterminding and conducting attacks targeting local police last year.

dh, jd, ka, lw

RUSSIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: *government vs. opposition groups*
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The system and power conflict between various opposition groups and the government continued. Several oppositional and pro-government demonstrations were staged throughout

the year, some of them turned violent.

On February 4, according to official sources, 35,000 anti-government protesters of the For Honest Elections movement gathered in Moscow, while organizers estimated their numbers at 200,000. Simultaneously, up to 35,000 protesters assembled in Saint Petersburg, forming the third mass demonstration since the parliamentary elections on 12/04/11. Two weeks later, designated president Vladimir Putin gathered 130,000 supporters in Moscow. On February 26, about 30,000 people staged an anti-government protest, forming a 16 km long human chain in Moscow and wearing white ribbons as a symbol for peaceful protest.

The presidential elections on March 4 sparked another wave of pro- and anti-Putin protests. Opposition activists and independent observers reported widespread fraud after Putin had won with a majority of around 64 percent. During protests in Moscow and Saint Petersburg one day later, police detained between 120 and 550 people including opposition leaders Alexey Navalny and Sergei Udaltsov. On May 6, violence between protesters and police officers erupted, with police using batons. Twenty protesters were injured and more than 250 out of at least 20,000 detained. Putin's inauguration on May 7 was accompanied by about 120 detentions as a result of the first of several consecutive March of Millions demonstrations. In June, the Upper House passed a law according to which protesters could be charged with about USD 50,000 or up to 200 hours of community service. After law enforcement officials raided homes of opposition leaders on June 11, they detained Navalny and Udaltsov one day later, an hour before they were to speak on a demonstration.

Shortly after pronouncing the sentence for the punk band Pussy Riot for an anti-Putin performance at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, Moscow, hundreds of activists demonstrated in front of the court on August 17. Some were detained. On September 14, the Duma unseated parliamentarian and Kremlin-critic Gennady Gudkov, a move criticized by the EU. On October 14, gubernatorial elections along with communal elections, in which Putin's United Russia secured a majority, had to face accusations of forgery. After the Russian Investigative Committee (SK) had accused and questioned opposition activists Leonid Razvozhayev, Konstantin Lebedev, and Sergei Udaltsov about plotting a mass disorder with foreign assistance, Razvozhayev claimed on October 21 of being kidnapped from Kiev while seeking political asylum and later being tortured by SK. From October 20 to 22, the opposition held its own Coordination Council elections. Almost 200,000 people had registered for the vote. *fes*

SERBIA (KOSOVO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: *Kosovar government vs. central government*
Conflict items: *secession*

The secession conflict between the Kosovar government, supported by the Albanian majority in Kosovo, on the one hand, and the central government of Serbia and parts of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, on the other, remained violent. Although both sides held EU-mediated talks, tensions arose in

the northern part of Kosovo, mainly inhabited by ethnic Serbs. On January 1, deputies of the three main Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo decided to hold a referendum in February on whether they wanted to acknowledge legal bindings by Kosovar institutions or not. On February 14 and 15, Serbs in northern Kosovo rejected Kosovar rule. The referendum was denounced by both the Kosovar and Serbian governments and was not legally binding. Serbian President Boris Tadic ruled out EU requirements regarding relations with Kosovo during a visit to a monastery in Pec, west Kosovo, on January 7. About 200 protesters from the Kosovar opposition Self-Determination movement (Vetevendosje), mainly ethnic Albanians, demonstrated against his visit and threw stones at Tadic's convoy. On January 14, hundreds of Vetevendosje members tried to block two border crossings near Merdare and Bela Zemlja and clashed with Kosovar police, who used tear gas and water cannon, arresting 146 protesters. 52 people, including 31 police officers, were injured.

A new round of EU-sponsored dialog between Kosovo and Serbia started in Brussels on February 21, resulting in an agreement concerning Kosovo's participation in regional and EU-Balkan forums and the application of previous agreements like the integrated border management. As a consequence, some border crossings were opened on February 23. On February 27, more than 1,000 Kosovar Albanian hardliners protested against the agreement. On March 1, Serbia was given EU candidacy status. Unknown persons attacked a Serbian delegation with stones in Pristina on April 4 when heading to a meeting with Kosovar officials. On April 8, tensions rose in north Kosovo when a bomb exploded in Mitrovica, leaving one ethnic Albanian dead and five children injured. The same day, three unidentified assailants beat up a Serb and hundreds of Serbs dismantled a mobile police post right after Kosovar officials had set it up. On May 23, unknown attackers torched two houses belonging to Serbian refugees in Drenovac.

On June 1, two KFOR soldiers and three Serbs were wounded in a clash when a crowd tried to stop them from removing border barricades. On June 19, unknown attackers threw two grenades at KFOR barracks at the border. About twenty Serbs and 40 officials were injured during border clashes between Serbs and Kosovar police on June 28 - 70 Serbs had entered Kosovo, throwing stones at the authorities and firing automatic rifles. Later that day, unknown perpetrators attacked five buses, carrying Kosovar Serb students, with stones and Molotov cocktails in Pristina, injuring ten. On August 2, a group of ethnic Albanians raided mainly Serb-populated Grabac and damaged houses, injuring one person. On August 14, a group of Serbs attacked two Albanians in Mitrovica, leaving one of them severely injured. On September 7, a policewoman was injured in northern Kosovo when unknown attackers opened fire at vehicles carrying EULEX forces and Kosovar police.

On October 18, EU chief diplomat Catherine Ashton met the prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia in a bid to re-launch talks. Four days later, hundreds protested and threw stones at police that used tear gas in response, leaving dozens injured in Pristina. The protest was organized by Vetevendosje, which opposes all talks with Serbia. As a reaction, Kosovar Prime Minister Hashim Thaci called on the movement to halt its protests. On November 7, the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo held talks again.

map

SERBIA (VOJVODINA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: *regional parties vs. government*
 Conflict items: *autonomy*

The autonomy conflict between regional parties of Vojvodina, among them the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV), the Union of Socialists of Vojvodina, the Vojvodinian Movement, and the Alliance for Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. On March 12, the Vojvodina Assembly president and SVM member Sandor Egeresi demanded an own police force for Vojvodina. In regional parliamentary elections on May 6 and 20, the Choice for a Better Vojvodina coalition, led by LSV Vice President and President of the Government of Vojvodina, Bojan Pajtic, gained the majority of votes, winning 58 out of 120 seats. On July 11, the Constitutional Court declared parts of the Law on Establishing Jurisdiction of Vojvodina, implemented in January 2010, as unconstitutional. While the Democratic Party of Serbia leader Vojislav Kostunica supported the court's decision seeing it as an important step to stop further dissolution from Serbia, LSV urged the regional government to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. On October 13, Prime Minister Ivica Dacic and Pajtic met in Belgrade to discuss the Constitutional Court's decision, specifically the Law on Financing of Vojvodina. *fph*

SLOVENIA–CROATIA (BORDER)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: *Slovenia vs. Croatia*
 Conflict items: *territory*

The maritime and land border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia continued. After both countries submitted their arbitration agreement to the UN on 05/25/11, Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vesna Pusic and his Slovenian counterpart Samuel Zbogar met in Brussels on January 10 to discuss a list of potential arbitrator judges for the dispute resolution process. On January 18, Pusic and Zbogar announced the five candidates in Zagreb. Moreover, both sides agreed to accept any judgment of the panel, without the possibility of appeal. At a meeting in The Hague, Netherlands, on April 14, Croatia and Slovenia agreed to submit their memoranda and reasoning on 02/11/13 and their counter-memoranda on 11/11/13. The deciding debate will be held in spring 2015. *sth*

SPAIN (CATALAN NATIONALISTS / CATALONIA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: *CiU, ERC, Catalan government vs. central government*
 Conflict items: *secession*

The secession conflict between the Catalan regional govern-

ment and the central government continued on a non-violent level. On March 14, some municipalities called for tax disobedience against the central state. On July 18, the Catalanian president and Convergence and Union (CiU) leader, Artur Mas, exhorted other regions to object to a government's austerity plan, according to which the regions had to reduce their public deficit to 1.5 percent of the economic output. Additionally, he blamed the central government to be responsible for the tense economic situation of Catalonia. On September 11, the Catalan national holiday, up to 1.5 million people demonstrated peacefully in Barcelona against the government's fiscal policy, for greater tax autonomy, and for independence. Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy rejected the Catalan's demands in a meeting with Mas on September 20. In response, Mas announced snap elections. On September 27, the Catalan regional parliament adopted a resolution backing Mas' demands for a referendum on independence during the next legislative period in case CiU won the snap elections. The central government declared a referendum unconstitutional and on October 9, parliament voted against the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) party's motion that asked for the executive permission to hold such a referendum. In snap elections on November 25, the pro-independence parties CiU and ERC emerged as the strongest parties. On December 12, CiU and ERC agreed to hold a referendum on independence before the end of 2014. joe

ber in Macon, France. On November 12, about 15,000 people demonstrated in Bayonne, southwestern France, in support of arrested Basque separatists. On November 24, ETA announced a possible disbanding under certain conditions, especially the transfer of detained members to Basque prisons. A total of nineteen people suspected of having links to ETA were arrested this year, twelve of them in France. joe

UNITED KINGDOM (NATIONALISTS / NORTHERN IRELAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: ***Sinn Féin, RAAD, RIRA, The IRA vs. DUP, Alliance Party, SDLP, UUP, UDA, UVF, government***

Conflict items: ***secession***

The conflict between the antagonistic communities over the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom continued. On May 24, the Alliance Party withdrew from the five-party working group aimed at promoting better community relations and greater integration in Northern Ireland. Alliance leader David Ford said there had not been enough progress on the issues of integrated education, segregated housing, or illegal flags. On July 19, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Owen Paterson, criticized the Stormont Executive over the delay in the publication of the community relations strategy (CSI). On October 16, Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams declared republican ambitions for Irish unity had been boosted by the decision to hold a referendum on Scottish independence in 2014 [→United Kingdom (SNP / Scotland)].

On December 3, the Belfast City Council voted to fly the union flag at city hall only on designated days, compromising on the nationalists' pledge to take down the flag altogether. A loyalists' protest outside the building erupted into violence, leaving fifteen police officers injured. On December 8, Assistant Chief Constable Will Kerr said loyalist paramilitary groups were actively involved in orchestrating the disorder. At least 29 police officers were injured and 40 people arrested as a result of protest-related violence.

Throughout the year, paramilitary violence continued. The Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) claimed responsibility for the murder of a man in Buncrana, County Donegal, Republic of Ireland, on February 9. On September 3, Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) key figure Alan Ryan was shot dead in the Clongriffin area of Dublin, Republic of Ireland. Three men were subsequently charged over paramilitary displays at his funeral. On October 24, the Home Office declared the threat level in Northern Ireland remained severe still regarding an attack by dissident republicans very likely. Again, on November 1, a prison officer was shot and killed in County Armagh. On November 12, a new paramilitary group calling itself The IRA claimed responsibility for the murder. jb

SPAIN (ETA, PNV / BASQUE PROVINCES)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1959**


Conflict parties: ***ETA, PNV vs. government***

Conflict items: ***secession***

The conflict between Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and the central government concerning the secession of the Basque Country from Spain continued on a non-violent level. Since ETA declared a permanent ceasefire on 01/10/11, President of the Government Mariano Rajoy entered into a dialog with the President of the Basque regional government, Patxi López, agreeing on fundamentals to marginalize ETA. On February 10, French police found a weapons cache in Capbreton, southwestern France, allegedly belonging to ETA. The political wing of ETA apologized for the first time on February 26 for the group's armed struggle. On March 8, ETA urged France and Spain to open direct talks on a definitive end to the conflict and on the situation of arrested ETA members. On May 3, the National Court sentenced former head of ETA Félix Alberto López de la Calle Gauna, alias Mobutu, to 81 years in prison. In August, about 700 ETA members in French and Spanish prisons, including former leader Arnaldo Otegi, went on hunger strike to demand the release of terminally ill ETA member Iosua Uribebarria. A few days later, the government agreed to release him. In the regional elections on October 21, the pro-independence Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and EH Bildu, a separatist coalition, became the strongest parties with 27 and 21 seats, respectively. PNV leader Inigo Urkullu became Basque Prime Minister. On October 28, police arrested ETA top leader Izaskun Lesaka and another suspected ETA mem-

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



- : NO VIOLENT CONFLICT
- : VIOLENT CRISIS
- : LIMITED WAR
- : WAR

At a total 90 conflicts, the number of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa decreased by two compared to 2011. The number of highly violent conflicts increased by five to eighteen. This was the highest number of highly violent conflicts observed in Sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the observation period in 1945. All wars and limited wars were recorded in Western, Eastern and Central Africa, with Southern Africa being only sporadically affected. Altogether, nine wars were observed: Four conflicts continued as a war [→ Somalia (Islamist groups), Sudan (Darfur), Sudan (inter-ethnic violence), Nigeria (Boko Haram)], whereas five conflicts escalated to the intensity level of a war. The conflict between the Islamist group al-Shabaab and the Somali government, supported by the Ahlu Sunna wa-Jama'a, was fought as a war for the seventh year running. The war between various ethnic groups in South Sudan and the war in the Sudanese region of Darfur continued, the latter since its eruption in 2003. In addition, the conflict between the Islamist group Boko Haram, mainly active in northern Nigeria, and the government remained on the intensity level of a war. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the conflict between former CNDP rebels and the government escalated by three levels. The rebels started defecting from the army in Nord Kivu province in March, forming the new group M23 in May. The rebellion reached the level of a war in May, when government forces and the rebels clashed near Virunga National Park. The conflict between the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad aiming at the secession of the regions Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal in northern Mali, and the Islamist group Ansar al-Din, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, turned highly violent at the beginning of 2012. Although having de-escalated to a violent crisis in 2011, the conflict over arable land between the predominantly Christian farmers of Berom and Tiv tribes on the one hand, and the mainly Muslim Fulani nomads on the other, escalated to a war for the first time. The former limited war over territory and resources between Sudan and South Sudan escalated to a war, constituting the only interstate war worldwide. Additionally, the conflict between the SPLM/A-North, which formed the Sudanese Revolutionary Front with two other armed groups, and the Sudanese


government over the status of the provinces of Blue Nile and South Kordofan intensified to the level of a war.

Three of the wars observed in 2011 de-escalated to violent crises. A peace treaty was reached between several militias and the government of South Sudan in February 2012, leading to a significant decrease in rebel activity throughout the year. After Laurent Gbagbo had surrendered in April 2011 and Alassane Ouattara became president of Côte d'Ivoire, the conflict between supporters of presidential candidates Ouattara and Gbagbo de-escalated to a violent crisis in the second half of 2011 and had become on this level in 2012. Similarly, the conflict between Northerners and Southerners in Nigeria, which had escalated in the course of the presidential elections in 2011, eased by two levels. The war between the SPLM/A and the government in Khartoum, observed in 2011, ended the same year, following South Sudan's independence.


Apart from the nine wars, nine limited wars were observed in 2012. In addition to the two continuing limited wars, six conflicts escalated from a violent crisis to a limited war and one new conflict on this level of intensity erupted. Of the five limited wars observed in 2011, one de-escalated to a violent crisis, two escalated to a war, and two remained on the same level of intensity. While the conflict in Uganda (LRA) de-escalated to a violent crisis, the conflicts in the DRC between the FDLR and the government and the conflict between militant groups were fought out as limited wars for the second year running. The conflicts between ethnic groups in Kenya, between Islamist groups and the Malian government, between rebel groups active in CAR and the Chadian government, between the SSC regions and Somaliland, between Mayi-Mayi groups and the Congolese government and between Christian and Muslim groups in Nigeria escalated to limited wars [→ Kenya (inter-ethnic violence), Mali (Islamist groups), Chad (rebel groups), Somalia (Somaliland - SSC), Nigeria (Christians - Muslims)]. In April, a new conflict on the level of a limited war erupted in northern Mali between Islamist groups and the MNLA.

The number of non-violent conflicts decreased by five resulting in 34 non-violent conflicts. In addition, 38 conflicts of medium intensity were observed, slightly fewer than the 40 in

CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2012 COMPARED TO 2011



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2012 IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY INTENSITY GROUPS



2011. Altogether, 62 percent of all conflicts included the use of violence and twenty percent were highly violent. In 2011, 57 percent of all conflicts included the use of violent means, and approx. fourteen percent were highly violent.

As in the previous year, the most frequent conflict items in Sub-Saharan Africa were resources with 27 cases, often combined with national power (30 cases) or subnational predominance (23 cases).

Two cases of successful coup d'états were observed in Sub-Saharan Africa [→Mali (coup plotters), Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)].

In three out of eight wars, Islamist militants were direct actors. The affected countries were Mali and Nigeria in West Africa and Somalia in East Africa. In at least twelve countries of the African continent, Islamist groups were directly involved in violent conflicts. Observations over the last several years showed an increase in cooperation between different Islamist groups all over the continent. Reportedly, scores of fighters from neighbouring countries joined the Islamist groups in Mali in their fight against the government. Most active groups in Mali, namely Ansar al-Din and Movement for Unity and Jihad

in West Africa were closely linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM also allegedly cooperated with Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In Central Africa, several violent conflicts were related to a lack of state structures, e.g. CAR (rebel groups), DR Congo (CNDP/M23) and DR Congo (FDLR).

In the DR Congo, the former CNDP rebels accused the government in Kinshasa of neglecting the Kivu provinces and not adhering to the 2009 peace agreement. Consequently, a new, well-equipped rebel group formed and quickly took over parts of Nord Kivu province, ultimately forcing the government to submit to negotiations. The conflict gained an international dimension due to M23 being allegedly supported by Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, by Uganda.

A similar pattern could be observed in the Central African Republic. Different rebel groups formed the new coalition Séléka and swiftly occupied more than half of the country, with the government agreeing to talks by the end of the year. Several conflicts were fought out between different ethnic groups, among these the wars Nigeria (Farmers - Pastoralists) and South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence).

CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Angola (FLEC / Cabinda)*	FLEC vs. government	secession, resources	1975	↓	1
Angola (UNITA)	UNITA, CASA vs. government	national power	1975	↗	3
Angola–DR Congo*	Angola vs. DR Congo	territory, resources	2009	↘	1
Botswana (Basarwa)*	Basarwa vs. government	system / ideology, resources	1997	•	1
Burundi (FNL)	FNL led by Agathon Rwasa, FRD-Abanyagihugu, FNL-Ubugabo burihabwa, FPM-Abatabazi vs. government	national power	2005	•	3
Burundi (Hutu – Tutsi)*	Hutu vs. Tutsi	national power	1962	•	1
Burundi (opposition groups)*	UPRONA, FRODEBU, CNDD, MSD, ADC-Ikibiri vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2006	•	3
Burundi–Rwanda (border)*	Burundi vs. Rwanda	territory	1960	•	1
Cameroon (militants / Bakassi)*	BSDF vs. government	secession	2006	↘	2
Central African Republic (rebel groups)	APRD, CPJP, CPSK, FDPC, UFDR vs. government	national power	2005	↗	4
Chad (opposition groups)*	UNDR, UDR, et al. vs. government	national power	1990	•	1
Chad (rebel groups)	FPR vs. government	national power, resources	2005	↗	4
Comores (Anjouan, Mohéli)*	regional government of Moheli, regional government of Anjouan vs. regional government of Grand Comore vs.	national power	1997	•	1
Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)*	supporters of Gbagbo vs. government	national power	1999	↓	3
DR Congo (CNDP/M23)	CNDP/M23 vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2004	↑	5
DR Congo (Enyele)*	Enyele vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	↘	1
DR Congo (FDLR)	FDLR vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1997	•	4
DR Congo (FRF)*	FRF vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1998	↘	1
DR Congo (inter-militant violence)	FDLR, Nyatura vs. Mayi-Mayi Cheka, Raia Mutomboki, FDC vs. APCLS vs. Mayi-Mayi Shetani vs. M23	subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	4
DR Congo (Ituri militias)	FRPI, FPJC, Cogai vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1999	•	3
DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)	Mayi-Mayi groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1997	↗	4
DR Congo (opposition)*	UPDS et al. vs. government	national power	1997	•	3
DR Congo–Rwanda*	DR Congo vs. Rwanda	resources, other	2002	↑	3
Equatorial Guinea - Gabon (Mbanié, Cocotier, Conga islands)*	Equatorial Guinea vs. Gabon	territory, resources	1970	•	1
Eritrea–Djibouti (border)*	Eritrea vs. Djibouti	territory	1994	↘	1
Ethiopia (ARDUF)	ARDUF vs. government	autonomy	1995	↑	3
Ethiopia (OLF / Oromiya)	OLF vs. government	secession	1973	•	3
Ethiopia (ONLF / Ogaden)*	ONLF vs. government	secession, resources	1984	•	3
Ethiopia (opposition)*	CUD, Medrek, Ginbot 7, ENDP, UDJ, WPDP, EUFF, ARDUF vs. government	territory, other	2005	↗	3
Ethiopia–Eritrea*	Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	territory, other	1998	•	2
Gabon (opposition)	UN, PDS, UPG, UFC vs. government	national power	2009	•	3
Guinea (opposition)*	UFDG et al. vs. government	national power	2006	•	3
Guinea–Bissau (coup plotters)	coup plotters vs. government	national power	2009	•	3
Guinea–Bissau (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	1998	•	2
Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)	Borana vs. Gabra vs. Pokot vs. Turkana vs. Meru vs. Merille vs. Degodia vs. Garre vs. Orma vs. Pokomo, Samburu,	subnational predominance, resources	1991	↗	4
Kenya (MRC)	MRC vs. government	secession	2008	↗	3

CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Kenya (Mungiki)*	Mungiki vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2002	•	3
Kenya (SLDF)*	SLDF vs. government	subnational predominance	2002	•	2
Kenya (TNA - ODM)*	TNA vs. ODM	national power	1999	•	2
Madagascar (TGV - TIM)*	TIM vs. TGV	national power	2009	•	2
Malawi (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2011	END	1
Mali (coup plotters)	CNRDRE vs. government	national power	2012	NEW	3
Mali (Islamist groups - MNLA)	Ansar al-Din, MUJAO, AQIM vs. MNLA	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2012	NEW	4
Mali (Islamist groups)	AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar al-Din vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2009	↗	4
Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)	MNLA, Ansar al-Din vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1989	↑	5
Niger (AQIM, MUJAO)	AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar al-Din vs. government	system / ideology, subnational predominance	2009	•	3
Niger (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	↓	1
Niger (Tuareg / Agadez)*	MNJ vs. government	autonomy, resources	1999	•	2
Nigeria (Boko Haram) ⁵	Boko Haram vs. government	system / ideology	2003	•	5
Nigeria (Christians – Muslims)	Christian groups vs. Muslim groups	system / ideology, subnational predominance	1960	↗	4
Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)*	farmers vs. pastoralists	subnational predominance, resources	1960	↑	5
Nigeria (Ijaw groups / Niger Delta)*	MEND, NDLF et al. vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1997	•	3
Nigeria (MASSOB, BZM / Biafra)*	MASSOB vs. government	secession	1967	•	3
Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni / Niger Delta)*	MOSOP, Ogoni vs. government	autonomy, resources, other	1990	↗	2
Nigeria (Northerners – Southerners)*	Northerners vs. Southerners	system / ideology, national power, resources	1960	↓	3
Nigeria - Cameroon (Bakassi)*	Nigeria vs. Cameroon	territory, resources, other	1961	•	1
Rwanda (Hutu rebel groups)	FDLR, Mayi-Mayi vs. government	national power	1990	•	3
Rwanda (opposition)*	PS, DGPR, UDF, FDU-Inkingi vs. government	national power	2010	↘	1
Rwanda – France*	Rwanda vs. France	international power, other	2004	•	1
Rwanda – Uganda*	Rwanda vs. Uganda	other	2000	•	1
Senegal (June 23 Movement)*	June 23 Movement vs. government	national power	2011	•	3
Senegal (MFDC / Casamance)	MFDC vs. government	secession	1982	•	3
Sierra Leone (APC – SLPP)*	APC vs. SLPP	national power	2007	•	3
Somalia (Islamist groups)	al-Shabaab vs. TFG, KDF, ENA	system / ideology, national power	2006	•	5
Somalia (Puntland – Somaliland)*	autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	territory, subnational predominance	1998	•	3
Somalia (Puntland)*	TFG vs. autonomous region of Puntland	autonomy	1998	•	1
Somalia (Somaliland – SSC)	Somaliland vs. SSC	subnational predominance	2009	↗	4
Somalia (Somaliland)*	TFG vs. regional government of Somaliland	secession	1991	•	1
South Africa (KwaZulu – Natal)*	IFP vs. ANC vs. NFP	subnational predominance	1990	•	3
South Africa (xenophobes – immigrants)*	xenophobic gangs vs. immigrants in South Africa	other	2008	•	3
South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)	Murle vs. Lou Nuer vs. Misseriya vs. Dinka Gok vs. Dinka Rek vs. Dinka Bor vs. Bari vs. Fartit	subnational predominance, resources	2008	•	5
South Sudan (LRA)*	LRA vs. government	subnational predominance	1994	↓	1

CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
South Sudan (various militias)	SSPLM/A, SSDM, SSDF, SSLA vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2010	↓	3
South Sudan - Uganda*	South Sudan vs. Uganda	territory	1994	•	2
Sudan (Darfur)	SRF, LJM vs. border guards vs. pro-government militias vs. government	subnational predominance, resources, other	2003	•	5
Sudan (Eastern Front)*	Eastern Front vs. government	autonomy, resources	2005	•	1
Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)	SPLM / A-North vs. government	autonomy	2011	↗	5
Sudan-Eritrea *	Eritrea vs. Sudan	other	1994	•	1
Sudan-South Sudan	Sudan vs. South Sudan	territory, resources	2011	↗	5
Swaziland (opposition)*	PUDEMO, SNUS, SFTU, COSATU vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1998	•	3
Swaziland-South Africa*	Swaziland vs. South Africa	territory	1902	•	1
Tanzania (CUF / Zanzibar)*	CUF vs. CCM	autonomy	1993	↑	3
Tanzania (Uamsho)	Uamsho vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2010	↑	3
Togo (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2002	•	3
Uganda (ADF, NALU)*	ADF, NALU vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1987	•	3
Uganda (Baganda / Buganda)*	Kingdom of Buganda vs. government	autonomy, resources	1995	•	2
Uganda (LRA)	LRA vs. government	subnational predominance	1987	↘	3
Uganda (opposition)*	government vs. opposition	national power	2001	•	3
Uganda-DR Congo (Lake Albert)*	Uganda vs. DR Congo	territory, resources	2007	•	2
Zimbabwe (MDC-T, MDC-M – ZANU-PF)*	MDC-T, MDC-M vs. government	national power	2000	•	3

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK wants to express their special thanks to the advanced course for Social Science at the Bunsen-Gymnasium Heidelberg and their teacher Bernhard Bildstein for their valuable research assistance in the course of HIIK's school project concerning terrorism.

ANGOLA (UNITA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: **UNITA, CASA vs. government**
 Conflict items: **national power**

The conflict over national power between the opposition parties and the government escalated. The governing party Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the main opposition party National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) had fought each other in the civil war from 1975 to 2002. In March, former UNITA leader Abel Chivukuvuku left the party to found the Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola (CASA) party, which formed the CASA-Coalition Electoral (CASA-CE) together with other parties to run for the general elections on August 31. In the run-up to the elections, UNITA and other parties repeatedly protested in Angola's main cities. Protesters condemned the reappointment of the head of the National Electoral Commission (CNE), claiming it undermined CNE's objectivity, as well as fostering irregularities in the electoral process, in particular the system to transmit and monitor election results. The government cracked down on the protests. For instance, on March 10, security forces dispersed demonstrations, injuring dozens of protesters. In May, the Supreme Court annulled the appointment of the former CNE chief and subsequently CNE elected a new chairman. Furthermore, the court approved nine of 27 parties to participate in the elections. According to a report published by a civil society group in July, MPLA and UNITA members repeatedly clashed in the provinces of Huambo and Benguela in June and July, leaving members of both parties injured. In Benguela, more than 100 MPLA activists attacked an UNITA convoy on June 20, resulting in one fatality. On July 12, MPLA reportedly tried to prevent UNITA rallies, causing two fatalities. In Huambo, MPLA militants attacked another UNITA convoy on July 14. Two days later, MPLA attempted to prevent UNITA from reinstalling its office in the Mbave commune. In the parliamentary elections on August 31, MPLA won 72 percent of the votes, UNITA got nineteen percent, and CASA-CE six percent, resulting in the reelection of José Eduardo dos Santos as president. On September 19, Angola's Constitutional Court rejected an objection filed by UNITA along with other opposition parties. rab

BURUNDI (FNL)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: **FNL led by Agathon Rwasa, FRD-Abanyagihugu, FNL-Ubugabo burihabwa, FPM-Abatabazi vs. government**
 Conflict items: **national power**

The power conflict between Agathon Rwasa's National Liberation Front (FNL) and the government continued. Rwasa had gone into hiding in the neighboring Democratic Republic

of the Congo's (DRC) Sud Kivu province in 2010, and started to reassemble his fighters there. On January 28, a court sentenced sixteen suspects to jail for their alleged participation in the so-called Gatumba bar massacre of 2011. The government accused FNL to be responsible for the attack. In Gihanga district, Bubanza province, gunmen supposedly coming from DRC raided a security checkpoint on March 7. Two police officers and one attacker were killed. While officials blamed armed bandits for the attack, Gihanga district was a known FNL stronghold. Three soldiers were reportedly killed in mid-April when FNL and the Congolese army, the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), clashed in the Congolese part of the Rukoko Forest, near the Burundian border. While a FARDC officer stated they had carried out a joint operation with the Burundian army in pursuit of the FNL, Burundi denied any army presence in the DRC. Two weeks later, fighting between FARDC and FNL left dead FNL commander Claver Nduwayezu in the Uvira region, Sud Kivu. The government believed Nduwayezu to be behind the Gatumba bar massacre. In the same skirmish, FARDC captured Jean-Petit Nduwimana, probable leader of the rebel group Forces for the Restoration of Democracy (FRD-Abanyagihugu) formed in 2011. Nduwimana was a leading member of the then-rebel group National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), Burundi's present ruling party. Later, he was chief of staff of the intelligence service until he went into hiding in 2008. FARDC handed Nduwimana over to Burundi. Early in June, a local human rights group claimed he had recently been executed by the army. In August, the commission set up to investigate alleged extra-judicial killings targeted against suspected FNL members, among others, announced that no evidence of such killings could be found. Nevertheless, the Burundian human rights group upheld their claims and stated that fifteen people had been extra-judicially executed in 2012 as of October [→Burundi (opposition groups)].

On June 24, a gunfight between military forces and militants coming from the DRC, allegedly led by Aloys Nzabampema, left 41 dead in Bubanza province. In early September, a group calling itself FNL-Ubugabo burihabwa claimed responsibility for a recent attack on an army position located between the capital and the Rukoko Forest. Its leader Nzabampema declared war on the government. Nevertheless, a Rwasa's spokesman declared that FNL did not intend to take up arms again and denied Nzabampema being a member of FNL. In clashes with Burundian rebels near Uvira, DRC, at least one Burundian army officer was killed on October 4. Burundian officials declared that the officer had been on an official intelligence mission. In the same region, several FNL fighters died and others were captured in skirmishes with FARDC and local self-defense militias in late October. In retaliation, FNL set alight ten villages near Uvira. From October 22 to 24, the formerly unknown rebel group Murundi People's Front - the Saviours (FPM-Abatabazi) attacked several towns and communes in Cibitoke province, western Burundi. About 100 fighters entered Burundi from the DRC and targeted security forces, as well as members of the CNDD-FDD's militant youth-wing Imbonerakure. While the army claimed that nine rebels had been killed, the rebels denied this number and stated they had killed nine soldiers. hlm

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (REBEL GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: **APRD, CPJP, CPSK, FDPC, UFDR vs. government**
 Conflict items: **national power**

The national power conflict between rebel groups and the government escalated. On May 17, the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD) officially dissolved. A hitherto unknown militia emerged in the middle of the year, the Convention of Patriots of Salut and Kodro (CPSK) allegedly encompassing dissident factions of Conventions of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR). In late August, the leaders of CPJP and of CPSK signed an agreement to merge their groups under one command. The coalition called itself Séléka and accused the government of blocking the peace process. Factions of UFDR, under Michel Djotodia, and of the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC), under Abdoulaye Miskine, later joined the agreement.

A dissident faction of the former CPJP, the Fundamental CPJP under Hassan al-Habib, attacked the cities of Sibut and Dekoa, Kémo prefecture, and Damara, Ombella-M'Poko prefecture, on September 15, killing one policeman and two civilians. The militia later stated that they intended to overthrow President François Bozizé. On September 19, soldiers killed al-Habib near Dékoa. In late November, nine soldiers and at least eight suspected Séléka members were killed in clashes in Kabo, Ouham prefecture.

Séléka started an offensive in the north-west of the country on December 10, moving south towards the capital Bangui. In the course of the offensive, Séléka attacked the north-western town of Ndélé, Bamingi-Bangoran prefecture the same day, causing thousands to flee. The following day, Séléka took the towns of Sam Ouandja and Ouadda, Haute-Kotto prefecture. On December 12, the army claimed to have regained control of the two towns. The same day, Séléka demanded the government to uphold the promises made in the peace deals. Three days later, advancing further, the rebel coalition gained control of Bamingui, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture on December 15, and of Bria, Haute-Kotto prefecture, a diamond-mining area. Fifteen soldiers were killed. Chadian soldiers crossed into the Central African Republic (CAR) on December 18 to back the army. According to Séléka, they took the town of Kabo one day later, advancing to Bambari, Ouaka prefecture on December 23. As a result, the rebels controlled approx. two-thirds of the country. Despite an attack of the army on December 28, the rebels stayed in control of Bambari. On December 29, Séléka took the town of Sibut 150 km north from the capital, without firing a shot.

President Bozizé called on France to support the army on December 27. However, President François Hollande rejected the request. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) assured the deployment of additional troops to secure Bangui. ECCAS diplomats negotiated with the government in Bangui and with Séléka in the rebel-held northern town Ndélé. As a result of the negotiations, Bozizé offered

peace talks and the formation of a unity government with Séléka on December 30. fw

CHAD (REBEL GROUPS)


Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: **FPR vs. government**
 Conflict items: **national power, other**

The conflict between various rebel groups, mainly the Popular Front for Recovery (FPR), and the government over national power and resources escalated to a limited war. FPR's main areas of activity were the northern parts of the neighboring Central African Republic (CAR). Its main objective was the overthrow of the political regimes in N'Djamena and Bangui. The Union of Forces of the Resistance (UFR), the Rally of Forces for Change (RFC), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), the Union of Forces for Change and Democracy (UFCD), the Front for the Salvation of the Republic (FPSR) and the National Alliance for Change and Democracy (ANCD) had been disarmed in the last years. However, it remained unclear whether remnants of these groups still existed in the tri-border areas of CAR, South Sudan and Chad. From 2008 on, FPR rebels had assaulted the population in the north-eastern provinces of CAR. On February 14, FPR claimed to prepare the deployment of its forces to the N'Djamena area. Following a decision of the ECCAS conference in N'Djamena on January 15, the Chadian armed forces (ANT) and the army of CAR (FACA) launched a joint offensive against the FPR bases in the Nana-Grébizi region on January 23. In the offensive, involving Chadian helicopters, the FPR's command center as well as seven villages were destroyed. An unknown number of people died and 22,000 were displaced. After brief resistance, the FPR rebels fled and their leader, Baba Laddé, escaped. Nevertheless, FPR elements continued raiding and robbing, mainly in the prefectures Ouham, Nana-Grébizi, Ombella-Mpoko, and Ouaka. For instance, on March 1, nineteen heavily armed FPR rebels assaulted and seized the village of Ngoulinga, Ouaka, for 48 hours, killing two villagers and raping several women. On June 1, Baba Laddé claimed to be located in South Sudan, which was later confirmed by CAR officials. On June 24, rebels attacked an uranium mining site at Bakouma, Mbomou. It remained unclear whether the attack was launched by FPR or supporters of the Lord's Resistance Army (→Uganda (LRA)). Following his return to the CAR on August 24, Laddé surrendered to the Central African authorities in Ippy, Ouaka, on September 2. Subsequently, he was transferred to Bangui by the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) on September 3. Laddé arrived at N'Djamena two days later to resume peace negotiations and the repatriation of the alleged 1,000 FPR affiliates remaining in CAR. The Chadian and the CAR government concluded an agreement with Laddé on September 8, which provided for the return of the FPR members to Chad within a month. On October 8, a first group of an estimated 400 fighters, children, and women was transferred to the border village of Sido. Three days later, CAR's minister for territorial administration declared that the FPR had left the CAR. Nevertheless, hundreds of FPR members returned to CAR in late October and November, some of them presumably joining local rebel groups

[→CAR (rebel groups)]. In November, several ambushes in Haut-Mbomou were tied to FPR fighters, such as an attack on a FACA vehicle on November 13 near Obo. One civilian died and several soldiers were wounded. jni

DR CONGO (CNDP/M23)



Conflict parties: **CNDP/M23 vs. government**
 Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The conflict concerning subnational predominance and resources in North Kivu and South Kivu, eastern DR Congo, between the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), later M23, and the government escalated to a war. While the government was supported by the UN mission MONUSCO, the rebels were backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Following the 2009 peace deal between the government and CNDP, the rebels were integrated into the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) while their former command structures remained intact. The peace treaty had provided for CNDP's integration into the army under recognition of ranks, amnesty for CNDP members, release of prisoners, and administrative, territorial and economic reform in the Kivu region. In 2011, President Joseph Kabila ordered a restructuring of military units in the Kivus in order to break CNDP's predominance in the region. Subsequently, the majority of CNDP fighters deserted the army in 2012, demanding the government to adhere to the 2009 peace deal.

The first to defect were three former CNDP officers with 300 of their troops in Baraka and Uvira district, South Kivu, and in Pinga and Nyabiondo, North Kivu, in early April. Ensuing clashes between the army and the deserters left at least ten dead. The mutineers were allegedly led by their former commander Bosco Ntaganda, wanted for war crimes by the ICC. On April 29, heavy fighting broke out in Masisi, North Kivu, when the mutineers attacked the FARDC, which responded with heavy weapons. Six mutineers were killed and three soldiers injured. The next day, the defectors seized Karuba and Mushaki, two towns in North Kivu. On May 3, another 80 soldiers left their ranks in Goma, the capital of North Kivu. Among them was Sultani Makenga, Ntaganda's second-in-command. On May 7, the deserters announced the formation of the new rebel group M23, named after the failed peace deal of 03/23/09. On November 20, the rebels took Goma without fighting after the army had fled. The following day, the so far highest number of former CNDP fighters defected from the army. 2,500 soldiers and policemen joined the ranks of M23 in Goma. Apart from defections, the M23 recruited its personnel, including children, by force. M23 took position in the area of the Virunga National Park close to the border to Rwanda and Uganda, from where they staged attacks on FARDC and MONUSCO. The rebels seized various towns and villages. Often they pulled out again several days later but continued controlling the conquered area from their basis in the park. On July 8, M23 seized the town Rutshu-

ru, North Kivu, and retreated one day later. On August 20, M23 announced the formation of a regional government for the rebel-held area, mainly the Rutshuru district and the Virunga National Park. The rebels approached Goma again by seizing the strategic towns Kibumba and Kibati, North Kivu, between November 17 and 19. Following heavy fighting with FARDC and MONUSCO, M23 was able to advance further till they reached Goma airport on November 19. When M23 entered the city one day later, FARDC troops fled to Sake, North Kivu. MONUSCO kept the airport under their control but refrained from fighting the rebels in order to prevent the death of inhabitants. After the seizing of Goma, M23 announced their next target was to conquer Bukavu, capital of South Kivu, and in the long run Kinshasa, capital of the DRC. M23 seized Sake on November 23. Shortly thereafter DRC and M23, represented by Makenga, started negotiations in Kampala under Ugandan mediation. As a result, the rebels pulled out of Goma and Sake on December 1, under the condition that further talks would be held. Negotiations ended on December 21 but were scheduled to resume on 01/04/13. M23 denounced Kinshasa's unwillingness to deal with certain armed groups in the Kivus [→DR Congo (FDLR), Uganda (ADF, NALU)], alleged fraud in the 2011 presidential elections, and continuing marginalization of the Kivu region. From June on, the UN repeatedly accused Rwanda and Uganda of supporting M23 with financial and military means, which was in turn denied by the respective states. Rwanda especially was accused of providing fighters and heavy weapons. Rwandan Defense Minister James Kabarebe allegedly commanded M23 in the fight for Goma. The UN and DRC accused the rebels of serious violations against civilians, among them rape, looting, and killing. The UN Security Council imposed a military embargo on M23, as well as a travel embargo and an assets freeze on Makenga and M23's president Jean-Marie Rungiga. Between April and December, at least 700 people died and 841,000 fled. jhe

DR CONGO (FDLR)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **FDLR vs. government**
 Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The conflict between the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the government over subnational predominance and resources remained highly violent. The Hutu rebel group FDLR originated from the Interahamwe, who were held responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, but also recruited Congolese Hutu [→Rwanda (Hutu rebel groups)]. Although FDLR fighting capacity decreased compared to previous years, FDLR spokesman Laforge Fils Bazaye confirmed their ultimate goal to take down the Rwandan government. Until the end of September, 867 combatants deserted from FDLR and returned to Rwanda. For instance, in March, FDLR Colonel Idrissa Muradadi, leading the second battalion in South Kivu, defected to MONUSCO with fifteen of his fighters. Between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters remained in the Kivu region of eastern DRC. Throughout the year, at least 100,000 fled due to FDLR activity. FDLR collaborated with

the newly formed armed group Nyatura, composed largely of Congolese Hutu from Masisi, North Kivu. Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and FDLR repeatedly clashed in North and South Kivu. FDLR frequently attacked FARDC and MONUSCO bases and killed at least 30 soldiers. However, factions of FDLR tried to collaborate with the army, following repeated attacks by other armed groups [→DR Congo (inter-militant violence)].

On February 15, FARDC and MONUSCO launched operation Amani Kamilifu, intended to track FDLR in Kabare district, South Kivu. FARDC claimed to have killed 60 and captured 162 FDLR militants. The operations led to the displacement of at least 20,000 civilians. Following the M23 mutiny, President Joseph Kabila announced the suspension of all military operations in the east, including Amani Leo which was intended to eradicate FDLR [→DR Congo (CNDP / M23)]. After FDLR expanded their territory in 2011, it increasingly faced resistance by other armed groups. However, FDLR recaptured territory and continued violating the population following the military void left by the M23 rebellion in April. For instance, FDLR killed at least 50 civilians in May during raids in Kalehe, South Kivu. The most fatal of which occurred in Kamananga on May 14, leaving at least twenty people dead. Consequently, civilians demonstrated in front of the MONUSCO base in Bunyakiri, South Kivu. The demonstration turned violent and eleven Pakistani blue helmets were injured. In October, FARDC and MONUSCO launched operation Taharazi against Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba, FDLR and National Front for Liberation (FNL) in Fizi, South Kivu [→Burundi (FNL)], killing at least seven militants and arresting several dozens. On October 16, FDLR killed five civilians and injured six MONUSCO peacekeepers in an ambush in Buganza, near Lake Edward, North Kivu.

The trial against FDLR president Ignace Murwanashyaka and his deputy Straton Musoni continued in Stuttgart, Germany. On July 13, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sylvestre Mudacumura, the highest ranking military FDLR commander, on the count of war crimes. In December, three suspected FDLR members were arrested in Bonn, Germany. They were also accused of financially supporting Ignace Murwanashyaka who was under EU embargo. The UN Security Council renewed MONUSCO's mandate until 30/06/13. Also, on November 28, it adopted a resolution prolonging the arms embargo on M23, FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups. *fb*

DR CONGO (INTER-MILITANT VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *FDLR, Nyatura vs. Mayi-Mayi Cheka, Raia Mutomboki, FDC vs. APCLS vs. Mayi-Mayi Shetani vs. M23*

Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The conflict concerning subnational predominance and resources between different militant groups in the eastern DR Congo continued on a violent level. In North Kivu, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Nyatura militants, composed largely of Congolese Hutu, clashed with

Mayi-Mayi Cheka and the newly emerged group Forces for the Defense of the Congolese (FDC) in the Walikale and Masisi regions [→DR Congo (FDLR), DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. FDC was created in late 2011 as a local defense group against FDLR as well as the DRC army, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). FDC was led by Butu Luananda, an ex-officer of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) [→DR Congo (CNDP/M23)]. In South Kivu, FDLR fought the Raia Mutomboki militia. Raia Mutomboki had been mostly dormant for the past few years but resurfaced in 2011 after continued FDLR presence in South Kivu. Raia Mutomboki was composed of members of the ethnic groups Tembo and Hunde.

In January, FDLR repeatedly clashed with FDC near the towns of Walikale and Masisi, causing approx. 35,000 to flee. On January 11, a group of soldiers, allegedly Rwandan special forces guided by the FDC, raided the FDLR headquarters in Walikale. They killed FDLR leader Brigadier General Mugaragu, prompting the defection of about 50 FDLR fighters. Skirmishes between FDLR and FDC continued throughout the year. In the very first days of January, FDLR attacked civilians in Bamuguba Sud, Shabunda, accusing them of collaboration with Raia Mutomboki. About 45 people were killed and some 4,400 fled. Facing repeated attacks by Raia Mutomboki, FDLR collaborated with the Nyatura militia. Both Raia Mutomboki together with Mayi-Mayi Kifuafua, and FDLR together with Nyatura abused the local population, accusing them of supporting the respective antagonist coalition. Torching and looting villages in North Kivu, they caused the death of 264 civilians between April and September. Throughout the year, FDLR and Raia Mutomboki repeatedly clashed in South Kivu, mainly in the Hauts Plateaux in Kalehe and eastern Kabare. The fighting between Raia Mutomboki, FDLR, and FARDC displaced at least 218,000 people in South Kivu until June.

