Promoting Democracy

What Role for the Democratic Emerging Powers?

Gerd Schönwälder
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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BDF</td>
<td>Bali Democracy Forum</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Community of Democracies</td>
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<td>CIPS</td>
<td>Centre for International Policy Studies (University of Ottawa)</td>
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<td>DEPs</td>
<td>Democratic emerging powers</td>
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<td>DIE</td>
<td>Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungsquititik</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPR</td>
<td>Indonesia’s House of People’s Representatives</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUL</td>
<td>Mercado Comum do Sul</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADPA</td>
<td>South African Development Partnership Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNASUL</td>
<td>União de Nações Sul-Americanas</td>
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<td>US</td>
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Summary

This paper examines the role of the democratic emerging powers – India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey – in promoting democracy beyond their own borders. The relevance of this issue stems from the increased significance of these countries in world affairs – as evidenced by their phenomenal economic ascent, growing clout in international trade negotiations and strong voice in global fora such as the G20 – which raises the question of how they could also contribute to broader global public goods.

The paper argues that such a contribution could be significant, especially given the relative lack of progress of western-sponsored democracy-support activities and the remarkable resilience of authoritarian regimes worldwide. The democratic emerging powers have some potential advantages compared to western democracy supporters, such as their own experiences in transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule and their greater proximity to non-democratic regimes, which could render their democracy support better targeted and therefore more relevant.

The paper goes on to examine why the democratic emerging powers so far have fallen short of realising this potential. It argues that the decision of whether or not to support democratisation processes beyond one’s own borders is not straightforward; on the contrary, it is rooted in “state preferences”, a complex amalgam of values, interests and structures of representation and power, which is in turn conditioned by surrounding regional and global environments.

The paper then uses this theoretical framework to analyse the democracy support provided by India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey. Adopting a comparative perspective, it examines their respective origins and drivers, supplies an overview of key policies and initiatives, and ventures an assessment as well as a tentative outlook towards the future. The analysis reveals that while all five countries studied – to varying degrees and with the partial exception of Turkey – have supported democratisation processes beyond their own borders, they have done so rather cautiously. Fear of a heightened risk of political instability in surrounding states, as well as that of harming vital security and economic interests and of providing inroads to extra-regional rivals emerge as the principal reasons behind this stance.

The paper identifies four key factors that help explain the various commonalities and differences among the five cases studied, namely, recent memories of democratic transitions; the relative strength of democratic fabrics; the presence or absence of significant security challenges; as well as economic interests; and the potential for regional expansion. The paper argues that a shift to a more proactive stance on external democracy promotion would require the democratic emerging powers to make some critical choices as to how to fill their new regional and global leadership roles. Western democracy promoters, in turn, could influence these processes and help build equitable partnerships, as long as they acknowledge the distinct challenges faced by these democratic emerging powers and adhere to commonly held democratic standards and principles.
Promoting democracy. What role for the democratic emerging powers?

1 Introduction

The worldwide trend towards more democracy and expanded political and civil liberties, thought virtually unstoppable in the last decade of the twentieth century (Fukuyama 1992), has come to a halt or at least slowed to a crawl (notwithstanding the recent – since faded – enthusiasm surrounding the Arab Spring of 2011).\(^1\) Authoritarian regimes the world over have proved remarkably resistant to the successive democratic “waves” (Huntington 1991) engulfing them, sometimes through outright repression but also by adapting to or circumventing the democratic rules of the game. In addition, instead of full-blown democracies, a range of semi-autocratic or “hybrid” regimes (Diamond 2002) have sprung up, situated somewhere between autocratic and democratic rule.\(^2\)

These setbacks notwithstanding, efforts to promote democracy\(^3\) have continued (Price 2009; Wiarda 2009; McFaul 2010), propelled by the unbroken attractiveness of the democratic model to millions of people worldwide and sustained by a considerable institutional infrastructure especially in the United States (US) and Western Europe. Democracy promoters have expanded their toolkit, adding items such as support for the rule of law (Sen 1999; Foweraker / Krznaric 2002; Ferejohn / Pasquino 2003) or political party strengthening (Gershman 2004) to old stalwarts like electoral support or institution-building. The sequencing of democratic reforms has attracted greater attention, with some scholars questioning the reliance on early elections in the absence of a functioning institutional framework and broadly representative political parties (Mansfield / Snyder 2007). Furthermore, substantial efforts were made to strengthen civil society in transition countries (Ottaway / Carothers 2000; Lovell 2007), even to include traditional forms of governance (e. g., elders’ councils) in the new democratic framework (Youngs 2011).

But at the same time, western-led attempts to build democracy have been criticised as ineffectual, unsuited to the needs of democratising states, or for being self-interested and

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1 Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World Report 2013* notes that the year 2012 marked “the seventh consecutive year in which countries with declines [in freedom] outnumbered those with improvements (Freedom House 2013, 1). The report also mentions that the overall number of countries considered “free” had risen to 90 from the previous year, “suggesting that the overall ferment includes a potential for progress as well as deterioration” (ibid.).

2 It is doubtful that these developments signalled an “authoritarian resurgence,” in the sense of an actual increase in the power and attractiveness of authoritarian regimes. More likely they reflected a greater appreciation of the many existing obstacles to democratisation processes, rooted in unfavourable domestic conditions and the real power of non-democratic elites to resist them. See Burnell / Schlumberger (2010, 3).

3 Since “democracy promotion” is sometimes taken to include the imposition of democracy by force, some prefer to speak instead of “democracy support” when referring to activities aimed at fostering democracy and human rights. (The European Union, for example, has stressed that it *supports* different forms of democracy – not least given the diversity of democratic practice expressed by its own member states – instead of *promoting* a single model, although Kurki (2012) has criticised the EU’s rhetoric as “fuzzy” and “vague”). Given that the exact meaning of these terms remains contested in the literature, they will be used interchangeably in this paper, generally *without* any reference to the use of force. By contrast, the term “democracy assistance” is used in a more limited sense, referring to particular activities in support of specific actors. See Burnell (2007, 1 f.) or Acuto (2008, 464 f.) for attempts to arrive at more precise definitions.
insincere. 4 Cultural and religious barriers, together with widespread corruption or other
governance deficits certainly have proved to be formidable obstacles, particularly in the
conflict-ridden contexts of the Middle East. Historic inequalities, tensions over indigenous
rights or regional disparities have allowed neo-populist regimes to warp democratic insti-
tutions, as in the Andean countries of South America. Perhaps most damaging, Western
concerns for political stability – and for protecting its own strategic interests – have some-
times trumped those for more democracy and better protection of human rights, not least
in the course of the second Bush administration’s disastrous attempts to forcibly install
democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. 5

These critiques, along with the perceived failure of democracy promotion policies to pro-
duce concrete, actionable results (Burnell 2007), 6 have contributed to a feeling that, in the
words of one of its principal proponents, “the democracy enterprise is at a puzzling half-
way state” (Carothers 2011). Despite the efforts to adjust and rejuvenate the instruments
and methods used – mentioned just above – these critiques have reinforced a sense of un-
certainty within the democracy promotion camp over what to do next, along with calls for
“new strategies” (Carothers / Youngs 2011b). Even in Europe, where these sentiments are
perhaps less acute than in the United States or Canada, there have been calls for “new in-
sights,” notably to better understand how democratisation processes unfold in practice,
and for greater openness in engaging with conceptual alternatives to liberal representative
democracy that lie outside of the political mainstream (Burnell 2013, 267). This would
yield entry points for democracy promoters, enabling them to make better decisions as to
when, where, and how to engage, and when, where, and how not to.

Seen against this background, one of the most significant developments in recent years has
been the rise of the “democratic emerging powers” (DEPs), a label that can be applied to a
group of seemingly disparate countries – specifically, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indone-
sia and Turkey – which nonetheless share a number of key characteristics. Most notably,
these democratic emerging powers have experienced a phenomenal economic ascent in
recent decades, turning them into major players in global trade negotiations and giving
them increased clout in global governance fora such as the Group of Twenty (G20). But as
opposed to emerging authoritarian powers – such as Russia and especially China, which
saw their economies and influence grow as well – these countries have also restructured
their political systems in the course of their economic rise, making them more open and
democratic, often following long periods of non-democratic rule. At the same time, the

4  See Carothers (2006) and Youngs (2010). Some critics (Hobson 2009; Kurki 2010; Bridoux / Hobson /
Kurki 2012) have gone further, arguing that democracy promotion remains fundamentally disconnected
from local realities – due to its over-reliance on exporting western “blueprints” – and that it is informed
by a minimalist, largely procedural notion of liberal democracy. In turn, these critics were themselves
accused of putting undemocratic state-led development ahead of protecting core liberal norms (Youngs
2011, 14).

5  Of course, the United States has a much longer history of intervening in other countries, notably in
Latin America. This is a principal reason why developing nations tend to be wary of US-sponsored at-
ttempts to promote democracy. European-led programmes have also been criticised for being self-
interested and insufficiently geared towards the needs of recipient countries (Youngs 2010), although
they do not usually go hand-in-hand with military interventions.

6  Burnell responded “Yes? No? We really do not know.” to his own rhetorical question “Does interna-
tional democracy promotion work?” (Burnell 2007, 11 f.).
democratic emerging powers differ from smaller emerging democratic countries given their much larger economies, populations and availability of other resources, putting them in a position to back up their claims to play leadership roles not just on the global stage but also in their respective regions.

The specific characteristics of the DEPs – large, rising economies that have voiced leadership ambitions but are democratically constituted – and their increasing relevance in regional and global affairs have produced expectations regarding their potential role in promoting democracy beyond their own borders. Western democracy promoters in particular have urged them to play a greater role in supporting democratisation processes elsewhere, in their own regions but possibly also beyond, now that their own democratic systems are reasonably stable and consolidated. Democracy promoters have also expressed the hope that the democratic emerging powers might be able to transcend some of the shortcomings of Western-led democracy promotion efforts. Specifically, it was hoped that the DEPs would:

- First, be able to provide more relevant assistance to democracy-building efforts than their Western counterparts, based on their own, often more recent experience of transitioning from authoritarianism, and greater familiarity with the challenges of building democracy in third-world conditions. This would help to overcome the aforementioned reliance on “blueprints” and other forms of “exporting” democracy.
- Second, be open to building more context-sensitive forms of democracy that would complement but also go beyond the western-style representative model – incorporating, for example, forms of participatory democracy or traditional norms and traditions, such as cultural or religious ones. This could help address the perceived “substantive” deficit of representative democracy, by demonstrating that inclusive social and economic policymaking designed to address developmental deficits can go hand-in-hand with – indeed, be intrinsic to – democratic forms of representation.

So far, these expectations have largely been left unfulfilled. While all the democratic emerging countries – with the partial exception of Turkey⁷ – have provided democracy support of some sort to other countries, their desire to maintain good relations with regimes of all types has often muted their defence of democracy and human rights abroad (Brookings 2011, Carothers / Youngs 2011a, b). Reluctant to interfere in other nations’ internal affairs and wary of what they perceive as Western interventionism, they have been careful not to harm their other foreign policy interests, even if this made their democracy support less effective.

This stance is perplexing: it would seem that the democratic emerging powers cannot afford to remain indifferent to the persistence of authoritarianism and the various tensions this produces in their immediate neighbourhoods. Political globalisation has added a further twist: increasingly called upon to contribute to delivering global public goods, the democratic emerging powers could parlay more support for democracy and human rights into a more prominent role at the United Nations and in other global fora – one of their key foreign policy goals – and a greater say also on other key global governance issues.

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⁷ Turkey has avoided framing its foreign policy in terms of supporting democracy, although some of its initiatives to mitigate and help resolve regional conflicts could be seen in this light. See case study below.
The present paper sets out to explain this apparent contradiction, focusing on three interrelated questions which will form the backbone of the following sections. First, the paper delves more deeply into the motivations behind the democratic emerging powers’ democracy promotion policies, in an attempt to go beyond the black-and-white depictions sometimes found in the literature. It argues that such policies are rooted in “state preferences” (Moravcsik 2008, 2010): a complex amalgam of drivers and constraints – notably values, interests and structures of power and representation – which are in turn conditioned by the openings or obstacles presented by surrounding regional and global environments. Second, the paper takes a look at the actual democracy promotion policies enacted by the five countries examined here, adopting a comparative lens in order to do so. It identifies four key factors that help explain relevant patterns and commonalities, as well as key differences, namely, recent memories of democratic transitions, the relative strength of democratic fabrics, the presence of significant security challenges, as well as economic interests and the potential for regional expansion. Third and finally, the paper offers some thoughts on what policy directions the democratic emerging powers might adopt in the future, and how others – particularly traditional Western democracy supporters such as the United States, Canada, or European states – could interact with them. Essentially, Western states should recognise that the democratic emerging powers face distinct challenges, but they should also uphold democratic standards, including their own.

2 Why promote democracy? A brief look at interests, values and contexts

Democracy promotion efforts are often based – implicitly or explicitly – on some version of the democratic peace theory, which asserts that democracy is conducive to peace, prosperity, and mutual collaboration among democratic nations. Put simply, the theory holds that democratic nations do not wage war on one another, since their rulers are accountable to the people who are generally adverse to war. In addition, democratic nations favour market economies and encourage the economic activities of their citizens, which tends to lift mutual trade and has a beneficial effect on overall prosperity. Finally, since democratic nations have a general proclivity to seek peaceful solutions to their differences, they will also be more open to finding collaborative solutions in areas other than security or economic welfare.

Given the purported benefits of the democratic peace, one would assume that democratic nations will want to promote democracy elsewhere, in their own neighbourhoods as well

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8 See, for example, Cornell (2012) who asserts that key Turkish policymakers are first and foremost Islamists whose core values will never correspond with those underpinning representative democracy.

9 The validity of the democratic peace theory and its supposed benefits continue to be much debated. See, for example, Rosato (2003) and Doyle (2005). At the same time, “the proposition that democratic institutions and values help states cooperate with each other ... has held up reasonably well [and] the belief that democracies never fight wars against each other is the closest thing we have to an iron law in social science” (Snyder 2004, 57).

10 Importantly, democratic peace theory does not preclude the possibility of democratic nations going to war against non-democratic ones (liberal democracies can develop a quasi-missionary zeal to spread democracy, including by force, as pointed out by Jack Snyder (2004). Democratic nations are not thought to be more peaceful in general (monadic peace), just less prone to fight one another (dyadic peace).
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as beyond. It certainly seems plausible that democratic states would want to coexist with others that have comparable goals and visions, in an environment that allows for negotiation and compromise, rather than in hostile surroundings. This assumption, however, is not supported by the evidence, at least not always. Democratic states sometimes behave quite differently, supporting autocratic regimes or at least looking the other way when faced with their abuses, while often hesitating to back democratic reform movements and sometimes actively discouraging them. The explanation for this behaviour is not simply that they are democracies in name only – an accusation often levelled at the democratic emerging nations, but also against Western states, particularly the United States – although of course their political systems are not flawless. Even for committed democracies, there are some good arguments against democracy promotion.

Some of these arguments relate to the very nature of democracy itself. One of the key dilemmas for democracy promoters is that democracy results from a process that tends to unfold over longer periods of time and whose outcomes cannot be predicted in advance. Requiring a long-term, strategic commitment to succeed, the benefits of democratisation are tenuous and uncertain, while its risks and costs are direct and immediate. Especially important from the perspective of the democratic emerging nations is the fact that democratisation processes tend to be conflictual and can produce significant political instability in the short and medium term (Mansfield / Snyder 1995), or give rise to hybrid regimes that remain “stuck” somewhere in a grey zone between authoritarianism and democracy (Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002). Faced with the prospect of such instability affecting their own, still fragile polities, policymakers in democratic emerging states may instead opt for backing unwanted, but stable and established autocracies instead.

A further risk stems from systemic competition between democratic emerging powers and authoritarian ones, particularly China, who are keen to expand their own spheres of influence (Bader / Grävingholt / Kästner 2010). Authoritarian powers can act as sources of diplomatic support for smaller authoritarian states, they can absorb their exports in exchange for strategic supplies, and they can provide much-needed development finance and technical assistance. Alternatively, smaller authoritarian states can deflect pressures to democratis by banding together, thereby marginalising or at least restricting the influence of much bigger states in their regions. These are real concerns for all democratic emerging powers, but they are even more acute for those – such as India – that face real challenges to their external security, in addition to a potential loss of political influence and economic clout.

Clearly, then, there are two different logics at play, one militating in favour of supporting democracy elsewhere, and another one against it. Whereas the first logic emphasises states’ long-term, strategic interests – peace, prosperity, greater collaboration to solve shared problems – the other one points to the more immediate risks inherent in democratisation processes – increased uncertainty regarding political outcomes, rising instability and greater potential for violence in the short and medium term, and the potential of damaging foreign policy interests by involuntarily empowering autocratic rulers or creating inroads for competing extra-regional powers.

Faced with these competing logics, democratic states have three basic options when deciding whether or not to support democratisation processes beyond their own borders. The first such option is not to promote democracy proactively and instead rely on passive
demonstration and diffusion effects, in the hope of reaping the benefits of further democratisation without incurring the potential costs. Samuel Huntington (1991) showed that such external influences were instrumental in bringing about the “third wave” of democracy in the late twentieth century. A strategy based on passive demonstration and diffusion effects might appear sensible not just because it is relatively risk free, but also because there is still much uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness and impact of more proactive democracy promotion policies (Burnell 2007; 2011). At the same time, however, diffusion as a strategy to spread democracy has its own limitations, notably the fact that in order to be effective, it requires that a critical mass of states in a given region are already democratic. With respect to the cases examined in this paper, such favourable conditions are simply not present. Furthermore, diffusion does not seem to be particularly effectual in preventing the re-emergence of autocratic regimes, or that of hybrid regimes that are neither truly democratic nor fully authoritarian.

The second option, then, is to support democratisation processes cautiously and selectively, while controlling and if possible eliminating the inherent risks, and without endangering vital security or economic interests. For example, Cooper / Farooq (2013) have shown that democratic emerging powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa have privileged relatively uncontroversial activities in their bilateral support to democratising states, for example, capacity-building and training to run elections. Support for more contentious activities – such as promoting good governance or funding civil society organisations to foster democratic values – was accorded much less importance and provided mostly under the cover of partnerships with Western countries or in the context of multilateral initiatives. The countries in question – all five countries examined in this paper, in marked contrast to some Western democracy supporters – were also careful to offer their assistance only when invited to do so by the recipient countries.