FDLR also fought over subnational predominance with different Mayi-Mayi groups. Mayi-Mayi Cheka and FDLR repeatedly clashed in Walikale over the control of mining sites, causing the population to flee. On September 1 and 2, Mayi-Mayi Cheka and FDC on the one side, and FDLR and Nyatura on the other, clashed in Rutshuru, as well as in Masisi. Also, the Mayi-Mayi militia Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) clashed repeatedly with Mayi-Mayi Cheka in Walikale and Masisi territories. After FARDC concentrated its North Kivu forces in order to fight M23 in July, both FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Shetani occupied the villages around Ishasha, Rutshuru. Fighting over control and taxation, they caused over 3,000 people to flee to Uganda. At the beginning of October, M23 took control over these villages without encountering resistance of FDLR or Mayi-Mayi Shetani [→DR Congo (CNDP/M23)]. After FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Shetani had retreated, they clashed over control of other regions in Rutshuru on October 10, leaving thirteen militants dead. Subsequently, FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups also clashed with M23 towards the end of the year. On October 22, alleged M23 fighters clashed with APCLS near the latter's headquarters in Lukweti, Masisi. Together with FARDC, APCLS fought M23 elements in Sake, North Kivu, on November 22, eventually driving them off. All rebel groups engaged in raping and extorting the population as well as in the forced recruitment of children. *fb, fgi*

DR CONGO (ITURI MILITIAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: **FRPI, FPJC, Cogai vs. government**
 Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The conflict between militia groups, mainly the Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, concerning subnational predominance and resources in Ituri, Orientale province, remained violent. Throughout the year, FRPI repeatedly attacked villages in the region of Bunia, looting goods as well as killing and abducting several people. On January 29, the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) attacked four FRPI hideouts 90 km south of Bunia. FRPI leader Cobra Matata met with government representatives in Bukuringi, on February 23 and 26, to negotiate about the integration of his militia into FARDC. They met again on May 10. On March 14, FRPI fighters seized Gety, near Bunia. The next day, they raided the village of Kanjoka, 100 km southeast of Bunia, stole twenty cows and abducted two civilians. FRPI established a new alliance, the Coalition of Armed Groups of Ituri (Cogai), together with three hitherto unknown groups, the Popular Front for the Durable Development of Ituri, the Armed Forces for the Revolution, and the Armed Forces for the Integration of Ituri. Cogai demanded the reorganization of the provinces, establishing Ituri as a province, as well as a military district. They further called for the integration of their fighters into the army including recognition of their ranks as well as the immediate removal of Col. Fal Sikabwe, the army commander of Ituri, to be replaced by one of their ranks. On July 8, FRPI and FARDC clashed in Koga, near Kasenyi. FRPI abducted five farmers near Kanzo on July 15. In late July, the Hema community of Kasenyi accused the Lendu-dominated FRPI of having killed five Hema, which was denied by Cogai. Reportedly, several FARDC elements deserted and joined Cogai ranks in August. From September on, FRPI started to gather near Bunia under the survey of an army official, in order to be integrated into FARDC. Matata demanded amnesty for the militia in case of an integration. On December 7, FARDC attacked FRPI fighters to regain control over Boga, a village 100 km south of Bunia, causing the population to flee. The next day, FARDC reconquered the village and dispersed the FRPI fighters. Former Ituri rebel leader, Thomas Lubanga, of the Union of Congolese Patriots, was found guilty for war crimes by the ICC on March 14. He was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment. On December 21, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a former FRPI commander, was acquitted by the ICC. The prosecutor, however, appealed the verdict. hsp

DR CONGO (MAYI-MAYI)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **Mayi-Mayi groups vs. government**
 Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The conflict between various Mayi-Mayi groups and the

government over subnational predominance and resources escalated to a highly violent level. Mayi-Mayi was a general term used to describe various self-organized local defense units in the eastern DR Congo.

Several Mayi-Mayi groups were active throughout North and South Kivu, Katanga and Orientale provinces. They repeatedly attacked bases of the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC), burned down villages, but occasionally cooperated with FARDC. At least 200 people died and at least 200,000 people fled due to clashes between the various factions and FARDC. Mayi-Mayi Cheka and Raia Mutomboki allied with M23, whereas Alliance of Patriots for a free and sovereign Congo (APCLS) collaborated with the army to dislodge M23 from Rutshuru district, North Kivu [→DR Congo (CNDP/M23), DR Congo (inter-militant violence)].

Raia Mutomboki, originally a self-defense group against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) from Shabunda, South Kivu, emerged as one of the strongest groups. Raia Mutomboki increased their influence in Masisi and Walikale districts, North Kivu, as well as in Kalehe and Kabare districts, South Kivu, clashing repeatedly with both FDLR and FARDC. According to a UN report, they were supported by M23 and strengthened M23's rebellion by destabilizing large parts of Masisi. FARDC and Raia Mutomboki signed a peace agreement in Shabunda on April 12 which broke down shortly thereafter. Throughout the year, Raia Mutomboki repeatedly took over Walikale and neighbouring territory rich in resources. They clashed with FARDC from July 17 to 19 over the control of Walikale and Njingala, killing dozens of civilians. FARDC eventually expelled Raia Mutomboki after several days. Between November 6 and 13, military spokespersons held talks with the militia, offering them to integrate into the army. On December 22, FARDC drove off Raia Mutomboki from one of their strongholds in Shabunda, claiming to have killed ten militants.

The fighting between Raia Mutomboki, FDLR and FARDC displaced at least 218,000 people in South Kivu until June. Mayi Mayi Cheka, also known as Nduma Defence for the Congo, led by Cheka Ntabo Ntaberi, operated in Masisi district, North Kivu, and allied with M23. After the M23 mutiny in April, over 100 deserters joined the ranks of Cheka, attacked villages, and killed several FARDC officers around Mpofi and Kibua, Walikale district.

APCLS was active in its stronghold territory, Masisi. APCLS's leader Janvier Karairi claimed to command 4,500 men.

In the first half of the year, FARDC unsuccessfully tried to take over the APCLS headquarters in Lukweti. However, in August, FARDC approached APCLS to fight M23, as their sphere of influence bordered the territory conquered by M23.

In the northern mineral-rich Katanga province, Mayi-Mayi led by Gédéon Kyungu were active. On February 29, around 26,000 fled after clashes between Mayi-Mayi Gédéon and FARDC in Shamwana, Katanga. On September 18, six militants and one soldier died when Mayi-Mayi Gédéon attacked an FARDC base in Kiyambi, Katanga.

Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba operated in South Kivu. After they had occupied several villages along Lake Tanganyika, Fizi, South Kivu, FARDC pushed them out on May 30, killing five Mayi-Mayi. Clashes between FARDC and Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba continued throughout the year.

In the course of the year, the army tried to forge alliances with the armed groups. In September, FARDC announced that APCLS had agreed to join the army. 35 militia leaders and combatants took part in an army parade in North Kivu on November 13, among them several Raia Mutomboki leaders, stating that their members would join the army. In December, over 80 Mayi-Mayi fighters surrendered to FARDC in South Kivu. On December 31, eleven Mayi-Mayi groups from South Kivu, among them Mayi-Mayi Kirikicho, based in Kalehe, demanded to be included in negotiations held by M23 and the government. *fb, fgi*

ETHIOPIA (ARDUF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: **ARDUF vs. government**
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between the Ethiopian Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) and the government continued. ARDUF consisted of up to 200 fighters and fought for an autonomous and united Afar region, which was divided by the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Ethiopia accused Eritrea of training and arming groups, among them ARDUF, attempting to destabilize Ethiopia [→Ethiopia - Eritrea].

On January 17, ARDUF attacked a group of tourists near Erta Ale Volcano in Afar Region, killing five, injuring three and kidnapping another four. In response, Ethiopia attacked three camps in Ramid, Gelahbe, and Gimbi, located approx. ten miles inside southeastern Eritrea, on March 15, allegedly killing 50 ARDUF rebels. This had been the first operation of Ethiopian troops on Eritrean territory since the end of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in June 2000. *mwe*

ETHIOPIA (OLF / OROMIYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: **OLF vs. government**
Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and its armed wing, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. In the course of the year, OLF stated to have conducted several attacks on security forces in Oromiya region, which were neither confirmed nor denied by the government.

On January 1, a faction of OLF led by Kamal Galchu announced that OLF would stop fighting for secession.

OLF rejected the statement on January 5, explaining it was made by a minority splinter group that had no right to act on behalf of OLF. On January 29, OLA claimed to have killed a government agent in West Hararge. On February 3, OLA killed a police commander in Mieso. According to OLF, their fighters killed at least 22 soldiers in Addis Ababa and North Shewa Zone on March 19 and 20. In March and April, OLA fighters asserted to have killed at least seven soldiers and wounded

several dozens more in Illubabor zone. They recovered AK-47 rifles, hand grenades, and pistols.

On June 4 and 5, OLF claimed to have killed seven soldiers in North Shewa zone and two more in Addis Ababa, respectively. Ten days later, OLA attacked a pickup truck transporting soldiers in Addis Ababa, killing four and wounding five. On June 20, OLA stated they had killed nine soldiers and wounded more than six others in North Shewa Zone. On the same day, 21 soldiers surrendered to the OLA North Shewa command, according to OLF. On July 14, OLA reported to have killed seven soldiers and wounded six in East Hararge zone. Four days later, OLA in turn argued to have killed an officer in West Hararge zone.

On December 13, the Federal High Court convicted two opposition politicians of having links with OLF and sentenced them to jail [→Ethiopia (opposition)]. *sga*

GABON (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: **UN, PDS, UPG, UFC vs. government**
Conflict items: **national power**

The conflict over national power between opposition parties and the government, led by Ali-Ben Bongo, remained on the level of a violent crisis. Following the elections to the National Assembly in December 2011, the opposition parties, Union of the Gabonese People (UPG) and the Party of Development and Social Solidarity (PDS), claimed fraud. Furthermore, the constitutional court obtained 45 challenges against the election results. The election results were verified in February, confirming the distinct majority of the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG). Throughout the year, the opposition experienced significant obstruction of the media. In January, the license of the privately owned company TV+ and the newspaper Echo of the North were temporarily withdrawn, after they had covered a New Year's ceremony of Andre Mba Obame, leader of the outlawed opposition party, National Union (UN), and main opposition figure in Gabon. In August, the National Communications Council suspended the two newspapers Ezombolo and La Une for six months after they had published articles offending the president and the Gabonese diplomat Jean Ping. After fourteen months in exile, Obame returned to the capital Libreville on August 11, and called for the formation of an independent national conference to discuss democratic reforms. In the following days, up to 2,000 opposition members protested in Libreville, torching cars and throwing stones at the police. Security forces used tear gas to disperse the protesters. According to the National Union, three people were killed, dozens injured and 57 activists arrested, of whom 33 were sentenced to one year in prison. According to opposition sources, in Libreville on August 15, about fifteen masked men armed with assault rifles and petrol bombs torched a TV+ broadcasting station, owned by Obame. On September 5, assailants armed with clubs attacked another TV+ station in Libreville, leaving one security guard injured. Four days later, twenty opposition parties formed the alliance Union of Forces for Change (UFC), in Mouila, Ngounié Province, and repeated Obame's call for a

national conference. President Ali-Ben Bongo rejected the requests. Following power struggles in October and November, nine parties of the UFC formed a new coalition called Union of Forces for Alternation on December 14. *qgu*

GUINEA-BISSAU (COUP PLOTTERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: *coup plotters vs. government*

Conflict items: *national power*

The conflict over national power between military coup plotters and the government continued on a violent level. On January 9, President Malam Bacai Sanha died of natural causes in a hospital in Paris. Subsequently, Raimundo Pereira, former Speaker of Parliament, became interim President. On March 18, the first round of presidential elections led to a run-off ballot between Prime Minister Carlos Domingos Gomes Jr. and former President Kumba Yala. On April 12, seventeen days before the scheduled presidential run-off, military coup plotters under the leadership of Army Chief Antonio Indjai took over power, followed by shootings and grenade explosions, leaving one dead in the capital Bissau. Soldiers occupied offices of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), as well as TV and radio stations. The army detained several politicians including Prime Minister Gomes and interim president Pereira. Consequently, the army appointed an interim government. Subsequently, AU suspended Guinea Bissau's membership. On April 26, ECOWAS announced a military intervention to provide security for democratic elections and the transition process. The next day, Gomes and Pereira were released and went into exile in Côte d'Ivoire. On May 17, the first 70 troops of the ECOWAS military stabilization force, encompassing a planned total of 638 troops from Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, and Burkina Faso, arrived. According to an agreement between military leaders and 25 political parties on May 19, former parliamentary speaker Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo became interim president. Four days later, Nhamadjo appointed a transitional government and the military coup plotters declared their withdrawal. The new cabinet consisted of 27 members, including one of the coup plotters. On October 21, gunmen, led by Captain Pansau N'Tchama, attacked army barracks near the capital's airport. The ensuing gun battle left seven people dead. Six days later, governmental security forces arrested N'Tchama, who had been the head of the commando unit that had killed then-president Vieira in 2009. On December 14, the UN Security Council expressed its concern about the political instability in Guinea Bissau and imposed travel bans on the coup leaders and their key supporters. *sad*

KENYA (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: *Borana vs. Gabra vs. Pokot vs. Turkana vs. Meru vs. Merille vs. Degodia vs. Garre vs. Orma vs. Pokomo, Samburu*

Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The conflict over resources and subnational predominance between various ethnic groups escalated to a limited war. Most incidents were related to cattle rustling and land ownership. The conflict between Borana and Gabra communities, which started in Ethiopia in November 2011, spilled over to northeastern Kenya. On January 4, approx. six people were killed and several injured after a peace meeting in the border town Moyale, Eastern Province. Suspected Pokot attacked Turkana people on January 9, killing three in Lokapel area, Turkana South District. Violence in Moyale continued, as clashes between Borana and Gabra clans on January 26 left five people dead and over 40,000 people displaced. Following the incidents in Moyale, police arrested dozens of suspects, among them chiefs and civil leaders. In an attack on February 13, and a counterattack on February 14, three people were killed, respectively, in clashes between Meru and Turkana near Isiolo, Eastern Province, leading to hundreds of displaced Turkana members. Over 200 Pokot members raided Turkana villages, killing seven Turkana and stealing over 1,500 herds of cattle on March 23. In Todonyang, Rift Valley, clashes over cattle raids between Turkana and over 300 Merille militias from Ethiopia left two policemen dead on April 16. On August 20, during a cattle raid, Garre clan shot dead five people from the Degodia clan near Malkari, North Eastern Province. On August 21, the dispute over water and pasture between Orma and Pokomo in Tana River District, Coast Province, escalated, leaving 62 dead. In a revenge attack on September 9, 500 armed Pokomo killed 38 people, including nine police officers, in Kilelengwani village, Coast Province, resulting in thousands of displaced persons. Suspected Pokot stole cattle and killed two Ugandan soldiers in the districts of Nakapiripit and Amudat, Northern Province, Uganda, on October 3. Subsequently, Ugandan military was deployed to the Kenyan border on October 12, and Kenyan security officers were deployed on October 19. On October 30, thirteen Samburu were killed in the attempt to recover cattle, stolen from them by the Turkana on October 20, in Baragoi, Rift Valley. The government responded by sending 107 police officers to pursue the armed Turkana rustlers and seize the stolen cattle. In Baragoi, November 10, Turkana ambushed them, killing 46. On November 13, the government ordered the deployment of the army to search for the perpetrators, causing 1,500 Turkana to flee their homes. Rival clashes between Pokomo and Orma on December 21, resulted in over 39 deaths in Tana River district. *lke*

KENYA (MRC)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: **MRC vs. government**
Conflict items: **secession**

The conflict between the secessionist group Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and the government, concerning the secession of Kenya's coastal region, escalated. In addition to secessionist demands, the MRC threatened to disrupt the 2013 general elections and encouraged the Coast province inhabitants to boycott the elections. On April 24, MRC protested outside a courthouse in Mombasa, Coast province, where a hearing concerning its legitimacy was taking place, after having been banned in 2010. Police tried to disperse them, leaving one MRC member dead. The MRC dismissed negotiation offers by members of parliament on June 18, refusing any dialog until the ban imposed on it was lifted. The same month, the High Court declared the MRC's banishment unconstitutional. Nevertheless, four months later, a court in Mombasa outlawed the group again. In June and July, police repeatedly arrested MRC members trying to recruit new followers. After MRC members had assassinated one resident of Tsangasini village in Kilifi district, Coast province, on September 27, villagers and police killed at least ten MRC members. MRC members killed one villager and injured a policeman in the course of the clashes. In Silaloni in Samburu district, Rift Valley province, villagers killed four of the alleged attackers the following day. Five people were killed when suspected MRC members interrupted a meeting attended by the fisheries minister in Mtwapa in Kilifi County, Coast province, on October 4. Five days later, police cracked down on MRC in Kombani, Coast province, arresting 39 suspected MRC members, among them MRC leader Omar Mwamnuadzi. In the raid, police allegedly killed two of Mwamnuadzi's bodyguards. In the following weeks, sixteen further MRC members were arrested in Kwale, Coast province. On October 20, a group of 30 suspected MRC youths attacked a police camp in Kaloleni, Coast province, injuring a security officer. 60 suspected members of Nyuki Movement for Independence, supposedly linked to the MRC, raided a police post in Mombasa on December 12. Three of the attackers were shot dead by the police and four arrested. *thg*

MALI (COUP PLOTTERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: **CNRDRE vs. government**
Conflict items: **national power**

A violent conflict over national power between mutinying soldiers and the government erupted. Soldiers under the command of Captain Amadou Sanogo staged a coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré on March 21, six weeks before the presidential elections. They suspended the constitution and took control over the capital Bamako. The coup was preceded by numerous civil protests in February at the government's

lack of action against the Tuareg attacks in the north and the insufficient equipment of the army [→Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)]. After two days of fighting between the soldiers loyal to the government and the presidential guard, on the one hand, and the mutinying soldiers, on the other, the latter took control of Bamako. Three people died in the fighting. Subsequently, the mutinying soldiers arrested fourteen members of the government, whereas Touré was able to flee to Senegal. The coup leaders established the National Committee for the Recovery of Democracy and Restoration of the State (CNRDRE) and announced to hand over power to an elected government as soon as the Tuareg rebellion would be put down. The AU, as well as ECOWAS suspended the country's membership on March 28. After having set an ultimatum of 72 hours to the military junta to hand over power to a civilian government, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Mali on April 3. Four days later, CNRDRE agreed to relinquish power and to hold elections within 40 days. Subsequently, ECOWAS lifted the sanctions. After Touré had officially resigned on April 8, the former speaker of parliament, Dioncounda Traoré, was sworn in as interim president on April 12, appointing Cheick Modibo Diarra as transitional prime minister five days later. The same day, the army arrested six allies of ex-president Touré. On April 25, a new civilian government was announced by Traoré. Three military representatives were appointed ministers of internal security, defense, and interior. On April 30, soldiers loyal to Touré tried to reclaim the state broadcasting building, the airport, and army barracks in a counter-coup, but junta forces remained in control and arrested 140 of the counter-coup plotters. Fourteen people died in the fighting. By granting a ten-day extension, ECOWAS ordered the interim authorities to form a unity government by August 10. However, Traoré formed a national unity government on August 20. On October 23, AU lifted the suspension of Mali's membership. On December 11, Diarra announced his and his government's resignation after having been arrested by the military. The same day, interim President Traoré named Dango Cissoko prime minister. AU condemned the resignation, emphasizing that the military needed to be subordinate to civil authorities. *kse*

MALI (ISLAMIST GROUPS – MNLA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: **Ansar al-Din, MUJAO, AQIM vs. MNLA**
Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance**

A new highly violent conflict between Islamist groups and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) erupted. At the beginning of the year, Ansar al-Din and MNLA had fought together against the government for the secession of Azawad, consisting of the regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, but had split several times over the year. On March 18, after the leader of Ansar al-Din, Iyad Ag Ghali, had called for the implementation of Sharia in Mali, tensions between MNLA and Ansar Dine arose and a violent conflict erupted. At the end of March, MNLA took control of Gao, although the Islamist groups in turn also strengthened their presence in Gao. In April, the two groups cooperated again and seized Timbuktu [→Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)]. Ultimately, Ansar al-Din kept control

over the town, having ousted MNLA. On May 4, MNLA attempted to convince Ansar al-Din to cease its cooperation with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) at a meeting in Adrar des Ifoghas, Kidal Region. After negotiations, MNLA and Ansar al-Din declared Azawad to be an Islamic state on May 27. Two days later, the two rebel groups dissociated, resulting from a disagreement on the strictness of the Sharia law to be implemented. On June 8, MNLA and Ansar al-Din clashed in the town of Kidal, after anti-Sharia protests from 500 residents. At least two people died during the fighting. On June 13, MNLA and Ansar al-Din clashed in Timbuktu, causing two deaths. On June 27, Islamist groups and MNLA fought each other in Gao, leaving at least 35 people dead. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), another AQIM-linked group, took control over the town. On June 29, Islamist groups forced MNLA to leave Timbuktu again. On July 11, MUJAO ousted MNLA from their last base in Ansogo, Gao Region. Mid-October, MNLA and Ansar Dine met in Kidal to negotiate. On November 16 and 17, MNLA and MUJAO fought one another near the town of Gao, leaving ten people dead. Two days later, MUJAO seized the town of Menaka, Gao Region, which had been under the control of MNLA. Several combatants died during the fighting. On November 29, Ansar al-Din ousted MNLA from the town of Léré, Timbuktu Region. At the end of 2012 most of northern Mali was under control of Islamist groups. kse

MALI (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: **AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar al-Din vs. government**
 Conflict items: **system/ideology, secession**

The conflict between the Islamist groups al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar al-Din, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a limited war.

In a short-lived alliance with the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Islamist groups brought the north of the country under their control after a military coup in March [→Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad), Mali (coup plotters)]. Presumably, most of the members of these Islamist groups originated from adjacent countries [→Algeria (AQIM, MUJAO)].

Throughout the year, the Islamist groups repeatedly kidnapped foreigners and engaged in fights with the government. In addition, they destroyed several mausoleums belonging to UNESCO cultural heritage register. For instance, AQIM fighters took five European citizens hostage in Timbuktu in mid-February. In April, MUJAO took hostage seven Algerian diplomats and a Swiss citizen in Gao Region. Ansar al-Din destroyed several Sufi shrines in Timbuktu in late June. In early September, MUJAO expanded its area of influence to Douentza, Mopti Region. The same month, MUJAO declared the death of one of the Algerian diplomats abducted in April. On November 21, MUJAO kidnapped a French citizen in south-western Mali outside the Islamist-held territory. Additionally, in November, Ansar al-Din signaled its readiness for peace talks, distancing itself from AQIM and MUJAO. Nevertheless, Ansar al-Din and AQIM attacked further mausoleums in Timbuktu in December.

Human rights organizations repeatedly expressed concerns over the mistreatment of civilians by the groups. Tens of thousands fled due to human rights violations by the Islamist groups. In November, ECOWAS decided to send a 3,300 strong force to Mali to recapture the north of the country which was mostly held by Islamist groups by the end of the year. On December 20, the UN Security Council authorized the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), led by ECOWAS, starting in January 2013. bkm

MALI (MNLA, ANSAR AL-DIN / AZAWAD)

Intensity: **5** | Change: ↑ | Start: **1989**



Conflict parties: **MNLA, Ansar al-Din vs. government**
 Conflict items: **secession, system/ideology**

The secession conflict between the Tuareg group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Islamist Tuareg group Ansar al-Din, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a war. Azawad was the area claimed by MNLA, consisting of the three regions Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. While the Tuareg strove for autonomy in previous years, 2012 was marked by secessionist aims.

On January 17, MNLA and Ansar al-Din clashed with government troops in the town of Menaka, Kidal, in northern Mali [→Mali (Islamist groups)]. The army deployed at least one helicopter; the Tuaregs used machinegun-mounted vehicles, and anti-tank and aircraft rockets. The following day, Tuareg rebels attacked two military camps in the towns of Aguelhok and Tessalit, Kidal Region, leaving 45 rebels and up to 40 soldiers dead. On January 24, the rebels captured and executed approx. 82 soldiers and civilians in an offensive in Aguelhok. At the end of January, MNLA attacked the towns of Léré, Timbuktu Region, and Andéramboukane and Menaka, Gao Region. UN reports estimated 30,000 internally displaced people (IDP) and 34,000 refugees at the beginning of February. The toll had risen to 60,000 IDPs and 60,000 refugees by the end of the month. On February 2, hundreds of Malians protested in the streets of Bamako over the government's handling of the attacks by Tuareg rebels in the North [→Mali (coup-plotters)]. The same day, Foreign Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga held negotiations with MNLA in Algiers, Algeria. MNLA rejected any agreement. In fights around Timbuktu on February 4, the army killed twenty rebels. On February 8, MNLA seized the strategic border town of Tinzawatene, Kidal Region, and forced government troops to withdraw into Algeria. On February 10, army helicopters attacked rebel positions near Kidal, killing dozens. In mid-February, MNLA and the army fought over the towns of Tessalit and Léré, leaving dozens of rebels dead. Finally, on March 11, the army retreated from a military base near Tessalit; subsequently, MNLA captured the town. In mid-March, MNLA and Ansar al-Din separated after the leader of Ansar al-Din, Iyad Ag Ghali, had called for the implementation of Sharia law in Mali [→Mali (Islamist groups vs. MNLA)]. After the military coup in the capital on March 22, MNLA announced its intention

to profit from the situation's instabilities by taking the cities of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu in order to control the area of Azawad [→Mali (coup-plotters)]. By April 1, MNLA and Ansar al-Din had seized the three cities without encountering resistance. After a ceasefire announcement, MNLA declared the independence of Azawad on April 6. The AU, EU, and US rejected this declaration of independence. On April 10, around 2,000 people protested in Bamako for the liberation of the rebel-held north. Two days later, the transitional president Dioncounda Traoré threatened a total war against Tuareg rebels. On April 20, some 200 residents protested against the occupation of Timbuktu by rebels. On May 27, MNLA and Ansar al-Din resumed cooperation and declared Azawad an Islamic state. Two days later, the two rebel groups separated again, resulting from a disagreement the over strictness of Sharia to be imposed [→Mali (Islamist groups vs. MNLA)]. On June 9, representatives of MNLA met ECOWAS mediator Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso. As of July, more than 350,000 people had fled the conflict areas, among them 155,000 IDPs. On October 12, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution paving the way for a military intervention to retake the north. At the end of October, envoys of the AU, ECOWAS, EU, as well as the UN Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, met in Bamako to elaborate upon an operation plan for a military intervention. On November 6, Compaoré met with a delegation of Ansar al-Din, urging the group to dissociate from al-Qaeda. At a summit on November 11 in Nigeria, ECOWAS agreed to deploy 3,300 soldiers. The plan to send troops to Mali covers a six-month period, including operations in the north. On November 19, the EU Foreign Affairs Council decided to send military experts to train the army. On December 4, an official delegation of the government met representatives of MNLA and Ansar al-Din for negotiations in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. On December 20, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The next day, MNLA and Ansar al-Din committed to suspending hostilities and holding peace talks with the government. kse

NIGER (AQIM, MUJAO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**


Conflict parties: **AQIM, MUJAO vs. government**
 Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance**

The ideology and subnational predominance conflict between the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the government remained violent. On March 22, authorities in Niger arrested National Assembly adviser and former Tuareg leader Aghali Alambo. He was accused of being involved in the smuggling of arms from Libya for AQIM in Niger in June 2011. On August 1, the EU sent an advisory team of 50 international officers to the capital, Niamey, to train local security forces to combat AQIM in Niger and Mali [→Mali (Islamist groups)]. It was part of the European Union's Capacity Building Mission, which was scheduled to last two years. In August, security forces arrested several armed militants suspected to be members of AQIM. On October 14, the Islamist group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which is linked

to AQIM and operates extensively in northern Mali, abducted six aid workers from the town of Dakoro, Maradi. One of the hostages was wounded by a bullet during the kidnapping and later died of his injuries. On November 5, the five remaining aid workers were freed.

On October 18, the defense ministers of Niger and Nigeria signed security and defense agreements aimed exchanging information in the fight against trans-border crime, especially in respect to the activities of AQIM and the Boko Haram from Nigeria [→Nigeria (Boko Haram)]. jas

NIGERIA (BOKO HARAM)



Conflict parties: **Boko Haram vs. government**
 Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The system and ideology conflict between the Islamist group Boko Haram and the government continued on the level of war. The group was radically opposed to secular ideals and aimed at the implementation of Sharia law throughout Nigeria. Over the course of the year, Boko Haram attacks killed at least 700 people and displaced thousands. Violence also spread to the previously unaffected Ebo, Kogi, and Rivers States. President Goodluck Jonathan admitted at the beginning of January that Boko Haram members presumably held offices in government, parliament, and courts, and had infiltrated security forces and intelligence organizations. According to General Carter Ham, commander of the US Africa Command, the group presumably collaborated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other Islamist groups in West Africa regarding training, provision of weapons, and financial assistance [→Mali (Islamist groups), Algeria (AQIM, MUJAO)]. In January, the UN expressed concerns that the Libyan civil war gave Islamists in the Sahel Region including Boko Haram access to heavy weapons [→Libya (opposition)]. In October, the government signed an agreement with Niger on joint border patrols, aiming at the reduction of security risks caused by Boko Haram and AQIM [→Niger (AQIM)].

On January 2, Boko Haram issued an ultimatum, threatening all Christians who would not leave the mainly Muslim-inhabited northeastern areas within three days with death. After the expiration of the period, Boko Haram launched attacks on Christians, causing at least 250 fatalities and displacing thousands over the course of the month. In the most fatal attacks on January 20 and 21, coordinated bomb attacks, followed by gunfire, targeted four police stations in Kano State, leaving more than 190 people dead. In reaction, Jonathan dismissed the chief of police in order to reorganize the police forces and increase their effectiveness. The government announced its intentions to intensify efforts to capture the militants, subsequently killing up to 49 in clashes and raids as well as arresting approx. 200 suspected members. However, attacks continued in February, killing some 70 people. On February 15, Boko Haram attacked Kogi Prison, Kogi State, freeing

119. On February 20, attacks left about 30 dead in the Boko Haram stronghold of Maiduguri, Borno State, when several bomb explosions were followed by gun fights between Boko Haram and security forces. In Kaduna, Kaduna State, a suicide car bomber killed a further 38 near a church on April 8. Just as in many of such incidents, Boko Haram attacks were followed by severe clashes and reprisal attacks between Christians and Muslims [→Nigeria (Christians-Muslims)]. In Okene, Kogi State, on March 31, security forces raided an alleged bomb manufacturer. Nine Boko Haram members and two soldiers died. In coordinated attacks on April 26, three newspaper buildings in Abuja and Kaduna were hit by Boko Haram car bombs, leaving nine civilians dead. Up to 50 people died in an alleged Boko Haram attack at a market in Potiskum, Yobe State, on May 3. In June, a splinter group of Boko Haram called Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Bidalis Sudan (Ansaru) emerged. On June 4, a Boko Haram suicide bombing hit a church in Bauchi State, leaving fifteen people dead and 40 injured. Two days later, sixteen Boko Haram members were killed in gunfights with the military Joint Task Force in Maiduguri. On June 18, clashes between militants and security forces in Damaturu, Yobe State, left 40 dead. On August 6, Boko Haram members opened fire upon the attendants of a church service in Kogi, killing twenty people. On September 16, military forces killed Boko Haram leader Abu Qaqa in Kano. At the end of September, security forces killed 35 suspected Boko Haram members and arrested 156 in a three-day operation in Mubi, Adamawa State. On October 1, at least 46 students died in Boko Haram gunfire at universities in Mubi. Military forces launched a two-day operation against suspected group members on October 31, killing at least 48 in Maiduguri, after a Boko Haram suicide bomber had killed seven and wounded hundreds in Kaduna. In early November, Boko Haram declared its readiness for peace talks on the condition of all imprisoned group members being released, which was rejected by the government. On November 25, Boko Haram carried out two car bomb attacks in Kaduna, killing eleven attendants of church services. In mid-November, Ansaru kidnapped a French citizen, citing the French involvement in Mali. Boko Haram gunmen raided a church in Peri, Yobe State, on Christmas Eve, killing six Christians and setting the church ablaze. *dig, ses*

NIGERIA (CHRISTIANS–MUSLIMS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1960**


Conflict parties: *Christian groups vs. Muslim groups*
 Conflict items: *system/ideology, subnational predominance*

The conflict between Christians and Muslims over subnational predominance escalated to a limited war and was exacerbated by Boko Haram attacks against Christians [→Nigeria (Boko Haram)]. Throughout the year, Muslim gunmen repeatedly raided Christian church services, assemblies, and other events, opening fire upon crowds. Nearly all such assaults were followed by reprisal attacks from Christian youth groups. In the course of the year, approx. 600 people died and thousands fled. During January, at least 50 people died in mutual attacks. For instance, on January 10, suspected Muslim youths torched the homes

of Christian villagers near Jos, Plateau State and opened fire on those who fled, killing seven. Following a bomb attack on a church by Boko Haram, Christian youths raided Muslim communities in Jos, leaving ten people dead on May 11. Between June 19 and 22, approx. 200 died in clashes between Christians and Muslims in Kaduna State, 100 of which were in Kaduna City. Following multiple suicide bombings on churches on June 16 by suspected Boko Haram members, Christian youths attacked several predominantly Muslim towns and villages on June 19 using machetes and handguns. The following day, Muslim youth groups attacked Christian villagers, leaving at least 36 dead. The conflict spread southwards to Okene, Kogi State, when gunmen entered a church and opened fire at the visitors on August 6, leaving twenty people dead. One day later, gunmen attacked a mosque in Okene, leading to the deaths of three. On October 14, a Christian youth gang shot dead 22 people in a mosque near Kaduna. After Christian youths had set up barricades on a road leading into a Muslim neighborhood in Ibi, Taraba State, two-day clashes between Christians and Muslims erupted on November 18, leaving ten people dead. Another four people died on November 22, when Muslim youths rioted in Bichi, Kano State, following rumors of blasphemy against Islam. *ses*

NIGERIA (FARMERS–PASTORALISTS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1960**



Conflict parties: *pastoralists vs. farmers*
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The conflict between farmers and pastoralists over resources and subnational predominance escalated to a war. While the main item of the conflict was arable land, it was further fueled by differences concerning political, ethnic, and religious issues between the predominantly Christian farmers of the Berom and Tiv tribes on the one hand, and the mainly Muslim Fulani nomads on the other. As desertification in the Sahelian Zone narrowed fertile grounds, farmers insisted on their traditional right to cultivate the contested lands, while Fulani nomads claimed them as grazing areas for their cattle. Due to increasing violence between farmers and pastoralists since 2009, the government established a Special Task Force (STF) to observe the situation in Plateau State and intervene if necessary. At the beginning of March, feuding between Fulani herdsmen and Tiv farmers resulted in the deaths of 66 people in Benue State. Most of them were killed in raids by herdsmen in Western Benue on March 5. Several days later, Fulani herdsmen assassinated fifteen people in central Plateau State. At least twelve Tiv villagers died and 48 were wounded in a two-day attack on several villages near Gombe, Gombe State, on May 12. Some 500 Fulani gunmen raided the villages, torched houses, and attacked villagers with guns and machetes. A week later, Fulani herdsmen again attacked several Tiv villages in Benue and Nasarawa States, burning down huts and farmland and killing 75 people. In an alleged reprisal attack, farmers killed thirteen Fulani herdsmen on June 10.

The conflict further intensified in early July, when at least 200 Fulani gunmen raided more than 25 villages near Jos, Plateau State. STF tried to control the situation. 100 people died in the incident, 21 of whom were killed by STF. The killings again were accompanied by the burning of houses and the destruction of farmland. The next day, Fulani herdsmen attacked the mass burial of the victims. The assailants set fire to the church in which many mourners had sought shelter, resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people. The next day, Berom youths launched revenge attacks, killing some 100 Fulani. After these attacks, on July 16, STF demanded all Fulani inhabitants of some crisis-prone villages to leave their homes within 48 hours, threatening to forcefully expel them otherwise. Many Fulani fled. On August 23, two farmers were murdered by two herdsmen near Jos. Violence continued on October 13, when Fulani herdsmen killed 24 villagers in Kaduna State. The following nights, Fulani herdsmen attacked a Tiv community, torched houses and killed at least 30 people, causing 5,000 to flee. In a two-day attack by Fulani herdsmen in Nasarawa starting on October 19, twelve people died. Violence between farmers and pastoralists also spread to the states of Ebonyi, Enugu, Ogun, Osun, and Oyo in the south of Nigeria. Over the course of the year, approx. 600 people died and at least 15,000 were displaced. ses

RWANDA (HUTU REBEL GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: **FDLR vs. government**
Conflict items: **national power**

The conflict over national power between Hutu-dominated rebel groups and the Tutsi-dominated government of President Paul Kagame remained violent. The conflict was closely linked to the subnational predominance conflict between the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the government of DR Congo [→DR Congo (FDLR)]. FDLR allegedly launched a series of grenade attacks, beginning with an incident on January 4 which killed two citizens in the capital Kigali. In another attack which took place in Muhanga, Sud Province, on January 24, ten people were wounded. On March 23, a grenade blast in Musanze, Nord Province, left one civilian dead. Due to a new outbreak of violence in the neighboring DR Congo, by mid-September 25,000 had fled to Rwanda. On June 19, the government met with Congolese representatives to discuss further cooperation concerning the fight against FDLR and other rebels in the border region. On June 21, parliament passed a resolution criticizing MONUSCO and demanding the UN to clarify possible connections between the mission and FDLR. On September 1, the government withdrew two companies of the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) that had cooperated with the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in Nord Kivu. On November 26, FDLR attacked the RDF in Rubavu District, Ouest Province. During the fighting, one civilian and up to ten rebels were killed. On December 3, FDLR killed a park warden in Volcanoes National Park in Musanze District. nab

SENEGAL (MFDC / CASAMANCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1982**

Conflict parties: **MFDC vs. government**
Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict over the southern region of Casamance between the Movement for Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the government continued on a violent level. Between January 2 and March 23, at least seventeen people were killed in clashes. For instance, suspected MFDC rebels attacked security forces in the village of Affiniam, Ziguinchor Province, on January 2 and 4, leaving one officer dead and three injured. In an operation in southern Casamance on January 10, the military bombed rebel positions in the area. Searching for MFDC fighters in the region of Ziguinchor, government forces clashed with rebels on February 14 and 15, leaving four soldiers dead and nine wounded. Also on February 14, 50 suspected MFDC members raided a business area in Baghagha, Ziguinchor. Between February 24 and March 23, government forces conducted five combat operations in which seven soldiers died and twelve were injured. On March 24, MFDC rebels took seven civilians hostage, releasing them on May 11. On June 27, newly-elected President Macky Sall announced his readiness for negotiations with MFDC. In July, several rebels agreed to enter peace talks. However, rebels clashed again with military forces on July 29 after MFDC members had robbed civilians. On October 13 and 14, preliminary talks between representatives of both sides were held in Rome, Italy, in the presence of the mediators of the Christian Sant'Egidio community. Following the community's mediation, an MFDC delegation handed over eight hostages captured in 2011 to Gambian authorities on December 10. abs

SOMALIA (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: **al-Shabaab vs. TFG, KDF, ENA**
Conflict items: **system / ideology, national power**

The ideology and national power conflict between the Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) continued on the intensity level of a war for the seventh consecutive year. On 12/31/11, Ethiopia officially joined the struggle against al-Shabaab, taking over the strategically relevant town of Beledweyne, Hiiran Region, which resulted in dozens of casualties. In May, the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) were incorporated into AMISOM. During the last week of July, the National Constituent Assembly approved a new constitution and accordingly a new parliament elected by elders was sworn in on August 20, in Mogadishu, Banaadir Region. On September 10, the new Somali parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the first President

of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), ending the transitional period. On November 7, the UN Security Council extended the AMISOM mandate for another four months. On December 1, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) officially joined the Somali government forces. ASWJ was a paramilitary group, which had supported TFG in their fight against al-Shabaab for several years. At the beginning of the year, Kenyan warplanes bombed several al-Shabaab positions in Gedo, Jubbada Hexe, and Jubbada Hoose, allegedly killing over 70 militants in January. The most devastating air strikes took place on January 6, 15, and 21, as well as on February 3, the latter allegedly killing 100 militants. On January 24, al-Shabaab carried out a suicide bomb attack on an Ethiopian military base in Beledweyne, allegedly killing ten soldiers. During February, KDF, supported by the TFG and Ras Kamboni militants, increasingly conducted ground offensives against al-Shabaab, mostly in Jubbada Hoose, leading to at least 45 deaths. During the first three weeks of February, violence between al-Shabaab and AMISOM-backed TFG increased in the capital of Mogadishu, leading to more than 100 deaths, approx. 8,000 displaced, and several houses being destroyed. On March 10, al-Shabaab militants raided an Ethiopian and TFG military base in Turkud, Gedo Region. Both sides claimed to have killed over 75 of the other side. On July 1, suspected al-Shabaab members attacked several churches in Garissa, capital of North-Eastern Province, Kenya, killing seventeen civilians. KDF restarted their air raid campaign against al-Shabaab positions in Jubbada Hoose and Gedo Region, allegedly killing eleven militants on July 7, twenty on July 16 and 17, and 30 on the last three days of the month, as well as eighteen on August 23. On August 15, after clashes in Gedo Region between KDF and TFG forces on the one side and al-Shabaab militants on the other, both sides claimed to have inflicted over 50 casualties. On September 12, al-Shabaab launched a suicide bomb attack on the newly elected president, killing more than eight people at a hotel in Mogadishu but failing to kill the president. Another al-Shabaab suicide bomber targeted a popular Mogadishu restaurant, leaving fourteen people dead on September 20. In early October, KDF captured the harbor city of Kismayo, Jubbada Hoose, from al-Shabaab after a month of fighting, with at least 100 battle-related deaths and a minimum of 18,000 displaced people. During those fights in Jubbada Hoose Region, FGS and Ras Kamboni fighters backed KDF. After retreating from Kismayo, al-Shabaab launched numerous bombings and raids against Kenyan and FGS forces throughout October, killing at least twenty. In November, KDF and FGS forces cracked down on al-Shabaab in Kismayo, arresting several hundreds. On November 19, alleged al-Shabaab militants threw a grenade into a minibus in a Somali populated suburb of Nairobi, Kenya, killing six civilians. UNHCR recorded that more than 78,000 people fled the country in 2012. The total number of IDPs has decreased by approx. 200,000 since 2011. *tg*

SOMALIA (SOMALILAND–SSC)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: ***Somaliland vs. SSC***
 Conflict items: ***subnational predominance***

The conflict over subnational predominance in the regions of Sool and Sanaag, as well as Togdheer's Cayn Section, between the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and the local resistance group from Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC), escalated to a limited war. After clan meetings in Taleh, Sool Region, between January 6 and 11, Khatumo State, consisting of the SSC provinces, was officially founded on January 11. The same day, Somaliland's parliament and upper house condemned the newly-formed regional administration. On January 12, Somaliland forces injured two protesters during a demonstration for a united Somalia in Las'anod, Sool. Three days later, fighting started between Somaliland troops and SSC fighters in Buhodle, Cayn, lasting for two days. According to local sources, Somaliland forces entered the city with armed trucks and fired with mortars at a Khatumo militia base, leaving ten people dead. Somaliland troops using heavy artillery launched an attack on Buhodle from three different fronts on January 18, causing seven casualties. On January 25, Somaliland troops clashed with Khatumo forces, causing 50 deaths in Buhodle. After a firefight between Somaliland forces and Khatumo in Buhodle involving artillery and machine guns on February 6, local sources reported ten casualties and 6,000 fleeing the area. On March 5, Somaliland announced its readiness for talks with the Khatumo administration. On April 1, Somaliland's military launched an offensive on Khatumo bases, near the town of Las'anod, leaving at least fifteen people dead. Khatumo assailants threw a hand grenade into a house of Somaliland's regional intelligence in Las'anod, killing one person on July 8. Khatumo soldiers opened fire at Somaliland troops in a village near Buhodle on July 26. Following ensuing firefights, which left seven people dead, Somaliland declared Buhodle region to be under its control. On August 11, a delegation of Khatumo politicians and regional leaders of Buhodle met Somaliland's president, Ahmad Silanyo, in Somaliland's capital Hargeysa, Woqooyi Galbeed, for peace talks. One day later, local leaders of Buhodle and Silanyo signed an agreement aimed at defusing the conflict. Somaliland pulled back military forces from Buhodle, and released 68 Khatumo fighters from prison. Silanyo named former SSC leader Saleban Isse Ahmed as Minister of Resettlement and Aid in Somaliland, on October 14. On November 28, regional council elections held in Somaliland provinces were followed by violent protests. Khatumo fighters abducted members of Somaliland's Xaqsoor political party in Sool region on November 27. On the day of the election, six people were killed and several injured in clashes between Khatumo fighters and Somaliland forces in Huddun, Sanaag. On December 8, four protesters died in post-election violence in Hargeysa. On December 24, Somaliland launched attacks against Khatumo fighters, who had reportedly attacked their base in Sool Region. *rbr*

SOUTH SUDAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2008**



Conflict parties: **Murle vs. Lou Nuer vs. Misseriya vs. Dinka Gok vs. Dinka Rek vs. Dinka Bor vs. Bari vs. Fartit**

Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources**

The war over subnational predominance and resources between various ethnic groups continued. Violence usually revolved around cattle raids, abduction, tribal controversies, and disputes over grazing land and water. At the very beginning of the year, 6,000-8,000 armed Lou-Nuer members, the so-called Nuer White Army, assembled in Pibor County, Jonglei state, after having declared their intention to wipe out the Murle Tribe. In a series of Lou-Nuer attacks on Murle villages, 20,000 to 60,000 people were displaced and 612 killed. The tribes had stood on different sides in the secession conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. On January 3, UNMIS deployed peacekeeping troops to Pibor County and supported the government in deploying troops and 2,000 policemen to Pibor, Jonglei. The following day, the government declared a state of emergency in Jonglei. In multiple revenge attacks between January 5 and 14, Murle members assaulted Lou-Nuer villages in Duk, Akobo, Uror, and Nyirol Counties, all in Jonglei, killing 209. On January 16, Murle members attacked Dinkas in Duk. 300 houses were torched and 83 people killed. In another Nuer attack on Dinkas in late January, 78 people died in Warrap state. Eleven people died in early February, when Murle members attacked Lou-Nuer villages in Akobo. Another 22 people died in clashes between Dinka Bor and Murle in Pibor. On March 1, the government started a six-week disarmament program in Jonglei State. The following day, Murle members attacked Lou-Nuer in Nyirol County, resulting in 30 fatalities. Clashes spread to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, when fighting between Bari, Dinka, and Lou-Nuer over land left ten people dead. Between March 9 and 11, 223 people died when Murle attacked Lou-Nuer members in Upper Nile. Five days later, three people were killed when Murle attacked a bus in Jonglei. On May 5, President Salva Kiir attended the signing of a peace deal between ethnic group leaders in Bor, Jonglei. Four days later, Murle killed two people in Twic East County, Jonglei. On October 1, Murle killed a Dinka Bor. Misseriya stole some 100 cows in Abyei on October 24. On November 6, Dinka killed 23 in Rumbek Central County, Lakes State. Clashes between Dinka Gok and Dinka Rek on November 30 left 31 dead. In mid-December, some twenty people died in clashes between Dinka and Fertit in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. Four people died in a cattle raid in Twice East County on December 19. Murle killed seven people in Duk and an additional two Lou-Nuer in a cattle raid in Jonglei on December 28.

jpu

SOUTH SUDAN (VARIOUS MILITIAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↓ | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: **SSPLM/A, SSDM, SSDF, SSLA vs. government**

Conflict items: **system / ideology, resources**

The conflict between the government and various militias over the orientation of the political system and resources de-escalated from a war to the level of a violent crisis. The government reached a peace treaty with the SSDM leader Peter Kuol Chol Awan on February 27, leading to a significant decrease in rebel activities. While parts of the SSDM rejected this peace deal, choosing John Olony as their new leader, approx. 1,800 SSDM fighters joined the demobilization and reintegration process. The South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), led by James Gai Yoach, and factions of SSDM opposing the treaty continued fighting throughout the year. In the course of rehabilitating rebel leaders, the government reinstated Peter Gadet, former leader of the SSLA, allowing him to keep the rank he had prior to his rebellion. Finally, the South Sudan People Liberation Movement/ Army (SSPLM/A), a rebel group founded by Tong Lual Ayat at the end of 2011, announced their reintegration into the armed forces on May 5. On March 27, SSLA forces attacked government positions in Lalop, Unity state, followed by an attack by SSDM forces on government positions in Kuek, Upper Nile State on April 19. In addition, David Yau Yau, a militia leader who had concluded a peace agreement with the government on 06/16/2010, resumed his armed struggle in April, becoming military commander of combined SSLA and South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) contingents in Jonglei State. On April 19, SSLA forces attacked government positions in Mayom County, Unity State, killing five soldiers. Fighting intensified on August 24, when joint SSLA/SSDF forces attacked government troops in the Nanaam area of Jonglei, leaving between 25 and 100 government forces dead. Approx. 7,000 people were displaced as a result of the fighting. Further clashes were reported in Likuangole, Jonglei, between August 27 and 30, as well as on September 22. On October 25 and 26, government troops and SSLA/SSDF forces clashed in the same region, leaving one person dead. In reaction, the government ordered the armed forces to suspend disarmament measures in Jonglei State that had been intended to ease tensions between different ethnic groups and instead concentrate its capacities on the fight against SSLA/SSDF rebels [→ South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)]. On November 19, about nineteen SSLA/SSDF militias and one government soldier were killed during clashes in Linkwangule, Jonglei.

rs

SUDAN (DARFUR)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**



Conflict parties: **SRF, LJM vs. border guards vs. pro-government militias vs. government**
 Conflict items: **subnational predominance, resources, other**

The war over subnational predominance and resources in the Darfur region between several rebel groups and the government continued, mainly affecting North Darfur. Beside regular troops, the government also deployed a variety of police and paramilitary forces such as the reserve police Abu Tira. During the year tensions among these various police and paramilitary forces resulted in violent confrontations between these groups. In 2011, the rebel groups Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Minni Minnawi (SLM/A-MM), and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Abdul Wahid an-Nur (SLM/A-AW) formed the umbrella group Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).

The conflict remained a key issue within the international community. On February 28, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against the Sudanese Minister of Defense Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein for crimes against humanity. On April 26, the UN Security Council decided to reduce the police and military personnel of the UNAMID by 3,000. About 16,000 troops remained in Darfur. On February 8, the establishment of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), as agreed upon in the AU- and UN-supported Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006, was completed. Led by Tijani Al-Sisi, DRA was to be responsible for post-war reconstruction and reconciliation. DRA implemented the new division of the Darfur region into South, North, Central, East, and West Darfur, as scheduled in the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD).

While most violent incidents concerned government aggression against civilians, the highest death toll was reached in the fighting between rebels and government. On June 2, the government army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), killed more than 45 JEM fighters in North Darfur. SAF and SRF clashed on September 19 in East Jebel Marra, North Darfur, causing more than 80 fatalities. On October 18, SRF killed 63 soldiers in the region of Abu Delek, North Darfur. Between December 23 and 24, SLM/A-AW killed 90 soldiers in Golo, Central Darfur.

While no fighting between different rebel factions was reported, government forces and militias clashed heavily on various occasions. For instance, between September 25 and 28, at least 70 civilians were killed and 25,000 displaced in fighting between Abu Tira, pro-government militias, and border guards in Hashaba, North Darfur. After the militia had plundered the village, the air force bombed the area. Day-long fighting between government troops and pro-government militias in Kutum, North Darfur, relocated to the nearby IDP camps of Kassab and Fatah Barno in early August. Some twenty IDPs were killed and 600 injured. The government forces also repeatedly attacked the civilian population as well as IDP

camp, employing their air force and heavy weapons. Among other incidents, the SAF killed four civilians participating in violent mass protests against the new governor of South Darfur, Hamad Ismail, in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, between January 24 and 26. A pro-government militia burned down five villages in North Darfur between March 27 and 29, displacing 7,000. On November 2, a militia attacked Sigili village, North Darfur, causing the death of thirteen civilians and leaving the village completely destroyed.

Attacks upon the civilian population by rebel groups were reported less often. As on April 25, SLM/A-MM supposedly killed eight people and detained 25 in Abu Gamra, North Darfur. Throughout the year, at least 1,000 people were killed, including several hundred civilians and fourteen UNAMID peacekeepers. Some 800 died from September to December alone. The war was accompanied by rape and torture, especially in refugee camps. More than 80 rape cases by pro-government militias were registered. For instance, on August 22, militia forces raped more than twenty women in public at Kassab Camp, North Darfur. At the end of the year, 2,850,000 people from the Darfur region lived in refugee camps. Although the DDPD foresaw the refugees' return to Darfur, most of them refused to do so due to the unstable security situation. *apa*

SUDAN (SPLM/A-NORTH/SOUTHERN KORDOFAN, BLUE NILE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2011**



Conflict parties: **SPLM/A-North vs. government**
 Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the government in the Sudanese provinces of South Kordofan and Blue Nile escalated to a war. The SRF was an alliance between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-North) and the three main rebel groups: Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Abul Wahed (SLM/A-AW), and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Minni Minnawi (SLM/A-MM) based in Darfur [→Sudan (Darfur)]. The struggle between SRF and the government was closely linked to the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan concerning the boundary line in South Kordofan and Blue Nile [→Sudan – South Sudan]. Between January 2 and 9, government troops bombarded South Kordofan Province, killing nineteen civilians and injuring 34.

On January 16, the government army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and SPLM/A-North rebels clashed in the areas of Hajar Jawad and Elhijirat Mountains, South Kordofan. On January 23, SAF conducted air strikes in Blue Nile State, resulting in several thousand refugees. The following day, the air force bombed a transit center for refugees in Elfoi, South Kordofan, near the South Sudanese border. At least 1,100 civilians fled as a result. After SRF had seized ten villages in South Kordofan on January 28, 30,000 civilians fled. SRF rebels seized an army garrison near Lake Obyad, South Kordofan, on Februa-

ry 26, killing 130 government troops and capturing machine guns, heavy artillery, and vehicles. Due to SAF bombardments between February 27 and March 4, more than 24 soldiers died and 2,000 civilians fled from Blue Nile State to South Sudan. The same day, SPLM/A-North rebels launched an attack in al-Dalang, South Kordofan. Fifteen SAF soldiers died, an army camp was destroyed, and a large number of arms seized in the assault, while the rebels suffered one death and six injuries. Between March 26 and April 18, SRF rebels claimed to have killed more than 190 government soldiers. In late April, sixteen civilians were killed and 34 injured in SAF bombings. On June 27, the government allowed the UN to deliver humanitarian assistance to civilians in areas held by SPLM/A-North. In June and July, bombardments and clashes continued. At least 77 rebel fighters were killed in clashes between SRF and government forces near the village of Hagar al-Dom, South Kordofan, on August 6. Fighting between SAF and SRF in South Kordofan left 82 soldiers and 29 rebels dead on August 24 and 25. More than 5,000 civilians fled the area. On September 2, 70 government troops and seven rebels died in a major battle northeast of Kadugli, South Kordofan's capital. On September 6 and 7, government forces killed at least 77 in South Kordofan. On September 10, SAF soldiers killed eighteen SRF forces near Kadugli. On September 20, fighting in South Kordofan resulted in the death of twelve SAF soldiers and 30 rebels. SPLM/A-North shot down an SAF airplane near Jau, South Kordofan, on September 7, following a bombardment of rebel positions. The same day, rebels ambushed a military patrol between Hajar-jawas and Angarko, South Kordofan, killing ten soldiers. On October 8, SPLM/A-North shelled Kadugli, killing at least 27, including seven civilians and five SAF members. During rebel attacks on November 8 and 14 in South Kordofan, more than nineteen people were killed and 31 injured. On December 5, SAF soldiers arrested 70 people for collaborating with SPLM/A-North. On December 13, SPLM/A-North repelled a government attack, killing 27 government forces in a South Kordofan village. The majority of statements on casualties originated from local sources in favor of either one of the parties or the other. According to UNHCR, 181,000 people had fled from Blue Nile and South Kordofan by December. Throughout the year, SRF was repeatedly accused of recruiting children and sending them to training camps in South Sudan. lmp

by the UN, AU, and its AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), the conflict parties reached several agreements in Addis Ababa on September 27. A consensus was reached on various conflict issues, but not on the future status of contested border areas, including Abyei. Though the treaties were ratified by both Sudanese parliaments, they were yet to be implemented. In early 2012, the parties' dispute over transit fees for South Sudan's oil exports through Sudanese territory resulted in a complete shut-down of oil production in South Sudan on January 22.

Relations further deteriorated when South Sudan accused Sudan of conducting air raids on South Sudanese territory. In late January, the UN confirmed that air raids had been conducted on a refugee registration site and on Panakuac Region, both in Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Although the conflict parties had reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on non-aggression and cooperation on February 10, followed by a MoU on the repatriation process on February 14, fighting continued. On February 14, Sudan bombed the border town of Jau, killing four people. Though the two Sudans reached an agreement on border demarcation on March 13, aerial bombardments by the Sudanese air force on the South Sudanese states of Upper Nile, Unity State, and Bahr el Ghazal continued throughout March and April. Additional heavy fighting on the ground was reported at Teshwin, Unity State, on March 23. Two days of fighting erupted around Heglig, an oil-rich border area claimed by both conflict parties, when South Sudanese troops briefly occupied the nearby oil installations on March 26. In addition, fighting intensified in the South Sudanese Bahr el Ghazal State between March and April, displacing approx. 10,000 people. Heavy fighting over the oil installations of Heglig erupted on April 10. The conflict parties deployed more than 1,000 soldiers, tanks, anti-aircraft rockets, mortars, and rocket launchers, SAF bombing strategic infrastructure. The fighting severely damaged the oil installations and halted oil production. Between 400 and 1,200 people were killed and a further 5,000 displaced in the battle which resulted in South Sudan controlling the oil field. After severe international criticism, South Sudanese forces retreated on April 20. Notwithstanding, air raids as well as ground fighting continued on various occasions, e.g. in northern Unity State on May 4, and the War Guit area in northern Bahr el Ghazal State on May 25. The negotiations between the two Sudans came to a temporary halt after a Sudanese air raid upon the locality of Rumaker in Bahr el Ghazal State left several people injured on July 20. Even after the conclusion of the September agreements, which encompassed the restart of oil exports from South Sudan, a demilitarized zone along the border, and principles of border demarcation, clashes continued. From November 20 to 22, seven people were killed and 200 displaced when Sudan conducted air raids into Bahr el Ghazal. Sudanese ground attacks on the area of Kirr Adem in the same state left three people dead on December 9. Moreover, border clashes continued at the end of the year. For example on December 26, up to 28 people were killed in the area of Warguet in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in fighting between the two armed forces. On the Sudanese side, these attacks were justified as part of their fight against rebel forces which they claimed were supported by South Sudan [→ Sudan (SPLM/A-North/Southern Kordofan,

SUDAN – SOUTH SUDAN

Intensity: **5** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2011**



Conflict parties: **SPLM/A-North vs. government**
 Conflict items: **territory, resources, other**

The conflict between Sudan and South Sudan over contested border areas in general and the oil rich Higlig Region in particular, the status of the Abyei area, border security, citizenship, transit fees for oil exports, and the alleged support of rebel movements, escalated to a war. Against the backdrop of intensified international pressure, including ultimatums

Blue Nile)]. South Sudan denied the allegations, and in turn accused Sudan of supporting rebel groups as well as stirring up ethnic tensions in South Sudan's territory [→ South Sudan (various militias), South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)].

While the conflict parties in turn clashed in the contested area of Abyei on May 2, tensions over Abyei conflict slightly decreased when both Sudans withdrew most of their police forces from the region. Additionally, in the framework of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, the conflict parties agreed upon a frame of reference for the Joint Military Observer Committee. However, the main joint institutions for Abyei, as foreseen in the Abyei agreement of 06/20/11, remained non-operational throughout the year. Despite massive diplomatic pressure, the conflict parties also failed to agree upon the persons eligible to vote in the referendum determining the future status of the Abyei area. South Sudan's president Salva Kirr reiterated the South's claim on the territories of Higlig, Magenes-Jida, Kafia Kingi, Hafra Nahas, Taka Tijariya, and Wheatly Monroe Strip on June 11. Approx. 20 percent of the common border remained contested. With respect to border security, the conflict parties also failed to implement the Abyei agreement of 06/20/11. The question of the boundary line of the envisaged Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) remained especially highly contested. On 11/21/11, the AU had proposed a map displaying a temporary administrative line. While South Sudan agreed to the map, it was rejected by Sudan, on the grounds of allocating Wheatly Monroe Strip to South Sudan. As the AU had done before, the UN Security Council demanded the resumption of negotiations within two weeks and the resolution of all conflict issues in the following three months on May 2. On August 3, the AU extended the deadline to September 22, simultaneously mandating the AUHIP to draft detailed proposals for binding settlements on all outstanding issues. In case of the conflict parties' failure to agree, AUHIP's proposals were to be implemented by the AU in consultation with the UN. Subsequently, on September 27 in Addis Ababa, the conflict parties reached various agreements dealing with the issues of citizenship, transit fees for oil exports, cross border trade, and border security respectively. Concerning citizenship, the agreement foresaw for all citizens of Sudan and South Sudan the right to live, work, travel, and own property in the respective neighboring country. With respect to border security, the immediate implementation of the SDBZ on the basis of the AU-proposed temporary administrative line was envisaged. The treaties were ratified by both Sudanese parliaments on October 17 and 18. The conflict parties also planned the resumption of oil exports from South Sudan to Sudan that had stopped in January. However, on November 28, the UN Security Council condemned the lack of progress in implementing the September agreements. As the conflict parties were also unable to make any progress concerning contested border areas as well as of the future status of Abyei, both of which having not been dealt with in the September agreements, the AU issued a new ultimatum on October 24: The conflict parties were to agree on the border areas within two weeks and on the future status of Abyei within six weeks, or face final and binding proposals set by the AU. Both deadlines lapsed without any solution to the respective conflict issues.

rs

TANZANIA (UAMSHO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: ***Uamsho vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***secession, system/ideology***

The conflict between the secessionist movement Association for Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation (Uamsho) and the government turned violent. Uamsho demanded semi-autonomous Zanzibar's independence from mainland Tanganyika, claiming that Zanzibar was being politically and economically marginalized. Uamsho gained support after the largest opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF), formed a government of national unity with Tanzania's ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), in 2010. On May 26 and 27, alleged Uamsho members violently clashed with police forces in Zanzibar's capital, Stone Town. Around 200 Uamsho members protesting against the arrest of one of their leaders burned down two churches and attacked several bars, clubs, and shops. Police cracked down on the rioters with tear gas and water cannons, arresting 30 alleged Uamsho members. Several people were also injured. The following day, Uamsho leaders, police and government met for negotiations without any results. After the government had banned any gatherings concerning Zanzibar's status as part of Tanzania, police dispersed Uamsho meetings in Zanzibar Urban/West on June 17 and 20, using teargas and watercannons, arresting 43 alleged Uamsho supporters. After Uamsho leader and Muslim cleric Sheikh Farid Hadi Ahmed disappeared, Uamsho members and police clashed violently in central Stone Town between October 16 and 18. The rioters killed one police officer and torched two offices of the ruling party CCM. Uamsho threatened to kill Christians and burn churches if its leader did not resurface. On October 19, Ahmed claimed to have been abducted by government agents, but police denied the accusations. Three days later, seven Uamsho leaders were charged with inciting the riots.

jli

TOGO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2002**

Conflict parties: ***opposition vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***national power***

The conflict between the government of President Faure Gnassingbé and the National Progress Alliance (ANC) under Jean-Pierre Fabre as well as other opposition groups continued. The Permanent Committee for Dialog and Consultation (CPDC), which had been set up in 2009 to facilitate dialog between the ruling party Rally for Togolese People (RPT), opposition parties, and civil society representatives, was boycotted by opposition members in mid-February. In April, President Gnassingbé dissolved RPT to create the new Union for the Republic (UNIR), uniting different political groups and civil society organizations with links to the RPT. The opposition regularly staged protests, many of them being dispersed by police forces using teargas and rubber bullets. In May, opposition leader Fabre

threatened to boycott parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2012. On July 11, Prime Minister Gilbert Houngbo announced his and his government's resignation. Eight days later, President Gnassingbé appointed opposition member Kwesi Ahoomey-Zunu as prime minister. In early August, six opposition groups formed the Rainbow Coalition for the upcoming presidential elections and announced their cooperation with the Save Togo Collective (CST), a newly founded human rights organization. On August 25, thousands protested peacefully against the government and Fabre demanded Gnassingbé to step down as President. The same day in a protest initiated by CST, women started a one-week sex strike, withholding sexual intercourse from their partners, in order to mobilize them against Gnassingbé. However, parliamentary elections were postponed to 2013. *dt*

plant near Bakouma, Mbomou Prefecture, in eastern CAR, looting goods, abducting fourteen and leaving two civilians dead. Between September and December, violent LRA activity significantly decreased in the DRC and CAR. *cke, mwe*

UGANDA (LRA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: ***LRA vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***subnational predominance***

The conflict over subnational predominance in central Africa between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the government de-escalated but remained violent. After being pushed out of northern Uganda by the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) in 2006, the LRA operations concentrated in the border triangle of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan. As of 2012, all documented conflict activity was solely based in the territories of DRC and CAR. CAR remained the suspected location of the LRA's top command, including LRA leaders Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo commanding 100 fighters. The LRA's leader, Joseph Kony, was suspected to be in the Darfur region of Sudan with an estimated 100 to 150 rebels at the beginning of the year. Though there was an initial increase in LRA attacks in CAR, the highest concentration remained in Orientale Province, DRC. Some 443,000 people remained displaced due to LRA activity, including an additional 2,000 newly displaced persons since the beginning of the year. The highest number of displaced continued to be in northern DRC, with 347,000 IDPs. Attacks most commonly consisted of lootings and abductions carried out by small formations.

Around 100 CAR soldiers were deployed in the eastern region of CAR with another estimated 600 to 800 UPDF troops. In March, the AU officially launched the Regional Cooperation Initiative (RCI) to strengthen efforts to combat the LRA. The initiative included the establishment of a 5,000 member Regional Task Force (RTF) composed of soldiers from Uganda, DRC, CAR, and South Sudan.

From January to September, 180 presumed LRA attacks occurred, resulting in 39 deaths and 311 abductions. For instance, on January 20, LRA burnt down two schools in Faradje, Orientale Province, DRC. In a CAR hunting reserve, LRA allegedly killed thirteen artisanal gold miners on March 20 and 21. On May 12, Ugandan military forces seized LRA senior commander Caesar Achellam at the CAR-Congo border. From June 21 to 25, LRA combatants carried out a series of attacks on a French uranium

THE AMERICAS

THE AMERICAS



■ : NO VIOLENT CONFLICT
■ : VIOLENT CRISIS
■ : LIMITED WAR
■ : WAR

In the Americas, the total number of conflicts increased from 45 to 51. While one interstate conflict ended in 2012 [→ Colombia – Venezuela (system)], six intrastate conflicts erupted; one over national power [→ Paraguay (impeachment)], two over wages [→ Bolivia (police riots), Brazil (police riots)], two over subnational predominance [→ El Salvador (Maras), Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)], and one over the orientation of the political system [→ Nicaragua (militant groups)]. Five of the six newly emerged conflicts started on a violent level, while the national power struggle in Paraguay resulting from the impeachment of President Fernando Lugo constituted a dispute.

The number of highly violent conflicts remained at four, with the conflict between drug cartels and the government in Mexico constituting the sole war [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. While one limited war in Colombia decreased to a violent crisis [→ Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)], another conflict increased to a limited war [→ Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)]. The limited war between the FARC and the government of Colombia persisted despite peace negotiations, as did the limited war between several armed groups in Mexico [→ Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)].

Two interstate conflicts were conducted violently, leaving Guatemalan and Mexican civilians dead in the respective border areas [→ Guatemala - Belize (territory), USA - Mexico (border security)]. Nicaragua’s conflict with neighboring Costa Rica over the border river San Juan de-escalated to a dispute, while the maritime conflict with Colombia escalated to a non-violent crisis after Colombian warships had remained in contested waters despite the ruling of the ICJ [→ Nicaragua - Costa Rica (Río San Juan), Nicaragua - Colombia (sea border)]. The conflict between Argentina and the UK over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands also escalated to a non-violent crisis due to a warship deployment by the UK and heightened diplomatic tensions [→ Argentina - United Kingdom (Malvinas/Falkland Islands)].

In the course of presidential elections in Venezuela as well as in Mexico, the two respective opposition conflicts turned violent again [→ Venezuela (opposition), Mexico (opposition)].


Three conflicts saw changes by two levels. The opposition conflict in Ecuador escalated from a dispute to a violent crisis, while two conflicts involving indigenous people de-escalated from a violent crisis to a dispute [→ Ecuador (opposition groups), Mexico (APPO), Chile (Rapa Nui / Easter Island)].

The predominant conflict items in the Americas were resources and system/ideology, with 21 cases each. Furthermore, struggles over subnational predominance accounted for ten old and two new conflicts, and the dispute between supporters of former President Fernando Lugo and new President Franco in Paraguay added to the six existing national power conflicts.


The various conflicts over illicit drugs were again accompanied by the deployment of military forces in the region, in several cases supported by US agencies. Military personnel was deployed against organized crime (OC) as well as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). In Mexico, military deployment shifted to the central states after a surge in drug-related violence in the first six months. The newly-elected President Enrique Peña Nieto announced to create a nationwide gendarmerie of several ten thousand personnel. In Jamaica, military forces were deployed in areas dominated by drug gangs, and a joint police-military operation was conducted in St. Catherine in March. El Salvador deployed military forces and a Special Counter-Terrorism Command to ensure the safety of public transport, which was compromised by Mara gangs throughout the country. In Brazil, in the course of Operations Ágata IV-VI, more than 25,000 soldiers were deployed to secure the borders and to halt cross-border trafficking. Moreover, military forces joined with civilian law enforcement agencies to re-establish security in urban areas under the influence of DTO/OC.

The US supplied Latin American countries with military infrastructure as well as military personnel and troops. Under the Mérida Initiative, a US-Mexican program aimed at fighting DTO/OC in Mexico, the US supported Mexican law enforcement agencies and the military with aircraft. Multinational anti-drug operations in Central America, aimed at hindering land and airborne drug trafficking from South America and the Caribbean, led to increased military presence and action

CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN THE AMERICAS IN 2012 COMPARED TO 2011



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2012 IN THE AMERICAS BY INTENSITY GROUPS



throughout the isthmus. In Guatemala, US Marines were deployed to cooperate with Guatemalan troops as part of »Operation Hammer.« The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) launched the corresponding »Operation Anvil« in the northern departments of Honduras, mainly to intercept planes and fight traffickers on the ground. Additionally, apart from the aforementioned operation, 20,000 Honduran soldiers re-

mained deployed against DTO/OC with the aim to improve security.

The DEA supported Honduras with radar intelligence, several helicopters as well as at least one Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST), a force initially created for rapid deployment and combat in drug-producing regions in Afghanistan.

CONFLICTS IN THE AMERICAS IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Argentina–Iran (AMIA)*	Argentina vs. Iran	other	1994	•	1
Argentina–United Kingdom (Malvinas/Falkland Islands)	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	1833	↗	2
Bolivia (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1983	•	1
Bolivia (police riots)	Bolivian National Police vs. government	other	2012	NEW	3
Bolivia–Chile (access to sea)*	Bolivia vs. Chile	territory, resources	1883	•	1
Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)	drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	↗	4
Brazil (MST)*	MST vs. government	resources	1996	↘	2
Brazil (police riots)	Police forces in Bahía vs. government	other	2012	NEW	3
Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía)	Mapuche, ATM, CAM vs. government	autonomy, resources	2008	•	3
Chile (Rapa Nui / Easter Island)*	Rapa Nui vs. government	autonomy	2010	↓	1
Chile (social movements)	Confech, Fech, CUT vs. government	system / ideology	2006	•	3
Colombia (ELN)*	ELN vs. government	system / ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1964	•	3
Colombia (FARC–ELN)*	FARC vs. ELN	system / ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2006	↘	1
Colombia (FARC)	FARC vs. government	system / ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1964	•	4
Colombia (indigenous groups)	various indigenous groups vs. government	resources	2005	↗	3
Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)*	paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1983	↘	3
Colombia–Venezuela (system)*	Colombia vs. Venezuela	system / ideology, international power	2004	END	1
Dominican Republic–Haiti*	Dominican Republic vs. Haiti	other	2009	•	1
Ecuador (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology	1980	↑	3
El Salvador (Maras)	Mara Salvatrucha, Barrio 18 vs. government	subnational predominance	2012	NEW	3
Guatemala (drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2009	•	3
Guatemala (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology	1985	↗	3
Guatemala–Belize (territory)	Guatemala vs. Belize	territory	1981	↑	3
Haiti (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1986	↘	2
Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)	drug trafficking organizations, organized crime vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2012	NEW	3
Honduras (MUCA, MARCA, farmers of Bajo Aguán valley - landowners)	big landowners vs. peasant farmers of Bajo Aguán, MUCA, MARCA	resources	2009	•	3
Honduras (opposition)	FNRP, LIBRE, anti-government activists vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2009	↗	3
Jamaica (drug gangs)	drug gangs vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	•	3
Mexico (APPO) *	APPO vs. government	system / ideology	2006	↓	1
Mexico (drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2006	•	5
Mexico (EPR / Guerrero)*	EPR vs. government	autonomy, system / ideology	1995	•	2
Mexico (EZLN / Chiapas)*	EZLN vs. government	autonomy, system / ideology, resources, other	1994	•	2
Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)	Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. La Familia et al. vs. CJNG et al. vs. LCT et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2005	•	4
Mexico (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2006	↑	3
Nicaragua (militant groups)	militant groups vs. government	system/ideology	2012	NEW	3
Nicaragua (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2008	•	3

CONFLICTS IN THE AMERICAS IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Nicaragua–Colombia (sea border)	Nicaragua vs. Colombia	territory, resources	1825	↗	2
Nicaragua–Costa Rica (Río San Juan)*	Nicaragua vs. Costa Rica	territory	1858	↘	1
Panama (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system / ideology, resources	2008	•	3
Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)	EPP, agrarian movements vs. government	system / ideology, resources	1989	•	3
Paraguay (impeachment)	Franco supporters vs. Lugo supporters	national power	2012	NEW	1
Peru (opposition movements)	opposition movements vs. government	system / ideology, resources	2008	•	3
Peru (Shining Path)	SL vs. government	system / ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1980	•	3
Peru–Chile (border)*	Peru vs. Chile	territory	1883	•	1
United Kingdom–Chile (Antarctica)*	United Kingdom vs. Chile	territory	2007	•	1
USA–Cuba (Guantanamo)*	USA vs. Cuba	territory	1959	•	1
USA–Cuba (system)*	USA vs. Cuba	system / ideology, international power	1960	•	2
USA–Mexico (border security)	USA vs. Mexico	other	2005	•	3
USA–Venezuela*	USA vs. Venezuela	system / ideology, international power	2001	•	2
Venezuela (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1992	↗	3
Venezuela–Colombia (Monjes Islands)*	Colombia vs. Venezuela	territory, resources	1871	•	1

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

ARGENTINA – UNITED KINGDOM (MALVINAS / FALKLAND ISLANDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1833**

Conflict parties: **Argentina vs. United Kingdom**
Conflict items: **territory, resources**

The conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK) over the territory of the Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands escalated, but remained non-violent. On January 31, the UK sent the destroyer HMS Dauntless to a naval exercise near the disputed islands, with Prince William participating. The Argentine government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner accused the UK of militarizing the South Atlantic, whereas the British government of Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the dispatch of the warship was a routine naval exercise. Moreover, Argentina accused the UK on February 10 of having deployed a nuclear submarine near the disputed islands. The Argentine foreign minister Héctor Timerman filed a formal protest at the UN the same day. On March 27, the UK rejected the accusations. On June 4, Argentina declared the oil drilling in the disputed waters by UK-listed companies illegal, whereas the UK said the activity was part of the islands' right of self-determination. On October 5, Argentina sent a letter of complaint to the UN Security Council regarding the planned British military exercises, including missile launches, on the disputed territory. Argentina perceived these exercises as a provocation, whereas the UK stated that they were part of their military defense presence. On November 19, Argentine nationalists ransacked a shipping agency in Buenos Aires that offers cruise trips to the islands. The UK condemned the Argentine police not trying to prevent the incident and thus responded with seeking actions through the European Union, the World Trade Organization and the International Maritime Organization. In addition, the UK summoned the Argentine ambassador and called the incident a »violent act of intimidation.« *swa*

BOLIVIA (POLICE RIOTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: **Bolivian National Police vs. government**
Conflict items: **other**

The conflict over wages and labor conditions between police forces and the government lasted for a week. In the cities of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Potosí, several hundred low-ranking police officers expelled their commanders on June 21. Three people were injured in clashes with anti-riot police. The strikers demanded their payments and pensions to be adjusted to those of the armed forces and urged the government to annul a law restricting their right to strike. Furthermore, they refused to accept the authority of the new police chief, Colonel Víctor Santos Maldonado, and called for his resignation. One day later, some 200 police forces successively attacked the National Intelligence Directorate (Digipi), an office of the police disciplinary board (Segip), and the departmental police

headquarters in La Paz, burned documents and demolished office furniture and equipment. Similar actions took place in Oruro, while an estimated 4,000 rank and file police officers all over the country joined the protests by occupying their barracks. On June 24, low-ranking police officers on strike rejected an agreement signed by the government and the police union Anssclapol. While officers in Santa Cruz decided to suspend their protest, police forces in the other main cities burned copies of the agreement. The government accused its political opponents of using the mutiny to prepare a coup d'état [→Bolivia (opposition)]. The opposition, as well as the police, denied any such plans. On June 25, about 1,000 protesting officers and 500 government supporters clashed in front of the presidential palace. They attacked each other with batons and tear gas. No injuries were reported. Two days later, the government and the police on strike reached a deal which ended the protests across the country. *hef*

BRAZIL (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: **drug trafficking organizations vs. government**
Conflict items: **subnational predominance**

The conflict over subnational predominance between the main drug trafficking organizations, as well as militias, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a limited war. It remained the main goal of the government to permanently re-establish control over areas being currently under the rule of drug trafficking organizations and militia groups.

Starting in May, the government conducted operations Ágata IV-VI in order to reduce criminal activities along the border. Approx. 25,000 military and civilian officials, backed by armored vehicles, helicopters, and jets, were involved. Dozens of suspects were arrested, more than six tons of drugs and eleven tons of explosives seized. Gang activities also affected neighboring Bolivia and Paraguay. On July 18, Comando Vermelho (CV) leader, Osmar Jesus "Bola de Fogo" Chavez, was killed by two gunmen near the border town of Salto del Guairá in Paraguay's Canindeyú department.

Throughout the year, police and military forces carried out anti-drug operations in favelas all over the state of Rio de Janeiro resulting in the arrests of several suspects, deaths on either side, and the seizure of drugs and weapons. In March and April, alleged drug traffickers killed nine people including a security officer in the favela Rocinha. In a joint operation of military forces as well as civil and federal police in the Vila Aliança favela on May 13, Márcio José »Matemático« Sabino Pereira, leader of the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP), was fatally wounded. On May 17, 1,600 police officers arrested fifteen suspects and seized arms and drugs in sixteen favelas all over the state. As part of operation "Purificação" at least 59 allegedly corrupt police officers and eleven members of CV were arrested in Duque de Caxias on December 4.

On January 27, police in São Paulo captured a leader of CV, Fabiano »FB« Atanázio da Silva, along with three other CV

members. On May 28, officers of the special unit Rondas Ostensivas Tobias Aguiar killed six Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) members. In a series of revenge killings between members of PCC and the police approx. 380 people were killed of which at least 100 were police officers. PCC leader Francisco Antônio »Piauí« Cesário da Silva was arrested on August 26, in Santa Catarina state. On October 29, 500 agents of military police and its special unit Tropa de Choque conducted the operation »Saturação« in the PCC stronghold community Paraisópolis. The right hand of »Piauí,« Edson »Nenê« Ferreira dos Santos, was arrested together with 107 suspects during the operation. Police also discovered a death list containing the names of 40 policemen and seized weapons and drugs. *jva, hef*

BRAZIL (POLICE RIOTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: ***Police forces in Bahía vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***other***

The conflict over wages and working conditions between police forces in Bahía and the government lasted for twelve days. On January 31, at least 10,000 of the 32,000 members of the Military Police of Bahía went on strike demanding a 30 percent pay increase and better working conditions. Under the leadership of former police officer Marco Prisco, 245 strikers along with their families occupied the legislative assembly in the state capital Salvador da Bahía. Businesses, as well as public venues, closed down temporarily as strikers seized police cars, torched vehicles, looted stores, and blocked roads to Salvador. During the strike, the number of homicides in Salvador's metropolitan area rose significantly, most of the killings were attributed to militia groups (→Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)). The government and Bahía state governor, Jacques Wagner, repeatedly called the strike illegal, which later was approved by a court in Bahía on February 2. The government deployed 3,500 soldiers, 650 federal police officers and 40 officers of an army elite force to provide security. More than 1,000 soldiers surrounded the occupied state assembly while strike leader Prisco vowed to resist. On February 6, army forces and occupiers clashed using tear gas and rubber bullets, leaving six injured. Three days later, the military police being on strike left the building peacefully, but stressed that the strike was not over. Prisco was arrested along with eleven other strike leaders. On February 11, striking officers accepted an agreement over salary increases as well as additional benefits and called off the strike. *jva*

CHILE (MAPUCHE / ARAUCANÍA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: ***Mapuche, ATM, CAM vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***autonomy, resources***

The conflict over autonomy and resources in the region of La Araucanía between members of the indigenous Mapu-

che people, among them Wenté Winkul Mapu, Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) as well as Mapuche Territorial Alliance (ATM), and the government remained violent. Police operations and occupation actions caused casualties on both sides. For instance, on April 2, police raided the Mapuche community Wenté Winkul Mapu, Araucanía, using armored vehicles to block roads, searching houses, applying teargas and arresting three Mapuche. Shots fired by an unidentified shooter in a nearby forest killed one police officer. During an arrest on June 7, police injured seven Mapuche, including children, with pellet shots. Mapuche attacked at least one policeman with axes and rods. In the aftermath, the Court of Appeals approved, on July 6, a constitutional complaint against the disproportional use of force by the police. On the same day, one of the leaders of CAM was arrested during the occupation of the agricultural estate El Natre. The latter used teargas and rubber pellets. Between July 7 and 19, Mapuche set fire to several buildings in Ercilla. On July 22, CAM, among others, officially declared being responsible for the incendiary of machines and trucks of the company Forestal Cautín. At a security summit on July 24, President Sebastián Piñera announced to increase the police's resources and staff in the region. Two days later, ATM occupied the UNICEF office in the capital Santiago de Chile. On September 2, an agreement with UNICEF was reached and the occupation ended. Under the agreement, UNICEF was to ask the Ministry of the Interior to withdraw police forces from the Mapuche communities.

Throughout the year, Mapuche repeatedly went on hunger strike. In Angol prison, Araucanía, Mapuche started a hunger strike on July 27. They demanded freedom for all political Mapuche prisoners and the mitigation of their own sentences. The hunger strike ended after three months following the easing of their sentences by the Supreme Court. Five Mapuche detained in the prison of Temuco, Araucanía, went on hunger strike on October 1. They demanded to be transferred to Angol prison, where their families were imprisoned. After 22 days, the authorities granted them their demands. During the hunger strikes, protests were held by other Mapuche. The largest of which occurred on October 15, with 5,000 to 10,000 thousand participants in Santiago de Chile. Once it turned violent, it was ended by the police using teargas. On November 14, two imprisoned leaders of CAM started a hunger strike demanding the liberation of all political Mapuche prisoners and the abatement of action concerning their condemnation. *lef, hka*

CHILE (SOCIAL MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: ***CONFECH, ACES vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***system/ideology***

The system conflict between various social movements led by the Confederation of Chilean Students (CONFECH) and the government remained violent. On January 27, President Sebastián Piñera issued the Solidarity Loan Fund Law, granting 110,000 student loans, and called upon students not to stage protests in 2012. Nevertheless, beginning in March, mostly vi-

olent protests for educational reform regularly took place all over the country. The protesters usually hurled stones, sticks, paint-filled bottles and lit barricades, while police used teargas and water cannons.

On March 15, the Coordinating Assembly of High School Students (ACES) called for the first protests this year. About 5,000 students took to the streets in the capital Santiago de Chile demanding free quality-education and protesting against the expulsion of about 200 students who participated in last year's protests. At least three officers were injured and 50 protesters detained. After ongoing protests, the government announced a new financing system for students on April 23. Two days later, protests organized by CONFECH took place all over the country. In Santiago, 48,000 to 80,000 people demonstrated largely peacefully, nevertheless, 69 were arrested. The same day, Piñera announced further investments regarding education. On May 16, CONFECH staged nationwide mass protests, with about 100,000 participants only in Santiago. Three people were injured and 70 arrested. In his annual State of the Nation speech on May 21, Piñera said that he wanted to advocate an education reform, but dismissed the demands for a free education system. The speech coincided with mass demonstrations of various civil groups, including CONFECH, in 27 cities. On August 8, demonstrators and police forces clashed in Santiago. At least 49 officers were injured, about 75 students arrested, and three public buses burned. Pressured by the continued mass demonstrations, the congress approved a tax reform, raising funds exclusively for education spending, on September 4. However, the student movement rejected the initiative as insufficient and resumed their protests. *lef, hef*

COLOMBIA (FARC)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: ***FARC vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources***

The system conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government remained highly violent. The Marxist-Leninist FARC financed its activities mainly through extortion, drug trafficking, and illegal mining. Counting approx. 8,000 members, FARC exerted considerable influence especially in the departments of Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca. On January 9, a communiqué signed by FARC top commander Rodrigo Londoño Echeverry, alias Timochenko, was released signaling willingness to re-establish peace talks. In reaction, President Juan Manuel Santos reiterated his demand to release all FARC-held hostages and ruled out the establishment of a demilitarized zone.

In another communiqué released on February 26, FARC announced to abandon the practice of kidnapping civilians for extortion and to release the last ten members of the security forces held captive. The six policemen and four soldiers were finally released at the beginning of April. However, on April 28, a French journalist was kidnapped by FARC in Caqueta. He was released on May 30.

On August 27, Santos publicly confirmed exploratory peace talks. Representatives of both parties conducted preparatory talks in Oslo, Norway, on October 18. Norway and Cuba acted as guarantors, while Chile and Venezuela as witnesses. At the first round of talks held in Havana, Cuba, between November 19 and 29, FARC declared a unilateral ceasefire until January 20, 2013. The preliminary results were kept secret.

Meanwhile, violent actions continued. On January 13, FARC set off a car bomb in Tibú, Norte de Santander, causing the death of four civilians. Until the end of January, FARC increased its actions in the department, allegedly in collaboration with other guerrilla groups [→ Colombia (ELN)]. On February 11, FARC assaulted a military base in Valle del Cauca, killing four soldiers. Two days later, the Minister of Defense announced the deployment of 1,100 police officers to protect the region's main cities Cali and Palmira. On February 20, clashes with security forces left three soldiers dead and caused 250 civilians to flee.

On March 17, eleven soldiers were killed in an ambush in Arauca, near the Venezuelan border. Four days later, an air strike on a FARC camp in the same region resulted in the death of 33 guerillas. In another air-ground operation in Meta, 36 militants, including seven front commanders, were killed on March 26.

In early April, FARC forced a stoppage of transportation in several municipalities of Chocó and a nighttime curfew in the provincial capital Quibdó. An attack on a military patrol caused the death of six soldiers and two militants on April 7 in the same department. In another attack on a military squad, FARC members killed twelve soldiers in the department of La Guajira on May 21 and fled to Venezuela. In support of the Colombian government, Venezuela announced the deployment of troops to the area and declared not to allow incursions by any armed groups. Beginning in late June, FARC launched attacks on the urban areas of Toribío and Caldonó, Cauca. Dozens of houses were destroyed by mortar fire. In the aftermath, at least 2,800 people were displaced from the area. Local indigenous groups launched efforts to expel all armed actors from their territories, mostly by non-violent means [→ Colombia (various indigenous groups)]. In spite of FARC's unilateral ceasefire declaration, the government continued offensive operations in December. At least 30 militants were killed in air strikes on FARC camps in Nariño and Antioquia.

Throughout the year, FARC attacks against the electric infrastructure and the oil sector increased. On July 5, they killed five employees of the national oil company. Five days later, the government announced the deployment of 5,000 soldiers to protect petroleum facilities. On August 15, three people were killed by a landmine in Chocó while trying to re-establish power supply interrupted by FARC. *fbl*

COLOMBIA (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: ***various indigenous groups vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***resources***

The conflict between various indigenous groups and the government over resources turned violent. The indigenous

communities repeatedly complained about human rights violations and their territories being affected by armed conflicts [→Colombia (FARC); Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. On January 24, the President of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) urged the government to discuss the humanitarian situation. On May 31, around 400 members of the Embera Chami had to flee the Pacific coastal region of Risaralda department due to fights between the army and a paramilitary group [→Colombia (paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. On July 10, the Nasa indigenous community in the municipality of Toribío, Cauca, marched against the continuous fights between the military and the FARC, requesting both sides to leave their land. As a consequence, on July 12, between 400 and 1,000 members of Nasa armed themselves with rods and knives and stormed the army post Cerro Berlin, evicting 100 soldiers. On July 18, the army, in cooperation with the anti-riot police, reclaimed the post. At least one member of the Nasa died and some twenty were injured. During the following week, several meetings between the Nasa tribe and the government were held without results. On December 7, the US ambassador vowed to support the indigenous communities in Cauca. From July onwards, local indigenous leaders had increasingly received death threats, culminating in the assassination of at least 24 leaders, according to the Association of Indigenous Councils of North Cauca. *meq*

EL SALVADOR (MARAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: ***Mara Salvatrucha, Barrio 18 vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***subnational predominance***

A violent crisis over subnational predominance erupted between the country's main criminal gangs and the government. Gang members conducted targeted killings of security forces in the first months of the year. In February, three soldiers were shot and killed while on patrol in separate incidents in the departments of Cabañas, La Libertad, and Chalatenango. While the government refused to negotiate directly with the gangs, a truce between the two main gangs Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 was brokered mainly by the Catholic Church in March. Subsequently, the gangs announced to stop inter-gang violence and the targeted killings of security forces. Later, the government supported an informal peace deal, granting improved conditions to 30 imprisoned gang leaders. The following months, the country's murder rate dropped significantly, down from thirteen murders a day in February to about five per day in the remainder of the year. However, law enforcement measures backed by military forces continued against the gangs. On June 21, 185 gang members were arrested in the capital San Salvador. In October, the government launched the Active Prevention Patrol plan in the capital, deploying National Civil Police, military officers as well as the Special Counter-Terrorism Command to ensure the safety of public transport. On October 11, the US Treasury Department designated the Mara Salvatrucha as a transnational criminal organization alongside organizations such as Los Zetas of Mexico [→Mexico (drug cartels)]. President Manuel Fuentes rejected the catego-

rization in a radio message three days later. On December 5, a new phase of the peace deal was announced in which the government and the gangs would agree to special zones without crime. In exchange, Barrio 18 leader Carlos »Viejo Lin« Mojica Lechuga demanded the repeal of an anti-gang law that enabled mass arrests of suspected gang members. Several gangs announced to abdicate violence and extortion in ten municipalities which were not further specified. *peh*

GUATEMALA (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: ***drug cartels vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***subnational predominance, resources***

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between various drug cartels and the government, currently led by President Otto Pérez Molina, continued on a violent level. On April 3, the government arrested Horst Walther Overdick, one of the most searched Guatemalan drug traffickers and point man of the Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas, in San Lucas Sacatepéquez, in the department of Alta Verapaz. On December 10, the government extradited Overdick to the USA. On August 6, a Guatemalan court ordered the extradition of Waldemar Lorenzana Lima, head of the Lorenzana crime family, to the USA.