Such an approach might indeed limit the risks of pushing for more democracy beyond one’s own borders and allow the democratic emerging powers to remain on good terms with their autocratic neighbours. Engaging at least partially with Western-sponsored democracy promotion initiatives also has the advantage of mollifying Western critics who have charged that the DEPs are not doing enough to further global public goods. Still, as will become clearer further on in this paper, the effectiveness of such an approach in bringing about democratic change is open to question. Furthermore, while it mitigates certain key risks to the democratic emerging powers, it is not completely risk-free. Even a cautious, carefully calibrated engagement in favour of democracy elsewhere can highlight

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11 Subsequent research confirmed the existence of such demonstration and diffusion effects, resulting in “clusters” of democratic states that could not be explained solely on the basis of domestic “requisites” of democracy (Gleditsch / Ward 2006).

12 Brazil is a partial exception, in the sense that the diffusion of democratic norms and values in the 1980s and 1990s did facilitate the latest wave of democratic transitions in Latin America. But even there, diffusion did not play much of a role in consolidating and deepening actual democratic practice afterwards, and it did little to stop the rise of neo-populist regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia or Ecuador. India is a good counterexample, demonstrating that the presence of just one democratic state in a given region – even one as powerful as India – does not automatically result in meaningful diffusion effects. As regards Turkey, which among the cases studied here has relied the most on passive demonstration and diffusion effects, the exemplary power of its democracy for surrounding states derives at least in part from the country’s democratic “anchor” in the European Union, not just from its own experience. See the following section for further details.
democratic deficiencies at home, and it can appear contradictory when contrasted, for example, with expansionary economic policies that pay little heed to the needs of neighbouring countries. Conversely, even a limited engagement with Western democracy promoters can open the DEPs up to charges that they are beholden to hidden Western agendas and are doing the West’s bidding.

The third option, finally, is to support democracy elsewhere more deliberately and proactively, despite the associated risks and in accepting that doing so might well conflict with other important interests. There are two plausible explanations why democratic states would do so. One of them relates to the role of values and principles in democratic societies and the way in which these are brought to bear on the formulation of foreign policy. Democratic states have public spheres that allow for the expression of opinions and beliefs, giving pro-democracy actors a stage from which to demand consistency between the values and principles that govern domestic policymaking, as well as those that guide external policy. If expressed forcefully enough, such normative concerns can come to override the “pragmatic” or “realistic” foreign policy considerations that might prevail otherwise, which are based not on values but rational – although often short-term and sometimes short-sighted – cost-benefit calculations.

This dynamic is perhaps most apparent in the context of transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. Often accompanied by significant social mobilisations, the resulting upsurge in pro-democracy sentiment can provoke far-reaching changes in the foreign-policy posture of the respective countries. Obviously, though, democratic transitions are special periods and pro-democracy constituencies tend to become smaller and less vocal with the return to normal life. Likewise, governments tend to reassert their prerogatives especially for foreign policymaking, often helped by enduring traditions of secrecy and a lack of transparency and accountability rooted in foreign policy ministries not accustomed to external scrutiny. Despite these obstacles, in all the countries examined here, pro-democracy actors such as civil society organisations, parts of the media, or parliamentary oversight committees, have managed to keep relevant issues on the public radar and thereby put pressure on their governments, albeit to varying degrees. But overall, the democratic fabric in these countries is still fairly weak and will need to be nourished and supported in years to come.13

Another plausible explanation for why states decide to promote democracy beyond their own borders, which incorporates but also goes beyond the first explanation, is that “state preferences” (Moravcsik 2008, 2010) change, which in turn provokes changes in their foreign policy postures. In this view, state preferences are seen not just as the result of social identities and values, but also economic interests as expressed by firms and owners of assets but also workers, as well as structures of representation and power that determine which social groups or coalitions will be able to “capture” the state and impose their views. When these parameters shift, states can come to decide that promoting democracy is not only “the right thing to do” but also, crucially, in their own best interest, given the

13 Helping to do so, or at least not erecting additional obstacles (such as restrictive regulations governing the activities of civil society groups), might be in the best interest of the governments concerned. Greater openness in foreign policymaking and improved consistency between the principles governing domestic and foreign policies help improve the legitimacy of democratic regimes, with positive implications for political stability and public acceptance of policy choices once made.
long-term, strategic benefits of the democratic peace or in other words, the “utilitarian value” of democratic rule.

A crucial underlying assumption is that state preferences are the result of domestic societal processes of identity formation, interest formulation, and political articulation, which in turn determine “national interests” and therefore the stances states take in the international arena. In other words, state preferences and therefore state interests are not static and immutable – as both realists and institutionalists in international relations theory would have it – but vary according to domestic societal preferences. But at the same time, since states themselves are embedded not only in domestic but also transnational society, their actions are framed and conditioned by regional and global contexts as well.

In the case of the democratic emerging powers, all these contexts – domestic, regional, as well as transnational – are currently in a state of flux. In some of these countries examined here – Brazil, India, and Turkey, notably – deficiencies in domestic governance systems have led to popular protests and demands for qualitative improvements, which are sometimes resisted by the authorities. At the regional and global level, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey have all been pushing for greater leadership roles; at the same time, the precise content of these roles has been changing, too. These changes are driven, on the one hand, by the democratic emerging powers’ increasing economic clout, and their resulting aspiration for a greater say in regional and global affairs, and on the other hand, their evolving identities as emerging democracies. In regional contexts, this has produced more leadership claims by the democratic emerging powers, who are aiming to put issues – including greater respect for democracy and human rights – on the regional agenda, frame debates around them, and persuade others to move along. Neighbouring states, who had long insisted on their national sovereignty and rejected any interference in their domestic affairs, are slowly becoming more receptive, although they remain concerned about new forms of regional dominance and (economic) imperialism. In global settings, the democratic emerging powers have gained greater clout in the context of international trade negotiations, and they have become part of global governance mechanisms such as the G20. At the same time, they have refused – mostly – to join Western-led efforts to deliver a range of “global public goods” – including democracy and greater respect for human rights – largely out of distrust for Western motives and for fear of being instrumentalised in the interest of hidden agendas.

Processes such as these are by their very nature open-ended. Importantly, they encompass policy establishments, policymakers, and state bureaucracies – they are not limited just to

14 There is some overlap between Moravcsik’s liberal brand of international relations theory and the constructivist strand as formulated, for example, by Alexander Wendt (1992), in the sense that both see value orientations and social identities as central for the formulation of foreign policy. Realists and institutionalists, by contrast, hold that states act according to their material interests – guaranteeing their survival and maximising their power – which are essentially seen as constant. Liberalism and constructivism do differ in important ways: liberalism attaches greater importance to processes of interest formulation and political representation, whereas constructivism puts greater emphasis on the power of ideas and the meanings that individuals and societies attach to their surroundings.

15 The democratic emerging powers themselves long supported the non-interference principle – and to some extent still do – due to their roots in the Non-Aligned Movement (where India and Indonesia played especially prominent roles).
mobilised sectors of civil society or economic operators – with crucial implications for how states see themselves and what they consider to be “in their best interest.” Before coming back to these issues in the conclusion to this paper, the following second section will take a closer look at what the democratic emerging powers – India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey – have or have not done to advance democracy in their respective regions. More specifically, it will ask what motivated the respective policies, how obstacles and challenges were addressed, as well as what distinguished the different approaches.

3 The democratic emerging countries as democracy supporters

3.1 India: doing more while being seen to be doing less

Origins and drivers

Despite continuous support for democracy at home, Indian foreign policy regarding the promotion of democracy abroad has undergone some significant shifts over the years.16 Basically, these shifts can be broken down into three distinct phases (Muni 2009), reflecting a struggle between India’s commitment to democratic values, the careful consideration of its security and economic interests along with the need to contain the fractiousness of its own polity (Mehta 2011, 102) and, more recently, a re-evaluation of its place in the region and in the world.

The first, post-independence phase under Jawaharlal Nehru was characterised by, on the one hand, a strong commitment to democratic values and institutions, stemming from India’s struggle for independence, and on the other hand, an equally strong sense of India’s insecurity as a relatively weak country in an inhospitable region. The result was a constant balancing act that saw India support the principles of national independence and self-determination, particularly in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), but at the same time resist democratic aspirations in neighbouring countries when these threatened regional stability. In the second, post-Nehruvian phase, interest-based calculations became more prominent and expressions of support for democratic rule abroad less frequent, not coincidentally at the same time as Indian democracy faced threats at home, stemming from the imposition of emergency legislation under Indira Gandhi. The third phase, following the end of the Cold War, broke with this pattern and saw a cautious expansion of India’s democracy promotion activities abroad, driven by its changing role in

16 India has been a democratic state since the promulgation of its constitution in 1950, following its independence from Britain in 1947. Democratic rule has been continuous – with the exception of a twenty-one-month period of emergency rule in the mid-1970s, for which the ruling Congress Party was promptly punished at the polls. India’s democracy is not perfect: the list of shortcomings is long, ranging from long-standing discrimination on the basis of caste or gender, to vastly unequal access to basic services such as health and education, and serious governance deficits, including pervasive corruption and an over-sized, under-performing bureaucracy. In the face of these challenges, public support for democracy has remained strong, but Indian democracy has also become more fractious and contentious, with more intense competition among different elites (which produces coalition governments more frequently) and more frequent and vocal protests by marginalised and disadvantaged groups (such as the recent mass mobilisations against rape and ill-treatment of women). See also Chitalkar / Malone (2011).
regional and world affairs but always tempered by continued concerns with its own security.

Policies and initiatives

One of the key factors in India’s decision to become more active in the democracy promotion arena was its rapprochement with the United States following the end of the Cold War (Mohan 2007, 100; Cartwright 2009, 405), prompted by realignments in regional alliance patterns and the loss of its privileged partnership with the Soviet Union. At the request of the United States, India became a founding member of the Community of Democracies (CD), an intergovernmental organisation established in 2000 to support emerging democracies and civil society worldwide, as well as the UN Democracy Caucus, which first met in 2004 to improve coordination among CD member countries at the United Nations. India also became the second-largest financial contributor to the UN Democracy Fund (after the United States), set up in 2005 by the UN Secretary-General to support democratisation efforts around the world.

At the same time, India was careful not to align itself too closely with the United States, so as to maintain some margin to manoeuvre in its relations with other states and not to compromise its stature as an emerging power in its own right. Consequently, India refused to take on the leadership of the UN Democracy Caucus (Parthasarathy 2000), preferring to remain an ordinary member instead. Its role on the UN Democracy Fund, despite its significant financial contribution, has also remained rather low-key. On a number of issues, India parted ways with the United States and other Western states, such as in its voting behaviour on human rights issues at the UN.17

Within its own region, India has displayed the same ambiguity between principled support for democracy, on the one hand, and the pragmatic pursuit of its own interests, on the other. While certainly more activist than before and more ready to offer assistance to neighbouring countries, India always made sure that its democracy support would not undermine other important foreign policy objectives, particularly shielding the country from political instability, hemming in regional competitors such as Pakistan, and countering the rise of China. Generally speaking, India’s democracy support has been stronger when its values and interests were aligned, such as in the case of Afghanistan or Nepal, and somewhat weaker when no important interests were at stake, as in Bhutan or the Maldives (Cartwright 2009). When India’s interests collided with its values, as in the case of Myanmar, the former would prevail.

Considered a “model case” by India’s external affairs ministry,18 Afghanistan has seen the most significant engagement by India to help build democracy in neighbouring countries (D’Souza 2013), as part of a comprehensive aid package that made Afghanistan the second-largest recipient of Indian assistance after Bhutan (Chaturvedi 2012, 569). Supported activities have included the construction of a new parliament building, parliamentary

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17 Piccone (2011) shows that India, just like Indonesia and South Africa, has often privileged the defence of national sovereignty over that of human rights in its votes on the UN Human Rights Council and in the UN General Assembly. Recent trends, however, are more favourable (Piccone 2011, 151).

training of Afghan officials in India, a contribution to a UNDP-financed project to help establish the Afghani legislature, as well as different forms of electoral assistance. While in line with India’s democratic values, these activities have also bolstered its strategic interests, namely, to reduce the risk that fragility and instability in Afghanistan could spread to India itself – notably to Kashmir – and to balance the influence of its main regional rival, Pakistan.

In Nepal, India was more hesitant to engage at first, fearful that supporting Nepal’s Maoist opposition movement might encourage its own Naxalite insurgency. It only changed tack after substantial prodding by the United States and once it became clear that King Gyanendra’s defeat had become all but inevitable. As such, India’s engagement might appear as solely driven by “short-term stability concerns” (Destradi 2012, 286), but this overlooks the fact that India had also opposed the Nepalese monarch when he seized power in 2005, stopping its arms supplies in response (Cartwright 2009, 410). Subsequent to the restoration of democracy in 2006, India provided substantial support to the peace process and significantly increased its overall assistance to Nepal (Chaturvedi 2012, 569). Overall, India’s actions appear consistent with its democratic principles although clearly, they also served its interest in regional stability, by creating a pathway for Nepal’s Maoist rebels to lay down their arms and integrate themselves into the political mainstream (with possible demonstration effects for India’s own Naxalite rebels). Resisting a possible increase in China’s influence was also an important consideration.

Bhutan and the Maldives both saw more modest engagement by India in support of local democracy. In Bhutan, India’s democracy support – while significant – pales in comparison with its overall assistance to the country, traditionally its largest aid recipient. While undoubtedly strategically important, India’s interests in Bhutan are not threatened – by regional competitors or by the risk of internal disturbances spreading to India proper – making a larger engagement unnecessary. In the Maldives, India responded to requests for its expertise in building democratic institutions (Cartwright 2009, 413). While of lesser strategic importance, the Maldives presented a win-win scenario and an opportunity to burnish India’s image at little cost to itself.

Myanmar, finally, is the clearest example of India’s strategic and security interests overruling and cancelling out its support for democratic principles and human rights. After first opposing the military coup against Aung San Suu Kyi in 1988, India reversed course in the mid-1990s and – despite much criticism from Western governments and international human rights groups – began to pursue a policy of “constructive engagement” with the Myanmar military regime, resulting in intensified cooperation in areas such as border management, energy security, and even defence (Mohan 2007, 111 f.; Cartwright 2009, 413 ff.). The shift was motivated by several factors, among them concerns that the Myanmar military might shelter rebels from India’s restive north-eastern region, but had its main root in the fear that China might gain a foothold on India’s sensitive eastern flank. Intensified economic competition – expressed in India’s “Look East” strategy – was also a factor. Subsequent to the recent democratic opening in Myanmar, it remains to be seen if India will revert to playing a role as a democracy promoter (Roepstorff 2013).
Assessment and outlook

India’s democracy promotion policies are best seen as part of its growing role in regional and world affairs. More assertive and interventionist than before, India has remained a cautious democracy promoter, often acting at the prodding of the United States but careful not to align itself too closely with the West. With the exception of Myanmar, India’s support for democracy has been genuine, although the country has never lost sight of its strategic interests, and the danger that changes in its regional environment could deepen existing cleavages in its own fractious polity.

An even more assertive stance, building on its own experience of constructing a multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious democracy in a developmental context, would buttress India’s regional – and global – leadership ambitions. This might include greater Indian involvement in democracy promotion efforts beyond its own region, for example in Africa, where India has important economic interests. But for now at least, the potential costs are seen as too high, particularly the fear that a too-assertive stance on democracy and human rights would sharpen regional divisions and play into the hands of India’s systemic rival, China. Such a stance would also attract attention to the many deficiencies in India’s own democratic system.

Immediate changes to this panorama are not on the horizon (Mallavarapu 2010, 59; Faust / Wagner 2010, 3). Over time, such changes could come from a variety of sources, including growing domestic pressures for improvements to India’s own democracy, which could also lead to calls for more consistency in its regional and global posture. But a true break in India’s current posture would require a less risk-prone regional environment and a less intense rivalry with China.

3.2 Brazil: democratic champion or soft hegemon?

Origins and drivers

Brazil’s approach to supporting democracy elsewhere reflects a genuine commitment to democratic norms and principles stemming from its own transition to democratic rule in 1985, but also an evolving sense of the country’s interests stemming from its growing role in regional and global affairs and a continuing insistence on the principle of non-
interference in other nations’ affairs. The tensions between these different drivers have manifested themselves in different ways during the successive administrations of Presidents Cardoso, Lula and most recently, Dilma, but all post-authoritarian presidents in Brazil have been keen to increase their country’s regional and global stature and to distinguish its democracy promotion policies from those of its powerful neighbour to the north, the United States.

Brazil’s democracy promotion policies can be subdivided into three distinct phases. Under Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the country focused mostly on the defence of democratic legality and constitutions via regional and sub-regional organisations, particularly the Organization of American States (OAS). At the same time, Brazil refused to interfere when democratic principles were eroded in more subtle ways. During Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s tenure, Brazil continued to intervene in cases of democratic interruptions in OAS member states, but began putting more emphasis on sub-regional organisations where Brazil had more clout. Non-interference also became the rationale for a shift in Brazil’s human rights posture at the United Nations, where it refused to condemn the practices of a number of autocratic regimes, voting against the West but siding with other emerging powers such as Indonesia or India. More recently, Dilma Rousseff returned Brazil to its traditional human rights posture at the UN, while otherwise following in the footsteps of her predecessors and pursuing Lula’s initiatives reaching out to other lusophone countries, particularly in Africa.

Policies and initiatives

Brazil’s post-authoritarian constitution contains a pledge to stand up for democratic norms and principles elsewhere, but it remained dormant until F. H. Cardoso became president in 1995.20 The country’s changed approach especially to its hemispheric relations, which manifested itself in a number of interventions when the democratic order in OAS member states was threatened, is generally seen as a step forward in protecting and promoting the cause of democracy in the Americas (Santiso 2002 / 2003; Burges / Daudelin 2007; Burges 2008; Stuenkel 2013). Notably, Brazil stepped in to halt attempted coups in Paraguay in 1999 and in Venezuela in 2002, and also intervened in several other crisis situations, such as again in Paraguay in 1999 and 2000. Working mostly through regional and sub-regional organisations, Brazil was instrumental in putting in place a set of legal rules and mechanisms to protect and defend the democratic order in the western hemisphere (Santiso 2003, 400).

At the same time, Brazil remained reluctant to intervene in what it considered the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, including procedural matters and challenges to democratic rules and principles that stopped just short of threatening the democratic order as such. For example, Brazil remained silent when Ecuadorian president Jamil Mahuad was...

20 Article 4 of the Brazilian constitution mentions the “prevalence of human rights” and the “self-determination of the peoples” as principles governing Brazil’s international relations. Previous presidents José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco had maintained Brazil’s strict non-interference posture, although José Sarney did agree to a reference to democracy being included in the preamble of a new OAS charter (Stuenkel 2013, 343).