On November 22, gunmen arriving in five cars, dressed as police officers and armed with AK-47 assault rifles, killed seven people in a hospital in Guatemala City. At least six of the killed were allegedly bodyguards for the local Zetas boss Jairo Orellana. According to authorities, secret jailhouse recordings suggest an alliance between the Maras, a street gang, and the Zetas. On September 27, authorities evacuated 44 people of Santa Cruz Barillas, Huehuetenango, after drug traffickers of the Zetas cartel threatened their lives. On October 17, the government stated that in the past four years it had withdrawn the National Civil Police (PNC) from 32 municipalities in eight departments due to a lack of respect for the authorities. On June 27, a court sentenced 36 members of the Zetas to imprisonment between two and 158 years because of drug possession, kidnapping, arms trafficking, and murder. They remained under investigation regarding last year's so-called Petén massacre. Nevertheless, according to an announcement by the Ministry of the Interior on May 31, the Zetas had expanded their operations in Guatemala and operated in eight of the 22 departments. Around September 25, Guatemala increased its military and police presence in seven departments in response to the splitting of the Zetas gang to prepare for violent spillover [→Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)]. On June 30, Molina inaugurated two new military bases in the departments of Petén and Guatemala in order to fight organized crime. During September, three more military bases were opened in the departments San Marcos, Péten, and Izaba. On August 11, 171 US marines started their two-month counterdrug effort »Operation Hammer« in cooperation with 2,000 Guatemalan soldiers in Guatemala, being the counterpart to »Operation Anvil« in Honduras [→Honduras (drug traffickers, organized crime)]. On February 13, the Guatemalan

and the Salvadorian presidents proposed the legalization of drugs such as marijuana and cocaine as a measure to fight the drug cartels more effectively. Despite their reiterated efforts throughout the year, both the US and the majority of the other Central American countries disapproved of this proposal. *cme*

GUATEMALA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: ***opposition groups vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***system/ideology, resources***

The conflict over the system and resources between various oppositional movements and the government under President Pérez Molina escalated to a violent level. Throughout the year, conflicts over land ownership, educational and constitutional reforms, and the President's frequent employment of the military to guarantee security mobilized unionized teachers, student groups and indigenous groups. On March 19, thousands of mainly indigenous protesters started a nine-day march from Cobán, Alta Verapaz, to the capital Guatemala City, demanding a solution to the land conflict as well as a moratorium on mining and hydroelectric projects adjacent to their communities. On March 27, Molina promised to attend to their demands with priority, leading to a peaceful ending of the protests. In April, however, protests continued when the president announced to establish two military bases in Petén and in San Juan Sacatepéquez. On May 1, the conflict between local communities in Santa Cruz Barillas, Huehuetenango, and the electricity company Hidro Santa Cruz over the construction of a hydroelectric dam on their territory turned violent. 200 local residents took control of a nearby military base, when attackers, allegedly linked to the electricity company, left one activist dead and two others severely injured. In response, the government decreed a state of siege in Santa Cruz Barillas, deploying at least 500 soldiers and 150 police officers on May 2. In reaction, 25 families fled into the nearby mountains. The government ended the state of siege on May 19. On July 3, student protesters clashed with police in Guatemala City. The protesters, studying to become teachers, opposed an education reform that would increase the duration of their university education from three to five years. Reportedly, at least 43 people were injured, including the ministers for education and the interior, who got caught in the demonstration. On October 4, police officers and soldiers killed at least four protesters and injured as many as 30 who had complained about the rise in electricity prices, the education reform, and had proposed a constitutional reform at a road blockade of the Pan-American highway in Totonicapán. After initially denying the involvement of soldiers in the shooting, Molina acknowledged on October 5, that soldiers were responsible for the deaths. Five days later, he added that the military would not be used to dissolve demonstrations in the future. On October 11, the Public Ministry arrested eight rank and file soldiers and a colonel over the killings. *cme*

GUATEMALA-BELIZE (TERRITORY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: ***Guatemala vs. Belize***
 Conflict items: ***territory***

The conflict between Guatemala and Belize over territory turned violent. Incidents in the border area claimed three lives in total. On January 28, the Belize Defense Force (BDF) shot dead a Guatemalan farmer close to the border in Chiquibul, Belize. On July 18, BDF killed one Guatemalan farmer who lumbered illegally near the Adjacency Zone and arrested two.

On October 4, another Guatemalan, presumably panning gold illegally, was shot dead by BDF soldiers on Belizean territory. The fatal incident of January 28 was the main topic of a meeting between the Belizean and Guatemalan foreign ministers on February 2. Throughout the year, representatives of both countries had met on several occasions. On April 27, delegations of the two countries met at the headquarters of the OAS in Washington, D.C., USA. They agreed on a date for simultaneous referendums to be held in the two countries on whether they should take their territorial dispute to the ICJ. The referendums are to take place on 10/06/13. On June 1, another meeting of Guatemalan and Belizean representatives took place at the office of the OAS, located in the Adjacency Zone. In order to mediate in the affair concerning the fatality of July 18, and in order to find a long-term solution for the enduring conflict, the OAS convoked a conference at their headquarters for July 31. On October 22, the Belizean president and his Guatemalan counterpart held another meeting. Three days later, the Belizean Minister of National Security, John Saldivar, announced the preferred use of non-lethal weapons and the deployment of supplementary BDF troops in the border zone. In order to financially support the settlement, the EU and the OAS signed a treaty at the OAS headquarters on December 17. *hka*

HONDURAS (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: ***drug trafficking organizations, organized crime vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***subnational predominance, resources***

A violent crisis erupted between drug trafficking organizations as well as organized crime syndicates and the government, supported by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Up to 20,000 soldiers were deployed nationwide in 2011 after the homicide rate had gone up to twenty per day and more than 79 percent of all drug flights from South America had passed through Honduras. In 2012, more than 400 people were killed in massacres by organized crime. Measures against drug traffickers primarily affected the northern departments of Atlántida, Colón, Gracias a Dios, Olancho, and Yoro. Counter-drug operations, supported by the DEA, included the destruction of

clandestine airfields and the interception of planes carrying illicit drugs. In »Operation Armadillo,« the military destroyed more than 60 clandestine landing sites in Gracias a Dios and other northern departments only in the first three months. Military forces were deployed in operations Xatruch I-III to form a joint police-military force in Colón [→Honduras (MUCA, MARCA, farmers of Bajo Aguán valley - landowners)]. In the course of the multi-national anti-drug operation »Anvil« to cut down the flow of illicit drugs through Central America [→Guatemala (drug cartels)], the government received helicopters and technical assistance from the US, including at least one Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST). On March 26, in the course of »Operation Xatruch II,« about 30 criminals ambushed a military convoy near Tascosa, Colón, injuring five soldiers. On May 11, in a combined US-Honduran anti-drug operation in Ahuas, Gracias a Dios, security forces killed four civilians from inside a helicopter. On June 13, helicopters and a Super Tucano warplane shot down an aircraft in Olancho. The two pilots were killed. On June 23, a DEA agent killed a trafficker near Brus Laguna, Gracias a Dios, in a raid on traffickers near a hidden landing site. On July 3, a plane with two Brazilian traffickers aboard was downed south of Catacamas, Olancho. Police officers and DEA agents killed a trafficker at the scene. About 900 kilograms of cocaine were found aboard the plane. From August 18 to November 19, the US suspended the sharing of radar intelligence with the Honduran military because of the violation of a bilateral agreement on the downing of airplanes in late July. Intelligence sharing was later reinitiated. On November 29, authorities seized an estimated fifteen tons of illegal drugs in the course of «Operation Julián Arístides González» in Pata de Gallina, Yoro. *rma*

HONDURAS (MUCA, MARCA, FARMERS OF BAJO AGUÁN VALLEY - LANDOWNERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: *big landowners vs. peasant farmers of Bajo Aguán, MUCA, MARCA*

Conflict items: *resources*

The conflict over farmland between peasant farmers of the Bajo Aguán Valley, located in the northern department of Colón, and regional big landowners supported by the government became separated from the opposition conflict in 2009, when then-President José Manuel Zelaya initiated negotiations over land distribution before being ousted in a coup d'état [→Honduras (opposition)]. Farm worker groups, namely the Unified Peasant Movement of Aguán (MUCA) and the Authentic Peasant Reclamation Movement of Aguán (MARCA), repeatedly declared the 1990s purchases by big landowners illegal and demanded the redistribution of farmland. In December that year, farm workers staged coordinated land invasions while big landowners hired private security personnel to protect ranches. Since 2009, the conflict claimed 80 lives, mostly peasant activists. Peasant organizations and human rights activists repeatedly blamed security guards for those murders, which were rarely solved. In the course of the operations Xatruch I-III, military forces were deployed. They dissol-

ved land occupations, sometimes violently. On March 28, four farm workers were killed near Trujillo, allegedly by security guards of big landowners. On June 5, President Porfirio Lobo and MUCA signed a deal intended to end the conflict, which implied selling 2,400 hectares to MUCA. The government granted a long-term loan for this purpose. On June 29, a court declared the 1990s land acquisitions illegal. In July, private security guards altogether killed three peasant farmers. On July 25, Lobo declared the land conflict a matter of national security and announced to resolve it before leaving office in January 2014. On August 1, Lobo opted against a formerly announced state of siege in the region and instead decreed a general disarmament with an exemption for private security guards. On August 9, security guards killed three peasant farmers. A month later, near Tocoa, Colón, an occupier died of teargas during the eviction of a farm. On September 12, security guards attacked a group of farmers, killing two. On September 23, a human rights lawyer concerned with the issue was assassinated in the capital Tegucigalpa. Throughout November, six farmers were killed in assaults, most of whom were members of peasant organizations. On December 6, landowner Miguel Facussé declared to suspend significant investments in Bajo Aguán and to have sold his plantations to the government. *rma*

HONDURAS (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: *FNRP, LIBRE, anti-government activists vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The system and national power conflict between the main opposition umbrella group National Front of People's Resistance (FNRP) and the government turned violent. FNRP consisted mainly of supporters of former President Manuel Zelaya, who was ousted in a coup in 2009, and was headed by Zelaya's wife, Xiomara Castro. On October 28, FNRP presented 81,000 signatures to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to request inscription as a political party called Freedom and Refoundation Party (LIBRE). In the course of the year, several opposition activists and supporters of FNRP and LIBRE had been killed. These incidents mostly remained unresolved. Oppositional politicians and human rights organizations repeatedly stated the murders to be politically motivated. For instance, on May 7, human rights and anti-coup activist Erick Martínez Ávila was found strangled in Guasculile in the Federal District. A month later, Miguel Ángel Ramos Díaz, member of FNRP and LIBRE, was gunned down in San Pedro Sula, Cortés department. On June 24, another LIBRE activist was killed in an ambush in the capital Tegucigalpa. *peh*

JAMAICA (DRUG GANGS)


Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: *drug gangs vs. government*
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The conflict between drug gangs and the government over subnational predominance remained violent. After the Ducus Coke affair in 2010, military forces remained deployed in gang-dominated areas throughout the country in 2012. Clansman and their rival One Order remained the leading criminal gangs, still dominating different regions. On March 3, a joint military-police operation in St. Catherine resulted in the seizure of several firearms and the detention of approx. 180 individuals. Just a few days later, on March 6, six people, among them two civilians, were killed during a police operation in the capital Kingston. The police assumed that three of the five males who were killed were part of different gangs and wanted for various crimes including homicide. In the operation, several weapons were seized and 58 people detained. On October 29, the police detained 100 men in St. Catherine, Spanish Town, in an operation aimed at preventing an internal One Order gang feud from escalating. Police shot and killed Delroy Scott, leader of the Banton Gang in August Town, St. Andrew, on November 18. Despite the death threats towards police personnel from both Clansman and One Order gang, the government planned to lower crime significantly in the next five years. *als*

MEXICO (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2006**



Conflict parties: *drug cartels vs. government*
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The war between various drug cartels and the government over subnational predominance and resources continued. The most active groups were the cartels of Sinaloa, Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel, and Los Caballeros Templarios.

Violent clashes with government forces took place almost daily. The regions most affected were the northern states of Nuevo León, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas, but also Sinaloa and Guerrero. Additionally, cartel infighting intensified in those states [→ Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)].

In Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, eight police officers were killed off duty in January. To prevent such attacks, authorities accommodated more than 2,000 policemen in hotels after their shifts. On March 28, gunmen conducted an attack on policemen, killing five. Despite these attacks, the city's rate of drug-related homicides dropped by 75 percent. Various firefights took place in Coahuila. In heavy clashes between authorities and gunmen in Saltillo, five gunmen were killed on March 13, another eight on June 21. On November 8, gun-

men attacked a hotel hosting officers of the Federal Police (PF) in Piedras Negras. Consecutive gunbattles left four criminals dead and two policemen injured, while one of the border crossings to the US was closed. In Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, joint army and navy personnel killed fifteen gunmen in a three hour shoot-out in the city's main streets on March 13. Until March 21, more than 9,500 federal forces were deployed to the state. Despite focused military deployment, violence escalated in the second half of the year in Tamaulipas. On July 3, two policemen were killed by gunmen attacking with grenades and later detonating a car bomb in Ciudad Victoria.

A five-day combat between the army and cartel members took place in the mountainous region of Choix, Sinaloa, starting on April 28. As the military deployed several helicopters, one of them was targeted and an air force officer killed. In the combats, 28 gunmen, three soldiers, and one municipal policeman were killed. 2,300 families in the hills of Sinaloa fled from violence. Consequently, army and Sinaloa state police strengthened their presence in Choix, deploying 600 troops. On July 9, gunmen ambushed state police forces heading to Choix. Seven police officers and four gunmen were killed in the highway-shootout near El Fuerte. In Canute A. Neri, Guerrero, an ambush on police forces on March 18 claimed the lives of twelve policemen. Police had been searching for suspects responsible for a massacre where ten human heads had been left in town.

Whereas violence in some border regions slightly declined, it surged in the central states corridor of Michoacán-Guanajuato-San Luis Potosí-Zacatecas in the second semester. On July 21, 80 gunmen attacked the mayor's office and police station of Vista Hermosa, Michoacán. Four municipal police officers and one civilian were killed. Heavy clashes between PF and gunmen took place on August 10 in Apatzingán, Michoacán. Authorities deployed Black Hawk helicopters to fight gang members armed with grenades and assault rifles. At least eight gunmen and eleven police officers were killed. Gang members killed another seven policemen in Jalisco and five in Michoacán in separate incidents on December 23. On October 23, a firefight between alleged Los Zetas members and marines took place in Guadalupe, Zacatecas, leaving seven gunmen and three soldiers dead. Grenades and high-caliber weapons were used. The central states were also a focus of intensified troop deployment. On August 13, incumbent President Felipe Calderón announced the deployment of 15,735 additional security forces to Michoacán, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and Nuevo León.

In a skirmish on June 25, PF officers assumed to be involved in cocaine smuggling killed three of their colleagues at the capital's international airport. In the aftermath, all of the airport's 348 PF officers were replaced. On August 24, a US embassy truck was targeted in a shootout on a road in Tres Mariás, Morelos, by men in four unmarked PF police cars. Two CIA agents were injured. Afterwards, nineteen PF officers were charged.

In Panuca, Veracruz, soldiers taking part in »Operation Veracruz Seguro« clashed with gunmen on October 13, killing ten. About 14,000 delinquents were detained in the operation, so far. Between December 27 and 29, another nine members of Los Zetas had been killed in Córdoba, four of them while trying

to recover the body of local Zetas leader from a morgue.

The government arrested and killed several cartel leaders. On September 12, Gulf Cartel leader Jorge Eduardo alias »El Coss« Costilla Sanchez was captured by marines in Tampico, Tamaulipas. Marines killed Los Zetas leader Heriberto »Z-3« Lazcano Lazcano, in a shootout in Progreso, Coahuila, on October 7. Several heavy weapons, such as rocket launchers, were found in Veracruz, Coahuila, Jalisco, and Michoacán. Most seizures were made in Coahuila, where gang members attacked police with a rocket launcher on March 8.

Drug cartels showed a strong presence in illegal businesses apart from drug-trafficking. Criminal syndicates stole more than 1.8 million barrels of oil from the national oil company Pemex in the first semester, marking an 18 percent rise. Cartels were also involved in illegal mining, human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, contraband, and product piracy.

Concerning security issues, the new President Peña Nieto planned to increase the size of the PF and to build an independent paramilitary police of several ten thousands. *tmi*

MEXICO (INTER-CARTEL VIOLENCE, PARAMILITARY GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: *Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. La Familia et al. vs. CJNG et al. vs. LCT et al.*
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The subnational predominance and resources conflict between various drug cartels and armed groups remained highly violent. Despite arrests and deaths of several gang leaders [→ Mexico (drug cartels)], violence increased while old cartels split and new groups ascended.

Especially turf wars between the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas caused hundreds of deaths throughout the country, whereby criminal organizations often resorted to mass killings to intimidate rival organizations or civilians. The victims of those killings mostly remained unidentified. On April 17, fourteen decapitated bodies were placed outside the city hall of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, with a message by the Sinaloa Cartel threatening Los Zetas. On May 4, nine bodies were hung from a bridge in the same city. A message stated that the dead were Zetas. In the outskirts of Guadalajara, Jalisco, eighteen dismembered bodies were left in vans on May 10. At the site, a message from Los Zetas was found. On September 17, seventeen bodies were abandoned in the same way nearby. However, most of the violent incidents occurred in the northern border state of Nuevo León, reportedly as a result of infighting between factions of Los Zetas and their feud with the Gulf Cartel. On May 14, gang members abandoned 49 mutilated bodies in the outskirts of the state capital Monterrey. Later on, a video showing the body dump appeared, and a banner was found signed by Los Zetas leaders threatening members of the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels as well as marines and soldiers.

A series of violent events took place in Monterrey. On January 25, gunmen killed eleven individuals. With the bodies, a printed banner addressed to a rival gang was left. Ten alleged

members of Los Zetas were later arrested and held responsible for the killings.

On February 20, in a clash between more than 3,000 members of Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel in Apodaca prison near Monterrey, 44 gang members were killed. In January, a prison fight between gang members in neighboring Tamaulipas had left 31 inmates dead. On November 3, a total of fourteen gang members were killed in a series of shootouts between rival drug gangs on the Reynosa-Monterrey highway.

An alleged split within Los Zetas and resulting disputes also generated violent confrontations. For instance, on June 7, fourteen dismembered bodies were discovered in a truck in Ciudad Mante, Tamaulipas. A printed banner, accusing two top Los Zetas leaders of betraying former prominent members of their own organization, was also found at the scene. Two Zetas factions, that of Ivan »El Talibán« Velazquez Caballero and a group called Los Legionarios, separated in the following months.

In the Pacific state of Michoacán, the groups La Familia, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), and Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT), fought for control. On April 10, sixteen individuals were found dead in Zinapécuaro, Tancítaro, and Lázaro Cárdenas, together with banners attributing the killings to CJNG. A couple of weeks before, in a video masked men claimed to be part of CJNG and threatened LCT in Guerrero and Michoacán. In March and April, nine dead bodies were found in the port of Acapulco, Guerrero, five of them beheaded. Similar killings continued in the city during the next months. Also in Guerrero, on August 26, eleven bodies were found on a highway with signs of torture, bullet wounds, and messages signed by LCT. On July 2, a shootout between LCT and La Familia left ten dead in Zacazonapan in the neighboring Estado de México. On December 24, 30 gunmen raided the community of Concordia, Sinaloa, and executed nine people with supposed ties to a local cartel.

Additionally, the year saw enhanced propaganda by cartels against each other, culminating when the leader of LCT, Servando "La Tuta" Gómez Martínez published a video in August in which he called upon other criminal groups and the military to make a common front against Los Zetas. *rgo*

MEXICO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↑ | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: *opposition vs. government*
 Conflict items: *national power*

The conflict over national power between the leftist opposition, led by Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador's Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), and the government escalated in the context of this year's presidential election. When, in 2006, the opposition lost by less than a percentage point, Obrador had encouraged numerous demonstrations in Mexico City, calling himself the legitimate president.

Prior to and on election day, a series of unresolved killings, kidnappings, and threats against politicians were registered. Among the victims were three PRD and two representatives of the National Action Party (PAN) of then President Felipe Calderón. On July 1, Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Re-

volutionary Party (PRI) won the presidential election. The UN registered 233 denouncements concerning vote-buying, intimidation of voters, and physical violence during the election process. PRD members in San Juan Chamula, Chiapas, stated a local candidate of theirs had received death threats by PRI. A shootout in Rincón Chamula, Chiapas that caused two deaths was also attributed to PRI by PRD officials. On July 7, PRD supporters initiated demonstrations in more than 28 cities against the imposition of Peña Nieto. On July 12, Obrador mounted a legal challenge in order to cause the election's invalidation. The Electoral Tribunal verified the elections by verdict on August 31. As a reaction of disapproval, the student organization #YoSoy132 congregated around 2,000 protesters in a peaceful demonstration in front of the tribunal. On September 9, Obrador announced the creation of a youth organization called National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). On December 1, in the context of Peña Nieto's inauguration, police forces and protesters clashed in a riot in the capital, leaving at least four protesters and twenty policemen injured. Police used tear gas and rubber bullets against protesters who were armed with clubs and Molotov cocktails. Vandalism inflicted damage on public facilities of around USD 1.5 - 1.9 million. *jok*

NICARAGUA (MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: ***militant groups vs. government***
Conflict items: ***system/ideology***

A new conflict over the political system erupted between various armed groups and the government. After various appearances and threats in earlier years, several groups, in tradition of the 1980s Contras, declared war on the government of President Daniel Ortega. Two groups, the Democratic Front of Commando 3-80 (FDC 3-80) and the Commando of National Justice (CJN), created an umbrella organization named Coordinated Nicaraguan Guerrillera (CGN) on May 5. Police stated that the militants had their retreat area on the Honduran side of the border. On January 13, the body of alleged FDC 3-80 leader Santos »Pablo Negro« Guadalupe Borges was found in the Honduran El Paraíso department. »Comandante Byron,« an ally of former militant leader »Yahob,« was killed on February 29. In response, FDC 3-80 announced to attack the government and military forces. On May 3, six militants with AK-47 attacked a group of police officers in the northern Jinotega department, injuring two. The same day, eight people were killed in an ambush in the municipality of La Cruz de Río Grande. On May 6, a group leader known as »Sheriff« declared in an interview that FDC 3-80 would continue to fight the Ortega government to »reinstall democracy.« On July 21, according to a CGN statement, FDC 3-80 killed three policemen and two soldiers in Las Breñas in the Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic (RAAN). Furthermore, CGN accused police and the military of assassinating farmers suspected to cooperate with the groups. On August 22, leaders of FDC 3-80 appealed for abstention from the November 4 municipal elections. On September 3, a soldier and two civilians died in a gunfight with a FDC 3-80 brigade near Siuna, RAAN. On September 27, FDC 3-80 at-

acked a police post in El Tortuguero, and on October 15, killed a police officer in Río Grande, both in the Autonomous Region of the Southern Atlantic. The government repeatedly denied the existence of any armed groups but nonetheless increased police and army patrols in the northern regions. *jne*

NICARAGUA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: ***opposition groups vs. government***
Conflict items: ***system/ideology, national power***

The system and national power conflict between various opposition groups and the government of President Daniel Ortega's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) continued on a violent level. While Ortega began his second presidential term on January 10, the government received strong international and internal criticism for last year's election process. Former presidential candidate Fabio Gadea Mantilla of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) protested with 200 of his supporters, claiming that last year's election had been manipulated. On February 6, several groups demanded new elections. Reports from the OAS, the US State Department, and the EU condemned the general lack of transparency, especially criticizing the role of the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). In the context of these accusations, several countries such as Germany and Finland cut their development aid for the country. On July 19, alleged FSLN members intercepted an oppositional gathering in front of the CSE, injuring eighteen people.

After FSLN had won the municipal elections on November 4, violent demonstrations took place. In Sebaco, Matagalpa, PLI members clashed with FSLN sympathizers, leaving five people injured. On November 6, two PLI members were killed during a post-electoral street protest in Ciudad Darío, Matagalpa, while a Sandinista Youth member was fatally wounded in El Jícaro, Nueva Segovia. In Paz Centro, León, 27 people were arrested when PLI sympathizers torched municipal government vehicles, the historical train station, the market, and the fire station. On November 14, the National Police set roadblocks in order to impede a march of several thousand protesters led by the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) candidate, Miguel Obando Bravo, in Nueva Guinea, Autonomous Region of the Southern Atlantic. The next day, clashes between PLC supporters and militant Sandinistas in the same municipality resulted in several injuries and about 60 arrests. The Nicaraguan Centre for Human Rights claimed that anti-riot police had acted with partiality on behalf of the Sandinistas. *jne*

NICARAGUA-COLOMBIA (SEA BORDER)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1825**

Conflict parties: ***Nicaragua vs. Colombia***
Conflict items: ***territory, resources***

The dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia over the maritime borders surrounding the archipelagos of San Andres,

Providencia, and Santa Catalina escalated, but remained non-violent. In a previous decision in 2007, the ICJ had ruled that the archipelagos were Colombian territory but left the maritime border dispute unresolved. In this context, Nicaragua accused Colombia of using its claim on the islands to encroach on Nicaragua's maritime boundaries. On April 23, a group of more than 600 residents of San Andres protested for their right to self-determination accompanied by Colombian politicians. On May 5, the Colombian congress requested assistance of UNESCO, fearing future Nicaraguan oil exploration in the area, which was declared a UN Marine Biosphere Reserve in 2001. On its Independence Day, July 20, Colombia held a military parade on San Andres, which was criticized by Nicaragua as being disrespectful towards the ICJ. On October 11, two Colombian warships and an aircraft intercepted a Nicaraguan-flagged vessel, forcing it to leave the disputed waters near the 82nd meridian. In response, Nicaragua accused Colombia of hostilities and of violating Nicaraguan national sovereignty. On November 19, the final ICJ ruling gave Colombia sovereignty over seven disputed islands within the San Andres archipelago while granting Nicaragua political and economic control of a large amount of the surrounding waters. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega appreciated the decision while his Colombian counterpart Manuel Santos announced a week later the country's withdrawal from the Pact of Bogotá that recognizes the authority of the ICJ. On December 1, the two presidents met for first talks after the ruling, committing themselves to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. On December 3, the Nicaraguan Chamber of Fishing stated that hundreds of fishermen had complained of being harassed by Colombian warships and helicopters in the disputed territory. On December 13, Colombian Foreign Minister María Angela Holguín announced the country's appeal against the ICJ ruling. By presidential order, Colombian warships remained in the disputed area while Nicaragua declared to enforce its sovereignty. jne

PANAMA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: *opposition vs. government*
Conflict items: *system / ideology, resources*

The system conflict between the oppositional umbrella group Frenadeso, supported by the recently founded party Broad Front for Democracy (FAD) and the worker union SUNTRACS, on the one hand, and the government of President Ricardo Martirelli, on the other, remained violent. At the end of January, Frenadeso and SUNTRACS declared solidarity with the indigenous Ngöbe-Buglé, who protested against the construction of mines and hydro-electric power plants in their territory.

About 5,000 Ngöbe-Buglé blocked the Pan-American Highway in the Chiriquí department near the Costa-Rican border. The government and the Catholic Church asked for a dialog in order to intervene. At least one protester was killed and several injured when police violently dissolved the blockades on February 5. The next day, 500 protesters torched the police station, the fire station, and the city hall in the municipality of Volcán. One

police officer was injured. At the same time, demonstrations of solidary organizations took place in Panama City.

After promulgating Law 72 on October 19, which would have overseen the selling of land in the Colón Free Trade Zone, protests in the city center of Colón turned violent. Protesters built up barricades and lit stores and gas stations. Local authority forces used teargas and rubber bullets, later imposing a curfew. One protester was killed, while at least nine others were wounded. Protests spread across the country in the following days. The Colón section of FAD announced a 48-hour general strike on October 22, supported by SUNTRACS, opposition parties, and other associations. In the lasting protests in Colón, security forces shot and killed three demonstrators. Local media reported twenty people injured and 275 arrested during the riots. On October 30, parliament withdrew the law and protests seized. js

PARAGUAY (EPP, AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: *EPP, agrarian movements vs. government*
Conflict items: *system / ideology, resources*

The conflict over land reform between the left-leaning People's Army of Paraguay (EPP), several farmers' organizations, indigenous groups, and landless people, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violent level. These groups continued to express their demands for integral agrarian, social and political reform. Violent clashes between landless farmers and mainly Brazilian-born farm owners took place in Iruña and Ñacunday in Alto Paraná department in mid-January and lasted for several weeks. At least two people had been injured and significant material damage been caused. In March, around 10,000 farmers invaded the territory of Paraguay's biggest soy producer Tránsito Favero. Violent clashes between farmers and security forces occurred on June 15 in the province of Curuguaty, Canindeyú department. Between 100 and 300 police forces tried to evict protesters from the occupied farm of business man and politician Blas N. Riquelme. The protesters claimed that Riquelme obtained the land illegally during the Stroessner dictatorship. When security forces moved in, a firefight ensued in which seven policemen and ten farmers died and more than 80 people were injured. President Fernando Lugo deployed the army to take control of the situation. The incident contributed to the impeachment of Lugo on June 22 [→ Paraguay (impeachment)].

After the impeachment of Lugo, offensive measures by EPP further increased, mainly in the Concepción department. In August, suspected EPP members attacked a farm and carried out a series of bomb attacks. The first occurred on October 4, when two bombs caused significant material damage to a local radio station in Horqueta. Another device was found by police before detonating. Suspected EPP member Édgar Mancuello was arrested in connection with the incident. On October 5, a bomb was found on a farm located near the municipality of Korusú de Hierro. ank

PARAGUAY (IMPEACHMENT)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: **Franco supporters vs. Lugo supporters**
 Conflict items: **national power**

A national power conflict emerged between supporters of the elected President Fernando Lugo and those of the new President Federico Franco. On June 21, the lower house of Parliament decided with 73 to 1 votes to start impeachment procedures against Lugo. The opposition brought five charges against the president, including his alleged failure to tackle a political crisis ignited by the conflict with the People's Army of Paraguay (EPP) [→Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)]. On June 22, the Senate voted 39 to 4 for the impeachment of Lugo.

After Lugo's impeachment was announced, his supporters assembled outside the parliamentary building. Police dispersed them with tear gas and rubber bullets. Lugo's lawyers argued that the impeachment process was unconstitutional as he had not been given time to either prepare his defense or to outline his case in front of the Senate. The complaint was rejected by the Supreme Court on June 25. In response to Lugo's impeachment, several Latin American countries withdrew their ambassadors. In addition, Venezuela stopped all energy supplies to the country. OAS sent a special commission to investigate the incident and decided on July 10 not to impose any sanctions. However, on June 28, Unasur and Mercosur excluded Paraguay and called for the re-establishment of the democratic order through fair and open elections. The Franco government regarded these measures illegal and withdrew its ambassadors from several countries. However, in October, the country announced its will to rejoin Mercosur and Unasur. *ank*

PERU (SHINING PATH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: **SL vs. government**
 Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources**

The system conflict, also concerning subnational predominance and resources, between two factions of the left-wing Maoist rebel group Shining Path (SL), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. The first faction, the Center Regional Committee (CRC), was active in southern Peru, especially in Apurímac and Ene River Valley (VRAE). The second faction, the Huallaga Regional Committee (CRH), operated in the Huallaga Valley region north of the capital Lima. The government accused both factions of being involved in drug trafficking and providing gunmen for drug cartels.

Security forces clashed with CRH on February 9, wounding their leader, Florindo Eleuterio Flores, alias "Comrade Artemio." Three days later, a military patrol detained Flores in Tocache province, San Martín. On March 4, his presumed successor, Walter Díaz Vega, alias "Comrade Freddy," was captured by national police in Leoncio Prado province, Huánuco. On April

3, security forces arrested the newly-appointed CRH leader Freddy Jaime Arenas Cavides, alias "Comrade Braulio," in the Santa Rosa de Yanajanca Valley, Huánuco region. Two days later, President Ollanta Humala claimed the total defeat of CRH.

Throughout the year, CRC fighters and security forces repeatedly clashed, altogether leaving at least thirteen officials dead. On April 9, 40 SL members kidnapped about three dozen workers from the Camisea gas field in the Cuzco region. They demanded a ransom of USD 10 million, explosives, and a yearly payment of USD 1.2 million. The government declared a 60-day state of emergency for the region and deployed 1,500 police and military troops to free the hostages. CRC members attacked a helicopter searching for the hostages on April 12, killing one police officer and wounding two. Two days later, security forces encircled the captors. In the ensuing skirmish, three members of the security forces and presumably two CRC fighters were killed. All abducted gas workers were freed. *mgm*

USA – MEXICO (BORDER SECURITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: **USA vs. Mexico**
 Conflict items: **other**

The conflict between the USA and Mexico over border security continued. Subject to disagreement were drug, weapon, and unauthorized immigration enforcement policies as well as the use of lethal force by the US Border Patrol. While withdrawing 900 National Guard troops from the Mexican border, the US increasingly relied on surveillance infrastructure like drones, gunboats, military helicopters, and aerostats to monitor the border. On June 25, the US Supreme Court partially upheld the Arizona immigration law SB 1070 which aimed at reducing undocumented immigration to Arizona. Mexican President Felipe Calderón repeatedly condemned the legislation. Throughout the year, Calderón criticized weapon trafficking into Mexico and called for an assault weapon ban in the US. On April 14, US President Barack Obama rejected any proposals on the legalization of drugs at the Summit of the Americas in Colombia. However, on November 6, the US states Washington and Colorado legalized the recreational use of marijuana. In reaction, the Mexican President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto said his government would have to review its anti-drug policy due to the changes in the US. Tensions between the US and Mexico increased over the killings of three Mexicans shot by Border Patrol agents after the Mexicans had thrown stones at them. In the incidents, US Border Patrol fired across the border on July 7, September 3, and October 10. The Mexican government condemned each of the shootings and demanded investigations. On October 18, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights criticized the disproportional use of lethal force by US Border Patrol agents. Despite these problems, cooperation continued with the Mérida Initiative as well as on a political level. Shortly before taking office, Peña Nieto met with Obama on November 27 in Washington, D.C. and affirmed that the Mexican government would continue working with the US in the future. *las*

VENEZUELA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1992**


Conflict parties: ***opposition vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***system/ideology, national power***

The system and national power conflict between the opposition, composed of student organizations, a coalition of a large number of political parties, and interest groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, turned violent. With regard to the presidential elections on October 7, the opposition's coalition Table for Democratic Unity (MUD) held primaries on February 12. Henrique Capriles Radonski from the party Justice First (PJ) was elected to run against President Hugo Chávez Frías. After nine months of campaigning, Chávez won the presidential elections with 54.42 percent on October 7, while Capriles gained 44.97 percent. On March 4, during a visit of Capriles in Cotiza, Caracas, Chávez' supporters shot at Capriles' campaigners, leaving six persons injured. On April 13, in order to express their disagreement with the government, members of the opposition broke into the Venezuelan Embassy in London and damaged property. On July 7, the national police hindered a rally of Capriles and his supporters in Caracas. One day later, supporters of Capriles attacked ten members of the pro-Chávez movement Comando Carabobo with knives and bottles in San Vicente de Maturín, Monagas state. Ten people were injured. On August 18, Chávez' adherents attacked supporters of Capriles during his visit in the state of Miranda throwing bottles and shooting at the campaigners. No casualties or injured persons were reported. On September 13, Chávez supporters blocked a main road in Puerto Cabello, Carabobo state, where opposition supporters had assembled for a visit of Capriles. Both sides attacked each other with rocks, leaving fourteen persons injured and an opposition campaign truck torched. On September 30, a supporter of Chávez' United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) killed at least three men during a march of Capriles in the state of Barinas. The victims were two politicians and one adherent of PJ. jca

ASIA AND OCEANIA

ASIA AND OCEANIA

- : NO VIOLENT CONFLICT
- : VIOLENT CRISIS
- : LIMITED WAR
- : WAR



With a total of 127 conflicts, the region of Asia and Oceania accounted for nearly a third of the world's conflicts, as in the previous year. Compared to 2011, the total number of violent conflicts increased by three to 65. Violent crises increased by one to 55, limited wars by two to seven. The number of wars remained unchanged with three.

One limited war escalated to a war in Myanmar [→Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)], while the war concerning the secession of Karen State and Kayah State de-escalated [→Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State)].

A non-violent crisis in India escalated by three levels to a war [→India (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis)]. The war between Islamist groups and the government in Pakistan continued [→Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. The 2011 war in Pakistan's Sindh province de-escalated to a limited war [→Pakistan (Mohajirs - Balochs, Pakhtuns, Sindhis)]. One violent crisis escalated to a limited war [→Pakistan (TTP et al. - religious groups)]. Two conflicts erupted as limited wars, one each in Myanmar and Tajikistan [→Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State), Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)].

Most conflicts in the region concerned system/ideology (42), followed by 32 conflicts concerning subnational predominance and 22 over national power, and resources, respectively. Violence occurred across all conflict items. Most of the highly violent conflicts were fought over system/ideology and subnational predominance.

South Asia saw the biggest number of highly violent conflicts. As in preceding years, Pakistan was affected by several such conflicts. The government's war against Islamist militant groups continued and claimed the lives of more than 4,000 people. While the conflict mainly took place in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province along the Afghan border, Islamists attacked government institutions and civilians all over the country. Moreover, the conflict Pakistan (TTP et al. - religious groups) caused the death of 500 people and spread to Gilgit-Baltistan for the first time. Karachi, the country's largest city and economic hub, was the scene of a limited war between Mohajirs on the one hand and Balochs, Pakhtuns, and Sindhis, on the other, which left approx. 700 dead.

In India, thirteen conflicts were carried out in the country's


northeast, nine of those by violent means. In the state of Assam, the conflict between ethnic Bodos and Muslims of Bengali origin escalated to a war. In July and August, more than 100 people were killed and 400,000 fled their homes. Throughout the year, several members of different militant groups laid down their weapons, partly due to the government granting amnesty [→India (HPC-D, HNA / Mizoram, Manipur, Assam), India (PULF), India (MPLF et al. / Manipur)]. As in the previous year, the conflict between left-wing militants and the government in the east remained on the level of a limited war [→India (Naxalites)].

In Central Asia, a limited war over subnational predominance erupted between the Tajik government and the militia group of Tolib Ayumbekov [→Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)]. The conflict between the Kazakh government and Islamist militant groups remained a violent crisis [→Kazakhstan (Islamist militant groups)].


In East Asia, leadership changes occurred in Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and South Korea. Six interstate conflicts persisted on a non-violent level.

The USA increased their military presence in the South China Sea [→China - Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)]. Under its new leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea accelerated its nuclear program and sent its first satellite successfully into orbit [→North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan]. Ongoing territorial disputes remained tense and strained Sino-Japanese [→Japan - China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)], Japanese - South Korean (Takeshima/Dokdo) and Sino-Vietnamese relations [→China-Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)]. Domestic conflicts with ethnic minorities continued on a violent level [→China (Tibet), China (Inner Mongolia), China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang), China (Hui - Han - Tibetans)], although violence in Inner Mongolia decreased significantly. In Papua New Guinea, a conflict over claims to the prime-ministership erupted with an attempted coup in the wake of the country's general elections [→Papua New Guinea (opposition)]. The elections were also accompanied by increased tribal violence [→Papua New Guinea (tribal violence)]. Additionally, in several countries people took to the streets, demanding improved working conditions, return of previously

CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2012 COMPARED TO 2011



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2012 IN ASIA AND OCEANIA BY INTENSITY GROUPS



taken land or compensation therefore and environmental protection [→China (socioeconomic protests), Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests), Samoa (landowner protests)].

In South East Asia, in Myanmar, the Union Election Commission formally accepted the re-registration of the oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD) in January. In by-elections in April, the NLD secured almost all seats of those contested [→Myanmar (opposition movement)]. Additionally, the government released hundreds of political prisoners. However, Myanmar remained the most conflict-ridden country in South East Asia, accounting for twelve intrastate conflicts with one limited war and one war. After President Thein Sein's call for negotiations in mid-2011, ceasefire agreements were reached with almost all ethnic rebel groups, among them the Chin National Front in January and the National United Party of Arakan and the Arakan Liberation Party in April. While the November 2011 ceasefire agreement with the United Wa State Army lasted, ceasefire agreements with the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) broke off. The government held several talks with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), which brought forth no agreement. The limited war in Kachin State escalated to a war, leaving hundreds of civilians dead and approx. 100,000 displaced. A highly violent conflict erupted between parts of the majority Buddhist

population and the minority Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State [→Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State)]. Around 180 people died, approx. 110,000 were displaced and thousands of houses as well as religious buildings were destroyed. A new violent conflict over land rights broke out between farmers, land rights activists, and monks, on the one hand, and the government, on the other [→Myanmar (farmers et al. / Sagaing Region)].

In the Philippines, the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued negotiations, which led to the signing of a framework agreement on the status of Bangsamoro in October [→Philippines (MILF / Mindanao)]. Under the agreement, a new autonomous political entity, the Bangsamoro, would be established and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao replaced. There were no reports of clashes between MILF militants and the government; however, clashes between MILF and a breakaway group intensified [→Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)].

The border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia de-escalated by two levels from a limited war to a non-violent conflict following the July 2011 ICJ ruling [→Thailand - Cambodia (border)]. In the south of Thailand, Islamists continued to launch bomb attacks in the provinces of Yala and Songkhla. Throughout the year, approx. 600 people were killed [→Thailand (Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)].

CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Bangladesh (AL, BCL - BNP, BJC)	AL, BCL vs. BNP, BJC	national power	1991	•	3
Bangladesh (ICS, JeI - AL, BCL)	JeI, ICS vs. AL, BCL	system/ideology, national power	2000	•	3
Bangladesh (JMB, HuJI-B)*	JMB, HuJI-B vs. government	system / ideology	2004	•	2
Bangladesh (PCJSS –UPDF)*	PCJSS vs. UPDF	subnational predominance	1997	•	3
Bangladesh (PCJSS, UPDF / Chittagong Hill Tracts)*	UPDF, PCJSS vs. government	autonomy	1971	•	2
Bangladesh–Myanmar*	Bangladesh vs. Myanmar	territory, resources, other	1978	•	1
Cambodia (opposition movement)	CPP vs. SRP, HRP, civil society groups	system / ideology, national power, resources	1997	•	3
Cambodia–Vietnam*	Cambodia vs. Vietnam	territory	1969	•	1
China (Falun Gong)*	Falun Gong vs. government	system / ideology	1999	•	2
China (Hong Kong pro-democracy parties)*	Hong Kong pro-democracy parties vs. government vs.	autonomy, system / ideology	1997	↗	2
China (house churches)*	House Church vs. government	system / ideology	1949	•	2
China (Hui–Han–Tibetans)*	Hui ethnic minority vs. Han Chinese vs. Tibetan ethnic minority	subnational predominance	1949	↗	3
China (Inner Mongolia)*	Mongolian ethnic minorities vs. Han Chinese, government	autonomy, subnational predominance, resources	1981	•	3
China (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system / ideology	1978	↘	1
China (socioeconomic protests)*	landowners, peasants, workers vs. government	system/ideology, resources, other	1978	•	3
China (Taiwan)	PRC vs. ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups	secession	1949	•	2
China (Tibet)	Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetan separatists vs. government	secession, system / ideology, resources	1950	•	3
China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)	TIP, ETIM, Uyghurs, WUC vs. government, Han Chinese	secession, system / ideology, subnational predominance	1949	•	3
China–India*	China vs. India	territory, international power, resources	1954	•	2
China–USA*	China vs. USA	international power	1949	•	1
China-Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)	Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Philippines vs. Vietnam	territory, international power, resources	1949	•	2
Fiji (Indo-Fijians – indigenous Fijian ethnonationalists)*	Indo-Fijians vs. indigenous Fijian	national power, subnational predominance	1970	•	1
Fiji (opposition groups)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1987	•	2
Fiji–Tonga (Minerva Reefs)*	Fiji, Tonga	territory	2005	↘	1
India (GJM et al. / northern West Bengal, eastern Assam)	GNLF, GNLF-C, GJM, IGPP, GLO, UGRF vs. ABGL, ABAVP, Janachetana, Amra Bengali, AIADC vs. government	autonomy	1947	•	3
India (GNLA et al. / Meghalaya)	HNLC, PLF-M, ANVC, ANVC-B, UANF, LAEF, GNLA vs. government	autonomy	1988	•	3
India (GNLA, HNLC –ANVC, UANF)*	GNLA vs. HNLC, ANVC, UANF	subnational predominance	1992	•	3
India (Hindus–Christians)*	Bajrang Dal, VHP, Hindus vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1999	•	2
India (Hindus–Muslims)	Hindus vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1947	↗	3
India (HPC-D, HNA / Mizoram, Manipur, Assam)*	HPC-D, HNA vs. government	secession	1986	↗	2
India (Islamist militant groups)*	JeM, HuJI, LeT, IM, SIMI, HM vs. government	system/ideology	2000	•	3
India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)	JeM, HM, LeT, HuM vs. government	secession	1947	•	3
India (MPLF et al./Manipur)*	MPLF, KCP, ZRA, KYKL, PREPAK (Progressive), UPPK vs. government	secession	1964	•	3

CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
India (Nagas–Kukis)*	KNF, KNA, KLA vs. NSCN, UNPC	subnational predominance	1947	•	2
India (Naxalites)	CPI-M vs. government	system / ideology	1997	•	4
India (NDFB–ACF, BCF)*	Bodos, NDFB vs. Santhals, ACF, BCF	subnational predominance	1994	•	2
India (NLFT, ATTF, BNCT / Tripura)*	NLFT, ATTF, BNCT vs. government	secession	1978	•	3
India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)*	NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-IM, NSCN-U, ANSAM, UNC, NNC vs. government	secession	1947	•	3
India (NSCN-K–NSCN-KK–NSCN-IM)	NSCN-K vs. NSCN-KK vs. NSCN-IM	subnational predominance	1988	•	3
India (PULF)*	PULF vs. government	autonomy, system / ideology	1993	↘	2
India (Sikhs–DSS)*	Sikhs vs. DSS	subnational predominance	2007	•	3
India (Sikhs / Punjab)	Shiromani Akali Dal, KLF, KZF, BKI, KTF vs. government	autonomy	1947	↗	3
India (TJAC / Telangana)*	TJAC vs. government	autonomy	1969	↗	3
India (ULFA et al. –Biharis, Bengalis)	ULFA, ATTF, NDFB, NLFT, AABYSF, AASU, Bodos vs. Bengalis, Biharis	subnational predominance	1981	↑	5
India (ULFA et al. / Assam)	ULFA, NDFB, DHD, Black Widow vs. government	secession	1979	•	3
Indonesia (Ahmadiyya)	Ahmadiyya vs. government, radical Sunni Muslims	system / ideology	1980	•	3
Indonesia (Bugis–Dayaks / Kalimantan)*	Bugis vs. Dayaks	subnational predominance	1999	•	1
Indonesia (Islamist militant groups)	Tanzim al-Qaeda in Aceh, JI, JAT, Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1981	•	3
Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh - Irwandi camp / Aceh)*	KPA, Partai Aceh vs. Irwandi camp	subnational predominance, resources	2006	•	3
Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh / Aceh)*	KPA, Partai Aceh vs. government	autonomy, resources	1953	•	1
Indonesia (Muslims–Christians / Moluccas)*	Muslims, Laskar Jihad vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1998	•	3
Indonesia (Muslims–Christians / Sulawesi)*	Muslims vs. Christians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1998	↗	3
Indonesia (OPM / Papua)	OPM vs. government	secession, resources	1961	•	3
Indonesia–Timor Leste*	Timor Leste vs. Indonesia	territory, other	2002	•	2
Indonesia (RMS, FKM / Moluccas)	RMS, FKM vs. government	Sezession	1950	•	1
Japan–China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)	PRC vs. ROC vs. Japan	territory, resources	1971	•	2
Japan–Russia (Southern Kuril Islands)*	Japan vs. Russia	territory	1945	↘	1
Japan–South Korea (Takeshima / Dokdo Islands)	Japan vs. South Korea	territory	1951	•	2
Kazakhstan (Islamist militant groups)	Djund al-Khalifat, Islamist militant groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Kazakhstan (oil worker protests)*	oil industry workers, opposition parties vs. government	resources	2011	↘	2
Kazakhstan (opposition groups)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	↘	2
Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz–Uzbeks)*	ethnic Kyrgyz vs. ethnic Uzbeks	subnational predominance, resources	1990	•	2
Laos (Christians)*	Christians vs. government	system / ideology	1975	↘	2
Laos (Hmong, royalists)*	Hmong, royalists vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1975	•	3
Malaysia (Malay–Chinese, Indian, and Indigenous Malaysians)*	Malay Malaysians vs. Chinese Malaysians, Indian Malaysians, Indigenous Malaysians	system / ideology, subnational predominance	1946	•	2
Malaysia (opposition movement)	Pakatan Rakyat, Bersih vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1969	•	3

CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Malaysia–Indonesia, Philippines (immigrants)*	Malaysia vs. Indonesia, Philippines	other	1998	•	2
Maldives (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2011	•	3
Myanmar (Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA / Rakhine State)*	Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA vs. government	secession	1948	↘	2
Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State)	Buddhists vs. Rohingya Muslims	subnational predominance, other	2012	NEW	4
Myanmar (CNA, CNF / Chin State)*	CNA, CNF vs. government	secession	1988	↘	2
Myanmar (farmers et al. / Sagaing Region)*	farmers et al. vs. government	resources	2012	NEW	3
Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)	KIA, KIO vs. government	autonomy, resources	1961	↗	5
Myanmar (KNPP, KnA, KNLP / Kayah State)*	KNPP, KnA, KNLP vs. government	autonomy	1948	•	3
Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 / Karen State, Kayah State)*	KNU, KNLA, DKBA Brigade 5 vs. DKBA, Karen BGF, government	autonomy	1948	↓	3
Myanmar (MNLA, NMSP / Mon State, Karen State)*	MNLA, NMSP vs. government	secession	1948	↘	2
Myanmar (opposition movement)	opposition vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1962	•	2
Myanmar (Rohingyas, ARNO / Rakhine State)*	Rohingyas, ARNO vs. government	other	1948	•	2
Myanmar (SSA-S, SSA-N / Shan State)	SSA-S, SSA-N vs. Government	autonomy	1952	•	3
Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State)*	UWSA, NDAA vs. government	autonomy	1988	↘	1
Nepal (former PLA members)*	former PLA members vs. government	other	2008	↗	3
Nepal (Kiratis/Kosi, Mechi, Sagarmatha)*	Khambuwan National Front, LNFL, Kirant National Front, FLSC, KJWP, KLF-U vs. government	autonomy	1992	↘	2
Nepal (Madheshis / Terai)	JTMM-G, JTMM-J, JTMM-R, JTMM-S, JTMM, ATMM, TJP-M, MMT, SJTMM, MJF, TMPD vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	3
Nepal (opposition II)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2008	↗	3
Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups)*	NDA, Ranabir Sena, Bishwo Hindu Youth Federation, RPPN vs. government	system / ideology	2006	↗	3
Nepal (UCPN-M Bhattarai–Dahal factions)*	UCPN-M Bhattarai faction vs. UCPN-M Dahal faction	subnational predominance	2011	•	3
Nepal–Bhutan*	Bhutan vs. Nepal	other	1985	•	1
North Korea - South Korea*	North Korea vs. South Korea	territory, system / ideology, international power	1948	•	2
North Korea–USA, South Korea, Japan	North Korea vs. USA, South Korea, Japan	system / ideology, international power, other	1990	•	2
Pakistan (BLA et al. / Balochistan)	Baloch and Brahui tribes, BLA, BRA, BLF, BLT, BNP, NP, BRP, UBA, BLUF, BSO vs. government	secession, resources	1948	•	3
Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)	Islamist militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	5
Pakistan (Mohajirs–Balochis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis)	Mohajirs, MQM vs. Pakhtuns, ANP, Balochs, PPP, Sindhis, Awami Tehreek	subnational predominance	1947	↘	1
Pakistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	1998	•	1
Pakistan (Taliban–tribes)	TTP, LI vs. various tribes, TI, Aman Lashka	system / ideology, subnational predominance	2001	↘	3

CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Pakistan (TTP–LI)*	TTP vs. LI	system / ideology, subnational predominance	2010	•	3
Pakistan (TTP et al. - religious groups)	TTP, LeJ, SSP, Jandullah, Fazal Saeed Haqqani group vs. various religious groups	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1985	↗	4
Pakistan–India	Pakistan vs. India	territory, international power	1947	•	3
Papua New Guinea (opposition)	Papua New Guinea vs. Opposition	national power	2011	•	2
Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)	landowners vs. employees vs. government	resources, other	2002	•	3
Papua New Guinea (tribal violence)	Various Highland Tribes vs. Various Highland Tribes	subnational predominance, resources	1975	•	3
Papua New Guinea (Highlanders–Lowlanders)*	Highlanders vs. Lowlanders	subnational predominance	1975	↓	1
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf / Mindanao)	Abu Sayyaf vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1991	•	3
Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)	BIFM, BIFF vs. MILF, government	subnational predominance	2011	↗	4
Philippines (CPP, NPA)*	CPP, NPA vs. government	system / ideology,	1968	•	3
Philippines (MILF–MNLF)*	MILF vs. MNLF	subnational predominance	2009	•	3
Philippines (MILF / Mindanao)*	MILF vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1977	↘	2 1
Philippines (MNLF / Mindanao)	MNLF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1969	↘	2
Samoa (landowner protests)*	traditional landowners vs. government	other	1946	↑	3
Singapore–Malaysia*	Singapore vs. Malaysia	territory	1963	•	1
Sri Lanka (Muslims)*	Muslims, SLMC vs. government	other	1948	↘	2
Sri Lanka (Sinhalese Buddhists, JHU, JVP - Hindus, Eelam Tamils, Muslims, SLMC, Christians)	Sinhalese Buddhists, JHU, JVP vs. Tamil Hindus, Eelam Tamils vs. SLMC, Muslims vs. Christians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1948	↗	2
Sri Lanka (Tamils–Muslims)*	Eelam Tamils vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1948	•	1
Sri Lanka (Upcountry Tamils)*	Upcountry Tamils, CWC vs. government	other	1948	•	1
Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)	Tolib Ayombekov's Militia vs. government	subnational predominance	2012	NEW	4
Tajikistan (Islamist militant groups)*	UTO, HuT, al-Qaeda, IMU vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	↘	2
Tajikistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1997	•	2
Thailand (Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)	various Islamist separatists vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1902	•	4
Thailand (UDD, PTP–PAD)*	UDD, PTP vs. PAD, Pitak Siam	national power	2006	•	3
Thailand–Cambodia (border)*	Thailand vs. Cambodia	territory, international power	1954	↓	2
Thailand–Myanmar*	Thailand vs. Myanmar	territory, other	1948	↘	1
Timor-Leste (FRETILIN - CNRT)*	FRETILIN vs. CNRT	national power	2006	↑	3
Timor-Leste (veterans)*	Veterans vs. government	other	2006	•	1
Timor-Leste–Australia*	Timor Leste vs. Australia	resources	2002	•	1
USA–Pakistan	USA vs. Pakistan	other	2003	↘	2
Uzbekistan (Islamist militant groups)*	IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir vs. various Islamist militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1991	•	1
Uzbekistan (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1991	↗	2
Uzbekistan–Tajikistan*	Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan	international power, resources	2010	•	2
Vietnam (Montagnards)*	Montagnards vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1958	↗	3

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

BANGLADESH (AL, BCL–BNP, BJC)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: **AL, BCL vs. BNP, BJC**
 Conflict items: **national power**

The national power conflict between the governing Awami League (AL) and its student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League, on the one hand, and the oppositional Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and its student wing, the Bangladesh Jatiyotabadi Chhatradal, on the other, continued on a violent level. Over the year, large numbers of activists were injured and several people killed in clashes between supporters of both parties. Numerous opposition leaders and activists were in turn arrested for alleged involvement in violent activities. When police clashed with opposition activists in Chandpur and Laxmipur, Chittagong division, on January 29, four people were killed and at least 450 people injured. Among them were 100 policemen. The protesters demanded the restoration of the institution of caretaker governments tasked with overseeing parliamentary elections. The respective constitutional provision had been amended in June 2011. On April 17, BNP's Organizing Secretary Mohammad Ilias Ali of Sylhet District and his driver went missing. In reaction, BNP held marches in different districts, which led to violent clashes between police and BNP supporters. On April 23, BNP called a three-day countrywide hartal, a general strike and shutdown, to protest against the disappearance of Ilias Ali. At least 60 people and five policemen were injured during the hartal and numerous vehicles vandalized. On May 13, BNP and its allies clashed with police in Chittagong over the obstruction of a march in response to the disappearance of Ilias Ali. The clashes left at least 100 people injured, including 50 police officials. On December 9, BNP called a countrywide road blockade to press for the restoration of the caretaker government. At least three people died and over 380 were injured during clashes with police personnel and AL supporters. On December 10, BNP Secretary-General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir was arrested for his alleged involvement in violence during the road blockade. In response, BNP called countrywide hartals on December 11 and 13. kbl

BANGLADESH (ICS, JEI–AL, BCL)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: **Jel, ICS vs. AL, BCL**
 Conflict items: **system / ideology, national power**

The national power and ideology conflict between the Islamic party Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel) and its student organization, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), on the one hand, and the governing Awami League (AL) and its student organization, the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), on the other, continued on a violent level. Throughout the year, numerous Jel and ICS leaders and activists were arrested for their suspected

involvement in riots and anti-government activities. ICS and Jel held rallies across the country demanding their release, resulting in violent clashes with the police. During clashes in Rajshahi District, on January 30, one Jel activist was shot dead by the police and 80 people, including 19 policemen, were injured.

In the course of the year, numerous clashes at campuses across the country between ICS and BCL left several hundreds injured. On February 5, two ICS activists died and numerous activists were injured in an incident which occurred between the parties at Chittagong University, Chittagong District. On July 9, clashes between ICS and BCL students left twenty injured and at least 42 dormitory rooms were set afire in Sylhet, Sylhet District.

The pending war crimes trials before the International War Crimes Tribunal also caused violent confrontations. Several Jel leaders were arrested for alleged involvement in war crimes during the 1971 Liberation War. The final verdict is expected in 2013. On November 4, Jel announced a nine-day protest against the tribunal. During the protest, nationwide clashes between Jel and ICS supporters, on the one hand, and the police and AL and BCL activists, on the other, left over 300 civilians and 200 policemen injured. On November 15, Home Minister Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir announced the arrest of 2,400 Jel and ICS activists during the previous days. On December 17, the Jel Central Publicity Secretary and other Jel activists were arrested for the possession of anti-government publications. Local Jel units called an eight-hour hartal, a general strike and shutdown, in Sylhet and Rajshahi for December 19. kbl

CAMBODIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **CPP vs. SRP, civil society groups**
 Conflict items: **system / ideology, national power, resources**

The conflict between the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, on the one hand, and the opposition movement comprising various political parties, in particular the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), and civil society groups, on the other, remained violent. Throughout the year, thousands of union members, garment workers, and victims of forced eviction demonstrated and blocked major national roads, demanding higher wages and an end to land seizure. Civil society groups repeatedly clashed with security forces. Several government critics and activists faced arbitrary arrests and court suits. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy, facing criminal charges at home, remained in self-imposed exile in France. In July, SRP formed an alliance with the second-largest opposition party, the Human Rights Party, forming a new entity called the Cambodia National Rescue Party. On April 26, environmental activist Chut Wutty was shot dead in Koh Kong Province by a military police officer, according to witnesses. Chut Wutty was investigating illegal deforestation and the timber trade. Official investigations into the killing were abandoned in September. On May 16, hundreds of soldiers, military police and police personnel raided the village of Broma, Kratie Province,

in order to confiscate farmland which had been subject to a long-running land dispute. During clashes between security forces and the villagers, security forces killed one person. On October 2, oppositional activists Mom Sonando and Bun Ratha were charged with insurrection and incitement and convicted to 20 and 30 years in jail respectively. On May 24, against the backdrop of land disputes, thirteen women from Boeung Kak, Phnom Penh, were sentenced to jail but released in early June. Protests accompanied court hearings; these were dispersed by riot police using electric shields and batons. Six people were injured as a result. som

CHINA (TAIWAN)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: **PRC vs. ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups**

Conflict items: **secession**

The conflict between the government of the Republic of China in Taipei (ROC) and the government of the People's Republic of China in Beijing (PRC) regarding the political status of Taiwan continued. Throughout the presidential elections in the ROC in January and leadership transition in the PRC in November, both governments promoted stable cross-Strait relations and economic cooperation.

On January 14, Ma Ying-jeou, chairman of the Kuomintang Party, was reelected as president. The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which rejected the 1992 Consensus between the ROC and PRC which acknowledged the existence of a single Chinese state, lost the election. On July 25, DPP announced a restructuring of its organization reflecting its renewed recognition of ROC's relations to the PRC as distinct from international relations. The US welcomed this development.

On August 9, the two governments signed agreements consolidating their investment relations by mutually guaranteeing the protection of the rights and interests of investors from both sides and by simplifying customs regulations.

The ROC continued to build up its military and urged the US to sell it defensive arms. The US continued to deny the long-debated sale of 60 F-16C/D jet fighters to the ROC. In August, the US delivered two coastal minesweepers to the ROC. According to the ROC's annual China Military Power Report, the PRC raised the number of its ballistic and cruise missiles directed at the island of Taiwan from 1,400 to more than 1,600. Furthermore, the PRC completed a new air force base in Shuimen, Fujian Province, situated not only close to Taiwan but also to the Diaoyu Islands, which are claimed by both of the Chinese governments and Japan respectively [→China-Japan (Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands)]. On August 21, Ma restated that the ROC would not side with the PRC in the territorial dispute.

On November 1, the US included ROC nationals in its Visa Waiver Program. On November 22, the PRC released new passports featuring a map depicting Taiwan as a part of its territory. The ROC protested, stating that the issue might harm the stability of the improved cross-Strait relations. yre

CHINA (TIBET)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1950**

Conflict parties: **Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetan separatists vs. government**

Conflict items: **secession, system / ideology, resources**

The conflict concerning secession, system, and resources between Tibetan separatists and the Tibetan government-in-exile, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, remained violent. Police forces killed at least ten Tibetans, wounding many more. Furthermore, 83 Tibetans resorted to self-immolation in protest of Chinese rule over Tibet. On January 8, police shot dead one Tibetan who had allegedly tried to sabotage the construction of an airfield in Labrang/Xiahe County, Gansu Province. The site was located at a place considered sacred by Tibetans. The incident triggered demonstrations by villagers which security forces dispersed, using tear gas and injuring many Tibetans. Between January 23 and 26, several thousands protested for a free Tibet and the return of the Dalai Lama in three counties of Sichuan. Security forces killed at least four demonstrators and many more were injured. On February 25, a Tibetan detonated a bomb at a government building in Derge/Dege County, Sichuan. On March 6, police shot dead one Tibetan and injured two others linked to an anti-government rally, in Golog/Guoluo Prefecture, Qinghai Province. Two self-immolations in Ngaba/Aba on August 13 led to clashes with police in which one Tibetan was killed. Two days later, about a thousand Tibetans protested against Chinese mining operations in Markham/Mangkang County, Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). One Tibetan was shot dead in a clash with the security forces. Self-immolations occurred in all provinces inhabited by Tibetans and often sparked protests. Officials reacted with an increased security presence and detentions. The month of November recorded the highest number of self-immolation incidents. On September 28, a Tibetan Special General Meeting was held by the government-in-exile in Dharamsala calling for an end to self-immolation incidents. On November 2, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, urged China to address the allegations of rights violations in Tibet, especially the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators and the curbing of Tibetans' cultural rights. Additionally, she advocated independent monitors for the region and called on the government to respect the right to peaceful assembly and expression. axt

CHINA (UIGHURS / XINJIANG)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: **ETIM, TIP, Uyghurs, WUC vs. Han Chinese, government**

Conflict items: **secession, system / ideology, subnational predominance**

The secession conflict between the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority mainly living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-

gion, and the government remained violent. Throughout the year, several dozen Uyghurs and Han Chinese died.

According to the government, a group of nine Uyghurs killed thirteen people, mostly Han Chinese, in Kargilik/Yecheng County, Xinjiang, on February 28. Police shot dead seven attackers and detained the other two. On March 9, police shot dead four Uyghurs in Korla/Ku'erle County, Xinjiang. The victims had allegedly constructed bombs. Six Uyghurs tried to hijack a plane on its route from Hotan/Hetian to Urumqi/Wulumuqi, Xinjiang, on June 29. They were overwhelmed by passengers and sky marshals. Some of the hijackers and at least seven passengers and two marshals were injured. Two of the hijackers died a few days later under custody due to their injuries. On September 6, the World Uyghur Congress, an exile organization fighting for Uyghur rights and an independent East Turkestan, blamed the government for cyber-attacks upon ten Uyghur organizations. On October 1, the Chinese national holiday, an Uyghur reportedly drove a motorcycle into a police facility in Kargilik/Yecheng County. The motorcycle triggered an explosion, killing up to twenty policemen as well as the driver. On October 23, three Uyghurs reportedly attacked a police station in Korla/Ku'erle. One attacker was killed while another one and two policemen were injured. After a Han Chinese person lifted the veil of a Uyghur girl, Uyghurs took to the streets in Zhenping County, Henan Province, on November 28. 50 of the protesters were injured in the ensuing clashes with police. axt

CHINA-VIETNAM ET AL. (SOUTH CHINA SEA, SPRATLY AND PARACEL ISLANDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: *Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Philippines vs. Vietnam*

Conflict items: *territory, international power, resources*

The conflict over territory, resources, and international power in the South China Sea (SCS), also known as East Vietnamese Sea or West Philippine Sea, between the governments of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia respectively continued. The Chinese governments and Vietnam reiterated extensive but ill-defined claims for most parts of the SCS, including all of the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The Philippines restated its claims for Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal, and eight of the Spratly Islands. The USA heightened its military presence in the area and strengthened its defense cooperation with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Efforts to establish a mitigating regional code of conduct continued to fail. The Cambodian ASEAN chair kept the SCS issue off the agenda of the summits in April and November. Mineral and fishing resources remained serious issues. ROC, the Philippines, and the state-owned oil firms China National Offshore Oil Corporation and PetroVietnam accelerated their gas and oil exploration plans in disputed territory, exacerbating the situation.

After the detention of fishermen in the disputed area, tensions increased. On April 10, a Philippine Navy frigate intercepted eight PRC fishing boats near Scarborough Shoal. Two unar-

med vessels of PRC's Chinese Marine Surveillance intervened shortly after. This led to tensions during which PRC reinforced its presence with armed ships of the Fishery Law Enforcement Command, while the Philippines replaced its warship with a Coast Guard cutter. About 26 PRC boats remained in the shoal. On May 22, the US reaffirmed its bilateral defense treaty with the Philippines. Both countries' forces conducted joint military exercises from April 16 to 27 near Palawan Island, Philippines. On June 21, Vietnam passed a law claiming sovereignty over both the Paracel and Spratly Islands, strongly opposed by the Philippines and PRC. On the same day, PRC established the SCS as a prefecture in Hainan Province, with Sansha on the island chain of Paracel's Woody Island as administrative center. The PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA) began aerial and naval patrols around the Spratly Islands. On August 3, the US voiced serious concerns over these actions. PRC officials reacted with strong rhetoric. One month later, PRC announced its intention to establish a PLA garrison in Sansha. On November 22, PRC released new passports displaying a map claiming sovereignty over the entire SCS and the island of Taiwan [→ China (Taiwan)]. The Philippines, ROC and Vietnam voiced strong criticism. Several anti-PRC protests occurred in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, between June and December. On November 27, Hainan Province passed a law allowing maritime authorities to seize foreign ships entering the claimed territory. The law was to become effective on 01/01/13. yre

INDIA (GJM ET AL. / NORTHERN WEST BENGAL, EASTERN ASSAM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: *GNLF, GNLF-C, GJM, IGPP, GLO, UGRF vs. ABGL, ABAVP, Janachetana, Amra Bengali, AIADC vs. government*

Conflict items: *autonomy*

The conflict over autonomy between different ethnic Gorkha groups, among them the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM), the United Gorkha Revolutionary Front (UGRF), and the Gorkha Liberation Organization (GLO), on one side, different non-Gorkha minority organizations like Amra Bangali, Janachetana, the All India Adivasi Development Council (AIADC), on another, and the government, on a third side, over the creation of a federal state of Gorkhland in the Dooars Region, encompassing areas in northern West Bengal State and eastern Assam State, remained violent.

In January and February, GJM repeatedly threatened to push for a separate federal state if an autonomous Gorkhland Territorial Administration (GTA) was not implemented by end of March. On March 7, President Pratibha Patil signed the GTA Bill which paved the way for the first GTA elections in July. In a clash between GNLF and GJM, six GNLF cadres were injured in Darjeeling District, West Bengal, on April 5. One week later, several non-Gorkha minority groups, including AIADC, organized a general strike in the Dooars and Terai areas of West Bengal in protest against GJM's demand to include 398 local administrative units from this region into the GTA. On April 21,

a high-ranking UGRF cadre surrendered to the authorities in Darjeeling District.

On April 23, GJM and an AIADC faction called a two-day general strike in the Dooars and Terai areas after they did not get the permission from the state government to hold a public rally. The strike turned violent, houses and vehicles were set on fire, and pro-GTA and anti-GTA groups clashed. The police used batons and tear gas to disperse the rival groups. The authorities deployed paramilitary forces to the region. Several people, including three police officers, were injured. On June 9, the Justice Shyamal Sen Committee, formed by the government to decide on the inclusion of the contested administrative units, recommended to include only five of them in the GTA. On July 29, GJM won all current constituencies in the GTA elections. From September onwards, the West Bengal government started to transfer departments, powers, and functions to the GTA. *lst*

INDIA (GNLA ET AL. / MEGHALAYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: **HNLC, PLF-M, ANVC, ANVC-B, UANF, LAEF, GNLA vs. government**

Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between various militant groups in the state of Meghalaya, among them the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), the Liberation of Achik Elite Force (LAEF) and the People's Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. Militants of all outfits were arrested throughout the year and several laid down their arms voluntarily.

On January 31, the government declared GNLA a terrorist organization. On March 30, around 300 ANVC militants joined the group's breakaway faction (ANVC-B) to protest against the unfulfilled tripartite ceasefire agreement of 2004 from the state and central governments, as well as to oppose the GNLA [→India (GNLA, HNLC - ANVC, UANF)]. ANVC-B herewith attracted public attention for the first time. The faction, together with GNLA, engaged in the assault, abduction, and killing of civilians for allegedly being police informants and in order to collect ransom. On April 5, security forces clashed with GNLA militants in East Garo Hills District, killing four of them. On April 19, police shot dead one GNLA combatant in an encounter in South Garo Hills District. Security forces killed a GNLA commander, injured one rebel, and recovered light weapons from their hideout in East Garo Hills on September 14. On October 8, three GNLA rebels died in clashes with security forces in Goalpara District, Assam State, and in North Garo Hills District. On November 10, suspected ANVC-B militants ambushed a police vehicle in South Garo Hills; two civilians died and six others were injured. The next day, police shot dead one GNLA member and arrested another during an encounter in West Garo Hills. Four days later, security forces killed one GNLA member in Goalpara District and recovered light arms and ammunition.

The government rejected the peace talk offer by HNLC on August 28, as the outfit refused to lay down arms unambiguously. *ve*

INDIA (HINDUS–MUSLIMS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: **Hindus vs. Muslims**

Conflict items: **subnational predominance**

The conflict over subnational predominance between Hindus and Muslims escalated to a violent level. Throughout the year, at least twelve people were killed. On February 23, Hindus and Muslims clashed in Anand District, Gujarat, attacking each other with stones, petrol-filled bottles, and acid bulbs. They clashed over the construction of shops on land owned by the Islamic waqf board, a religious endowment. Large numbers of security personnel, including one State Reserve Police Force company, fired tear gas at protesters. Approx. 40 people were injured, among them up to nine policemen. After a week of tensions between Hindus and Muslims, police forces interrupted a procession of a Hindu community on March 15 in the town of Rajouri, Jammu and Kashmir, in order to prevent further clashes. Over twelve people, including six policemen, were injured. On April 8, Hindus and Muslims clashed in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, after cow meat had been found in a Hindu temple. At least twelve people were injured, at least two vehicles torched, and about 57 people arrested. On July 23, violence erupted in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, over Hindu chanting. One person was shot dead and twenty were injured. On August 7, two days ahead of Hindu festivities, nearly 1,500 Hindus and Muslims, took to the streets in Banaskantha District, Gujarat. They were armed with clubs and swords. Five people were injured, including a police constable. On October 24, policemen used tear gas to disperse Muslims and Hindus in Faizabad, Uttar Pradesh, following a Hindu procession. The clash left two people dead and at least nine injured, including one policeman. Over 70 people were arrested. *csc*

INDIA (JEM ET AL. / KASHMIR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: **JeM, HM, LeT, HuM vs. government**

Conflict items: **secession**

The secession conflict in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between Kashmiri and Pakistani insurgency groups, namely Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harkat-ul-Mujahhideen (HuM), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violent level. LeT and HM remained the predominant militant groups. Militant activities claimed 117 lives, among them insurgents, security forces, and civilians. Throughout the year, police forces neutralized several militant hideouts in the districts of Poonch, Bandipora, and Ramban, seizing caches of arms and ammunition. On January 7, a grenade attack at Sopore

police station, Baramulla District, killed one militant and injured five people including two policemen. On March 28, security forces killed five LeT militants in two separate clashes in Kupwara District. On August 2 and 3, civilians on the behest of HM launched four grenade attacks in Sopore and Srinagar, injuring three people and damaging several vehicles. On October 1, 24 the counterinsurgent Rashtriya Rifles and state police killed five HM militants equipped with automatic weapons in Badgam District while conducting a joint search operation. Security forces seized five AK-47 rifles, two grenade launchers, and ammunition. On October 19, four heavily-armed LeT militants ambushed an army convoy with grenades in Srinagar. Subsequently, the militants stormed a nearby hotel, killing one civilian and injuring two others. While security forces were conducting search operations in Sopore on December 18, LeT militants attacked them with automatic weapons; the security forces shot dead five militants. On December 24, two LeT militants who were allegedly involved in the hotel incident and one policeman were killed in a clash in Dodhipora Village, Kulgam District. *lju, isy*

patnam District, Andhra Pradesh. Security forces recovered around 100 kilograms of explosives and other material during a raid against a Maoist camp in Bijapur District, Chhattisgarh, on September 20. On November 14, an encounter between security forces and Maoist militants in Odisha left five militants dead and at least two security personnel wounded. In response, Maoists called a statewide shutdown six days later. On December 14, 26 Maoists surrendered before the additional director general of police in Bihar. Rifles, revolvers, pipe guns, pistols, and ammunition were seized. A former CPI-M area commander assured the public that more than 100 Maoists were considering laying down their arms. On December 25, Maoist militants set ablaze two earthmovers in Garhwa District, Jharkhand. Between 30 and 40 armed Maoists stormed a road construction site, assaulting between ten and fifteen workers. *mwu, mst*

INDIA (NAXALITES)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: **CPI-M vs. government**
Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The ideological conflict between the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M), also called Naxalites, and the government continued on a highly violent level. The Naxalites operated in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and West Bengal, also known as the "Red Belt". With more than 100 fatalities, Chhattisgarh remained the primary battleground, while Jharkhand and Odisha were also heavily affected with over 90 and 60 casualties respectively. Encounters between security forces and CPI-M militants, abductions, bomb attacks, and strikes inflicted a total of over 360 casualties, among them over 100 security personnel, approx. 120 militants, and more than 140 civilians. Throughout the year, Maoists repeatedly targeted civilians, accusing them of collaborating with government authorities.

On January 2, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Combat Battalion for Resolute Action, and district police personnel clashed with Maoist militants near the forest of Matama, Rohtas District, Bihar. Three top Maoist cadres were killed and one other was seriously injured. In reaction, CPI-M called a bandh, a general strike, and blew up two mobile towers in Aurangabad District, Maharashtra, on January 17. Four days later in Garhwa District, Jharkhand, 50 to 60 Maoists triggered a landmine blast killing thirteen policemen and injuring two others. On March 4, 23 Maoists surrendered in Bihar. Between June 28 and 29, CRPF and Chhattisgarh police killed twenty people in two separate incidents in Sukma and Bijapur Districts. Six CRPF troopers were injured and at least seven suspected Maoists arrested. While CRPF claimed that those killed were CPI-M militants, other sources stated many of them were civilians. Two days later, CRPF and state police forces arrested 36 Maoists, among them six senior leaders, in Vishakh-

INDIA (NSCN-K–NSCN-KK–NSCN-IM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: **NSCN-K vs. NSCN-KK, ZUF vs. NSCN-IM**
Conflict items: **subnational predominance**

The conflict over subnational predominance between the different factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, i.e. Isak-Muivah-faction (NSCN-IM), the Khaplang-faction (NSCN-K), the Khole-Kitovi-faction (NSCN-KK) and its splinter group, Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), remained violent. Though all the groups share the common goal of establishing a Greater Nagaland in India's North East (→India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)), different ideological orientations and tribal affiliations caused various internal disputes. Violence mainly occurred in Nagaland state in northeast India. In total, 54 people were killed in the conflict.

Over the year, 37 militants and three civilians died in clashes between the NSCN-K and NSCN-KK. On January 15, NSCN-K raided an NSCN-KK camp and killed one insurgent in Peren District. Four days later, ten NSCN-KK militants armed with AK-47 rifles killed an NSCN-K chief secretary in Zunheboto District. In February and March, similar clashes between the two factions claimed sixteen lives in the districts of Dimapur, Peren, and Kohima. From May 30 to July 1, eight militants and one civilian died in five clashes in Zunheboto District. On September 6, NSCN-KK fighters attacked the house of an NSCN-K member in Dimapur using grenades and firearms, injuring two militants. Two NSCN-IM members were killed in separate clashes with NSCN-K in Manipur State on October 25 and in Arunachal Pradesh State on November 1. Clashes between NSCN-IM and ZUF in Manipur on May 30, September 26, and October 2 claimed the lives of eight militants and one civilian.

The Forum for Reconciliation, initiated in 2008 by independent Naga people with the aim of finding a solution to the political differences and ending the violence between the factions, organized two meetings this year. As NSCN-K did not participate in the meeting on February 29 and NSCN-IM abstained on May 26, no major progress was made. *fwo*

INDIA (SIKHS / PUNJAB)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1947**


Conflict parties: ***Shiromani Akali Dal, KLF, KZF, BKI, KTF vs. government***

Conflict items: ***autonomy***

The autonomy conflict between various Sikh organizations in the state of Punjab and the government turned violent. On March 24, various Sikh organizations, among them the Shiromani Akali Dal (Panch Pardhani and Amritsar), held a march in Jalandhar, protesting against the hanging of Babbar Khalsa International member Balwant Singh Rajoana scheduled for March 31. Rajoana was convicted for the assassination of former provincial Chief Minister Beant Singh in 1995. In response to the protests, fifteen companies of paramilitary forces and 60,000 policemen were deployed all over the state. On March 28, Sikh organizations called for a bandh, a general strike. Thousands took to the streets, demanding Rajoana's amnesty. Three people were injured, among them a head constable, as police forces dispersed 1,500 protesters who were blocking the Jalandhar-Amritsar railway track. On the same day, police arrested more than 100 Sikhs. As a result, the Home Ministry announced the postponement of Rajoana's execution. *lgr*

INDIA (ULFA ET AL. – BIHARIS, BENGALIS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1981**



Conflict parties: ***ULFA, ATTF, NDFB, NLFT, AASU, Bodos vs. Bengalis, Biharis, AABYSF***

Conflict items: ***subnational predominance***

The conflict over subnational predominance between ethnic Bodos and different militant groups like the United Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), on the one hand, and ethnic Bengalis and Biharis, on the other, escalated to a war. While also affecting other Indian states, the conflict mainly took place in the Assamese parts of the semi-autonomous Bodo Territorial Autonomous District (BTAD), where many Bodos perceived Muslims and Bengali-speakers to be illegal immigrants. Over the year, more than 100 people were killed, thousands of houses destroyed, and more than 400,000 people forced to flee their homes.

The violence started in the village of Magbari, Assam, on July 19, when a gunman attacked two Muslim student leaders. The day after, four former Bodo activists were killed. On July 21, the government deployed paramilitary forces to the BTAD, imposed a curfew in the region, extending it to other districts of Assam two days later, when Bodo and Bengali mobs killed at least nine people in Barpeta and Kokrajhar Districts. From July 21 to 29, mobs of both sides burned down several villa-

ges, clashed with police and killed at least 56 people in Assam. On August 4, a NDFB faction announced that they would not allow Muslim migrants to live in tribal areas. Three days later, violence erupted anew when a group of ten armed with AK-47 rifles, killed three Muslims in Ranighuli, Kokrajhar.

The day afterwards, the conflict spread to places outside Assam when five students from northeast India were attacked in Pune, Maharashtra state. On August 11, Muslim protester in Mumbai, Maharashtra, clashed with police, leaving two people dead. Two days later, NDFB killed a Muslim and injured two others at the Bhutanese border. After threats of violence, tens of thousands of people northeastern Indian origin fled from Bangalore, Karnataka State, and Chennai, Tamil Nadu State, as well as other major cities from August 15 onwards. However, most of them returned by the end of the month. In Assam, isolated outbreaks of violence occurred throughout August and raised the total death toll to 95 by the end of the month. For example, six Bengali speakers were killed in Chirang District and two more in Dhemaji District on August 25. One day later, ULFA announced actions against immigrants in Assam if the violence against people from the northeast in other states would not stop. From November 10 to 16, violence erupted once again and at least five Muslims and one ethnic Bodo were killed in separate incidents in Kokrajhar. *mw*

INDIA (ULFA ET AL. / ASSAM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: ***ULFA, NDFB, DHD, Black Widow vs. government***

Conflict items: ***secession***

The secession conflict over the state of Assam between the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), and the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), as well as its breakaway faction, the Black Widow, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Despite peace accords between the government and ULFA as well as NDFB, factions of both militant groups perpetrated violent actions.

The peace process between the government and ULFA's pro-talk faction (ULFA-PTF) proceeded in talks on April 9 and June 29, while violence perpetrated by ULFA's anti-talk faction (ULFA-ATF) continued. Throughout the year, thirteen ULFA-ATF cadres, three security personnel, and two civilians were killed, and 25 people were injured in at least eight ambushes and five bomb attacks. Authorities arrested 109 ULFA-ATF militants and recovered approx. fifteen small arms and four improvised explosive devices. The government extended the ceasefire agreement with the Dilip Nunisa faction of DHD (DHD-N) and NDFB pro-talk faction for another six months on January 18. Although NDFB's anti-talk faction (NDFB-ATF) had declared unilateral ceasefire beginning on 08/01/11, clashes with security forces continued. On May 31, security forces killed one NDFB-ATF militant in Kamrup District. Over the course of the year, the government arrested approx. 70 NDFB-ATF militants. On October 8, DHD and the central and state governments signed a Memorandum of Settlement after nine years of peace talks. *dsc*

INDONESIA (AHMADIYYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: *Ahmadiyya vs. government, radical Sunni Muslims*

Conflict items: *system/ideology*

The ideology conflict between the Indonesian branch of the Ahmadiyya religious community, on the one hand, and the government as well as radical Sunni Muslims, on the other, remained violent. Throughout the year, radical Sunni Muslims attacked Ahmadis and their facilities. Around 1,000 conservative Muslims took to the streets in Jakarta on March 9, demanding a government ban on the Ahmadiyya religion. On April 20, about 150 people attacked an Ahmadiyya mosque with Molotov cocktails and stones in Singaparna, West Java, destroying the whole interior as well as parts of the building. One week later, the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) disrupted the Friday prayers of an Ahmadiyya group in Batam, Riau Islands, and destroyed parts of the building's interior. FPI dragged three group members to a local police station, where they forced the leader of the group to stop all religious activities in the area. On July 13, a mob threw stones at Ahmadiyya houses in the village of Cisalada, West Java, resulting in a fight between the two communities. The clash damaged six houses and injured four people, among them three Ahmadis. After the mob had abandoned the site, it returned with knives and machetes. According to the police, security personnel brought the situation under control. On July 25, police and military forces prevented dozens of FPI members from breaking into a mosque in Cianjur, West Java. On November 8, approx. 200 FPI members protested in favor of the implementation of a ban on all activities of Ahmadis in West Java. *er*

INDONESIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: *al-Qaeda in Aceh, JI, Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The conflict between Islamist militant groups fighting for an Islamic state in Indonesia and the government continued on a violent level. On February 2, a top leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Zulfiki bin Hir was killed in an airstrike by the Philippine military on Jolo Island, the Philippines [→Philippines (Abu Sayyaf / Mindanao)]. On March 18, in Denpasar, Bali, police forces killed five suspected JI militants. Twelve days later, two suspected militants were shot dead in a firefight with police in Jakarta. On May 16, in West Jakarta, high-profile Islamist militant Abu Umar of the Abu Umar group was sentenced to ten years in prison for smuggling firearms. The last remaining militant involved in the 2002 Bali bombings, Umar Patek, was sentenced to twenty years in prison on June 21 in West Jakarta.

The Densus 88 anti-terrorism squad killed two suspected militants and arrested one other in Solo, Java, on September 1. The militants in turn shot dead one police officer. On September 22 and 23, Densus 88 arrested ten Islamic militants in Solo, Java, and West Kalimantan, Borneo. On October 27, police arrested eleven members of the new Islamist group Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society in Java. The group had been planning attacks on American diplomatic missions. *ska*

INDONESIA (OPM / PAPUA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: *OPM vs. government*

Conflict items: *secession, resources*

The conflict between the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and the government over the independence of the Papua region remained violent.

In the course of the year, shootings claimed the lives of at least eighteen people. On January 28, OPM attacked twelve paramilitary policemen during their patrol and killed one police officer in the highlands of Puncak Jaya, Central Papua. On April 8, OPM shot at a commercial airplane at Mulia Airport, Puncak Jaya, using machine guns. One man died and four civilians were wounded. On July 1, up to 30 OPM members attacked and killed a village chief. On August 18, OPM shot dead a government official near the border of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Three days later, OPM shot dead a police officer in Paniai, West Papua. While Papua activists claimed that the police torched houses while searching for militants, the police denied such allegations. On November 15, OPM members raided a police station and stole firearms and ammunition in Papua. On November 27, around 50 OPM members attacked a police station, killing three police officers, and set the office ablaze in the city of Wamena, West Papua.

Over the year, police arrested at least 27 OPM members in raids. In a raid on OPM's headquarters, two OPM members were arrested by police in Yapen on May 29. On September 2 and 3, the police arrested 25 OPM members in several raids, including OPM leader Daniel Kogoya in Jayapura and Abepura.

Throughout the year, people demonstrated peacefully in many cities in West Papua. For instance, on February 20, thousands of people took to the streets and demanded a referendum in West Papua. On July 4, OPM commander Lambert Pekikir announced that OPM would declare a ceasefire if the government held an international conference including the UN. *asc*

JAPAN-CHINA (SENKAKU / DIAOYU ISLANDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: *ROC vs. PRC vs. Japan*

Conflict items: *territory, resources*

The territory and resources conflict between the People's Re-

public of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and Japan over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands continued. All parties reiterated their sovereignty claims, supported by nationalist activist groups, most noteworthy among them Ganbare Nippon from Japan and PRC's China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (CFDD). In April, the CFDD officially associated with two activist groups from Hong Kong and ROC under the banner of the World Chinese Alliance in Defense of the Diaoyu Islands (WCADD). In mid-April, Shintaro Ishihara, the governor of Tokyo, Japan, urged the city's government to buy the islands from their private Japanese owners. In July, the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) stopped ROC activists sailing to the islands. On July 20, CFDD chairman and president of China Fortune Investment, Tong Zeng, requested the PRC's permission to invest in the Diaoyu Islands. On August 15, PRC and Hong Kong WCADD activists, among them leading members of radical Hong Kong pro-democracy parties [→China (Hong Kong pro-democracy parties)], procured a vessel and reached the islands. They were there arrested by the JCG and sent back on August 17. As a response to the campaign, Ganbare Nippon activists landed on the islands shortly after. Both incidents fueled a wave of riots in several major cities in PRC, erupting on August 18. On September 10, PRC formally declared the territorial baseline for the disputed area. Despite strong protests, the Japanese government purchased the islands on September 11. Subsequently, ROC recalled its envoy from Japan while PRC sent six more Chinese Marine Surveillance patrols to the islands. A second wave of protests intensified around September 18. Protesters looted Japanese shops and factories and threw objects at the Japanese embassy in Beijing. Beijing prohibited protests in front of the embassy, but condoned a boycott for Japanese products and suspended the 40th anniversary of Sino-Japanese relations. On September 23, between 800 and 1,400 Ganbare Nippon activists demonstrated in Tokyo against PRC's sovereignty claims. Two days later, the JCG fired water cannons at ROC fishing and coast guard ships. On September 26, Japan's Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, addressed the UN General Assembly, reiterating Japan's claims and also its willingness to resolve the conflict peacefully. On October 1, ROC returned its envoy to Japan and resumed dialog on fishing rights. Japan rejected ROC requests for allowing the ICJ to examine the conflict. Japan began joint maritime military drills with the US near the disputed islands on November 5. On December 13, a PRC plane patrolled above the disputed islands causing the Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto to file an objection with PRC and to heighten Japan's level of alert. *kol*

JAPAN–SOUTH KOREA (TAKESHIMA / DOKDO)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1951**

Conflict parties: *Japan vs. South Korea*
Conflict items: *territory*

The territorial conflict over the Liancourt Rocks between Japan, referring to them as Takeshima, and South Korea, referring to them as Dokdo, continued. The conflict remained strongly interwoven with Korean resentment over Japanese revisionism.