21 Including democracy clauses in the charters of the OAS, MERCOSUL (Mercado Comum do Sul) and UNASUL.
removed from his post in 2000 and refused to censure Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori for manipulating the presidential elections in his country in the same year, allowing him to remain in office.\(^{22}\) Brazil also defended Venezuela from external criticism regarding its democratic record, but never endorsed its alternative model of popular, “Bolivarian” democracy, which it shared with Ecuador, Bolivia, and others. In essence, Brazil insisted that determining the shape and functioning of their own democratic systems was up to the countries concerned, which amounted to a less interventionist approach to democracy promotion than that favoured by the United States.

Brazil’s insistence on developing its own distinct approach to democracy promotion became even more pronounced under the subsequent Lula administration.\(^{23}\) Continuing to intervene in constitutional and other crises that threatened the democratic order, such as in Bolivia in 2004 and 2005 (Burges 2008, 79) or in Ecuador in 2005 (Stuenkel 2013, 344), Brazil made greater use of bilateral channels or used sub-regional organisations where its influence was greater. In 2009, Brazil disagreed with the United States over the best way of dealing with the coup in Honduras, rallying many Latin American countries behind it.\(^{24}\) Brazil also parted ways with the United States and other Western nations in its approach to left-leaning regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia, or Ecuador, insisting that their electoral practices, treatment of the judiciary and adversarial relations with the media and the political opposition were within democratic norms and therefore internal matters that required no outside interference.

Under Lula’s presidency, Brazil also became more active internationally, taking over the lead of the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004 and offering electoral assistance to other lusophone countries, namely Guinea-Bissau in 2004 and Timor Leste in 2011 (Stuenkel 2013, 345). This more interventionist stance contrasted with Brazil’s human rights posture at the UN, where it opposed sanctions against authoritarian regimes both on the UN Human Rights Council and within the General Assembly (Piccone 2011), on the grounds that this would constitute an interference into their sovereign affairs. This posture, which arguably had its roots in Brazil’s unsuccessful campaign for a permanent seat at on the United Nations Security Council rather than a genuine shift in Brazil’s attitude towards democracy and human rights, was later rectified by Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff (Lins da Silva 2011). Dilma also signalled that Brazil was prepared to take even stronger action against breaches of the democratic order closer to home, suspending Paraguay from MERCOSUL (Mercado Comum do Sul) after the impeachment of President Fernando Lago, in concert with the leaders of Argentina and Uruguay (Stuenkel 2013, 345).

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\(^{22}\) Brazil later did support the Inter-American Democratic Charter, aimed squarely at such interruptions of the constitutional order.

\(^{23}\) See Almeida (2013) for an account of the recent evolution of Brazil’s foreign policy thinking, including the doctrines of “non-indifference” and “responsibility while protecting” developed under the Lula administration.

\(^{24}\) Following the coup against President Manuel Zelaya, the United States joined the rest of the region in ousting Honduras from the Organization of American States (OAS). But subsequently, it parted ways with Brazil and others in recognising the legitimacy of the elections that brought Porfirio Lobo to power, advocating Honduras’s reinstatement to the regional body (Lacey 2010).
Assessment and outlook

Brazil’s commitment to democracy is generally seen as genuine, despite significant flaws in its democratic system. The country has done much to make democratic rules and principles take root across the Latin America continent, particularly at the regional and sub-regional level. At the same time, there is widespread agreement that Brazil has often fallen short in advancing these goals, within its own region as well as in the international arena. In particular, in focusing mainly on legal and procedural requirements, Brazil has done little to share its own rich experience in building democratic systems under developmental conditions, which includes devising inclusive economic and social policies and strategies favouring the participation of marginalised populations, such as the participatory budget experience in Porto Alegre. The reasons for this state of affairs, on the other hand, remain contested.

Carlos Santiso, for example, sees the reasons for Brazil’s shortcomings in its adherence to two contradictory norms: its commitment to promote and protect democracy abroad, on the one hand, and its respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in other nations’ affairs, on the other. In order to become a more forceful democracy promoter, Brazil would need to “resolve the inherent tension” between these two opposing poles (Santiso 2003, 357). Burges and Daudelin challenge this explanation, arguing that instead of “weaving democratic consolidation into its very fabric” (Burges / Daudelin 2007, 129), Brazil has always given preference to its national interests – gaining greater security and influence. Democracy promotion has been a Brazilian foreign policy priority only to the extent that it could be reconciled with these other, more vital goals, which explains Brazil’s lacklustre performance in this area.

The view taken here is that while democracy promotion can and sometimes does clash with other national interests, it is not clear that “hard” interests will always take precedence over more “aspirational” ones. Viewed in this light, democracy and its promotion can be seen as an integral part of Brazil’s national interests, which are being reconfigured to account for Brazil’s changing stature both within its own region and at the global level. Put differently, Brazil’s growing influence – and indeed, its security – depend to a large extent on the continued success of its own democratic model, which gives it substantial soft power and the ability to win over others to its own positions. Of course, this is not to say that Brazil by necessity will become a more energetic democracy supporter in the future, nor that it will resist the impulse of promoting the interests of its growing economy at the expense of greater respect for democratic principles or human rights (Romero 2011).

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25 Despite the impressive array of cases reviewed by Burges / Daudelin (2007), the evidence remains inconclusive. In the case of the 2009 coup in Honduras, for example, Brazil principled defence of democracy clashed with the United States’ more lenient stance. For some – notably the “Atlanticists” in Brazil’s foreign policy community – this would run counter to Brazil’s national interest of always having good relations with its powerful neighbour to the north.

26 Sean Burges, in a subsequent article (Burges 2008), argues that Brazil has had much success in establishing a Gramscian “consensual hegemony” in its region, which he differentiates explicitly from coercive hegemony on neorealist terms (Burges 2008, 67).
3.3 South Africa: from a sense of mission to a sense of drift

Origins and drivers

South Africa’s approach to promoting democracy beyond its own borders is marked by a commitment to democratic principles – even a sense of mission, at least initially – stemming from its own transition to democratic rule in overcoming the previous apartheid regime. But it is also influenced by the country’s economic and strategic interests in a region where it faces few security threats but many economic opportunities, as well as considerations of how South Africa wants to fill its newly-acquired leadership role on the sub-Saharan continent as well as beyond. Three distinct phases can be identified, which roughly coincide with the administrations of the three immediate post-apartheid presidents: Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Jacob Zuma.

Under Nelson Mandela, normative drivers clearly had the upper hand, resulting in a highly activist approach that saw South Africa assume a strong moral leadership role in promoting democracy on the African continent. With Thabo Mbeki, as the costs and risks inherent in this approach became clearer, this posture changed and South Africa became more concerned to act in concert with other African countries. Jacob Zuma continued most of the policies of his predecessor, but increasing concerns over deficiencies in South Africa’s own democratic system under his tenure shifted the emphasis away from South Africa’s role as an external democracy promoter.

Policies and initiatives

Even before his formal inauguration as South Africa’s first post-apartheid president, Nelson Mandela made it clear that the foreign policy of his country would henceforth be guided by human rights concerns. Writing in the journal Foreign Affairs, Nelson Mandela stressed that his administration would not just concentrate on building a new, multi-racial democracy within South Africa proper, following the long years of rule by the white minority, but that his country would be “at the forefront of global efforts to promote and foster democratic systems of government” (Mandela 1993, 87).

Meant to draw inspiration from South Africa’s own success in overcoming the apartheid regime and aimed primarily at South Africa’s neighbours, both within the southern African region and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, this policy proved difficult to implement in practice. Mandela’s diplomatic démarches to isolate Nigeria’s military government following the execution of activist Ken Saro Wiwa proved fruitless; if anything, they height-
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ened South Africa’s own isolation among its fellow African states. South African efforts to resolve armed conflicts in its region, seen as a key step towards more democratic governance, were equally unsuccessful. A direct military intervention in Lesotho ended in humiliating failure, and attempts to mediate between the warring parties in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exposed a deep split within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), pitting South Africa against Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia (Landsberg 2000, 112 ff.; Barber 2005, 1085 f.). In the end, South Africa had to realize that it could not impose its will on other African states, despite its vastly superior resources, and that it had to find common ground with those that it wanted to influence.

Perhaps more than anything, South Africa proved vulnerable to charges that it was breaking rank and doing the West’s bidding, and that its expansionary trade and economic policies were perpetuating the dependency relations created under the previous apartheid regime. Mindful of these criticisms and keen to improve South Africa’s relations with its African peers, Nelson Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, therefore toned down the rhetoric of South African leadership and exceptionalism and instead emphasised the value of African solidarity and “African renaissance.” This new attitude found its expression in the Mbeki administration’s flagship initiative, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), meant to promote better governance by way of voluntary, reciprocal reviews among NEPAD members themselves. In support of these initiatives, South Africa established a special funding window, the African Renaissance and Cooperation Fund, which, along with the continued promotion of democracy and good governance as well as conflict prevention, now also targeted socio-economic development and integration, as well as humanitarian assistance and human resource development.

South Africa’s embrace of African solidarity also made it modify its approach to peace missions on the African continent: the country now preferred to act under the common roof of the African Union (AU) or the United Nations (UN), at the same time becoming one of the largest contributors. Lending credence to South Africa’s claim that it preferred to act in concert with fellow African states, this strategy was also meant to help South Africa’s quest for a greater role at the UN – including a permanent seat on the UN Security Council – both with limited success. Along with becoming more southern-focused, South Africa also became less interventionist in human rights matters, repeatedly parting ways with Western countries in the context of the UN General Assembly or the Human Rights Council.

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28 Western states were equally unhelpful, continuing to buy Nigeria’s oil and refusing to institute sanctions as Mandela had demanded (Barber 2005, 1084; Landsberg 2000, 112).
29 See for example, Adebajo (2007) or Bond (2013).
30 See Vale and Taylor (1999) for a more detailed discussion of this notion.
31 That is, without any privileged role for South Africa and certainly without any participation by Western democracy promoters. The effectiveness of the APRM in driving democratic change has been questioned (Barber 2005, 1090).
32 At the same time, the ANC softened its position on human rights, noting that there existed multiple interpretations and effectively subordinating human rights to broader concepts such as “democracy” or “good governance” (Barber 2005, 1087).
33 With regard to the civil war in the DRC, South Africa was unable to overcome the split within SADC that continued to pit it against states such as Zimbabwe that favoured a military resolution (Barber 2005, 1090 f.). At the UN, South Africa likewise was unable to make much headway.
Rights Council and refusing to sanction the human rights practices of authoritarian countries (*The Economist*, 14 October 2010; Piccone 2011).

With regard to its immediate neighbours, South Africa likewise displayed a much more lenient attitude than before, particularly in the case of Zimbabwe, where it tolerated obvious human rights abuses by the ruling Mugabe regime and, arguably, failed to deploy its real influence in order to hasten democratic change. The reasons for this stance – while not entirely clear – seem to go beyond pure interest calculations, especially since South Africa’s interests in this instance did not all point in the same direction. Specifically, fears for a repeat of the Nigeria episode and the resulting isolation of South Africa within SADC and the broader African community, as well as for political instability surrounding the sensitive land issue spreading to South Africa proper, were counter-balanced by an equally large risk that – absent a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis – increased migration to South Africa would heighten xenophobia at home, where violence surrounding regional migrants was already a significant threat to human security. In addition, too much leniency towards the Zimbabwean regime risked damaging South Africa’s international standing as a champion of human rights and good governance, with potential ripple effects also for its economic interests. In the end, ideological motivators, particularly the wish to maintain “African solidarity” in the face of persistent criticism from Western states, may have proved the decisive factor.34

Hopes that Thabo Mbeki’s successor, Jacob Zuma, would return South Africa to its earlier, much stronger position in defence of human rights and democracy were quickly dashed. Instead, the Zuma administration continued along the main lines developed under Mbeki, placing a premium on maintaining non-confrontational relations with fellow African states, collectively defending against outside interference in human rights matters, particularly by the International Court of Justice (Thipanyane 2011, 3f.), while continuing its non-interference stance at the United Nations, and maintaining South Africa’s non-confrontational, if not particularly effective, stance towards Zimbabwe.35 Along with ideological and programmatic affinities, this “pragmatic” attitude by the Zuma administration was motivated in part by a concern not to jeopardise the ongoing expansion of South Africa’s economy on the continent, particularly in light of growing criticism of South Africa’s increasing economic dominance. In addition, the mounting and increasingly visible deficiencies in South Africa’s own democratic system – mentioned just above – made it more difficult to preach the virtues of democratic governance and respect for human rights to others.

*Assessment and outlook*

South Africa’s approach to external democracy promotion has seen significant changes over the years. What started as an activist approach driven by normative considerations soon became a more restrained posture in which interest calculations – both strategic and  

34 See Barber (2005) and Nathan (2005) for a more detailed discussion.  
35 The establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), which is meant to absorb the African Renaissance and Cooperation Fund, did constitute a new development. Promoting democracy outside South Africa remains one of the agency’s goals, but it remains to be seen whether institutional changes will have an impact on actual policies. See Vickers (2012).
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economic – played a larger role than before. The drivers behind these shifts have been varied: apart from a genuine commitment to democratic principles and human rights stemming from the transition period – which persists although may be weakening – they are related to a more realistic assessment of South Africa’s capabilities to influence its neighbours, as well as of the costs and benefits associated with democracy promotion policies in a fairly unreceptive environment. The embrace of the ideas of African solidarity and African renaissance likewise had a dampening effect on South Africa’s democracy promotion posture, leading the country to become more lenient in the face of human rights violations, particularly in neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe.

South Africa has clearly adapted its democracy promotion stance to external influences, but domestic developments have also played an important role. Especially worrying have been the growing corruption and mismanagement in the public sector, which has put a strain on the democratic fabric, and the disregard for democratic governance principles shown by the ruling ANC government itself, for example, in trying to silence its critics by imposing stricter controls on the independent media and the judiciary (Roth 2013, 159 ff.). Taken together, these developments have harmed South Africa’s credibility as a supporter of democracy both within and beyond its own borders.

The outlook for the coming years is unclear. Much will depend on the future evolution of South Africa’s political system, which has shown signs of moving away from the ideals of the “rainbow nation” and towards a form of one-party rule, as well as the strength of the country’s civil society, particularly pro-democracy groups within civil society and the media. What role South Africa will want to play in regional and global settings – particularly the extent to which it will want to pursue its own, especially economic, interests – will likewise be important.

3.4 Indonesia: a giant with feet of clay?

Origins and drivers

Indonesia began to promote democracy beyond its own borders only once its own transition was more secure, and its new identity as a modern, democratic Muslim nation more firmly established. The respective policies were driven, initially, by a desire to improve Indonesia’s international image which had suffered in the wake of post-transition turmoil and the country’s heavy-handed intervention in East Timor, but also by a genuine commitment to democratic values and principles stemming from its own transition, as well as Indonesia’s own self-interest in both internal and external political stability, given its size

36 Indonesia became a democratic state only in 1998, having long insisted on the benefits of its authoritarian development model. Its democratic transition was precipitated by the Asian financial crisis of the previous year, which led to the collapse of the long-standing authoritarian regime of President Suharto and subsequent political reforms (“reformasi”). Following a rather rocky post-transition phase, Indonesia’s democratic regime stabilised after a few years and subsequently became a champion for more democracy also in its surrounding region. While benefitting from strong support by key policymakers, as well as influential civil society groups and media outlets, Indonesia’s young democracy is still plagued by numerous deficiencies, among them “corruption, terrorism, communal tensions, weak law-enforcement and, more recently, growing religious intolerance” (Sukma 2011, 118).
and exposure as a far-flung island nation. A first phase under President Megawati Sukarnoputri saw a heavy emphasis on regional organisations, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), resulting in the reform of its charter and the establishment of a new human rights commission. In a second, more recent phase under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyone, Indonesia proved willing to also go beyond regional instruments and to push for more democracy even in the absence of a regional consensus, using unilateral initiatives such as the Bali Democracy Forum. Still reluctant to interfere directly in the affairs of neighbouring states, Indonesia now seems somewhat less wedded to the non-interference principle, long a mainstay of its foreign policy.

Policies and initiatives

The onset of Indonesia’s democracy promotion policies was preceded by a period immediately following the transition to democratic rule, during which the country took steps to repair its battered international image and to entrench and consolidate its still-fragile democratic regime (Sukma 2011, 111 f.). The post-transition period in Indonesia had proved to be a fairly messy affair, with numerous new entrants into the political arena (Laksmana 2011, 159), bickering and infighting among the elites, and concerns – particularly in the West – over the growing influence of Islamist movements on Indonesia’s polity. Subsequent administrations therefore took steps to project a democratic image of the country to the outside world – for example, by signing on to a number of international human rights treaties – and to erase the memories of Indonesia’s ill-fated, and ultimately unsuccessful intervention to stop East Timor’s independence movement. At the same time, they endeavoured to entrench a new democratic identity among the country’s citizens, premised on the notion that policymaking – including the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign affairs – would now be subject to greater public scrutiny and that all relevant actors would have their place, provided they abided by democratic rules and principles.37

Indonesia’s first real foray into the democracy promotion arena came with its initiative to reform ASEAN, which had some success despite repeated set-backs along the way (Dosch 2008; Sukma 2011, 114; Anwar 2010, 132 ff.). Beginning in 2003 with the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which for the first time mentioned democracy and rights as core values of ASEAN, Indonesia was the driving force behind the revision of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, which now listed respect for and protection of human rights among its fundamental principles. The revised charter also provided for the creation of an ASEAN human rights body, which was finally established in 2009, albeit with a much weaker mandate than what the Indonesian government – and pro-democracy actors within Indonesia’s civil society – had originally envisaged.

Despite these qualified successes, Indonesian policymakers became increasingly frustrated with the inherent limitations in ASEAN’s human rights and democracy regime, particularly the lack of an effective sanctions mechanism and that of a mandate to promote – and not just protect – human rights and democratic principles. These limitations became glar-

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37 Anwar notes that within the administration as well, there were now multiple “power centres” influencing foreign policy decisions. The power of Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR), in particular, had “increased exponentially” (Anwar 2010, 128 ff.) and now rivalled that of the Foreign Affairs ministry. See also Laksmana (2011, 163 f.).
Promoting democracy. What role for the democratic emerging powers?

Inevitably obvious in ASEAN’s inability to put pressure on Myanmar to enact political reforms, due in large part to the organisation’s continued reluctance to interfere in the domestic affairs of its member states. As a result, Indonesian policymakers and influential opinion leaders began calling for a “post-ASEAN” foreign policy (Anwar 2010, 135) or at least an alternate route to pursue their pro-democracy objectives, which in 2008 gave birth to the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). A unilateral initiative of the Indonesian government, the BDF seeks to promote cooperation on peace and democracy through dialogue and the sharing of experiences and best practices. Now in its sixth year, the forum has attracted high-level participation by heads of state and government but little in the way of concrete results or lessons learned (Kleden 2012).