On January 24, Minister of Foreign Affairs Koichiro Genba emphasized Japanese claims over Takeshima, leading to protest from South Korea. On June 29, due to protests among the public, South Korea postponed the General Security of Military Information Agreement with Japan. On July 9, a South Korean national attacked the Japanese embassy in Seoul, South Korea, with his truck, displaying a banner stating that the Dokdo islets were Korean territory. The event was the first in a series of anti-Japanese protests. On August 29, the Japanese embassy issued a safety warning for its citizens in South Korea. On August 10, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited the islets. Four days later, he urged the Japanese emperor to officially apologize for the Japanese occupation of Korea. Japan's Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda responded by temporarily recalling his country's ambassador. On August 22, the ambassador returned. Noda proposed referring the conflict to the ICJ, which South Korea rejected. *tsp*

KAZAKHSTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *al-Khalifat, Islamist militant groups vs. government*
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The system and power conflict between Islamist militant groups, among others the Jund al-Khalifa, and the government remained violent. On February 21, a court in Aqtobe, Aqtobe Province, sentenced five suspects of the July 2011 attacks to terms ranging from five to thirteen years. On April 18, a court in Atyrau, Atyrau Province, convicted 42 out of 47 suspects involved in organizing the bombings of 10/31/2011. Police alleged that the suspects were linked to Jund al-Khalifa, which had taken responsibility for the attacks. Police forces conducted a series of raids against suspected Islamist militants in August. On July 11, alleged Islamist militants detonated a bomb in Tausamal, Almaty Province. Eight people died. On August 17, security forces stormed a hideout in the outskirts of Almaty, killing nine suspects. Five alleged militants were killed and one severely injured in a special operation in Atyrau on September 12. Three days later, two unknown persons attacked a police station in Atyrau, injuring two policemen. In response, special forces stormed a militants' hideout in Atyrau on September 21, killing four suspects in a firefight. In October, courts in Atyrau and Aqtobe sentenced several suspects apprehended during the raids to long prison terms for militant activities. *ayu*

MALAYSIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1969**

Conflict parties: *Pakatan Rakyat, Bersih vs. government*
Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The system and power conflict between the pro-democracy opposition, led by Pakatan Rakyat and the Coalition for Clean

and Fair Elections (Bersih), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violent level. Bersih is an alliance of several non-governmental organizations and Pakatan Rakyat encompasses the three largest opposition parties Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, Parti Keadilan Rakyat, and Parti Tindakan Demokratik.

In early April, the Parliamentary Select Committee on Electoral Reforms, formed in the aftermath of the Bersih 2.0 rally in 2011, released a report with 22 recommendations to improve the electoral system. While the House of Representatives passed the report without debate on April 3, the opposition parties and Bersih opposed the paper. Supported by Pakatan Rakyat, Bersih organized the Bersih 3.0 rally in the capital Kuala Lumpur on April 28, demanding further reforms of the electoral system. They called for the resignation of the Election Commission and the monitoring of the general elections to be held in early 2013 by international observers. Prime Minister Najib Razak warned against participation in the rally and police forces set up roadblocks. Up to 300,000 people protested in Kuala Lumpur and clashed with riot police. The latter fired tear gas and chemical-laced water, injuring at least 113 people. In addition, police attacked several journalists and arrested 512 demonstrators, most of whom were released the same day. International observers described the rally as peaceful. On January 9, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was acquitted by the Kuala Lumpur High Court of violating laws against homosexuality. However, the Attorney-General's Chambers filed an appeal against the Kuala Lumpur High Court decision on January 20. Ten months later, the Court of Appeal set 02/15/13 for case management of the appeal against Ibrahim's acquittal.

sg

emergency throughout Rakhine State and authorities imposed a curfew in Sittwe, among other places. Authorities also arrested at least ten local UN aid workers. Throughout June, clashes between Rohingyas and Buddhists continued in Sittwe, Kyauktaw, Rathidaung, Buthidaung, Maungdaw, Mrauk-U, Rambree, Pauktaw, and Taung Goat. Between August 4 and 6, clashes erupted after Rohingyas set a highway bus terminal on fire. During the clashes, which left seven people dead and destroyed five villages, Rohingyas and Buddhists perpetrated mutual arson attacks. According to Human Rights Watch, Rohingyas fell victim to human rights abuses, including arbitrary mass arrests, rapes, and killings conducted by local security forces, Na Sa Ka personnel, a paramilitary border force, and soldiers. On August 17, Thein Sein announced the formation of an investigatory commission. Rohingyas were excluded from the commission. On October 21, violence started anew when a Buddhist merchant in Mrauk-U was killed. Between October 21 and 26, dozens of people were killed and hundreds of houses burned down. Riots spread from Min Bya and Mrauk-U to several other towns, culminating in Kyaukpuyu where Buddhists destroyed a predominantly Muslim quarter between October 23 and 24. On October 26, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called upon the government to put an end to the violence.

fpe

MYANMAR (KIA, KIO / KACHIN STATE)



Conflict parties: **KIA, KIO vs. government**
 Conflict items: **autonomy, resources**

The autonomy and resource conflict between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a war.

The conflict flared up anew after a seventeen-year ceasefire collapsed in June 2011. KIA and government forces clashed repeatedly over the year in Kachin State and the northern area of Shan State, where 25 percent of the Burmese army were deployed. The army used heavy artillery, helicopter gunships, and fighter jets. The number of combatants killed on both sides in the course of the year remained conflicting, with estimates ranging in the thousands. In September, KIA reported the loss of over 700 fighters since the ceasefire's collapse. The conflict caused the death of hundreds of civilians and the displacement of approx. 100,000. An estimated 7,000 to 10,000 Kachins fled to Yunnan Province, China, from whence Chinese authorities repatriated 5,000 back to Kachin in August. The government repeatedly blocked aid deliveries. Human Rights Watch reported army attacks against civilians, extrajudicial killings, and the confiscation and destruction of property. Over the year, the conflict parties held several peace talks in Myanmar and China without results. While violence also occurred in Shan State, all major incidents took place in Kachin State, where the army

MYANMAR (BUDDHISTS-ROHINGYAS / RAKHINE STATE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: **Buddhists vs. Rohingya Muslims**
 Conflict items: **subnational predominance, other**

A highly violent conflict erupted between the majority Buddhist population and the minority Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State.

Clashes between Muslims and Buddhists occurred mainly in June and October and claimed the lives of around 180 people as well as the displacement of an estimated 110,000 people. The October violence alone led to 89 fatalities, at least 136 people injured, and the destruction of over 5,300 houses and religious buildings. About 2,000 Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh but were sent back. The rape and murder of a Buddhist woman on May 28 in Rambree Township, allegedly by three Rohingyas, sparked the ensuing violence. On June 3, around 300 Buddhists in the town of Toungop attacked a bus and beat to death ten Muslims on board. Five days later, in the town of Maungdaw, Rohingyas killed an unknown number of Buddhists and destroyed property of Buddhists. Subsequently, violence escalated in Sittwe, the state capital. Buddhists and Rohingyas attacked each other with torches, knives, and swords. On June 10, President Thein Sein declared a state of

had a strong interest in controlling natural resources and economic projects.

On March 1, President Thein Sein stated that he had ordered the army to only act in self-defense and not to launch offensive actions. On April 6, two government light infantry divisions shelled KIA bases around the town of Laiza, where the KIA headquarters are located, with heavy artillery. Between April 8 and 9, government troops attacked a KIA outpost with over 100 mortar shells near Waingmaw Township. On April 25, KIA rebels captured Pangwa, a strategically important town at the Sino-Burmese border. In response, army helicopters airlifted about 200 troops near Pangwa to recapture the town. According to state media, the number of casualties peaked in May, with over 100 that month. In addition, about 2,000 soldiers were deployed to Laiza. On May 6 and 7, KIA forces detonated several bombs in Bhamo and Momauk Townships, resulting in the deaths of up to 70 soldiers. On May 12 and 13, two soldiers were killed and four others injured in clashes with KIA combatants near the Myitson dam project, constructed by government contractors and the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation. On May 14, Mi-24 helicopters attacked the KIA-controlled villages of Jik Loi and Rit Pan, destroying civilian property. Over the month, KIA combatants destroyed bridges, railroads and energy supply towers. During November, the government heightened its military presence in Kachin State with 40 trucks carrying weapons, soldiers, and supplies. According to KIA, 1,000 government troops arrived in the vicinity of KIA's stronghold in Laiza. Four KIA rebels died and fifteen were injured between December 1 and 11 while reclaiming frontline posts. On December 14, the government attacked KIA outposts around Layang with three Mi-24 helicopters and mortars. In response, KIA forces killed and injured more than 60 soldiers. On December 28, five fighter jets and two helicopters launched rocket attacks near Layang, hitting strategically important KIA outposts. The number of casualties remained unknown. *phu*

MYANMAR (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1962**

Conflict parties: **opposition vs. government**
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The system and national power conflict continued between various opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent level.

On January 5, the Union Election Commission formally accepted the re-registration of the oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD). In by-elections on April 1, the NLD won 43 out of 44 parliamentary seats it contested. On January 13, the government released 650 political prisoners, among them leaders of student groups, Buddhist monks, generals, and the former prime minister U Khin Nyunt, after an amnesty order endorsed by President Thein Sein. On August 20, the government lifted its censorship of the press; the Press Scrutiny and Registration Department announced media outlets were no longer obliged to submit their works to state censors prior to

publication. These developments were welcomed by several Western nations as well as the EU. In September, Thein Sein reshuffled the cabinet. On September 6, all nine judges of the Constitution Tribunal resigned after the lower house Parliament voted to impeach them, a move that followed a week-long power struggle between the two bodies. Eight days later, the exiled oppositional National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma announced its dissolution to contribute to the achievement of national reconciliation. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi urged the government on November 29 to apologize for a violent crackdown of protestors at a copper mine project site but also stated the country had to continue to pursue its commitment to complete the project [[→ Myanmar \(farmers et al. / Sagaing Region\)](#)]. *lr*

MYANMAR (SSA-S, SSA-N / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1952**

Conflict parties: **SSA-S, SSA-N vs. government**
Conflict items: **autonomy**

The autonomy conflict between the northern and southern wings of the Shan State Army (SSA-N and SSA-S), on the one hand, and the government, on the other hand, remained violent.

Despite peace deals, tensions between the conflict parties remained as soldiers continued to force Shan rebels to withdraw from economically strategic bases. SSA-N signed an initial peace agreement with both the state-level and central government on January 28. However, clashes between SSA-N and government forces in Shan State persisted throughout the remainder of the year. On April 6, for instance, SSA-N reported that as many as seven soldiers were killed during fighting in Hsenwi Township. According to local sources, ten government infantry battalions attacked an SSA-N base in Monghsu Township for four days at the beginning of July. At least seven SSA-N militants were arrested following a clash in Mong Ton Township on October 26.

Following the signing of an initial peace agreement on 12/02/11, SSA-S and government officials continued to negotiate in January. On January 16, SSA-S signed a peace agreement with the government. However, SSA-S reported clashes with government forces beginning on February 7. In subsequent violent confrontations between February and May, both SSA-S and the government suffered casualties. On May 19, the Restoration Council of Shan State, the political wing of SSA-S, signed another peace agreement with the government in the town of Kengtung. However, fights between SSA-S and government forces continued throughout June and July. Violence abated until the advent of a skirmish between government and Shan State Army forces on November 24 in which one soldier reportedly died. *jre*

NEPAL (MADHESHIS / TERAI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: *JTMM-G, JTMM-J, JTMM-R, JTMM-S, JTMM, ATMM, TJP-M, MMT, SJTMM, MJF, TMPD vs. government*
 Conflict items: *autonomy*

The autonomy conflict between various Madhesi political parties, among them the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF) and the Terai Madhesh Democratic Party (TMPD), and assorted militant groups such as the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), the Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha (ATMM), the Madhesi Mukti Tigers (MMT), and the Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (SJTMM) and their various factions, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, diplomatic efforts increased. On January 22, JTMM-G, led by Jaikrishna Goit, signed an agreement with the government and renounced violence. On February 25, JTMM-B met with government officials in Rupandehi and similarly foreswore violence. On August 27, SJTMM in turn signed a deal with the government and also renounced violence. On March 8, Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai resumed the integration of Madhesi youth into the army for the first time since December 2011.

On January 1, police arrested a member of Bhagat Singh-led JTMM-B in Banke District. On March 12, the army defused an MMT-planted improvised explosive device (IED) inside the Itahari District Education Office. Ten days later, JTMM-J, led by Jwala Singh, installed an IED in a bus, injuring two passengers in Dang District. On March 31, an alliance of five Madhesi political parties, the United Democratic Madhesi Front, held a rally in Kathmandu to reiterate their claim for identity-based federalism within the pending constitution. On April 30, a JTMM-planted bomb killed five people and injured at least 24 in Janakpur. On August 10, ATMM set off an IED in a hotel in Siraha District. No casualties were reported. Two days later, police shot dead a JTMM member in Mahottari District. On September 1, JTMM-B handed over its weapons to the police. In a similar move, SJTMM started to hand over its weapons and explosives to the authorities by December 24. On November 30, police arrested an SJTMM member in Kapilvastu District. On December 26, police arrested another six militants from this organization in Kathmandu. *lst*

NORTH KOREA – USA, SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: *North Korea vs. USA, South Korea, Japan*
 Conflict items: *system / ideology, international power, other*

The system and international power conflict between North Korea (NK), on the one hand, and the USA, South Korea (SK), and Japan, on the other, continued. After Kim Jong-il's death on 12/17/2011, his son Kim Jong-un was proclaimed NK's

new supreme leader by the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party of Korea on 12/29/2011. Seven months later, he became a marshal in the Korean People's Army (KPA), after then-Chief of the General Staff of the KPA, Ri Yong-ho, had been dismissed. Kim continued his father's Military First policy and advanced NK's nuclear and satellite capabilities. Allegedly, NK prepared the Punggye-ri test facility in Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province, for a third nuclear test after 2006 and 2009. On May 30, NK proclaimed its status as a nuclear-armed state by amending its constitution. This change was criticized by the US and SK.

Trilateral cooperation between the US, SK, and Japan continued, despite conflicts between Japan and SK [→Japan – South Korea (Takeshima / Dokdo)]. The three countries conducted their first official joint naval exercise from June 21 to 22, followed by a large US-SK single-day drill. In spite of strong protest from NK, the US and SK conducted two of their regular annual large-scale exercises in spring and autumn, respectively. On October 7, the US and SK revised their treaty on technological aid, permitting an extension of the range of SK's ballistic missiles to 800 km and of the missiles' payload to over a ton. Two days later, NK claimed its missiles could reach the US mainland.

On January 11, NK test-fired three short-range ballistic missiles. During January and February, the US offered NK food aid in return for talks on denuclearization. As announced one month earlier, NK launched a satellite aboard an Unha-3 carrier rocket on April 13. The rocket launch failed shortly after lift-off. The international community condemned the test. The US withdrew its food aid offer from earlier on in the year and instead proposed economic sanctions against NK. The United Nations Security Council approved sanctions against three NK companies allegedly involved in NK's ballistic missile industry. NK revoked its previous permission for IAEA inspections to take place on April 16.

After stating the intention to reconsider its stance on the nuclear issue on July 20, four days later NK deployed twenty to 50 helicopters to airbases close to Baengnyeong Island, the sovereignty over which was disputed between NK and SK [→North Korea – South Korea]. On November 31, a government delegation from PR China voiced its concerns over NK's plans to launch a satellite. In early December, the US deployed warships equipped with sophisticated ballistic-missile defense systems to monitor a potential NK rocket launch. On December 12, NK successfully launched a long-range Unha-3 rocket, bringing a satellite into orbit for the first time. *lbs*

PAKISTAN (BLA ET AL. / BALOCHISTAN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: *Baloch and Brahui tribes, BSO, BPLF, JWP, BLA, BRA, BLUF, BNP, LeB, BMDT vs. government*
 Conflict items: *secession, resources*

The conflict over resources and secession between various militant groups and Baloch political parties in Balochistan province, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent.

Over the course of the year, at least 330 people were killed in encounters between security forces and militant groups as well as in attacks on civilians who were perceived to be alien to Balochistan. Moreover, nineteen attacks on railroad infrastructure and more than 30 attacks on gas pipelines, undermining the country's energy supply, were reported. On January 11, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) attacked a convoy of the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) in the Turbat area and killed fourteen soldiers. The Baloch Republican Army (BRA) destroyed a checkpoint and killed ten paramilitary security personnel in the Sui area on January 26. On February 1, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed at least eleven FC personnel in a fraught encounter in the Margut area. Two people died and twelve were injured in a BRA attack on a police van in Dera Murad Jamali, Nasirabad District, on February 13. Two days later in Turbat, BLA killed seven road workers from Sindh and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. BRA injured four people in a bomb attack in Dera Murad Jamali on May 16. The Baloch Liberation Tigers (BLT) killed eighteen civilians from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces in Turbat on July 6. One day later, BLA kidnapped and killed seven workers from the Sorange coal mining fields. About 50 BLF militants armed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades destroyed a coast guard post and killed six security personnel in Gwardar on July 21. The United Baloch Army (UBA) killed ten road workers in the Mastung District on September 13. Five people died in a BRA bomb attack on an army vehicle in Quetta on November 21.

In the first two weeks of February, BRA, the Balochistan Republican Party (BRP), Balochistan National Party, National Party, and other Baloch groups organized two province-wide strikes, lasting two and three days respectively, to protest against the murders of Sangat Sana Baloch, former vice-chairman of the Baloch Student Organization, and two relatives of a BRP leader. BRP accused the paramilitary Frontier Constabulary for the murders. On August 13, another province-wide strike against security forces in the region was organized by various Baloch nationalist groups. Two weeks later, BRP opened fire on two buses from Sindh and Punjab which operated despite the call for a strike. Five people died in the assault. The US Congress introduced a non-binding resolution demanding the right of self-determination for Balochistan on February 17. Despite protests against the resolution, the government announced amnesties for exiled Baloch leaders six days later.

cbr

PAKISTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: *various Islamist militant groups vs. government*

Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The war over national power and the orientation of the poli-

tical system between various Islamist militant groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda, Haqqani network, and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islam (HuJI) on the one hand, and the government, supported by the USA, on the other, continued for the sixth year running. The conflict claimed the lives of over 4,000 people over the course of the year. The heaviest clashes between security forces and militants occurred in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), especially in the agencies of Orakzai, Khyber, North Waziristan, Kurram, and Bajaur.

For instance, on January 2, fighter jets bombed militant hideouts in Orakzai, killing at least twenty TTP militants. In Khyber, fighting throughout the year claimed the lives of at least 360 people and forced more than 181,000 to flee. On March 11, for instance, security forces killed 39 militants during an operation in the Alam Godhar area and further 30 militants in the course of several clashes on June 2 in Tirah Valley.

In North Waziristan between May 7 and 8, security forces clashed with militants, leaving 39 people dead in the Miranshah area. In the TTP-dominated Kurram Agency, security forces attacked militant hideouts with artillery and helicopter gunships, killing at least twelve on May 14. A major battle, leaving 200 people dead, erupted in Bajaur on August 23 and lasted until September 19, when around 400 TTP militants attacked security forces supported by pro-government tribal militias from their bases in Afghanistan, temporarily taking control of six small villages near the border [→Pakistan (Taliban – tribes)].

In Upper Dir, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province, security forces killed at least 34 TTP militants, including their spokesman Mullah Mansoor, during fights between June 29 and July 1. After an interruption of almost two months, the US resumed drone operations in FATA to support the government on January 10 by killing four suspected militants in the outskirts of Miranshah, North Waziristan. In the course of the most fatal drone attack, 24 people died in Gorwaik Village in North Waziristan, on July 6. One attack targeted at the Haqqani network killed at least eighteen militants in a madrasa in Baland Khel, Orakzai, on October 11. Over the year, US drone attacks left a total of 312 people dead, including the two al-Qaeda commanders: Badr Mansoor on February 9 and Abu Yahya al-Libi on June 4.

Despite resumed peace negotiations between the government and TTP, Islamists carried out suicide attacks and ambushes targeting both security personnel and civilians, especially in warrant agencies of FATA, but also in all four provinces. In response to the army's assassination of TTP commander Qari Kamran on January 1, TTP militants killed fifteen previously kidnapped Frontier Constabulary personnel, in North Waziristan four days later.

On April 15, around 150 TTP militants stormed a prison in the town of Bannu, KP, and freed nearly 400 inmates. On June 24, TTP militants attacked a military convoy in Upper Dir district, KP, resulting in the death of at least eleven militants and ten soldiers. On July 9, the Punjabi wing of the TTP attacked an army camp near Wazirabad in Gujranwala district, killing eight soldiers. In a similar attack on an air force base in Kamra where nuclear warheads were allegedly being stored, two security forces and nine militants died on August 16. On December 15, ten TTP militants attacked the airport at Peshawar, KP, using a

suicide car bomb, three rockets, and several other explosives. The explosions and the ensuing gun battle left all the assailants, several civilians, and one police officer dead, and 35 people injured. One week later, TTP killed KP's Senior Minister for Local Government and Rural Development, Bashir Bilour, and seven other people in a suicide attack in Peshawar. *mfu*

suspects and recovered AK-47 assault rifles, pistols, and hand grenades in joint search operations. *mpa, hru*

PAKISTAN (MOHAJIRS – BALOCHS, PAKHTUNS, SINDHIS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: *Mohajirs, MQM vs. Pakhtuns, ANP, Balochs, PPP, Sindhis, Awami Tehreek*

Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The conflict in the province of Sindh over subnational predominance between the Urdu-speaking Mohajir people and their political organization, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), on the one hand, and Pakhtuns, backed by the Awami National Party (ANP), Balochs, supported by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Awami Tehreek, and Sindhis, on the other, de-escalated to a limited war. PPP was the ruling party on both provincial and federal levels. Most of the violence observed occurred in Karachi, Sindh's capital and Pakistan's largest city and economic hub, where Mohajirs make up the majority. According to official sources, approx. 700 people died in targeted killings over the year, among them 170 PPP, 150 MQM, and 97 ANP supporters.

In January, at least 30 people died in targeted killings in Karachi. Subsequent police and paramilitary search operations in the area of Teen Hati, Orangi Town, and Liaqatabad on January 30 and 31 sparked heavy protests involving hundreds chanting anti-government slogans and blocking roads with burning tires. In response, the police fired tear gas and arrested at least 50 people. On March 27, the killing of a MQM party worker and his brother sparked riots. Educational institutions, public transport, and business came to a halt; at least eleven people died, more than twenty were injured, and at least 35 vehicles were torched in clashes between armed groups. The day afterwards, the killing of an ANP member intensified unrest and at least fifteen more people had been killed by the end of March. After a police raid on April 1 in the town of Lyari, Karachi, and a visit from President Asif Ali Zardari, local gangs attacked police and PPP activists with rockets and automatic weapons. Seven people, including one PPP member, died. In late April, hundreds of families fled their homes when clashes between police and militants intensified and 22 people died within four days. Militants used rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47s. On May 22, a gunman attacked a Awami Tehreek rally, killing at least ten people and injuring 35. Beginning on July 17, 38 people fell victim to targeted killings within one week. The killing of one MQM provincial assembly member on July 30 caused violent uprisings in the following week, leaving approx. 90 people dead. On November 2, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan [→Pakistan (Islamist militants)] announced that it would combat the MQM dominance in the city after the party had taken a more pronounced anti-Taliban stance. Over the year, paramilitary and police forces detained several hundred

PAKISTAN (TALIBAN – TRIBES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: *TTP, LI vs. various tribes, TI, Aman Lashka*

Conflict items: *system / ideology, subnational predominance*

The conflict over subnational predominance and ideology between the Islamist militant groups Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), on the one hand, and various pro-government tribal militias, among them Aman Lashkar and Tawheedul Islam (TI), on the other, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP) de-escalated, but remained violent. More than 240 people were killed throughout the year, among them at least twelve tribal elders and pro-government militia leaders. Tribal militias, among them TI, fought alongside the Pakistani army in the war against the Taliban [→Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)].

On January 20, a tribal elder from the agency of Mohmand, FATA, was shot dead in Peshawar, KP. On May 4, a TTP suicide bomber killed 24 and injured more than 60 in Khar Bazaar, Bajaur Agency, FATA, among them two commanders of the local tribal police. After surviving a suicide attack on June 12 which killed three of his guards, Faheem Khan, chief of an anti-Taliban militia, and three other people, were found shot dead in Peshawar, KP, on June 27. TTP claimed responsibility. On November 3, a suicide bomber killed five people in Buner, KP, including Aman Lashkar's district head Fateh Khan. Pro-government tribal elders were killed in FATA on June 20, July 8, and 15. Clashes between TI and LI continued frequently in Tirah Valley, Khyber Agency, FATA. On February 20, a bomb killed at least nine TI fighters. In the subsequent fighting, at least two LI militants were killed. In late March, TI killed six LI militants in two separate incidents. Another two LI fighters were killed in a gunfight between TI and LI on April 6. Over the year, militants destroyed several schools in FATA and KP. For example, militants blew up one girls' school in Khyber agency on March 4. On October 9, TTP attempted to kill Malala Yousafzai, a teenage activist from Swat Valley, KP. *lr*

PAKISTAN (TTP ET AL. – RELIGIOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: *TTP, LeJ, SSP, Jandullah, Fazal Saeed Haqqani group vs. various religious groups*

Conflict items: *system / ideology, subnational predominance*

The system and predominance conflict between militant Sunni groups, among them Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and Jandullah, on the one hand, and various religious minorities, on the other, escalated. Islamist militants launched attacks and suicide bombings nationwide. According to a report from the

Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 537 people were killed in 202 sectarian attacks over the course of the year. Most of the victims were Shiites but at least four Hindus and four Ahmadis were also killed.

On January 15, alleged LeJ militants detonated an improvised explosive device in the midst of a Shiite procession in Khanpur, Punjab province, killing at least eighteen and injuring 30 people. On February 17, a suicide bomber killed at least 26 people in front of a Shiite mosque in the agency of Kurram, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). A TTP breakaway faction led by Fazal Saeed Haqqani claimed responsibility. On February 27, Jandullah militants stopped a bus in Kohistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province, and killed eighteen Shiites while sparing non-Shiite passengers. Over the following days, police clashed with protestors in Gilgit-Baltistan, the predominantly Shiite region to which the bus was headed. On April 3, clashes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims erupted in the region. Violence started in the city of Gilgit when Sunnis protesting against the arrest of one of their leaders who had been charged with an alleged attack on Shiites, clashed with the police. A hand grenade was thrown into the crowd, killing two and injuring approx. 30 protestors. In Chilas, protestors killed four people and torched four vehicles. At least ten people were killed and more than 45 injured in the clashes. In a separate incident on the same day, ten people were killed in an attack on a bus in Chilas. Later that day, police imposed a curfew and the army was deployed.

In the first half of April, at least 27 Shiites were killed in Quetta, Balochistan's provincial capital. At the same time, Shiite organizations staged protests in the major cities of the country against the killings and the government's lack of protection. On June 18, at least four Shiites were killed in a bus in Quetta when a 40 kg car bomb exploded nearby. LeJ claimed responsibility. On August 16, TTP militants forced the passengers of three buses to step out and killed at least twenty Shiites in Manshera District, KP. On September 10, twelve people died in a car bomb explosion at a market dominated by the Shiite Turi tribe in Parachinar, FATA. TTP was allegedly responsible. On September 18, a twin blast killed seven and injured 22 people in Karachi, Sindh's provincial capital. The victims were from the Shiite Dawoodi Bohra community. On November 22 in Rawalpindi, Punjab, a TTP suicide bomber killed at least 23 Shiites and injured more than 60 other in a Muharram procession, a ceremony especially sacred to the Shiite community. The same day, seven people were wounded in a TTP attack on a Shiite mosque in Karachi. On November 24, eight people died and at least 30 were injured when TTP detonated ten kilograms of explosives at a Muharram procession in Dera Ismail Khan District, KP. On December 30, at least eighteen Shiite pilgrims traveling by bus were killed in a remotely triggered explosion south of Quetta. *mpa*

PAKISTAN – INDIA

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: *Pakistan vs. India*
Conflict items: *territory, international power*

The conflict between Pakistan and India over international

power and the status of the Kashmir region remained violent. Over the course of the year, the contested Line of Control (LoC) served as the battlefield for at least 31 skirmishes between the Indian and Pakistani armies.

Between June 11 and 19, two Indian soldiers died and another five were injured in at least five encounters between Indian and Pakistani troops armed with automatic weapons and mortars. On June 18, the Indian army deployed artillery near the LoC for the first time in a decade. In several light-arms firefights between August 6 and 20, two Indian soldiers died and another three were wounded. Pakistani mortar fire on an Indian outpost wounded one Indian soldier on December 6. In the period under review, eighteen additional fire exchanges between the conflict parties occurred without inflicting damage on life or property. In the course of the year, the Indian army killed at least nineteen Pakistani militants who tried to cross the LoC illegally (→ India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)). On October 22, India's Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde accused Pakistan of assisting the militants.

After an avalanche in the Siachen Glacier area near the LoC had destroyed a battalion headquarters and claimed the lives of 140 Pakistani soldiers on April 7, in an informal meeting India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh offered Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari assistance in rescuing the buried soldiers. On April 18, high-ranking Pakistani military officials proposed a demilitarization of the Siachen area. The day after, India for the first time successfully test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile with an estimated range of 5,000 km. Six days later, Pakistan conducted a test of a nuclear-capable missile with an estimated range of 3,000 km. Bilateral negotiations on the demilitarization of the Siachen area on June 11 bore no results. On September 8 in Islamabad, the foreign ministers of both countries agreed upon new confidence-building measures such as facilitating business visas and expanding cross-LoC travel for the purpose of tourism and pilgrimage. *jmi*

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *Papua New Guinea vs. Opposition*
Conflict items: *national power*

The national power conflict between the government headed by Prime Minister Peter O'Neill, on the one hand, and the opposition of former Prime Minister Michael Somare and his supporters, on the other, continued. The conflict emerged following the parliament's appointment of O'Neill as new prime minister during Somare's hospital stay in Singapore in mid-2011. Although the Supreme Court had declared the appointment unconstitutional and ordered Somare's reinstatement on 12/12/11, O'Neill continued to be supported by the majority of the parliament, army, and civil service. In order to bring Somare back to power, retired colonel Yaura Sasa mutinied with twenty soldiers in the capital Port Moresby on January 26. They took three officers loyal to O'Neill hostage, among them army commander General Francis Agwi. The mutiny ended the same day with the hostages freed and Sasa arrested. On March 22, the parliament passed a law empowering the government

to suspend judges of the Supreme Court. The next day, 2,500 students marched to the government district, demanding the law's abrogation. Students in Lae, Morobe Province, joined them shortly thereafter. On April 5, parliament voted to postpone the upcoming national elections. Five days later, mass protests from several thousand students, in association with workers and churchmen, forced parliament to revoke the decision.

On May 21, three members of the Supreme Court again demanded Somare's reinstatement as prime minister. Three days later, Deputy Prime Minister Belden Namah led a contingent of police officers into the court to arrest Supreme Court Chief Justice Salamo Injia under charge of sedition. The next day, about 30 police officers loyal to Somare tried to prevent parliament from declaring a state of emergency for Port Moresby. Policemen loyal to O'Neill, however, ended the blockade. On May 28, police arrested Supreme Court Justice Nicholas Kirriwom. Two days later, parliament elected O'Neill as prime minister for a second time. Finally, after troubled parliamentary elections from June 23 to July 17 [→Papua New Guinea (tribal violence)], O'Neill was chosen and sworn into office as prime minister on August 3. *cbr*

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2002**

Conflict parties: *landowners vs. employees vs. government*
Conflict items: *resources, other*

The resource and labor security conflict between landowners, employees, and the government continued on a violent level. The government continued to grant Special Agricultural and Business Leases that so far have transferred over five million hectares of customary-owned land to foreign companies, whose large-scale logging, gas, oil, and mining projects often caused severe environmental damage. The biggest project was the Exxon Mobil-led PNG LNG joint venture in the provinces of Southern Highlands and Hela. Local landowners protested against the government and companies, demanding compensation for land-grabbing and environmental damage. Company employees launched strikes and protests over labor and security conditions.

On March 6, landowners protested over outstanding PNG LNG payments in the capital's government district. Fully armed Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) officers used tear gas and fired in the air to disperse the protest. A few weeks later, landowners' road blockades and employee strikes forced PNG LNG to cease work for two weeks. Allegedly, RPNGC squads arrived, burning down houses of landowners and opening fire on workers, killing one and injuring another. Shortly afterwards, the government deployed soldiers to protect PNG LNG and Barrick Gold's Porgera mine in Enga Province. On May 26, parliament declared a state of emergency in the capital, Port Moresby, and in Hela and Southern Highlands. To gain compensation, landowners threatened to stop energy supply or close down public facilities. On June 18, landowners stormed a hydroelectric power station in the village of Rouna,

Central Province, and cut off power to Port Moresby. On August 28, local employees of the Porgera mine protested against security shortcomings after locals killed two miners. Three days later, police ended the protests. In December, Prime Minister Peter O'Neill declared that state ownership of land would remain unchanged. *cbr*

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TRIBAL VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: *Various Highland Tribes*
Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between various tribes in the highlands of Papua New Guinea continued on a violent level. Compared to the elections of 2002 and 2007, violence rose significantly during the 2012 parliamentary elections as members of tribes violently supported their favored candidates. During the elections taking place from June 23 to July 17, the government deployed over 2,000 security personnel to the highlands supported by 240 troops, six helicopters, and two planes from Australia and New Zealand respectively.

At least eighteen people were killed during the pre-election period in the provinces of Chimbu, Enga, Jiwaka, and Eastern and Southern Highlands. The violence began on May 23 when clashes between candidates' supporters resulted in two deaths. A first climax was reached between June 2 and 8, when members of the Kuruka Nega and Hira tribes attacked each other with assault rifles in Lufa District, Eastern Highlands Province, leaving ten people dead and 50 injured.

Violence intensified after polling had commenced on June 23, claiming approx. twenty lives. The same day, three to six people were hacked to death near the Murusapa polling station in the coastal province of Madang. In Hela Province, rioting from candidates' supporters occurred in the villages of Tari, Kelabo, and Kereneba. Houses and cars were looted and ballot boxes destroyed or hijacked. Using warning shots and tear gas to disperse mobs, security forces shot a man in Mt. Hagen, Western Highlands, on July 15, and a boy in Womai, Chimbu, the next day. Post-election violence broke out after the declaration of the results. At the end of the month, members of the Dagle tribe in Kerowagi, Chimbu, fought against the Kamaneku tribe for not having supported their candidate, resulting in injuries and massive destruction of property.

On September 15, unrelated to the elections, fighting over land compensation money broke out between factions of the Bazanofi clan in Henganofi District, Eastern Highlands [→Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)]. One man was shot dead and several injured. Police arrested 40 men. Tribal violence broke out again on December 7, leaving fifteen dead and several injured from gunshot and bush knives. *cbr*

PHILIPPINES (ABU SAYYAF / MINDANAO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: *Abu Sayyaf vs. government*
 Conflict items: *secession, system / ideology*

The secession and ideology conflict between the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the government remained violent. Violence linked to ASG militants occurred mainly in the town of Sumisip, Basilan Province, Mindanao, and consisted of attacks and bombings. In addition, ASG resorted to kidnappings for ransom, targeting mainly foreigners. The abduction of two Europeans on February 1 raised the number of foreigners held hostage to ten since the beginning of 2011.

On February 2, a USA-backed airstrike killed fifteen members of ASG and Jemaah Islamiah on Jolo Island, Sulu Province. Soldiers arrested an Abu Sayyaf leader in Zamboanga City, Basilan, thirteen days later. On March 3, two civilians died and thirteen were injured from an improvised explosive device in a commercial area in the town of Jolo, Sulu. Police linked the incident to ASG. On March 15, security forces launched an operation, supported by helicopters and artillery, against ASG militants in Sumisip. At least four militants and one army ranger died, and three more soldiers were wounded. On April 10, one soldier was killed and 26 others wounded when they triggered ASG landmines in Sumisip. On July 26, army forces clashed with ASG militants in Basilan, leaving up to nineteen people dead and up to 23 wounded. On August 15, soldiers clashed with around 35 suspected ASG militants when they conducted an area-clearing operation in Basilan. One soldier was killed and a further three wounded. In another clash in Basilan on September 4, three ASG militants were killed and four army rangers wounded. The government used artillery and airstrikes. Three days later, Abu Sayyaf members killed one plantation worker and wounded 36 others in an extortion attempt in Basilan. On September 21, police and military forces killed three suspected ASG militants in Zamboanga City while rescuing a Chinese man kidnapped by ASG in 2011. On October 28, soldiers and ASG militants clashed in the village of Bakong, Sulu. Three soldiers and two militants died and ten other soldiers were injured. *aas*

PHILIPPINES (BIFM, BIFF–MILF, GOVERNMENT)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *BIFM, BIFF vs. MILF, government*
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The conflict between the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) and its military wing the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a breakaway faction of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), on the one hand, and the government supported by MILF, on the other, over subnational predominance in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and SOCCSKSARGEN region escalated to a limited war.

Throughout the year, BIFM attempted to enforce a Sharia-based justice system in areas under its control. On June 23, BIFF accused the military of killing one of its members in the course of an operation in the province of Maguindanao. In response, over 200 BIFF militants launched attacks on several army outposts and towns in Maguindanao between August 5 and 11 using grenade launchers, high-powered firearms, and explosives. In the course of these attacks, they killed ten soldiers, a police officer, and at least two villagers, set on fire over 50 houses, and forced 25,000 to 47,000 residents to flee the area. In a subsequent counteroffensive approved by MILF, the military deployed MG-520 helicopters which fired rockets at the rebels, killing 80 members of BIFF forces. In two separate attacks on August 12 and 13, BIFF shot dead two security guards and an army intelligence agent, injuring five others. After the army had captured two enclaves of BIFM on August 14, the latter injured three soldiers in a retaliatory attack in the town of Guindulungan, Maguindanao, two days later. The next day, soldiers killed six BIFF members in a gun battle and subsequently captured two further camps. In the SOCCSKSARGEN Region, BIFF attacked an army checkpoint in Pikit, North Cotabato Province, on August 22, killing one civilian and wounding two soldiers. The next day, fifteen BIFF militants fired grenades upon an army detachment near Pikit and shot dead one villager. An ensuing gun battle involving another 100 militants left two combatants and one civilian injured. On September 7, BIFM announced after a corresponding agreement with MILF that it would stop its attacks against the military. In order to monitor BIFM's compliance with the agreement, MILF deployed a large number of forces in Maguindanao two days later. However, on September 10, clashes erupted between MILF and BIFM, forcing 40 families to flee the area. On October 18, fighting resumed between dozens of MILF and BIFM members, leaving four combatants dead. *prü*

PHILIPPINES (MILF / MINDANAO)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1977**

Conflict parties: *MILF vs. government*
 Conflict items: *secession, system / ideology, resources*

The conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), consisting of members of the Bangsamoro ethnic group, and the government de-escalated to a non-violent level. From December 2011 to November 2012, twelve rounds of peace talks took place between the government and MILF with major achievements reached since April. In a meeting in Kuala Lumpur on April 23 and 24, the parties signed an agreement in which they identified preliminary principles that would serve as a framework for the eventual signing of a peace agreement. After exploratory talks from October 2 to 7, President Benigno Aquino III announced that the government and MILF had successfully drafted a framework agreement. They decided on the creation of a new autonomous political entity for Mindanao Muslims, called Bangsamoro, in place of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao already in existence. Furthermore, the agreement included wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and a normalization of the relations and was officially signed on

October 15 in Manila. On June 2, government troops arrested a MILF fighter in the town of Malita, Davao del Sur Province, and recovered three firearms. In reaction to the framework agreement, clashes between MILF and a breakaway group intensified [→Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)]. Additionally, the Moro National Liberation Front strongly criticized MILF for having signed the agreement [→Philippines (MNLF / Mindanao)].

prü

SRI LANKA (SINHALESE BUDDHISTS, JHU, JVP – HINDUS, EELAM TAMILS, MUSLIMS, SLMC, CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1977**

Conflict parties: *Sinhalese Buddhists, JHU, JVP vs. Tamil Hindus, Eelam Tamils vs. SLMC, Muslims vs. Christians*

Conflict items: *system/ideology, subnational predominance*

The system and subnational predominance conflict between the Sinhalese Buddhist side, along with the monk-led Jathika Hel Urumaya (JHU) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), on the one hand, and the Hindu side, consisting of Eelam Tamils and Tamil Hindus, along with Muslims, supported by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), and Christians, on the other, continued. On April 20, around 2,000 Buddhists, including monks, demanded the demolition of a mosque in Dambulla, Central Province, as well as the removal of a Tamil Hindu temple in the same area, which was considered by Buddhists to be sacred ground. Their claims were backed by JHU, arguing that the building of the mosque was unauthorized. Some reports indicated the fruitless use of incendiary devices and the storming of the mosque. People were evacuated from the site and nobody was injured. Two days later, the government ordered the mosque's relocation, thereby reacting to Buddhists' threats to otherwise destroy the building. On April 26, Muslims took to the streets in Ampara and Batticaloa Districts, Eastern Province, causing the shutdown of many public services. Demonstrations were halted by the military. On May 30, around 200 demonstrators led by several dozen Buddhist monks threw stones at a mosque near the capital Colombo.

lsc

TAJIKISTAN (GORNO–BADAQSHAN)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: *Tolib Ayombekov's Militia vs. government*

Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

A limited war over subnational predominance between the militia of Tolib Ayombekov and the government erupted in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province. Ayombekov was considered to be involved in human and drug trafficking.

On July 21, the government accused Ayombekov and three others of killing the regional head of the State Committee on National Security, Major-General Abdullo Nazarov, in the pro-

vincial capital Khorog. On the same day, the government ordered that Khorog be cut off from communication and set up street blockades. Ayombekov, however, denied involvement in Nazarov's killing and refused to surrender to the police. On July 23, aiming at restoring order and establishing full government authority in the semi-autonomous region, a massive military operation involving 3,000 soldiers and ten helicopters began in the region. The following day, Ayombekov's militia and soldiers clashed, leaving dead between 47 and 200 on both sides, including an unknown number of civilians. On July 25, the government ordered its troops to cease fire in order to enable talks on the immediate laying down of all weapons by Ayombekov's militia in exchange for amnesty. Since a growing number of insurgents had agreed to lay down their arms, on August 1 government forces started to withdraw from the province, with the exception of 500 troops scheduled to remain in Khorog. On August 12, Ayombekov and a group of supporters reportedly ended their resistance. Ten days later, the ceasefire was broken when special forces allegedly shot one of the militants after he had surrendered. This triggered massive protests from inhabitants of Khorog, who demanded the immediate withdrawal of all soldiers. President Emomali Rakhmon visited the region on September 18. He announced that his government will enforce law and order in the future and curb extremism. On September 29, the government announced the allocation of special development funds to stabilize security in the province.

sci

THAILAND (ISLAMIST SEPARATISTS / SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1902**

Conflict parties: *Islamist separatists vs. government*

Conflict items: *secession, system/ideology*

The secession and ideology conflict in the southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Songkhla remained highly violent. Islamist separatists staged near-daily attacks on representatives of the central government, including state officials, public school teachers, and defense volunteers, as well as Buddhist monks and civilians, regardless of religious affiliation. Over the course of the year, at least 600 people were killed.

On February 9, for instance, the detonation of a 30 kg explosive hidden in a vehicle outside a public health office in Muang District, Pattani, left at least one person dead and at least eleven others wounded. In March, 73 attacks carried out by alleged insurgents left 56 people dead and 547 people wounded. In a major incident on March 31, for example, at least fourteen people were killed and over 500 wounded in a series of four coordinated bomb blasts in Yala and Songkhla. The army blamed the independence movement Barisan Revolusi Nasional. On November 18, in Rueso District, Narathiwat, militants attacked a train, detonating 90 kilograms of explosives. At least three defense volunteers were killed and at least another fourteen passengers wounded.

In addition to bomb attacks, Islamist separatists repeatedly clashed with security forces. On January 6, 30 heavily armed

alleged separatists attacked a defense volunteer base in Rueso, Narathiwat. Two defense volunteers were killed and three others seriously wounded. On February 21, seven presumed militants ambushed a military checkpoint in Kampung Naprau, Pattani. Three Islamists were killed while at least two paramilitary rangers were wounded. On April 19, five insurgents of the Islamist militant group Runda Kumpulan Kecil, among them a presumed senior leader, were killed in a shootout with a 100-man squad in Krongpinang District, Yala. On September 5, in Rueso, Narathiwat, military forces besieged a suspected militant hideout. After a gunfight which killed one militant, military forces detained at least three others.

On April 7, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre admitted it had held talks with leaders of separatist groups. Nevertheless, it stated that no negotiations were carried out. On April 13, the National Security Council affirmed the continuation of talks with Islamist groups. On September 11, the government extended the emergency decree in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani by another three months until December 19. On the same day, over 100 separatists surrendered to authorities. On November 30, the government extended the Internal Security Act for Songkhla's four border districts by another year. *hal*

USA – PAKISTAN

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: **USA vs. Pakistan**
 Conflict items: **other**

The conflict between Pakistan and the USA over violation of Pakistan's sovereignty by the US de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. On May 23, Pakistan sentenced Shakil Afridi, a physician who conducted a fake vaccination campaign to provide information leading to the killing of Osama bin Laden on 05/02/11, to 33 years of imprisonment for treason. One day later, a US Senate committee cut the annual aid budget for Pakistan by USD 33 million. After a cross-border attack on the Pakistani army check post in Salala, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, by NATO troops on 11/26/11, Pakistan closed the supply routes for NATO forces in Afghanistan [→Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)]. On May 22, a US Senate panel approved aid cuts to Pakistan by 58 percent if the routes remained closed. After US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the losses suffered by the Pakistani military in the Salala attack on July 3, Pakistan reopened NATO supply routes to Afghanistan. On November 29, Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar stated that military and intelligence ties with the US were fully restored. Throughout the year, Pakistan reiterated that it considered any unsanctioned US-led drone attack on its territory a violation of its sovereignty [→Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. *mfu*

UZBEKISTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1991**


Conflict parties: **opposition vs. government**
 Conflict items: **system / ideology, national power**

The system and power conflict between the opposition party The People's Movement of Uzbekistan (PMU), formed in 2011 by the parties Erk and Berlik as well as other opposition groups, and the government continued on a non-violent level. On March 23, the senate approved terms for new presidential and parliamentary elections which would allow the incumbent President Islam Karimov to be re-elected for a fourth time. PMU leader Muhammad Salih and his associates mainly acted from exile in Germany and Turkey. On June 30 and July 1, PMU afterwards held its second congress in Berlin, Germany, its first being in 2011 in Prague, Czech Republic. The Youth Movement Chulpan, the People's Political Union For Free Elections, and the human rights organization Salvation joined PMU. During a press conference following the congressional meeting, Salih stated he did not rule out the use of force against the government. *ast*

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

- : NO VIOLENT CONFLICT
- : VIOLENT CRISIS
- : LIMITED WAR
- : WAR



The total number of conflicts in the region of the Middle East and Maghreb increased from 65 to 69 in 2012. As in 2011, about two-thirds of the conflicts in the region concerned, among other items, ideology or the orientation of the political system, while one-third concerned inter alia national power. Also like in 2011, system/ideology was the conflict item most violently fought over with seven highly violent conflicts. The conflicts regarding territory and international power were fought at a lower intensity. The overall number of highly violent conflicts decreased from thirteen to nine. In contrast to eight wars in the region in 2011, the toll declined to five in 2012.

A new violent opposition conflict emerged in Kuwait, while the violent crisis between Bedouins and the government continued. The opposition conflict in Saudi Arabia turned violent when police forces broke up a university protest of female students in March. The opposition conflicts in Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Morocco continued on the level of a violent crisis. In Oman, the violent crisis between the government and the opposition de-escalated to a dispute. Three of the five high intensity conflicts, which erupted in the course of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, de-escalated to violent crises [→Egypt (opposition groups), Tunisia (opposition groups), Yemen (opposition groups)]. Following the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, the war over national power de-escalated, yet remained on the level of a limited war [→Libya (opposition)]. Simultaneously, a new highly violent conflict over subnational predominance, the orientation of the political system, and resources erupted between numerous tribes, militias, religious groups, and the government [→Libya (inter-factional violence)]. The opposition conflict in Syria continued on the level of war. Government forces and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) tried to gain power over strategic cities and main routes, employing a significantly higher number of airstrikes and bombings. Since the beginning of the civil war, approx. 60,000 people were killed and more than 500,000 refugees were registered in neighboring countries.

Moreover, violence frequently spilled over into Syria's regional neighborhood. In reaction to cross-border incidents, Turkey increased its military presence at the border and requested NATO to deploy patriot missiles. Furthermore, Syrian troops

entered the Demilitarized Zone between Syria and Israel while pursuing fighters of opposition groups. Following the explosion of mortar shells near an Israeli army post, Israel responded with artillery fire. In North Lebanon, violence erupted as groups supporting the Syrian government repeatedly clashed with its opponents. The army tried to halt the fights [→Lebanon (March 14 Alliance - March 8 Alliance)]. In Syria's northeastern provinces, the Kurdish minority protested for more autonomy and took control over several towns, thus at times clashing with FSA fighters.


On the other side of the border, the autonomy conflict in Turkey's Kurdish areas remained on the level of a war. As in 2011, the government launched large-scale military operations, including airstrikes, against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the southeastern provinces and northern Iraq. In Iran, the conflict with the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) de-escalated but remained violent.

In Afghanistan, the war between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other militant groups, on the one hand, and the government, supported by foreign troops, on the other, continued. Militants were responsible for the majority of the approx. 2,300 civilian casualties in 2012. The number of foreign troop fatalities decreased to slightly over 400.


In Iraq, the war between Sunni militants and the government continued. The number of fatalities caused by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) as well as other militant groups further increased to 4,500. Areas populated by Shiite Muslims and their common festivities remained in the focus of militant attacks and bombings, which also targeted the Sunni civilian population and government institutions, public figures, officials, and security personnel.

Al-Qaeda and several of its militant Islamist affiliates continued to operate against governments in the Maghreb region and on the Arabian Peninsula. In Algeria, the conflict between the government and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained highly violent. Especially in the Sahara and Sahel zone, the AQIM-affiliated group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) clashed with security forces close to the border of Mali [→Mali (Islamist groups)]. In Tunisia and Mauritania, security forces clashed with AQIM and seized weapons and explosives. In Morocco, the government arrested

CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB IN 2012 COMPARED TO 2011



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT ITEMS IN 2012 IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB BY INTENSITY GROUPS



several suspected AQIM members. Also, the conflict in Yemen between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Ansar al-Sharia, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained on the level of a war, leaving approx. 1,800 people dead and causing thousands of refugees. However, the government, supported by tribal fighters as well as the USA,

was able to regain control of several large cities held by AQAP.

The conflict between Israel and various militant Palestinian groups operating in the Gaza strip remained on the level of a limited war [→ Israel (Hamas et al./ Palestinian Territory)]. For the first time since 1991, rockets reached the areas of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Afghanistan (Kuchi nomads–Hazara)	Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara	subnational predominance, resources	2007	•	3
Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)	Taliban, Haqqani network, HIG, various militant groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1994	•	5
Afghanistan - Pakistan*	Pakistan vs. Afghanistan	territory, international power, other	1947	•	3
Algeria (AQIM, MUJAO)	AQIM, MUJAO vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1989	•	4
Algeria (Berbers / Kabylia)*	Berbers vs. government	autonomy, system / ideology	1963	•	1
Algeria (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Bahrain (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1975	•	3
Egypt (Bedouin activists)*	Bedouin activists vs. government	other	2004	•	3
Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)	Takfir wal-Hijra, militant groups vs. government	secession, system / ideology	1992	•	3
Egypt (Muslims–Christians)	Muslims vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1952	•	3
Egypt (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1954	↓	3
Egypt–Sudan*	Egypt vs. Sudan	territory	1958	•	1
Iran (Jundallah / Sistan-Balochistan)*	Jundallah vs. government	autonomy, system / ideology	1979	•	3
Iran (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1993	•	3
Iran (People's Mujahideen)*	People's Mujahideen vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1965	•	1
Iran (PJAK / Kurdish areas)	PJAK vs. government	autonomy	1979	↘	3
Iran–Israel*	Iran vs. Israel	system / ideology, international power	1979	•	2
Iran–UAE	Iran vs. UAE	territory	1970	•	1
Iran–USA, EU (nuclear program)	Iran vs. USA, EU	international power	1979	•	2
Iraq (al-Sadr group, Shiite militant groups)*	al-Sadr group, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Promised Day Brigades vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2004	↘	2
Iraq (KRG–Kurdish opposition movement)*	KRG vs. Kurdish opposition movement	system / ideology, subnational predominance	2011	↓	1
Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government)*	KRG vs. government	autonomy, resources	2005	↑	3
Iraq (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system / ideology	2011	•	3
Iraq (Sunni militant groups)	AQI, ISI, Ansar al-Islam, 1920 Revolution Brigades, Sunni militant groups vs. government, Al-Sahwa militia	system / ideology, national power	2003	•	5
Iraq–Iran*	Iran vs. Iraq	territory, international power	1969	•	1
Iraq–Kuwait*	Iraq vs. Kuwait	territory, resources	1961	•	1
Israel (al-Fatah– Hamas)	al-Fatah vs. Hamas	system / ideology, subnational predominance	1994	•	1
Israel (Hamas–various Salafist groups)*	various Salafist groups vs. Hamas	system / ideology	2007	•	2
Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)	Hamas, PRC, PIJ vs. government	secession, system / ideology	1988	•	4
Israel (Hezbollah)*	Hezbollah vs. Israel	system / ideology	1982	•	2
Israel (PNA / Palestinian Territories)	Palestinian National Authority vs. government	secession, system / ideology, resources	1948	•	3
Israel–Lebanon*	Israel vs. Lebanon	territory, international power, resources	1948	↘	2
Jordan (Hamas)*	Hamas vs. government	system / ideology	1994	•	1

CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB IN 2012

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Intensity ⁴
Jordan (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology	2011	•	3
Kuwait (Bedouns)	Bedouns vs. government	other	1960	•	3
Kuwait (opposition movement)	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2012	NEW	3
Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam)*	Fatah al-Islam vs. government	system / ideology	2006	•	1
Lebanon (March 14 Alliance– March 8 Alliance)	March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance	system / ideology, national power	1975	•	3
Libya (Federalists / Cyrenaica)	government vs. Congress of the People of Cyrenaica and other federalists	autonomy, system/ideology	2012	NEW	3
Libya (inter-factional violence)	Warffallah tribe vs. Zwai vs. Tibu tribe vs. Berber ethnic groups vs. Ethnic Arab settlements vs. El-Mashasha tribe vs. al-Fawatra tribe et al.	subnational predominance, resources, other	2012	NEW	4
Libya (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2011	↘	4
Libya (Salafist groups)*	Salafist groups vs. government	system/ideology	2011	↗	3
Mauritania (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2007	↘	3
Morocco (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2003	•	2
Morocco (opposition)*	20 February Movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Morocco (POLISARIO / Western Sahara)	POLISARIO, indigenous Sahrawis vs. government	secession	1975	↘	2
Morocco–Spain (Ceuta and Melilla)*	Morocco vs. Spain	territory	1956	•	1
Morocco–Spain (Parsley Island)*	Morocco vs. Spain	territory	2002	•	1
Oman (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system / ideology	2011	↓	1
Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)*	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	subnational predominance	2009	↗	2
Saudi Arabia (AQAP)*	AQAP vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1990	•	3
Saudi Arabia (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system / ideology	1990	↑	3
Saudi Arabia (Shiites)	Shiites vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1979	•	3
Syria (Kurdish groups)	KDPS, PYD vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1962	↗	3
Syria (NC - KSC)*	NC vs. KSC	subnational predominance, other	2012	NEW	3
Syria (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2011	•	5
Syria–Israel	Syria vs. Israel	territory, international power, resources	1948	•	3
Syria Turkey	Syria vs. Turkey	territory, international power	1946	↑	3
Syria–USA*	Syria vs. USA	system / ideology, international power	2003	•	2
Tunisia (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Tunisia (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2010	↘	3
Turkey (PKK / Kurdish areas)	PKK vs. government	autonomy	1974	•	5
Turkey–Iraq*	Turkey vs. Iraq	international power	1979	↗	2
Yemen (al-Houthi rebels–Sunni tribal forces)	al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forces	subnational predominance	2011	•	3
Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)*	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	system / ideology, subnational predominance	2004	•	3
Yemen (AQAP–al-Houthi rebels)*	AQAP vs. al-Houthi rebels	system / ideology	2010	•	3
Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)	AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia vs. government	system / ideology, national power	1992	•	5
Yemen (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system / ideology, national power	2011	↓	3
Yemen (SMM / South Yemen)*	SMM vs. government	secession	2009	•	3

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

AFGHANISTAN (KUCHI NOMADS–HAZARA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: *Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara*
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources*

The conflict between Kuchi nomads and Shiite Hazara over resources and subnational predominance in eastern Afghanistan continued. Kuchi nomads and Hazara disputed over grazing land. The government and the UN intervened diplomatically. On May 26, Kuchi nomads allegedly attacked the Hazara-populated Behsud District, Nangarhar Province, torching schools and houses. On June 3, up to 2,000 Kuchi nomads armed with rocket launchers and machine guns launched an attack on the mainly Hazara-inhabited Kajab Valley, Wardak Province. A gun battle raged between the Kuchi nomads and Hazara with Afghan soldiers intervening in order to end the fighting. Casualty numbers ranged from three to eleven. A local police chief stated that a mosque, four shops, and nineteen houses were destroyed during the clashes. Most of the village's Hazara population fled. In order to de-escalate the conflict, President Hamid Karzai and the UN held talks with representatives of both conflict parties. In May, Karzai met Hazara representatives to discuss their conflict with Kuchi nomads. In mid-June, UN Deputy Special Envoy Nicholas Haysom met the governor of Wardak, government officials, and Hazara and Kuchi representatives to hold peace talks in the city of Maidan Shar, Wardak. mku

AFGHANISTAN (TALIBAN ET AL.)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1994**



Conflict parties: *Taliban, Haqqani network, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, HIG, militant groups vs. government*
 Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-e Islami, and various other militant groups, on the one hand, and the government, supported by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, on the other hand, continued. At the beginning of the year, the Taliban ruled out negotiations with the government of President Hamid Karzai, but agreed to meet US delegates for peace talks in Doha, Qatar. In March, these negotiations between the US and Taliban failed. The UN imposed sanctions on the Haqqani network and put it on a blacklist in November. A spokesman of Karzai approved that move and stated that the Haqqani network did not meet the preconditions required to engage in negotiations. By the end of December, militant groups, including Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami, and members of the Higher Peace Council met in Paris to hold peace talks.

According to UN figures, from January to October, more than 2,300 civilians were killed, mostly by militants. For example, on June 6, suicide bombers killed some twenty people in Kandahar province. On August 14, similar attacks in the provinces of Nimroz and Kunduz left 48 people dead and some 130 wounded. A suicide bomber killed 41 people and injured a further 56 in front of a mosque in the city of Maimana, Faryab Province, on October 26. In the capital of Wardak Province, a Taliban suicide attack killed two and injured some 90 on November 23.

Militants launched two major attacks in Kabul. In their first major attack upon Kabul, Taliban, allegedly backed by the Haqqani network, assaulted the parliament building, ISAF headquarters, and the German and British embassies on April 15. The militants were armed with rifles, suicide vests, and rocket propelled grenades (RPG). Subsequently, an eighteen-hour fight erupted between militants and security personnel supported by NATO helicopters. Simultaneously, Taliban launched assaults in Logar, Paktia, and Nangarhar provinces. According to Karzai, 36 militants, eleven members of security forces, and four civilians were killed in these interrelated attacks, constituting the beginning of the Taliban's spring offensive. On June 21, Taliban fighters armed with machine guns and RPGs attacked a hotel in Kabul, taking dozens of hostages. Security forces and ISAF troops engaged the militants in a twelve-hour firefight in which at least 22 people died.

The number of fatalities among foreign troops throughout the year decreased to slightly over 400. Nevertheless, ISAF remained a focus of militant attacks, which also caused significant losses among government forces and civilians. In an attack on an ISAF convoy in Khost City on June 20, a suicide bomber killed 25 people, including three ISAF troops, and injured 30. On September 14, some fifteen militants armed with RPGs, explosives, and automatic rifles attacked the NATO-led Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, killing two US marines and destroying six jet fighters. In a further suicide attack on a NATO convoy in Khost province on October 1, fifteen people, among them three ISAF soldiers, were killed and another 53 wounded.

In contrast to the large-scale operations prior to 2011, NATO and government forces continued to concentrate on less time- and personnel-intensive operations, making more use of precision airstrikes. For instance, security forces targeted 300 Taliban in Farah province in mid-May, leaving twenty militants and six troops dead. On June 2, government and ISAF troops conducted an operation in Helmand province, killing 26 Taliban. Some ten days later, Taliban fighters and security forces clashed in Helmand's Sangin District. NATO forces intervened with an airstrike. In the course of the incident, twenty Taliban and two members of security forces died. Beginning on September 28, dozens of police and security forces backed by ISAF soldiers conducted a six-day operation in Wardak Province, thereby killing 30 militants, including five Taliban commanders. On October 15, an ISAF airstrike in Ghazni Province killed seventeen militants, among them allegedly fifteen Pakistani nationals. In Logar Province, security forces launched an operation involving more than 1,000 troops in late December, killing numerous militants and arresting dozens more.

Provinces bordering on Pakistan, especially Kunar and Nuristan, faced major militant attacks, cross-border assaults, and frequent ISAF airstrikes [→Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. Hundreds of militants assaulted two villages in Kamdich District, Nuristan, on June 28, resulting in a gun battle between

security personnel and militants. In the course of events, an entire village was torched, six policemen, 25 militants, some of Pakistani nationality, and eight civilians were killed. In August, ISAF frequently carried out airstrikes in the eastern province of Kunar. In one such incident, an air raid killed eighteen militants in Watapur District on August 3. Four days later, twelve militants, half of them Pakistani, died in an airstrike in Marwara District. The most fatal airstrike delivered killed 52 militants in Chapa Dara District on August 18. *nho, et*

ALGERIA (AQIM, MUJAO)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: ***AQIM, MUJAO vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***system/ideology, national power***

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its splinter group Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained highly violent. In the course of the year, militants abducted at least seven civilians and one communal guard. For example, AQIM kidnapped the governor of Illizi Province on January 16. Hours later, Libyan forces freed him within their own territory.

Two bombings in January injured three soldiers and destroyed a railway track. Incidents increased at the border with Mali, especially in the course of AQIM incursions into Tamanrasset Province from Mali [→Mali (Islamist groups)]. For example, security forces clashed twice with AQIM in February, leaving one soldier and ten fighters dead. On January 2, security forces killed Mohand Ouramdane, al-Qaeda's key figure in Tizi Ouzou, together with his deputy. In Boumerdes Province, a roadside bomb detonated on February 19, killing four civilians and wounding at least nine others. Subsequently, security forces launched a large-scale operation in the area lasting until the end of the month, killing eleven AQIM fighters. On March 3, a MUJAO suicide bomber attacked police headquarters in the provincial capital Tamanrasset, injuring 24. In a helicopter-backed operation near the Malian border, the Algerian National Army (ANP) killed twenty MUJAO members on April 30. From late April to June, roadside-bombings and small-scale attacks by militant groups claimed the lives of at least fourteen security forces in Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou Provinces. On June 6, security forces killed six AQIM members in Tizi Ouzou. On June 15, some 50 fighters attacked police barracks in Ouacifs with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, killing two officers. In June, ANP conducted operations in the Kabilya region and close to the Tunisian border in Tebessa and El Oued Provinces, as a result of which at least twenty militants and two soldiers were killed. On July 23, some hundred soldiers backed by helicopters attacked a MUJAO convoy near Tinzouatine, Tamanrasset, and killed twelve militants. On August 28, air strikes killed another six MUJAO members near the Malian border. In August and October, security forces killed at least 23 AQIM members in nine separate operations in the provinces of Boumerdes, Jijel, and Tizi Ouzou. On October 18, AQIM militants forced two soldiers to leave a civilian bus and executed them. In mid-November,

ANP troops killed seven members of AQIM in Bouira and Bejaia Provinces. In December, several small clashes took place in Bouira and Boumerdes, leaving six people dead.

Throughout the year, security forces disbanded several smuggling networks and seized arms in the Sahara-Sahel desert zone. Several high level meetings and security summits including the Member States of the Arab Maghreb Union were held in Algiers in order to combine efforts against AQIM and MUJAO. Moreover, concerns arose that AQIM was cooperating with the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram [→Nigeria (Boko Haram)]. *kni*

BAHRAIN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: ***opposition groups vs. government***
 Conflict items: ***system/ideology, national power***

The conflict concerning the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and the government continued. Whereas the majority of the population as well as the protesters were comprised of Shiite Muslims, the government was mainly Sunni.

Protesters took to the streets nationwide every month, demanding a more democratic constitution, the improvement of living and working conditions, and the release of prisoners. Security forces employed tear gas, water cannons, birdshot, and sound bombs in clashes with the protesters. Fifteen protesters were killed, around 650 injured and up to 250 detained, among them leading opposition figures. One police officer died and up to fifty others were injured as protesters hurled stones, Molotov cocktails, and homemade bombs. Leading up to the anniversary of last year's February uprisings, several thousand protesters violently collided with security forces in several cities. For instance, on January 12, around 3,000 protesters clashed in Manama, riot police injuring several by firing tear gas, rubber bullets, and stun grenades. On February 4, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa promised strengthened commitment to reforms as well as the installation of a compensation fund for victims of the unrest. He further announced the implementation of the recommendations made by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, set up to investigate the protest-related violence of 2011. From February 13 to 17, thousands of protesters clashed with increased numbers of security forces. Five protesters died and up to 250 were injured. In April, tensions further intensified due to the upcoming Formula One Grand Prix to be held in Bahrain that month. Following clashes with security forces against the backdrop of the race, a protester was found dead on April 21 in a village near Manama. As another example, on April 9, protesters using petrol bombs wounded seven police officers. After Hamad had approved amendments to enhance parliament's competences on May 3, some thousand protesters demanded further constitutional reforms the following day. In the following months, clashes between protesters and security forces continued. The government, on October 30, banned all protest gatherings. Two days later, dozens of protesters demonstrating against the

ban clashed with police in Sanabis and Jidhafs. On November 7, authorities withdrew the citizenship of 31 government critics charged with undermining state security. *elu*

EGYPT (ISLAMIST GROUPS / SINAI PENINSULA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: *Takfir wal-Hijra, militant groups vs. government*

Conflict items: *secession, system / ideology*

The secession conflict, also concerning the creation of an Islamic state in the Sinai Peninsula, between Takfir wal-Hijra and other Islamist groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued in the North Sinai Governorate. Throughout the year, militants launched several attacks on security personnel. On August 5, for example, fighters stormed a checkpoint at the border with Israel near Rafah. The militants seized two armored vehicles and crossed into Israel. In an ensuing attack, the Israeli Air Force destroyed one of the vehicles. In the course of events, eight gunmen and sixteen Egyptian soldiers died. Responding to the incident, the government deployed hundreds of troops and dozens of military vehicles to the Sinai Peninsula for the first time since 1973. In subsequent operations, military forces launched airstrikes and missile strikes against suspected militants in the village of Touma on August 8, killing twenty people. Four days later, security forces killed five militants and injured six gunmen in the town of al-Ghora. In a further campaign on September 8, the army attacked militants with tanks, leaving 32 dead and destroying 31 tunnels into the Gaza Strip [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory)]. On September 16, Takfir wal-Hijra attacked the security headquarters in the city of al-Arish with mortar bombs and machine guns in order to free ten previously detained militants. The same day, militants clashed with government troops, backed by helicopters and 30 armored vehicles, in the town of Sheikh Zuweid, killing one soldier. On November 3, militants killed three police officers and wounded another in al-Arish. The following day, dozens of policemen went on strike, demanding a stronger military campaign against militants. *asm*

EGYPT (MUSLIMS–CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1952**

Conflict parties: *Muslims vs. Christians*

Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The conflict over subnational predominance between Muslims and Coptic Christians continued on a violent level. As in previous years, Coptic Christians, the largest non-Muslim minority, faced discriminatory government policies, political and economic marginalization, as well as sporadic violence, also at the hands of security forces. Following rumors about a love affair between a Copt and a Muslim woman, approx. 3,000 Muslims attacked Coptic homes and shops in Kobry-el-Sharbat, Alex-

andria, on January 27. Subsequently, traditional village elders and the local police reportedly expelled eight Coptic families. As a result of a similar scenario, a Coptic family was ordered by tribal elders, local lawmakers, and security officials to leave the town of Amriya, Kafr el-Sheikh, on March 21. On June 14, a Muslim was injured by a group of Copts in the capital of Luxor Governorate, Luxor. As a response, Muslim residents threw rocks at Copts and damaged several of their shops. On July 27, a two-day clash erupted between at least 1,000 Muslims and Copts using firebombs in the village of Dahshur, Giza, leaving a Muslim fatally wounded and forcing dozens of Coptic families to flee the village. In the course of the clashes, police forces prevented a thousand Muslims from storming the village's church. Three days later, on August 1, violent clashes between hundreds of Muslims and security forces armed with tear gas broke out again, while Muslim residents torched several Coptic homes and shops. Six people were injured. In response, the government set up a reconciliation committee and compensated affected Copts financially. On October 5, President Mohamed Mursi traveled to the Sinai Peninsula and ordered security measures tightened in Rafah, North Sinai, after an estimated fifteen Coptic families had fled in response to death threats by Islamists. On October 9, several thousand Copts, accompanied by Muslim clerics, activists, and liberal lawmakers, marched through Cairo in remembrance of the 09/10/11 military crackdown on a Coptic protest, demanding retribution against the army leaders responsible. The country's three Christian Churches withdrew from the constitutional assembly on November 16, claiming that the draft, published by the Islamist-dominated panel, would impose an Islamic state without protecting key rights of minority groups [→ Egypt (opposition groups)]. The new Coptic pope Tawadros II was elected on November 4. The absence of President Mursi during the enthronement of Pope Tawadros on November 18 led to disappointment among Copts. However, the Prime Minister Hisham Qandil attended the ceremony and President Mursi congratulated Tawadros on his installation. *skb*

EGYPT (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↓ | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: *opposition groups vs. government*

Conflict items: *system / ideology, national power*

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between several opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a violent crisis.

In the parliamentary elections on January 21, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, won 47.2 percent of the vote. On April 10, however, Cairo's Administrative Court suspended the assembly. In the wake of presidential elections, tens of thousands protested in Tahrir Square, Cairo, on April 13 and 15 against candidates with ties to the former government as well as the disqualification of opposition candidates by the Egyptian Electoral Commission. Alleged government supporters attacked protesters using rocks, clubs, Molotov cocktails, and shotguns, killing at least eleven and injuring hundreds. On May 31, the government lifted the

state of emergency after 31 years. On June 19, the government dissolved the parliament and amended the constitutional declaration of March 2011, triggering mass protests at Tahrir Square. FJP candidate Muhammad Mursi won the presidential election run-offs held June 16 to 18 with 51.73 percent of the vote. On June 30, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) handed over government control to newly elected President Muhammad Mursi.

On October 12 and 13, the government's opponents and supporters pelted each other with stones, bottles, and petrol bombs in Cairo, leaving over 120 people wounded. On November 22, Mursi issued a decree granting himself extensive powers. In response, thousands gathered in Cairo and clashed with police forces. In the governorate capital Alexandria, protesters stormed and torched FJP headquarters the following day. More than a hundred people were injured in protests across the country. Government supporters and opponents clashed on November 25 in Cairo and Damanhour, Beheira Governorate, with police forces intervening, leaving two dead and at least 60 people injured. In similar clashes throughout December, eight protesters were killed and hundreds wounded. In response, Mursi annulled the decree on December 8. After a constitutional referendum had been scheduled for December 15, violence erupted between rival factions from December 11 until 14 in Cairo, Alexandria, and Asyut, Asyut Governorate, which left at least 25 people injured by petrol bombs, shooting, clubs, and stones. In the course of clashes in Alexandria after the first round of the referendum, 32 people were injured on December 21. The next day, the second round concluded with 63.8 percent in favor of the government's proposal. *sep*

over three islands in the Persian Gulf named Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb continued on a non-violent level. During the period of observation, several Iranian politicians visited the Gulf Islands, an act which the UAE regarded as deliberate provocation. On April 11, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Abu Musa. It was the first time that an Iranian head of state had ever visited the island. The next day, the UAE recalled their ambassador from Iran's capital Tehran. In April and May, Iranian members of parliament and the commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guard also visited the three islands. The UAE cancelled a soccer match with Iran in April and three months later called upon UAE soccer clubs to no longer sign Iranian players. In September, at the UN General Assembly, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the international community to urge for the settlement of the island dispute and claimed full sovereignty over the islands. On October 9, Iranian media reported that Iran considered ending diplomatic ties with the UAE if they did not abstain from their claim of sovereignty over the three islands. The same day, the state-owned media denied that Iran took such steps into consideration. In November, in order to underline its authority over the disputed islands, Iran announced its intention to heighten its naval presence in the Gulf. *jba*

IRAN–USA, EU (NUCLEAR PROGRAM)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: *Iran vs. USA, EU*
Conflict items: *international power*

The non-violent crisis over Iran's nuclear program between Iran, on the one hand, and the USA and the EU, on the other, continued. Whereas Iran underlined that the program served civil purposes, the US, EU, and Israel suspected Iran of developing atomic weapons. The IAEA repeatedly reported on Iran's increasing capacities and progress in uranium enrichment. The US and EU imposed sanctions and the US and Israel threatened with the possibility of military strikes [→Iran - Israel]. Iran threatened in turn to close the Strait of Hormuz, an important oil shipping route. On January 23, three days after an IAEA report, US imposed sanctions on several banks, while EU member states banned all Iranian oil imports as of July 1. On February 16, Iran expressed its willingness to resume negotiations with the five members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1), led by EU chief diplomat Catherine Ashton. However, Iran continued with its uranium enrichment. Iran and the P5+1 met several times between April and July. In June, Iran offered to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for nuclear fuel with which to run its reactors, but negotiations failed. Iran subsequently announced plans to build a nuclear-powered submarine. On July 1, the US imposed new sanctions. Two days later, the Iranian parliament passed a draft bill closing the Strait of Hormuz. On November 16, the IAEA reported again that Iran had advanced its uranium enrichment pace and capacities.

In the course of the year, Iran conducted various military exercises in the Persian Gulf. As a result, The US and EU deployed warships, aircraft carriers, and mine-countermeasure ships to the Persian Gulf. Several Cyber-attacks against Iranian

IRAN (PJAK / KURDISH AREAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: *PJAK vs. government*
Conflict items: *autonomy*

The conflict in the Kurdish areas of north-western Iran between the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) and the government de-escalated, but remained violent. The PJAK was considered to be linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party [→Turkey (PKK)]. On April 25, PJAK forces killed four members of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and wounded another four near the town of Paveh, Kermanshah Province. Reports stated that PJAK fighters also suffered casualties in the clash. According to an article published on a pro-Kurdish website on May 6, three prisoners were sentenced to death by a court in the city of Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province, for membership in a Kurdish political party. *et, lto*

IRAN–UAE


Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1970**

Conflict parties: *Iran vs. UAE*
Conflict items: *territory*

The conflict between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

industrial and nuclear enrichment facilities also occurred. Iran repeatedly accused the US, Israel, France, and Germany of sabotage, espionage, and the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists. In July, Iran stated that it could hit every US base in the region. On November 1, Iranian jets opened fire on a US drone, accusing the US of violating its airspace. *flor*

IRAQ (SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS)



Conflict parties: ***AQI, ISI, Ansar al-Islam, 1920 Revolution Brigades, Sunni militant groups vs. government, Al-Sahwa militia***

Conflict items: ***system/ideology, national power***

The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni militant groups on the one hand, and the government supported by the Sahwa militia, on the other, continued. Militant Sunnis perceived their political and economic interests as well as their religious views to be underrepresented in the political system and the predominantly Shiite government. In the course of the year, the number of fatalities caused by militants slightly increased to over 4,500. Authorities frequently blamed AQI and affiliated Sunni militant groups. Many attacks took place in the predominantly Sunni provinces of Anbar, Diyala, Ninawa, and Salah ad-Din, as well as in Baghdad. Additionally, frequent attacks were carried out in the mainly Shiite provinces of Babil, Basra, and Dhi Qar, targeting religious festivities in particular. Besides Shiites, militants focused on Christian, Kurdish, and Shabak minorities.

On January 5, for instance, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) detonated five bombs in predominantly Shiite districts of Baghdad, leaving at least 24 dead and 66 wounded. The same day, a suicide bomber attacked Shiite pilgrims, killing at least 46 and injuring at least 80 in the area of al-Badha, Dhi Qar. The government had previously deployed more than 30,000 security forces to the area in order to protect pilgrims. In a further attack near Basra on January 14, militants killed 63 pilgrims and injured 130. On February 23, militant assaults in more than fifteen cities left at least 55 dead and hundreds injured. Four bombings targeted Shiites celebrating the anniversary of the death of a Shia Imam in Baghdad, killing 25 and wounding more than 70 on June 4. On the deadliest day since the US withdrawal in December 2011, militants killed a total of 93 and wounded 260 in car bomb, mortar, and suicide attacks in all provinces affected by the conflict on June 13. Both civilians and security forces were among the fatalities. One bomb hit the headquarters of the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani. Three days later, ISI claimed responsibility for the attacks. The same day, two car bombs targeting Shiite pilgrims in Baghdad killed 32 and wounded 68. On July 3, militants set off a huge truck bomb in a popular market in Diwaniya, Qasidiyah province, leaving 40 people dead and 75 wounded. After AQI had announced an offensive, militants killed at least 107

people and wounded 268 others in some 40 bomb and gun attacks in Baghdad, among other places, as well as in the predominantly Kurdish cities of Mosul and Kirkuk on July 23. Between August and December, militants orchestrated numerous large-scale coordinated attacks mainly on Shiites in several provinces on a monthly basis. Each assault left dozens dead and wounded.

Militants also frequently targeted security forces, politicians, and other public figures. On January 15, at least six gunmen stormed a police station in Ramadi, Anbar, and detonated three explosive belts. The explosions and the subsequent fight with police officers left ten dead and eighteen wounded. On March 5, AQI gunmen, posing as special forces, detained and killed two senior officers and attacked several security checkpoints in Haditha, Anbar. In the course of events, 27 policemen and three assailants died. On June 13, a twin bomb blast in the city of Hilla, Babil, targeted a restaurant frequented by policemen, killing 21 people. In a prison break in Tikrit on September 27, militants set off a car bomb in front of the main gate and took temporarily control of the prison. At least twelve security forces were killed and 65 wounded, while 47 suspected AQI members and 43 other inmates escaped. On November 6, militants targeted recruits waiting outside an army base in Taji, Baghdad, with a car bomb, killing at least 27 and injuring 40. *val*

ISRAEL (AL-FATAH–HAMAS)



Conflict parties: ***al-Fatah vs. Hamas***

Conflict items: ***system/ideology, subnational predominance***

The dispute between the secular Palestinian National Liberation Movement (al-Fatah) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) over system and subnational predominance in the Palestinian Territories continued. The conflict revolved around the reconciliation process and the formation of a unity government. On February 6, al-Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal signed an accord in Doha, Qatar, over the creation of an interim government run by Abbas which would oversee the formation of a unity government. Consequently, the parties issued a statement to the effect that an interim government line-up would be announced by February 18. In the following weeks, both parties repeatedly met, but did not bring the agreement into effect. Furthermore, Hamas named several terms that should be fulfilled before fully consenting to the agreement. Amidst paused talks, supporters of both parties gathered at a demonstration in Nablus on March 22, emphasizing their longing for unification. On March 30, security services in Gaza reportedly arrested some 80 al-Fatah members. On May 20, a further agreement was signed in Cairo, Egypt, as part of the broader reconciliation pact intended to bring both parties closer to joint elections. On May 28, Hamas allowed the Central Elections Committee to start updating the voters' lists. One week later, senior leaders from both sides met to discuss nominations for prime minister of the interim government. On July 2, however, Hamas stopped voter-registration in Gaza in protest against anti-Hamas security measures

by al-Fatah in the West Bank. Hamas also boycotted the municipal elections in the West Bank on October 20, which marked a victory for al-Fatah despite a low turnout. Hamas and al-Fatah announced mutual solidarity as well as efforts to stage reconciliation-meetings in the course of the war in Gaza commencing November 14 [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory)]. On November 25, Hamas consequently announced its intention to release all al-Fatah prisoners. ema

ISRAEL (HAMAS ET AL. / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: *Hamas, PRC, PIJ, Army of Islam vs. government*

Conflict items: *secession, system / ideology*

The conflict over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and other Islamist militant groups operating in Gaza, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued at the level of a limited war. Hamas and other militants repeatedly launched Qassam rocket attacks on the Southern District throughout the year, with a peak in launches in November, prompting a massive Israeli air offense. In mid-February, militants fired five rockets into Israel without causing injury or damage, after which Israel retaliated by striking several targets in Gaza. On February 18, Israeli helicopters attacked members of the al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Hamas movement, wounding seven Palestinians. In March, the fighting intensified as militants fired hundreds of rockets at Israel. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted some twenty airstrikes against rocket launching cells and militants, killing 24 Palestinians and wounding 68. Among the dead was the Popular Resistance Committee's (PRC) leader, Zuhair Qaisi. On March 12, both sides agreed to a ceasefire mediated by Egypt.

In June, hostilities erupted again when militants fired at least 300 rockets into southern Israel over the course of several days in response to Israeli air attacks on militant targets. At least fifteen Palestinians and militants linked to a Salafi group sympathetic to al-Qaeda died in various air attacks, while five Israelis were wounded. On June 18, militants killed one Israeli worker with a roadside bomb along the border to Egypt. A few hours later, Israeli forces shot two militants allegedly involved in the attack. Later on, a truce mediated by Egypt was unofficially declared, however this was broken by repeated rocket fire and retaliatory strikes. On September 5, militants fired several rockets into Israel, prompting an air strike that killed three of the militants. A day later, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) attacked militants attempting to place a bomb on the Gaza border, leaving three dead. During October rocket fire intensified once more. On October 8, militants fired over 50 rockets into Israel, while the IDF responded with air strikes and tank fire, wounding five Palestinians. On October 24, 80 rockets and mortar shells fired by militants hit the western Negev, severely wounding two Israeli workers. The same day, an Israeli airstrike on the Gaza Strip killed four Palestinians and injured ten others. A truce was agreed upon a day later.

In November, the heaviest fighting broke out since "Operation Cast Lead" in 2008. On November 10, four soldiers were injured in their jeep by an anti-tank missile fired from the Gaza Strip. The IDF retaliated with tank fire and helicopter strikes, killing four Palestinians and injuring at least 25 others. A day later, militants fired a barrage of approx. one hundred rockets into Israel, wounding three people.

On November 14, the IAF killed Hamas Military Chief Ahmed al-Jabari. Consequently, Palestinian militant groups fired more than 1,500 rockets at Israel within seven days, damaging homes, schools, and other civilian areas, killing five Israelis and wounding another 240. Some rockets reached the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem areas for the first time since the Gulf War of 1991. In response, IDF launched "Operation Pillar of Defense" with the main goal of disempowering militants and their infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. In the course of the operation, IDF attacked more than 1,500 targets, including command centers, weapon-manufacturing and storage facilities and approx. one thousand underground rocket launchers. At least 160 Palestinians were killed, with another 1,235 people wounded. On November 21, Egypt announced that a cease-fire had been reached. The truce largely held, despite an attack on a central Tel Aviv bus on the same day that resulted in 28 people being injured. It was the first such attack in the city since 2006. Two days later, police arrested a man allegedly connected to the Hamas and Islamic Jihad militant groups. hl

ISRAEL (PNA / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: *Palestinian National Authority vs. government*

Conflict items: *secession, system / ideology, resources*

The conflict between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the government centering on the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state continued. There were no serious attempts to resume peace talks and return to negotiations and the government continued to expand settlements in the West Bank. On June 6, for instance, the government announced the building of 851 new homes, which PNA condemned as prejudicing the final status issue. In reaction to massive Palestinian protest, PNA President Mahmoud Abbas canceled a planned meeting with Vice Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz regarding means of resuming peace talks on June 29. On November 29, the UN General Assembly recognized Palestine with a majority vote as a non-member state. Consequently, the government announced the building of 3,000 new housing units across the West Bank and decided to seize PNA tax revenues.

Throughout the year, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted arrests across the West Bank on a regular basis. The number of arrests increased while the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, houses, and villages in areas under governmental control continued unabated. On February 21, Palestinian prisoner Khader Adnan ended a 66-day hunger strike against his violent arrest and conditions of detention. His release on April 17 triggered a mass hunger strike of up to 2,500 other Pales-

tinians in Israeli prisons, which only ended on May 15 after both parties had reached a deal. On March 27, IDF conducted a raid in Rammun. According to government sources, they shot and injured three Palestinians, one of them fatally, after being attacked with knives. Three days later, Palestinians protesting against the expropriation of land in the occupied territories clashed with IDF during demonstrations across the West Bank. In the course of further widespread Palestinian demonstrations demanding the right to return for refugees, IDF injured over 80 protesters in clashes on May 15.

Between November 15 and 21, the war in Gaza sparked solidarity demonstrations across the West Bank [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory), Israel (al-Fatah - Hamas)]. In order to disperse these protests, IDF fired live ammunition, killing three protesters and injuring 65 more, detaining 120 others in turn. On December 6, some 250 Palestinian residents of Hebron attacked IDF forces with stones after the attempted arrest of a PNA policeman, injuring one soldier. In turn, IDF fired rubber bullets and threw stun grenades and tear gas, wounding twenty Palestinians. On December 12, IDF shot dead a Palestinian at a checkpoint near Hebron. His death under such controversial circumstances led to mass protests with thousands of participants. Demonstrators threw stones and bottles at the locally deployed soldiers, who responded with tear gas and rubber bullets, leaving five Palestinians injured. *eol*

JORDAN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *IAF, Salafists, opposition groups vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology*

The conflict between various opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the newly established National Front for Reform, and the government over the political system continued. Throughout the year, large demonstrations protesting against socioeconomic shortcomings and demanding democratic reforms took place in the capital Amman and other cities. The largest protests occurred on March 31 in Amman where police reportedly beat protesters, on October 5, with up to 15,000 participants, and on November 30, attracting some 7,000 demonstrators, respectively. On October 4, King Abdullah II dissolved parliament and later scheduled new elections for 2013, the first to be held under a newly amended election law. While the law included several concessions such as parliamentary election of the prime minister and the casting of an additional ballot for a party list, the opposition declared the reforms to be insufficient.

On November 13, the government announced the lifting of fuel subsidies. The measure sparked mass protests targeting the king himself on an unprecedented level during the following week. Several thousands took to the streets in all twelve governorates, police temporarily detaining some 150 protesters. Hours after the announcement, some 500 demonstrators hurled stones at riot police aiming to prevent a sit-in near the interior ministry in central Amman, also setting tires and garbage containers ablaze. Police fired tear gas in response. In Salt, Balqa Governorate, dozens of protesters demanding the prime

minister's resignation tried to storm his residence. However, riot police using tear gas and water cannons broke up the rally. In the governorate capital of Maan, demonstrators shot in the air during a confrontation with riot police, wounding one officer. Gatherings remained violent the next day when protesters armed with automatic weapons stormed police stations in Irbid and Amman's Shafa Badran suburb, injuring thirteen policemen, one of them fatally. One of the assailants also died in an ensuing firefight with security forces and another four demonstrators were wounded. Protesters smashed shop windows and torched buildings in the governorate capitals of Karak and Tafila, and a civil affairs office in Salt. Several protesters burned pictures of Abdullah II and called for the government's resignation. After the rioting had subsided, the conflict de-escalated and there were no violent outbreaks until the end of the year. *asu*

KUWAIT (BEDOUNS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: *Bedouns vs. government*

Conflict items: *other*

The conflict between Bedouns, stateless Arabs, demanding civil rights and citizenship and the government continued. Meaning "without", the Arabic word "bedoun" is used to designate those without nationality within Kuwait. Although the government warned Bedouns that participants of demonstrations would forfeit their chances of naturalization, Bedouns protested in al-Jahra Governorate, mainly in the cities of Taima' and Sulaibiya, over the course of the year. Security forces repeatedly dispersed demonstrations using batons, tear gas, water cannons, sound, and smoke bombs. For instance, on January 6, at least 4,000 Bedouns demonstrated, holding Kuwaiti flags and pictures of Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah aloft. One week later, security forces dispersed a demonstration of approx. 2,000 Bedouns, wounding several and arresting more than 50. Bedouns in turn threw stones, wounding up to 21 policemen. On October 2, hundreds of Bedouns protested in Taima'. Police forces broke up the demonstration, injuring at least two protesters and arresting 23. In the course of the year, some 230 Bedouns were charged with staging illegal demonstrations. The government made some concessions and announced the possible naturalization of thousands of Bedouns, though this did not satisfy the protesters. *sul*

KUWAIT (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: *opposition movement vs. government*

Conflict items: *system/ideology, national power*

A violent crisis between the opposition movement and the government erupted. The opposition demanded democratic reforms, especially an elected prime minister and the legalization of political parties, as well as an end to corruption. Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah's decrees of Decem-

ber 2011, which dissolved parliament and announced new elections respectively, were declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court on June 20. Therefore, the parliamentary elections held on February 2, in which the opposition had gained a majority, were also rendered invalid. The court dissolved the new parliament and reinstated its predecessor. Until mid-October, thousands of protesters staged demonstrations against the ruling and the government's plans to change the electoral law.

Violence erupted for the first time on October 15. When about 5,000 citizens started marching near the National Assembly in Kuwait City, security forces beat demonstrators with batons, injuring at least four and arresting just as many others. Protesters threw stones and bottles, wounding several policemen. Four days later, the emir announced new elections on December 1 and altered the election law by decree. Claiming that the reform put them at a disadvantage, the opposition called for a boycott of the forthcoming poll. On October 21, more than 20,000 protested in Kuwait City. Security forces using rubber bullets, tear gas, stun grenades, and batons clashed with the demonstrators. Eleven policemen and scores of protesters were wounded, and more than fifteen arrested. Subsequently, the government forbade gatherings of more than twenty people. On October 31, security forces attacked some 2,000 protesters demonstrating against the detention of leading opposition figure Mussallam al-Barrak next to Central Prison in Sulaibiya, al-Jahra Governorate. According to the government, the rioters blocked streets and assaulted police forces with stones and bottles. Furthermore, drivers tried to run over members of the special forces, injuring five. On November 3, the government announced its intention to make use of all necessary means to prevent the opposition from staging unauthorized protests. The next day, however, several thousand citizens protested in Mischref, Hawally Governorate. Intervening security forces arrested up to 70 people and injured around eighteen demonstrators. Protests continued both before and after the December 1 elections, which were boycotted by the opposition. sul

LEBANON (MARCH 14 ALLIANCE - MARCH 8 ALLIANCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: *March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance*
 Conflict items: *system / ideology, national power*

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance, led by the Future Movement and the Christian Lebanese Forces, on the one hand, and the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance, mainly consisting of Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Amal Movement, on the other, continued. In the course of the conflict, groups of Salafis also engaged in fights against Hezbollah.