Assessment and outlook

Indonesia’s commitment to democracy and its promotion abroad appears firmly rooted in pro-democratic value orientations that are broadly shared among key policymakers – including an assertive and vocal legislature – and reinforced by a critical public sphere that comprises activist civil society groups and attentive media outlets. Promoting democracy also appears to be in the best interest of Indonesia’s young democratic regime, not in the realist sense of projecting its economic or military power at the expense of surrounding states, but as a means of enhancing regional collaboration with the goal of containing the many internal and external sources of instability that the country faces. Conceiving of its interests in this way goes hand-in-hand with Indonesia’s emerging identity as a democratic power which seeks not to use force but to rally others around shared goals.38 Enacting this identity via practical foreign policy, however, is still a “work in progress”.

A frequent criticism of Indonesia’s democracy promotion record is that the country stays true to its principles within its own region, but reneges on them in the international realm. Indonesia’s voting record at the United Nations is indeed questionable: on several occasions, the country has refused to condemn the human rights practices of states such as North Korea, Iran, or even Myanmar, siding with authoritarian regimes instead of the West (Piccone 2011, 143). Observers have attributed this attitude to continuities in Indonesia’s foreign policy, notably its traditional defence of the non-interference principle,39 a lack of attention by domestic civil society actors and the media to UN matters, as well as, more fundamentally, to serious doubts on the part of Indonesia’s rulers regarding the effectiveness of public “naming and shaming” campaigns favoured by the West. Even within its own region, Indonesia has often tempered its critique notably of Myanmar – albeit taking a more critical stance than fellow ASEAN countries – in the hope of retaining some leverage over the Myanmar junta. In addition, Indonesia, just like other ASEAN countries, has not wanted to drive Myanmar into the arms of extra-regional powers – particularly China but also India – which are keen to increase their influence in the region at ASEAN’s expense.

38 There has been some debate as to whether the country’s emerging democratic identity is genuinely new (Sukma 2011, 112 ff.; Anwar 2010, 132 f.) or rather, a different expression of a national identity – and corresponding national interests – that have always had a moral foundation (Laksmana 2011, 159).

39 As mentioned, there are indications that this position is softening. Sukma (2011, 113) for example, quotes Indonesia’s foreign minister Wirajuda as saying that “violations of human rights in a country can no longer be seen as internal matters. ASEAN should not hide behind the principle of non-interference.”
A related criticism is that Indonesia’s democracy promotion policies have failed to produce tangible results: its focus on reforming ASEAN in particular had yielded little more than a string of pronouncements and “a mile-long paper trail” (Suryodiningrat 2004). This would not do justice to the real transformation of the organisation over the past years – previously a club of autocracies or semi-autocracies, all of which now recognise democracy and respect for human rights as foundational principles – but it is true that past achievements are no longer enough. ASEAN is in dire need of an effective sanctions regime that could be applied to punish breaches of democracy and human rights violations in the region, possibly modelled on similar provisions in the charter of the OAS or the European Union (EU) treaties. Indonesia, in turn, could take a stronger stance against offending states, within its own region and beyond, distancing itself further from the non-interference principle. At the same time, it could start to offer bilateral assistance, drawing on its own experiences in building democratic institutions and benefitting from its vocal and active civil society. Obviously, addressing the many deficiencies in its own democratic polity – mentioned earlier – would help to make such assistance more useful and enhance Indonesia’s credibility. Without such steps, criticisms that Indonesia’s policies are more about “democracy projection” than actual promotion (Sukma 2011, 122) and that ASEAN has failed to progress from accepting democracy to actively enforcing and promoting it (Dosch 2008, 542) will continue to ring true.

3.5 Turkey: a model under siege

Origins and drivers

Turkey differs in two important ways from the other democratic emerging powers discussed in this paper: 

First, its transition to democratic rule is inextricably linked with its longstanding ambition to become a member of the European Union. Turkey’s membership perspective has provided it with a powerful external incentive to adopt the same basic rules concerning democratic governance and respect for human rights that all EU members have to abide by; at the same time, it has provided an “anchor” for those within Turkey who had been pushing for political and economic reforms for a long time. Second, despite Turkey’s qualified success in consolidating and developing its young democratic regime, as well as an increasingly pro-active foreign policy, the country has yet to develop
actual policies to promote democracy beyond its own borders. Instead, Turkey has relied mostly on passive demonstration and diffusion effects, notwithstanding the considerable attention that the “Turkish model” has received particularly in the Middle East and North Africa.

Policies and initiatives

Turkey’s foreign policy was long held back by its colonial past, making countries in its region, especially those that had been part of the Ottoman empire, suspicious of any perceived rise in Turkey’s power and influence. This situation changed with the advent of the AKP government’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Justice and Development Party) “zero problems” foreign policy, spearheaded by foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (Davutoğlu 2010, 2012). Designed to settle all outstanding issues between Turkey and its neighbours, and predicated on a new commitment to democracy, international partnerships, and the use of soft power instead of military force, the new policy was also an expression of Turkey’s ambition to play a larger role in its region than before, albeit by different means. At the same time, the new policy was firmly anchored in Turkey’s longstanding strategic orientation towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, raising expectations for increased collaboration between Turkey and the West.42

Putting Turkey’s relations with its neighbours on a new footing, its new foreign policy also facilitated the further regional expansion of its economy, based on an economic boom that had started in the mid-1980s and produced a more than ten-fold increase in per-capita incomes, in tandem with the rise of the manufacturing and service economies and the relative decline of the agricultural sector (Kirişçi 2011, 37). Along with the structural transformation of its economy – which also produced profound social changes, notably the rise of a new middle class – Turkey’s regional trade increased exponentially and its economic operators – among them supermarket chains, transport or construction companies – came to own important stakes in the economies of surrounding nations (Kirişçi 2011, 38). Together with the political transformations resulting from its embracement of democracy and its new, more conciliatory foreign policy, Turkey’s resounding economic success produced powerful demonstration and diffusion effects that were not lost on surrounding states.

Most of these effects have been indirect and not the result of deliberate policies – as mentioned, Turkey has no democracy promotion policies as such. Rather, the living example of a Muslim state that had – seemingly – managed to transform its political system, reorient its external relations, as well as jumpstart its stagnant economy proved highly inspirational for many in the Middle East grappling with similar challenges (Al-Azm 2011). At the same time, the interactions between Turkish business people and their counterparts from neighbouring countries, the increasing popularity of Turkish TV and other media throughout the region, as well as the growing number of academic exchanges – Turkey is receiving an increasing number of foreign students – have brought Turkey’s neighbours

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42 See, for example, Segal (2011) or Saunders (2011). Kahraman (2011) warns that in the absence of further “normative reconciliation” with the EU and continued progress in Turkey’s accession process, the two may drift apart and end up competing, as opposed to cooperating, with one another.
face-to-face with the effects of the country’s internal transformations (Kirişçi 2011, 39 ff.).

When Turkey did intervene more directly in regional affairs, it was to advance peace processes or to mediate and help resolve regional sources of conflict, not to promote democratisation per se. For example, Turkey tried to help improve relations between Palestinians and Israelis, or Shiias and Sunnis in Iraq, and it made efforts to address the Cyprus question or its fraught relations with Armenia. These initiatives, and Turkey’s more conciliatory approach to its neighbourhood overall, were well received but fell short of the declared goal of “zero problems”; in fact they created some new ones. For example, Turkey has been accused of being partisan – such as on the Palestine conflict, resulting in a rapid deterioration of its relations with Israel after a brief honeymoon – or of getting too close to radical Islamist groups such as Hizbollah or Hamas. Its economic expansion was criticised for potentially harming the economic prospects of other states. Following its rapprochement with Syria, a long-time regional rival, relations quickly deteriorated as Syria’s civil war spread. And while some saw Turkey’s stronger focus on the Middle Eastern region as an indication that the country was loosening its Western foreign policy anchor (Cornell 2012), more recent belligerent pronouncements by Prime Minister Erdoğan – on Greek-Cypriot and Israeli gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean or on the country’s own Kurdish problem – raised the spectre of Turkey renewing its great-power ambitions under the veil of greater regional integration (The Economist, 5 November 2011).

Assessment and outlook

A more deliberate policy to promote democracy in the region would help clarify Turkey’s stance on the issues just mentioned. While the country did, overall, side with the pro-democracy movements during the Arab Spring, after some hesitation and sacrificing some carefully-wrought improvements in relations to key regional powers such as Syria, Turkey could do more to coordinate its efforts with those of Western powers, particularly the European Union given their commonality of interests (Kahraman 2011, 712). Providing more targeted assistance to pro-democracy actors in the region, drawing on Turkey’s own rich experience particularly in combining representative democracy and political Islam, might also be more effective than simply relying on passive demonstration and diffusion effects. Critically, Turkey’s credibility and effectiveness in doing so depends on making further efforts to strengthen and develop its own democratic system, whose imperfections became evident in the context of the Gezi Park protests (Schönwälder 2013), and on taming the autocratic reflexes of some of its rulers (Koplow / Cook 2012). The fact that Turkey’s democracy is still a “work in progress” may have contributed to its attractiveness to surrounding countries (Kirişçi 2011, 40), but standing still or moving backwards would certainly not.

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43 As well, Turkey made efforts to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, between Bosnia and Serbia, and between Iran and the West (Kirişçi 2011, 43). For more detail, see Altunışık and Martin (2011), Kanat (2012) and Özcan (2011).