On February 2, the UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon announced that the trial investigating the murder of former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri would be held in absence of the accused Hezbollah members. In July, the starting date for the trial was set for March 2013. Clashes between government supporters, mostly Alawites, and opponents, mainly

Sunni Muslims, intensified especially in Tripoli in the course of increasing spillover effects of the civil war in neighboring Syria [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. On February 10, hundreds demonstrated against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Tripoli, North Lebanon, and clashed with Assad supporters. In ensuing fights between Sunnis and Alawites, two were killed and at least eight injured, including several soldiers. In the aftermath of an assassination attempt on Lebanese Forces Party leader Samir Geagea on April 4, the coalition accused March 8 of the attack. Throughout May, Alawites and Sunnis repeatedly clashed in Tripoli, using guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Between May 12 and 14, fighting erupted after the arrest of a prominent Sunni cleric, leaving five people dead and twenty injured. Appeals from the army and politicians, as well as religious leaders, to bring an end to the fighting failed.

On May 20, soldiers killed an anti-Assad cleric at a Lebanese army checkpoint in Akkar, North Governorate. Subsequently, protestors blocked roads in Akkar. Ensuing clashes between the Future Movement and the pro-Syrian Arab Movement Party in Beirut left three dead and eighteen injured. After a two-day struggle between Sunnis and Alawites involving assault rifles, grenades, machine guns, and mortar bombs which left fourteen dead and 52 wounded, the government reinforced its troops in Tripoli on June 3. Nevertheless, clashes between Sunnis and Alawites from August 20 to 24 involving gun and grenade fire claimed the lives of at least fifteen people and wounded a further 120, among these eleven soldiers. On October 19, Wissam al-Hassan, a March 14-affiliated head of a branch of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, and eight other individuals were killed in a car bomb attack in Beirut. March 14 accused the March 8 Alliance and the Syrian government of responsibility. The same day, Prime Minister Najib Mikati offered to resign from office as March 14 had repeatedly demanded. President Michel Suleiman, however, rejected the proposal. In the following days, March 14 supporters held demonstrations condemning the bombing, but were dispersed by army gunfire, wounding two demonstrators. Further fighting between the groups in Tripoli left three more people dead on October 20. As a result of the fatal clashes in Beirut and Tripoli, the army increased its presence. By the end of October, March 14 announced its intent to use all necessary legal means to bring down the government. On November 12, four people were killed and seven wounded in fighting between Hezbollah members and supporters of Salafi leader Ahmad al-Assir in Sidon, South Governorate. The killing of 21 Lebanese Sunni fighters in Homs, Syria, in late November sparked new clashes between Sunni and Alawite gunmen in Tripoli. The confrontations lasted for two days and left at least six people dead as well as dozens injured by December 6. rl, yal

LIBYA (FEDERALISTS / CYRENAICA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: *government vs. Congress of the People of Cyrenaica and other federalists*
 Conflict items: *autonomy, system / ideology*

A violent conflict over autonomy and the orientation of the

political system erupted between pro-federalist forces in the eastern region of Cyrenaica and the central government. After past year's downfall of Muammar al-Qaddafi, Cyrenaicans demanded the National Transitional Council (NTC) to reintroduce the constitution of 1951 that had granted autonomy to the three regions of Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania. On March 6, about 3,000 delegates gathered for the Congress of the People of Cyrenaica in Benghazi. They declared the creation of a semi-autonomous region of Cyrenaica and formed a Supreme Transitional Council under Sheikh Ahmed al-Zubair al-Senussi. The leader of the NTC, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, announced afterwards that the interim government would defend the unity of Libya, even with force. However, Jalil called on Cyrenaican leaders to join a dialog about preserving national unity on March 7 and clarified that he did not intend to use military force against pro-federalists. On March 16, a week after demonstrations against federalism in Tripoli and Benghazi, federalists and anti-federalists clashed in Benghazi, leaving five people injured. On May 3, the Supreme Transitional Council called for a boycott of the following month's constituent assembly elections, rejecting the transition plan set out by the interim authorities. Pro-federalists blocked the main highway between Tripoli and Benghazi before the national poll, demanding an even number of seats for all three regions. About 300 pro-federalists stormed election offices in Benghazi as well as in Tobruk, burned election material and destroyed computers. The next day, pro-federalists blocked several oil ports to protest against the election, cutting approx. half of the country's oil exporting capacity. On July 5, the NTC passed a law granting equal representation for all Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica regions in the constituent authority. During the elections for the General National Congress, approx. a thousand people demonstrated in Benghazi, demanding more autonomy. *aje*

18 to stop the fighting, but they met with limited success. Ultimately, negotiations between tribal elders temporarily ended major fighting. More than 130 people were killed and half of the city's population was displaced. On March 26, clashes erupted in Sabha between former rebel fighters from Sabha and gunmen from the Tibu tribe. The government sent approx. 3,000 soldiers to the area. Two days later, the fighters negotiated a temporary ceasefire but fighting broke out again. Subsequently, tribe representatives and government officials, among them Prime Minister Abdurraheem al-Keib, brokered a new ceasefire. Within one week of fighting, some 150 people had reportedly died and approx. 400 people were injured.

From April 2 to 6 in the Western town of Zuwarah, al-Nuqat al-Khams, members of the Berber ethnic minority, who had opposed Qaddafi in 2011, clashed with members of the Arab settlements of al-Jumail and Regdalin, some of whom had backed the former leader. Fighting included large caliber weapons and left at least eighteen people dead and hundreds injured.

On June 12, members of the El-Mashasha tribe, a militia formerly loyal to Qaddafi, and rebel fighters of Zintan clashed southwest of Tripoli for three days, using heavy weapons, such as Grad rockets, and caused at least fourteen fatalities. A few days later, the army sent troops to intervene. Breaking a previously negotiated ceasefire, the incessant violence caused over 100 casualties. Subsequently, the area was declared a military zone. On August 23, heavy clashes between the rival tribes al-Haly and al-Fawatra occurred near Zlitan, leaving three people dead and eight injured. On December 17, the government announced emergency law in the southern regions Ghadames, Ghat, Obari, Al-Shati, Sebha, Murzuq, and Kufra.

Besides tribal violence, rival militias clashed several times throughout the year. For instance, on June 4, hundreds of al-Awfeia Brigade members drove on approx. 60 armed pickup trucks onto the tarmac of Tripoli's International Airport, bringing air traffic to a halt. Subsequently, clashes broke out when militia groups from Tripoli and Zintan arrived at the site, allegedly trying to convince them to lay down their weapons. *sel*

LIBYA (INTER-FACTIONAL VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: *Warffallah tribe vs. Zwai vs. Tibu tribe vs. Berber ethnic groups vs. Ethnic Arab settlements vs. El-Mashasha tribe vs. al-Fawatra tribe et al.*

Conflict items: *subnational predominance, resources, other*

Following the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi, a highly violent conflict over subnational predominance, the orientation of the political system and resources erupted both between tribes and militias as well as within the respective factions. On one side, tensions arose due to old rivalries, on the other side they were closely connected to the fact that the conflict parties had stood on opposing sides in the 2011 civil war (→Libya (opposition)). During 2011, the availability of weaponry for militant groups increased significantly. Several militant groups repeatedly used heavy weapons in the course of the year.

On February 13, clashes over control of territory between gunmen from the Zwai tribe and members of the Tibu ethnic group began in the city of Al Kufrah. In response to the ongoing clashes, the government sent the national army on February

LIBYA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: *opposition vs. government*

Conflict items: *system / ideology, national power*

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups and the National Transitional Council (NTC) de-escalated to a limited war. On the one hand, supporters of former ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi, killed on 10/20/2011, tried to regain national power. On the other hand, protesters repeatedly demanded democratic reforms and more transparency concerning the government's work. In July, the NTC transferred power to the General National Congress (GNC).

Former Qaddafi supporters frequently targeted governmental buildings and officials, while the government conducted several military operations in return. The areas most affected were the districts of Benghazi, Tripoli, al-Jabal al-Gharbi, as well as Bani Walid, a former stronghold of al-Qaddafi in Misrata district.

On May 13, an armed group killed Khaled Abu Saleh in Ob-

ari, the capital of Wadi al-Hayaa district, after he had registered as candidate for the national assembly elections. On August 19, three car bombs exploded near governmental buildings in Tripoli, killing at least two people and injuring several others. Subsequently, authorities arrested 32 Qaddafi loyalists. On September 25, the government issued a ten-day ultimatum, which requested Qaddafi loyalists to hand over the murderers of Omar Shaban who had given away Qaddafi's hideout in October 2011. After the ultimatum had expired, pro-government militias and Qaddafi loyalists clashed on October 8. Three combatants were killed and seven injured.

Throughout the year, pro-Qaddafi militias repeatedly announced that Bani Walid was under their control. In response, on October 18, the government sent several thousand troops to lay siege to the city in order to oust Qaddafi loyalists from the city with the help of pro-government militias and tribal fighters. Both rocket-propelled grenades and anti-aircraft weapons were used during the fighting. The clashes killed at least 26 people, injured hundreds and forced tens of thousands to flee. By October 24, the army had seized control of the city.

Throughout the year, protesters demanded further democratic reforms, safer living conditions, and the dismissal of the representatives of the former government [→ Libya (interfactual violence)]. Additionally, they protested against continuous violent clashes.

On January 21, for instance, hundreds of protesters demanded more transparency from the NTC and the discharge of former Qaddafi officials in Benghazi. A crowd of protesters threw stones and metal bars at NTC headquarters, prompting security forces to fire teargas. *kae*

MOROCCO (POLISARIO / WESTERN SAHARA)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: **POLISARIO vs. government**
Conflict items: **secession**

The conflict over the secession of Western Sahara between the Popular Front of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) and the government de-escalated. The ninth round of unofficial UN-brokered negotiations between POLISARIO and the government was held in Manhasset, USA, between March 11 and 13. Delegations from Algeria and Mauritania were also present. The talks ended at an impasse, both sides continuing to reject the other's respective proposals concerning future negotiations. In contrast to the government offering Western Sahara autonomy, POLISARIO insisted on a referendum in the region, including the option of independence. However, both parties reiterated their willingness to collaborate with the UN and initiated talks over de-mining, natural resources, and the environment. On April 30, the UN Security Council extended the MINURSO mandate for another year. While the government had blamed UN Western Sahara Envoy Christopher Ross of being partial, the latter met with the foreign minister in Rabat, on October 27. Subsequently, Ross conferred with POLISARIO representatives. POLISARIO activist Aminatou Haidar accused police of beating and threa-

tening her on November 1. Authorities, however, denied these assertions. On November 28, Ross declared the UN-brokered unofficial negotiations to have terminated, as they had not yielded any results. Instead, he would consult the conflict parties separately, as well as neighboring states. In its resolution of December 19, the UN Security Council expressed its support for the negotiation process. *shr*


SAUDI ARABIA (SHIITES)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: **Shiites vs. government**
Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between Shiites and the Sunni government continued. Violent protests and attacks on security forces took place in the Shiite-dominated Eastern Province. Main subjects of Shiite protest remained the call for political reforms, the end of sectarian discrimination, and the release of political detainees. Over the year, security forces killed up to thirteen protesters, wounded up to 29, and detained at least twenty. On January 12, Shiites demonstrated in the town of Awamiya, Qatif region. Police forces opened fire, killing one demonstrator and wounding another three, while protesters threw stones and petrol bombs. During demonstrations in the towns of Qatif and Awamiya on February 9 and 10, police forces killed one protester in each case. On July 8, security forces detained the Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, causing a protest which left two demonstrators dead. While activists claimed the protesters had been shot by police, the interior ministry denied any confrontation. Up to 300 Shiites protested in Qatif on July 27, demanding the release of the detained cleric. Protesters blocked roads and threw Molotov cocktails. In turn, police forces arrested several Shiites. According to protesters, security forces opened fire and wounded fourteen demonstrators, which was denied by officials. On July 13, four Shiites attacked a police station in Awamiya with Molotov cocktails and small arms. Police fired back and claimed to have killed one attacker, who Shia sources stated was a non-participant. On August 3, four Shiites opened fire on a police patrol in Qatif, killing one soldier and wounding another. Security forces fired back, killing one attacker, wounding another and arresting the survivors. Seven days later in the same town, a bystander was killed when a police patrol came under fire, allegedly from Shiites. Security forces conducted a raid in Awamiya, killing three Shiites on September 26. Another demonstration took place in Qatif region on December 27. Police fired upon demonstrators, killing one and wounding six. *cwi*

SYRIA (KURDISH GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1962**

Conflict parties: **KDPS, PYD vs. government**
Conflict items: **autonomy, subnational predominance**

The crisis between the Kurdish Democratic Party Syria (KDPS),

the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and their militia Popular Protection Unit (YPG), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, over cultural and political autonomy turned violent.

Since September 2011, anti-government protesters in predominantly Kurdish regions called to a greater extent for cultural and political rights [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. On March 12, tens of thousands commemorated the 2004 Qamishli revolts in numerous towns in the governorates of Aleppo and al-Hasakah. Security forces dispersed demonstrators using batons and tear gas, while those demonstrating responded by throwing stones. On March 30, police attacked Kurdish demonstrators calling for autonomy rights in al-Ashrafiyah, Aleppo. Protests took place in Qamishli and later in Amouda, both in al-Hasakah, on April 26 over the arrest of a YPG member by security forces the previous day. The rallies were dispersed with batons and tear gas and resulted in the arrest of two demonstrators. In response, PYD took three members of security forces hostage, who were later exchanged for all three detainees. On May 11, in the course of nationwide anti-government demonstrations, Kurdish activists marched in support of the Kurds of Aleppo while explicitly rejecting the strong Islamic context of protests in other areas [→ Syria (opposition groups); Syria (NC-KSC)]. Security forces violently dispersed Kurdish protests in Qudurbak, al-Hasakah. On June 8, Kurdish protesters in al-Hasakah and Aleppo called for an autonomous administration. In Ruknuddin, Rif Dimashq Governorate, security forces attacked demonstrators erecting roadblocks.


In June and July, YPG erected numerous armed checkpoints in al-Hasakah. Between July 19 and 21, PYD and YPG forces took control over cities in Aleppo and al-Hasakah, such as Ain al-Arab, Amouda, Afrin, and al-Malikiyah. Since government forces withdrew from the area, no major clashes have occurred. In Qamishli, however, government forces attacked YPG members and Kurdish protesters on July 21, killing one and leaving two injured. YPG responded by firing gunshots at the security forces, injuring one. The same day, security forces fired into a crowd of demonstrators in al-Malikiyah and killed one activist. In the course of the city's occupation, PYD and security forces exchanged fire and the latter regained control over all intelligence service headquarters, leaving one YPG fighter dead. On November 13, YPG forces and thousands of al-Malikiyah residents stormed the local intelligence headquarters and the city directorate. Security forces and officials reportedly fled the city after the exchange of fire at army checkpoints captured by YPG.

mki

tion of the political system continued. The opposition was led by the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the latter mainly consisting of defected soldiers. In November, various opposition groups including SNC and FSA united behind the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC), which was recognized by most Arab League countries, Western states, and the EU as the sole representative of the Syrian people. According to UN reports, approx. 60,000 people have been killed since the beginning of the uprising in March 2011, including over 13,000 members of security forces. This marked a substantial increase in the overall number of fatalities. By the end of the year, more than 500,000 refugees were registered in Egypt and all other neighboring countries with the exception of Israel. Approx. 2.3 million were left internally displaced this year. Throughout the year, mass anti-government protests continued to take place across the country, often violently dispersed by government forces.

In January, heavy fighting occurred in the governorates of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Dara'a, Dimasq, and Idlib. On January 22, for instance, Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) attacked opposition-held areas in the capital Damascus with tanks. Ensuing clashes left up to 60 people dead. Between January 24 and 27, at least 130 people were killed when SAF shelled districts of Homs, which remained at the center of fighting for several weeks. Security forces launched an offensive, killing at least 100 people on February 4 alone and bombarding the Baba Amr district for 27 consecutive days until March 1. Meanwhile, military assaults on Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib killed scores throughout February. SAF attacks on Homs continued in March, leaving at least 250 people dead. Security forces intensified their attacks in Idlib on March 7, eventually forcing FSA to retreat from the area. Skirmishing, however, continued. On March 14, SAF resumed its attack on Dara'a, killing seven defectors and thirteen civilians. Air strikes hit Hama for seventeen consecutive days. Prolonged clashes between FSA and security forces also occurred in Aleppo and Damascus. Heavy shelling in Hama, Homs, and Idlib killed some 660 FSA fighters throughout April. In an increasing number of bomb attacks upon urban centers, more than 100 civilians died in May. Twenty SAF soldiers were killed in ambushes in Aleppo and Damascus on May 2. In Rastan, Homs, FSA clashed with security forces on May 14, leaving at least 23 soldiers dead. SAF in turn assaulted Souran, Hama, killing 34 people on May 20. Some ten days later, SAF launched an offensive backed by tanks and helicopters to recapture the Atareb area, Aleppo. In the course of fighting, twenty soldiers, six opposition fighters, and six civilians were killed. The execution of 108 residents of al-Houla, Homs, on May 25, sparked international outrage and caused the expulsion of diplomats from several Western countries. According to UN reports, the killings were conducted by the pro-government al-Shabbiha militia. On June 4 and 5, FSA fighters attacked military vehicles with automatic weapons and grenades in Idlib and Damascus, killing up to 100 soldiers. Throughout the month, dozens of combatants died in heavy fighting, mainly in the governorates of Homs, Idlib, Aleppo, Dara'a, and Rif Dimashq. On June 21, SAF conducted simultaneous operations including bombing of opposition-held areas in Homs, Hama, Deir al-Zor, Idlib, and Dara'a, killing up to 114 civilians. Between July 15

SYRIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)



Conflict parties: *opposition groups vs. government*
 Conflict items: *system / ideology, national power*

The war between the opposition and the government of President Bashar al-Assad over national power and the orienta-

and 17, clashes involving thousands of combatants and heavy weaponry left at least 75 dead in Damascus. On July 18, a bomb attack targeting the national security headquarters killed four high-ranking officials, including Defense Minister Dawoud Rajiha. FSA and the Islamist group Liwa al-Islam claimed responsibility. The next day, FSA fighters seized for the first time border crossings into Iraq and Turkey. Meanwhile, SAF repeatedly bombarded Damascus, killing dozens. By the end of the month, thousands of troops and FSA fighters were involved in clashes in the city of Aleppo involving helicopters and rocket-propelled grenades. With approx. 5,000 casualties, August was the month with the highest death toll since March 2011. Government forces increasingly relied upon airstrikes, thereby concentrating on Damascus, Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, and Deir al-Zor. Some 3,500 refugees crossed into Turkey in mid-August. Clashes in Aleppo continued, leaving at least 70 people dead on August 7. An airstrike on nearby Azaz nine days later killed 40. From August 20 to 22, SAF attacked opposition-held areas in Damascus with helicopter gunships and tanks, killing 128 people. In ensuing clashes involving hundreds of soldiers, tanks, and warplanes, at least 157 people had died by August 29. In a siege on Daraya, Rif Dimashq, security forces allegedly killed up to 400 residents in mass executions and tank shelling. Over 250,000 fled their homes. In September, clashes in Aleppo left at least 200 dead and destroyed the UNESCO-protected ancient city. On September 27, some 6,000 opposition forces launched a three-day assault on government positions. Ensuing clashes and bombardment killed at least 60 people. In al-Raqqa, an airstrike killed up to 54 civilians on September 20. SAF repeatedly shelled suburbs of Damascus, killing hundreds. In early October, 30,000 additional soldiers were deployed to Aleppo. On October 15, FSA shot down a MIG fighter jet using an anti-aircraft gun. In Damascus, a FSA ambush killed 21 soldiers on October 4. Heavy fighting for the strategically important Maarat al-Numaan, Idlib, had left up to 200 combatants and civilians dead by October 12. At least 500 people died in clashes across the country between October 26 and 29. In November, FSA launched an offensive in regions bordering upon Turkey and Iraq. On November 1, assaults on army checkpoints in Idlib left 28 soldiers and five rebels dead. Two days later, FSA attacked the Taftanaz airbase, used to conduct airstrikes on Idlib. On November 8, FSA seized Ras al-Ain, al-Hasakah, killing eighteen soldiers. A SAF counterattack, backed by helicopters, forced some 9,000 residents to flee and sparked tensions between FSA and Kurdish militias [→ Syria (NC – KSC)]. FSA captured a military airport and an army base in Deir al-Zor in late November. Airstrikes continued, killing dozens of opposition fighters in Damascus on November 21 alone. SAF attacked opposition-held suburbs of Damascus with fighter jets and heavy rocket fire on December 2, killing at least ten. Heavy fighting continued across the country and caused hundreds of civilian casualties. On December 23, an air strike in Halfaya, Hama, killed up to 200 civilians.

International efforts to mediate failed due to discord in the UN Security Council. On February 23, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed UN-Arab League special envoy to Syria. He resigned on August 2, arguing that the lack of unity in the UN Security Council, the violation of

a ceasefire, and ongoing militarization in Syria had undermined his role. On August 17, the former Algerian minister of foreign affairs, Lakhdar Brahimi, had been appointed Annan's successor. A four-day truce negotiated by Brahimi started on October 26 was violated by both parties on the same day. A UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) established on April 21 ended on August 19.

Violence repeatedly affected neighboring countries, causing dozens of foreign casualties. Lebanese supporters of both the government of al-Assad and NC frequently clashed throughout the year [→ Lebanon (March 8 – March 14)]. On July 7, security forces in pursuit of opposition fighters fired mortar shells into northern Lebanon, leaving five residents dead. In a similar attack on October 3, SAF artillery fire hit Akcakale, Turkey, killing five civilians. Turkey responded with cross-border shelling [→ Syria – Turkey]. In November, stray bullets repeatedly struck the Golan Heights, provoking Israeli artillery fire [→ Syria – Israel].

yal, ghe, mki

SYRIA–ISRAEL

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: **Syria vs. Israel**
 Conflict items: **territory, international power, resources**

The conflict between Syria and Israel over international power and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights continued.

On May 2, the Israeli parliament approved a request from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to summon sixteen additional reserve battalions in case of unrest at the border as a result of the war in Syria [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. In early May, Israeli Minister for Energy and Water Uzi Landau decided to renew oil drilling permits on the Golan Heights. On May 13, the Syrian state media condemned the decision as a violation of international law. On June 5, the Jordanian media claimed that Syria was moving hundreds of long-range Scud missile launchers towards its borders with Israel and Turkey [→ Syria - Turkey]. Israeli officials expressed their concerns about increased Syrian arms transfers and the proliferation of chemical weapons to the Lebanese Hezbollah, calling the latter a red line for Israel [→ Israel (Hezbollah)].

On July 19, Syrian armed forces in pursuit of opposition fighters entered the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the Golan Heights near the village of Jubata al-Khashab, Quneitra Governorate, with 500 soldiers and 50 vehicles [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. In response, Israel filed a formal complaint with the UN Security Council on July 22. Syrian mortar shells aimed at rebel forces hit the DMZ on September 25 and November 8. On November 3, three Syrian tanks entered the DMZ. In all cases, Israel complained to UNDOF. In response to mortar shells fired in the course of Syrian intrastate fighting which hit the ground near an IDF post in the DMZ on November 11, Israel fired a guided missile into Syria. The next day, IDF fired tank shells at the assumed source of firing, claiming direct hits. Again on November 17, Syrian gunfire spilled over into the DMZ. Israel responded with artillery fire the following day.

mki

SYRIA – TURKEY

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1946**

Conflict parties: **Syria vs. Turkey**
 Conflict items: **territory, international power**

The latent conflict between Syria and Turkey over international power escalated due to spillover effects from the war in Syria [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. As a result, both parties were unable to reach a formal agreement regarding the status of Turkey's Hatay province, which is officially claimed by Syria. On April 9, Turkey protested and summoned Syria's envoy after Syrian forces opened fire at refugees across the border in Kilis province and stray bullets struck Turkish territory. On June 22, Syrian Armed Forces downed a Turkish F-14 Phantom jet over the Mediterranean Sea, killing the two pilots. Shortly thereafter, Syrian ground-to-air defense system reportedly shot at a Turkish search and rescue plane searching for the jet. On June 26, NATO condemned the shooting as unacceptable. In the following days, Turkey deployed 30 military vehicles and six additional warplanes to the border, while Syria also reinforced its troops there with some 170 tanks and other armored vehicles.

The conflict peaked on October 3 and 4 when Turkish forces shot artillery into the Syrian border provinces of Idlib and al-Raqqah, killing up to twelve soldiers. The artillery barrages were fired in response to Syrian mortar shells directed at fleeing Syrian opposition forces which had left five Turkish civilians dead in Akcakale, Sanliurfa. The next five days, both parties exchanged cross-border artillery fire and the Turkish parliament authorized troops to conduct operations in Syria if necessary. Responding to the events, Turkey increased its military presence in its southeastern land and maritime regions with additional troops, warships, and submarines. On October 10, the Turkish Air Force intercepted a Syrian passenger plane coming from Russia and forced it to temporarily land in Ankara, suspecting it of carrying weapons. Afterwards, Syria and Turkey mutually closed their airspaces in respect to civil flights. Throughout the following weeks, Syrian shells repeatedly hit Turkish territory, to which Turkey responded with artillery fire and the strengthening of its military presence. On November 16, in response to a bombardment by the Syrian Air Force in the border region, Turkey deployed two additional warplanes to the area. On November 21, Turkey requested NATO to deploy Patriot missiles on the border. The US, Germany, and the Netherlands confirmed in December the stationing of missiles in southern Turkey. *aje*

TUNISIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2010**


Conflict parties: **opposition groups vs. government**
 Conflict items: **system/ideology, national power**

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups and the govern-

ment de-escalated, but remained violent. The opposition consisted of various groups, including labor unions, students, lawyers, and diverse Salafist groups. Throughout the year, the opposition groups repeatedly protested against economic shortcomings, poor living conditions, and the lack of improvement regarding civil rights. Following a general strike which started in Makhtar, Siliana Governorate, on January 13, protests spread to neighboring towns. The protesters demanded jobs and better living conditions, barricading access roads to several towns. On October 17, media employees went on strike over the government's interference in the media. Subsequently, the government announced the implementation of two decrees to protect freedom of the media which had already been passed the previous year. On November 27, after the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) had called for demonstrations, thousands of demonstrators protested in Siliana, demanding financial aid for economic development and the governor's dismissal. Protesters threw stones, while riot police used birdshot, teargas, and batons to disperse the demonstrators. The protests lasted five days, leaving approx. 300 injured. The clashes ended on December 1, when the central government and labor unions reached an agreement including the replacement of the governor and a regional development plan. The same day, further clashes erupted between the police and protesters in Bargou, Siliana Governorate. Over the course of the year, Salafists held at least ten demonstrations against the secularization of the state, calling for the introduction of Sharia law. The protests repeatedly escalated into violent confrontations with the police. On August 16, Salafists armed with swords and rods attacked the Bizerte music and theater festival, injuring five. The police dispersed the Salafists and arrested four. Following the arrest of a Salafist accused of attacking a policeman, hundreds of Salafists reportedly attacked a police station in the town of Dawar Hicher, Manouba Governorate, on October 30. The police opened fire on the assailants, leaving two dead. In response to the enduring protests, on May 4, the interim president Moncef Marzouki prolonged the state of emergency until the end of July, and then in September extended it once more to January 2013. *sag, shr*

TURKEY (PKK)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **1974**



Conflict parties: **PKK vs. government**
 Conflict items: **autonomy**

The war between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the government over autonomy continued. The government repeatedly accused various Kurdish political organizations, such as the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the banned Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), of supporting the PKK, arresting many of their members. Over the course of the year, at least 500 security forces and militants died in numerous

roadside bombings and PKK attacks, as well as in the minimum of 974 military operations carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), among them 55 cross-border attacks into northern Iraq.

Violence between PKK and the military in the first half of the year affected the southeastern provinces of Agri, Amasya, Batman, Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Hatay, Siirt, Sirnak, and Tunceli and claimed the lives of at least 126 PKK militants and 40 security personnel. Clashes escalated from June onwards, primarily in Hakkari, spilling over into the neighboring Erbil region of northern Iraq. On June 19, for instance, at least hundred PKK fighters attacked three military outposts in Hakkari with rocket launchers, rifles, and hand grenades, leaving eight soldiers and ten to twenty militants dead. In subsequent operations, both in the region bordering Iraq and Iran, and in Erbil involving some 5,000 soldiers, combat helicopters, howitzers, and F-16 warplanes, more than 30 PKK militants died. According to PKK sources, militants shot down four helicopters and killed over a hundred soldiers.

Several incidents affected the province of Hakkari between July and September. In response to a PKK attempt to seize control of the town of Semdinli, Hakkari province, starting on July 23, the government sent in up to 2,000 troops and bombarded the area with helicopters and warplanes, killing 22 militants and forcing hundreds of residents to flee the area. According to PKK media outlets, some 30 soldiers died in the course of the clashes, whereas official media reported only two casualties and ten injured. On August 4, a PKK attack on a military outpost in Gecimli and subsequent clashes left fourteen militants, six soldiers, and two village guards dead. In response to a roadside bomb attack by PKK which killed five soldiers on August 22, the government sent troop reinforcements and helicopter gunships into the region. Operations and subsequent clashes for the next two days left 21 militants dead. Between September 6 and 17, TAF launched a large-scale ground operation, including some 5,000 troops backed by fighter jets and helicopters. During the fighting, TAF killed 155 militants and lost four soldiers.

In simultaneous attacks on government institutions in Beytussebab, Sirnak province, on September 2, PKK killed ten soldiers. Subsequent TAF operations in the Kato Mountains involved over 2,000 troops as well as F-16 fighter jets, included cross border attacks into northern Iraq, and left at least 25 militants and one soldier dead. Twelve F-16 fighter jets bombed PKK targets in Iraq starting on October 7. Four days later, parliament extended a one-year mandate allowing military operations in northern Iraq despite objections from Baghdad [→Turkey - Iraq]. In the course of a PKK attack in Hakkari in mid-October, and in subsequent TAF operations involving the use of fighter jets and helicopters, 40 militants, three soldiers, and two village guards died. After PKK had attacked government institutions in Sirnak with automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades on October 28, TAF conducted large-scale operations in both Hakkari and Sirnak between October 30 and November 7, killing at least 31 militants in Sirnak alone.

On November 6, six F-16 warplanes bombarded PKK targets in northern Iraq, simultaneous to a ground operation of Maroon Beret soldiers. Between November 7 and 9, TAF struck several PKK targets with warplanes and performed a ground operation in Hakkari, killing 42 militants. During the clashes

one soldier died. On November 18, PKK clashed with TAF in Semdinli, leaving five soldiers dead. In a subsequent, two-day, large-scale operation, TAF killed fourteen militants. In early December, warplanes bombarded PKK camps and installations in the Iraqi Kandil Mountains for two days in a row.

On September 12, some 1,700 Kurdish prisoners began a hunger strike, demanding an end to the solitary confinement of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and freedom to use the Kurdish language in the judicial system and education. The strike ended on November 18 after signals of governmental concessions and an appeal from Ocalan himself. *vs, mki*

YEMEN (AL-HOUSHI REBELS–SUNNI TRIBAL FORCES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**


Conflict parties: *al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forces*
 Conflict items: *subnational predominance*

The conflict over subnational predominance between the Shiite al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces including Salafist militants continued on a violent level. In the course of the year, al-Houthi rebels repeatedly clashed with tribesmen affiliated to the Sunni al-Islah party and Salafist militants in the northern provinces of Saada, Hajjah, and Amran. The USA and the government accused Iran of supporting and financing al-Houthi rebels [→Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. Throughout the year, clashes claimed the lives of more than 400 people on both sides, including unarmed civilians. Fighting took place, especially in January and February, between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribesmen in Hajjah and Saada. On January 26, ongoing fighting in Hajjah displaced more than 300 families. On February 5 and 6, clashes in the area led to 55 casualties before a ceasefire was established on February 10. However, two days later, al-Houthis resumed fighting. At least 44 more casualties were reported before the end of February. In March, several landmine blasts killed a total of eighteen people, mostly civilians. Al-Houthis were accused of having planted around 3,000 landmines in the area. In April, conflict renewed in Saada, yielding around 35 casualties from both sides. Further clashes on May 29 left dozens more dead on both sides. During the fighting, tribesmen were able to seize a village held by al-Houthi fighters. On June 3, clashes resulted in at least 24 casualties in Saada. Two days later, al-Houthi fighters raided three houses and took captive at least twenty men. In the same area, al-Houthi fighters killed two British Muslims on June 26. Further clashes claiming at least four casualties were sparked after al-Houthi rebels killed two women in Hajjah on August 21. A renewed ceasefire was established on August 27. However, on September 6, al-Houthi fighters destroyed houses and wells in Amran and clashed with Sunni tribesmen, causing at least 30 casualties. In the same area, thirteen people were killed when Islah Party militias and al-Houthi supporters clashed from September 21 to 23.

Al-Houthis skirmished with Sunni tribal forces again on November 3 in Sanaa province. On December 16, al-Houthi rebels stormed the Islah Party headquarters in Saada. *jri*

YEMEN (AQAP, ANSAR AL-SHARIA)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1992**



Conflict parties: **AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia vs. government**
 Conflict items: **system / ideology, national power**

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the linked Islamist militants of Ansar al-Sharia, on the one hand, and the government, supported by the USA, on the other, remained at war level. The militants were mainly active in the southern province of Abyan, where they had seized several towns the previous year. Since Ali Abdullah Saleh handed over power to the new president, Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, in February [→Yemen (opposition groups)], the government intensified its cooperation and US-backed efforts to fight AQAP. In total, the conflict claimed the lives of at least 1,800 people in 2012, including civilian casualties. According to UN reports, the fighting also resulted in the displacement of several tens of thousands of civilians.

Several clashes between soldiers and militants took place in Zinjibar, Abyan province, and Radda, Bayda province, in February. On February 25, the day the newly elected president was inaugurated in the capital Sanaa, a suicide attack in front of a presidential palace in Mukalla, Hadramout province, left 26 people dead, including twenty soldiers. On March 4, at least 85 soldiers and 20 militants died in two suicide attacks and subsequent clashes in Zinjibar. On April 9, militants attacked an army camp in the city of Lawdar, Abyan, claiming the lives of 57 from both sides. In response, the army launched an offensive, including air strikes, against Ansar al-Sharia in the area. Within a week, more than 200 people had been killed. On April 24, militants clashed with pro-government tribal fighters in Abyan, as a result of which 21 militants and two tribesmen died.

Starting mid-May, troops launched a US-backed offensive to regain control over southern cities held by AQAP fighters, involving around 20,000 soldiers as well as numerous fighters from army-allied tribes. Altogether, air strikes, ground offensives with heavy weapons, and counter-attacks from AQAP in the Abyan cities of Jaar, Zinjibar, and Shaqra, left more than 500 people dead in May. On May 21, an Islamist suicide bomber killed about 100 soldiers at a military parade in Sanaa. On June 4, hundreds of troops retook the coastal town of Shaqra. On June 12, the Defense Ministry stated that it had completely retaken the cities of Zinjibar and Jaar. Twenty militants and four soldiers died in heavy fighting in Jaar, as well as ten militants in Zinjibar, while 200 to 300 Islamist fighters fled the towns. However, clashes in both cities continued. On June 13, the army launched two air strikes on the town of Azzan, Shabwah province, killing at least 27 militants. In the same area, another 76 militants died in clashes with the army in the following two days.

Having lost their strongholds in the south, AQAP then focused on targeted assassinations, such as a suicide attack that

killed an army chief and two soldiers in Aden on June 18. An Ansar al-Sharia suicide bomber killed 45 tribesmen at a funeral in an Abyan village on August 4. On September 11, Defense Minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmad survived an assassination attempt in Sanaa. Furthermore, Islamist militants claimed responsibility for repeatedly destroying various oil and gas pipelines. Several drone strikes, reportedly conducted by the US, killed at least 114 suspected AQAP members throughout the year, particularly in Yemen's south. *cf*

YEMEN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↓ | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: **opposition groups vs. government**
 Conflict items: **system / ideology, national power**

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government de-escalated to a violent crisis. The opposition consisted of the Joint Meeting Parties, the Yemeni Youth Movement, tribal forces, and previously defected troops.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh had signed a deal in November 2011 to hand over power, also granting him immunity. Throughout the year, up to several hundred thousand demonstrators, rejecting the agreement, called for Saleh's prosecution and the removal of his allies from government positions. Supporters and opponents of Saleh clashed repeatedly, leaving 36 people dead in total.

On January 13, security forces shot dead up to four protesters and injured over a dozen others in Aden. On February 21, former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi was confirmed in a single-candidate election as Saleh's successor. In the following months, Hadi consecutively dismissed several senior government members and military officers, including a nephew and a half-brother of Saleh. On July 29, some 100 tribesmen loyal to Saleh temporarily seized control of the interior ministry in the capital, Sanaa. As they tried to storm the building again two days later, clashes with security forces ensued, leaving fifteen people dead and 43 wounded. On August 1, security forces retook control of the ministry. On August 6, Hadi deprived Saleh's son Ahmed, the head of the Republican Guard (RG), of some of his units and put them under his own authority. In protest, hundreds of RG members clashed with government troops as they surrounded the defense ministry on August 14. Three people were killed and nine wounded. On December 15, a military tribunal sentenced 93 RG members to prison terms for the attack. Four days later, Hadi decreed a restructuring of the military, including the dissolution of the RG and the First Armored Division of General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, who had defected during last year's protests. A National Dialogue set to begin on November 5 had not started until the end of the year. *ba*


METHODOLOGY

Since 1991, quantitative conflict research at the HIIK has analyzed political conflicts by focusing on conflict processes rather than e.g. purely quantitative thresholds of casualties of war. Thus, the HIIK is particularly concerned with the concrete actions and communications between conflict parties. Such a process-oriented approach gives the analysis of political conflicts, especially regarding intensities, a broader and more detailed empirical foundation.

Beginning in 2011, the HIIK in cooperation with the Conflict Information System (CONIS) research group – established in 2005 and likewise located at Heidelberg University – has taken steps to further elaborate its methodological approach. In particular, the institute has revised its definition of political conflicts and restructured its conflict intensity assessment. The latter now not only takes into account the intensity for a given conflict area in a given year, but determines the intensity of the conflict processes for subnational political units and months as well. As such, it allows for a much more detailed measurement of conflict dynamics. Furthermore, the conflict actions and communications, on which the intensity assessment is based, are now evaluated by combining qualitative and quantitative indicators measuring the means and consequences of a conflict. This is intended to further enhance exactitude, reliability, and reproducibility of the conflict information provided.

According to the revised definition, a political conflict is a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society (the conflict items), between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so.

A conflict actor is either an individual, a state, an interna-



The concept of political conflict and its attributes

tional organization or a non-state actor. Collective conflict actors are distinguished from one another through their internal cohesion and internally shared goals. An actor is regarded as decisive if his existence, actions, and communications considerably alter the practices of at least one other conflict actor pertaining to the conflict item.

Conflict measures are actions and communications carried out by a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict. They are constitutive for an identifiable conflict if they lie outside established procedures of conflict regulations and – possibly in conjunction with other conflict measures – if they threaten the international order or a core function of the state. Established regulatory procedures are defined as those mechanisms of conflict management that are accepted by the conflict ac-

tors. Examples may include elections and court proceedings. The use of physical violence, however, is never considered to be an established regulatory procedure. Core state functions encompass providing security of a population, integrity of a territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic or cultural order. A state function or the international order is threatened if its fulfillment and persistence, respectively, becomes unlikely in a conflict actor’s point of view.

Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors via conflict measures. Due to the character of conflict measures, conflict items attain relevance for the society as a whole - either for coexistence within a given state or between states. This aspect constitutes the genuinely political dimension of political conflicts. The catalog of conflict items in use up to the present Conflict Barometer covers ten different items. Ideology/system is encoded if a conflict actor aspires a change of the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or changing the regime type itself. National power means the power to govern a state. Whereas autonomy refers to attaining or extending political self-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territory without striving for independence, secession refers to the aspired separation of a part of a territory of a state aiming to establish a new state or to merge with another state. Furthermore, decolonization aims at the independence of a dependent territory. Subnational predominance focuses on the attainment of the de-facto control by a government, a non-state organization or a population over a territory or a population. The item resources is encoded if the possession of natural resources or raw materials, or the profits gained thereof, is pursued. Territory means a change of the course of an international border, while international power as an item describes the change aspired in the power constellation in the international system or a regional system therein, especially by changing military capabilities or the political or economic influence of a state. The item other is used as residual category.

In addition to the three constituting elements – conflict actors, measures, and items – conflict intensity is an essential feature of political conflicts. A conflict intensity is an attribute of the sum of conflict measures in a specific political conflict in a geographical area and a given space of time. Since 2003, the HIIK has been using a five-level model of conflict intensity. Under its revised methodology, the intensity levels are now known as dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, and war. The last three constitute the category of violent conflicts, in contrast to the non-violent conflicts (dispute and non-violent crisis). Whereas a dispute is a political conflict carried out completely without resorting to violence, in a non-violent crisis one of the actors is threatened with violence.

In measuring the three levels of violent conflict, five proxies are used indicating the conflict means and consequences. The dimension of means encompasses the use of weapons and personnel, the dimension of consequences the number of casualties, destruction, and refugees. For every region-month observed – i.e. for every calendar month in every first-level subnational political unit – each of these indicators is assessed and given a score. In order to determine the respective region-month intensity, the five values are aggregated.

Combining qualitative and quantitative research strategies, the following concrete steps are taken when assessing

the conflict intensities: First, the institute’s conflict observer evaluates the type of weapon and the manner in which it was used. A catalog of keywords helps to distinguish light from heavy weapons and to evaluate the severity of the weapon’s employment. Second, the observer identifies the conflict measure of an analyzed region-month in which the highest number of personnel was employed. He or she then distinguishes between low, medium, and high numbers of personnel, based on two thresholds: 50 and 400 persons.

Third, the observer evaluates the overall number of casualties in the conflict in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 20 and 60 persons killed. Fourth, the amount of destruction resulting from the conflict is determined in four dimensions considered essential for civil populations: infrastructure, accommodation, economy, and culture. Last, the conflict observer evaluates the overall number of cross-border refugees and internally displaced persons in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 1,000 and 20,000 refugees. The region-month intensities can be aggregated to inform about the conflict intensity in a given calendar year in a specific conflict area. A conflict area is the sum of all subnational units affected by the violent conflict in question. The area-year intensity is basically equal to the maximum region-month intensity in a given area-year. In addition, the exact area-year intensity is fine-tuned by looking at the annual and area-wide

numbers of casualties and refugees as the two core indicators of conflict assessment. A violent crisis can thereby be upgraded to limited war level if there were more than 360 casualties or more than 18,000 refugees in the whole year in the conflict area. A limited war can be upgraded to war level if there were more than 1,080 fatalities or more than 360,000 refugees. In contrast, a limited war can be downgraded to a violent crisis if there were less than 120 casualties and less than 6,000 refugees. Likewise, a war can be downgraded to limited war level if there were less than 360 casualties and less than 120,000 refugees.

The revised methodology of the HIIK and CONIS enables a detailed analysis of conflict dynamics. In contrast to other conflict methodologies, the Heidelberg approach rests on a broad empirical basis. The number of conflict-related deaths is not excluded from the analysis, but is just one indicator among several. This aims at increasing the validity of the data obtained. The specified set of indicators guides the institute’s conflict observers through the research process, improving reliability and reproducibility of the data. The theoretical disaggregation of the concepts of political conflict and conflict intensity, the multitude of indicators included, as well as the differentiated evaluation at the subnational and monthly levels, allow for a detailed observation, collection, and analysis of non-violent and violent political conflicts worldwide.

Intensity Level	Previous Terminology	Terminology since 2011	Level of Violence	Intensity Class
1	latent conflict	dispute	non-violent conflicts	low intensity
2	manifest conflict	non-violent crisis		
3	crisis	violent crisis	violent conflicts	medium intensity
4	serious crisis	limited war		high intensity
5	war	war		

The terminology of intensity levels

DATABASE CONIS

The data on which the Conflict Barometer is based has been collected and processed in cooperation between the HIIK and the CONIS Group, using news archives and other open sources. The CONIS database comprises information on all forms of inter- and intrastate political conflicts from 1945 until today. With more than 15,000 conflict-year data, it aims at understanding the dynamics of violent and non-violent conflicts

worldwide. CONIS (Conflict Information System) was developed on the basis of the Conflict Simulation Model (COSIMO) database in the course of two research projects at Heidelberg University, co-financed by the European Union and in collaboration with the HIIK. More information on CONIS, containing data on affected countries, conflict parties, conflict items, and annual intensities, can be accessed at www.conis.org

LIMITED WARS

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EFFECTIVE:

April 02, 2013

THE AMERICAS

Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)

Colombia (FARC)

Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)

ASIA AND OCEANIA

India (Naxalites)

Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State)

Pakistan (Mohajirs - Balochs, Pakhtuns, Sindhis)

Pakistan (TTP et al. - religious groups)

Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)

Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)

Thailand (various Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)

EUROPE

Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Algeria (AQIM, MUJAO)

Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territory)

Libya (opposition)

Libya (inter-factional violence)

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Central African Republic (rebel groups)

Chad (rebel groups)

DR Congo (FDLR)

DR Congo (inter-militant violence)

DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)

Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)

Mali (Islamist groups – MNLA)

Mali (Islamist groups)

Nigeria (Christians – Muslims)

Somalia (Somaliland – SSC)

WARS

THE AMERICAS

Mexico (drug cartels)

ASIA AND OCEANIA

India (ULFA et al. - Biharis, Bengalis)

Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)

Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)

MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)

Iraq (Sunni militant groups)

Syria (opposition groups)

Turkey (PKK)

Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

DR Congo (CNDP/M23)

Mali (MNLA, Ansar al-Din / Azawad)

Nigeria (Boko Haram)

Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)

Somalia (Islamist groups)

Sudan (Darfur)

Sudan (SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile)

Sudan – South Sudan

South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)

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


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VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2012 ON SUBNATIONAL LEVEL



■ : NO VIOLENT CONFLICT
■ : VIOLENT CRISIS
■ : LIMITED WAR
■ : WAR



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