44 Kalaycioglu (2011) asserts as much, referring to Turkey’s expanding economic and business links with Africa.
4 Conclusions

This paper started out by asking why – in the face of an apparent long-term, strategic interest in promoting democracy – the democratic emerging powers (India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey) have been rather cautious in supporting actual democratisation processes beyond their own borders. It provided a first answer based on a brief analysis of the motivations underlying such policies: while democratic states do seem to have a well-founded interest in more democratic surroundings, they also face a number of obstacles and constraints. Specifically, democratisation processes, at least in their early stages, can heighten the risk of political instability, with possible repercussions at home. Furthermore, support for such processes can stiffen the resolve of autocratic regimes or create inroads for competing authoritarian powers, which can harm vital economic and security interests. Respect for the non-intervention principle, traditionally a major plank in the foreign policies of the democratic emerging powers, can act as a further break.

These are major hurdles, but they do not impede the formulation and enactment of pro-democracy foreign policies, at least not necessarily. As opposed to some of the literature on the subject, this paper did not share the view that pragmatic, “realist” policy drivers will (almost) always gain the upper hand, given the primacy of states’ interests in security and survival.45 Rather, it started from the premise that foreign policy choices – including whether or not to support democracy elsewhere – are rooted in a complex interplay of value orientations, the interests of major societal groups, as well as structures of power and representation, resulting in what can be termed “state preferences” (Moravcsik 2008, 2010). Importantly, this view implies that foreign policy choices are dynamic and open to change – since they are not based on state interests considered static and immutable – although clearly, this change can work in different directions.

By and large, the case studies presented in this paper bear out this view. With the partial exception of Turkey, all five countries have enacted and pursued policies to promote democracy beyond their own borders, albeit with different emphases and different levels of priority, and not necessarily using this precise term. Even Turkey has reached out to its immediate neighbourhood, taking initiatives to help mitigate and resolve conflicts. All five democratic emerging powers have experienced tensions between normative policy drivers, pushing for more and more decisive initiatives to further democratic principles and human rights, and interest-based ones, often calling for “pragmatic” accommodation with neighbouring autocracies and restraint in the face of systemic competition with large authoritarian powers. Despite some limited collaboration in some cases, all five democratic emerging powers have mostly kept their distance from Western democracy promoters, sometimes insisting on regional or “southern” solidarity over human rights concerns. And finally, all five democratic emerging powers have faced capacity and financial shortages, which limited the reach and effectiveness of their policies.

Notwithstanding these similarities, there are also some crucial differences, in terms of the level of engagement in favour of democracy, the reach and range of pro-democracy policies pursued, and the management of trade-offs between such policies and broader economic and security interests. Four key factors stand out in explaining these differences:

45 Likewise, the paper does not endorse the view that it is somehow “natural” and inescapable for liberal democracies to promote democracy elsewhere.
• First, recent memories of successful democratic transitions processes clearly play a role in shaping subsequent democracy promotion policies. Indonesia, the most recent entrant into the democracy promotion field among the five countries examined, has also been one of the most vocal, certainly within its own region. In Brazil, whose transition dates further back, or in India, which has been democratic since 1950, this has been much less of a factor.

• Second, the relative strength or weakness of the democratic fabric – which includes legislatures and parliamentary committees, civil society groups, and the media – can have a similar effect. In Indonesia, a pro-active legislature, supported by civil society groups and an alert media, has helped to keep democracy promotion issues on the political agenda. In South Africa, by contrast, worries over domestic governance deficits have increasingly drawn attention away from external democracy promotion efforts. Domestic democracy deficits, however, can also lead to a reinvigoration of the democratic fabric when they provoke a public response, as recently seen in Brazil in the context of the demonstrations surrounding the Confederations Cup, in India with regard to the protest against gender violence, or in Turkey with respect to the Gezi Park protests.

• Third, the presence of significant security challenges, especially in conjunction with systemic competition with authoritarian powers, militates against external democracy support, even when such a stance corresponds with long-term strategic interests. India is a case in point: It had to carefully calibrate its efforts to support democracy in neighbouring states, so as not to exacerbate existing differences with regional rivals – especially Pakistan – and to limit the influence of extra-regional competitors – particularly China. These challenges are less acute in the case of the other democratic emerging powers examined, although both Indonesia and South Africa are facing growing Chinese influence in their regions.

• Fourth, strong economic interests and the potential for expansion into the markets of neighbouring states can reinforce pressures for pragmatic accommodation with authoritarian regimes. Brazil, South Africa and Turkey in particular have been facing such pressures, given their already dominant positions in their respective regional economies and obvious interests to expand further. If gone unchecked, such interests can marginalise other policy concerns, notably democratisation and greater respect for human rights. They can also lead to charges of economic dominance and disregard for the legitimate interests of smaller, less powerful countries.

Clearly, similar influences shape the democracy support policies also of older, more established democracy promoters, such as the United States or Europe, but they apply to the democratic emerging powers in different ways. These differences appear most starkly with regard to the first two factors, which relate mostly to the internal dynamics of the countries concerned. Memories of democratic transitions are generally more recent in the democratic emerging powers, giving them greater prevalence also for foreign policy making. But at the same time, and for the same reason, democratic fabrics tend to be weaker and less firmly rooted, which has the opposite effect. Security challenges and economic interests, by contrast – which are rooted chiefly in external environments – produce conflicts

46 Despite the fact that the rule of law and better governance overall can play a key role also in improved economic performance.
between competing goals that are common to older and newer democracy promoters alike. Arguably, though, these conflicts are more keenly felt in the latter: Generally speaking, the democratic emerging powers are more vulnerable to security challenges in their immediate neighbourhoods and have fewer alternatives to pursuing economic opportunities in their own regions than would be the case for more established democracy promoters.

What emerges from the cases examined is a complex picture, with the democracy support provided by the democratic emerging powers set against other, often conflicting foreign policy concerns. While the same four factors also shape the democracy support policies of older, more established democracy promoters such as the United States or Europe, they apply in different ways to the democratic emerging powers. In terms of the three basic options explained earlier – inaction coupled with a reliance on passive demonstration and diffusion effects; cautious support for democratisation processes elsewhere but not at the expense of other foreign policy interests; and more proactive democracy support despite the risks and dangers involved – it is clear that the countries studied mostly opted for the second one. Still, the fact that they provided such support at all remains significant: faced with considerable risks and the potential of damaging their other foreign policy interests, they could easily have opted to do nothing.

Clearly, though, there is much unused potential. For one, the democratic emerging powers have not been particularly innovative in their choice of methods. Frequently, they have resorted to similar instruments and modalities as Western democracy promoters, such as electoral assistance or institution-building, in addition to strengthening the democracy provisions embedded in regional organisations or helping to end violent conflicts as a precondition for subsequent democratisation. While a relative lack of conditions and a more demand-driven approach may have resulted in greater acceptance on the part of democratising countries (D’Souza 2013), it is not clear whether this approach also made the support provided more relevant and effective.

In fact, the reluctance on the part of the democratic emerging powers to become more deeply involved in the affairs of neighbouring countries may have deprived them of what is perhaps their greatest asset, namely, the ability to bring their own experience in building democratic political systems to bear on ongoing democratisation processes there. For example, there have been few, if any, deliberate attempts to make use of India’s or South Africa’s experience in building multi-ethnic and multi-racial democracies, Brazil’s considerable track record in opening its political system to popular participation, or Turkey’s...

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47 See Grimm / Leininger (2012) for a more detailed discussion of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion.

48 As mentioned, Turkey did mostly pursue the first option, as did India in the period following its independence.

49 Brazil did make certain “social technologies” – tested approaches to address developmental problems in areas such as health and education – available to others (Marques 2013), which might be considered an example of “embedded” democracy support. Since it is notoriously difficult to separate such forms of support from more technical development assistance, and even harder to distinguish their respective impacts, this article has concentrated on more explicit and targeted forms of democracy support only.
key’s long-running experiment in marrying Islam with representative democracy. As to furthering alternative, more context-sensitive forms of democracy that would go beyond the standard model of western-style representative democracy, the cases studies yielded hardly any evidence at all.

Changes to the present status quo, and a shift to a more proactive stance on external democracy promotion, could come from a variety of internal and external sources, which, taken together, could provoke a shift in “state preferences” as explained above. As to domestic factors, greater pressure from domestic pro-democracy constituencies and more transparency in foreign policymaking, obliging governments to lay open the calculations behind their foreign policy decisions, would militate in favour of a more proactive stance on external democracy promotion. There are promising signs pointing in this direction – witness the recent popular protests against deficiencies in domestic political systems in Brazil or India. At the same time, there are worrying trends pointing the other way: the clampdown by the Turkish government on the Gezi Park protests may indicate a hardening of the regime, while growing governance deficits in South Africa could signal a weakening commitment of the regime to democratic rules and principles.

On the external front, changes in both regional and global contexts are presenting the democratic emerging powers with some critical choices as to how to fill their new regional and global leadership roles. Within their own regions, they need to decide if they want to pursue their own interests first and foremost, becoming new regional hegemons, or instead take on the role of regional representatives and champions. Defining and defending regional interests, including those of smaller, less powerful states, and of disadvantaged populations within them, has not been an overriding objective for the democratic emerging powers to date. Much the same can be said about the forging of stronger links among the democratic emerging powers themselves, where few advances have been made (Alden / Vieira 2005; Graham 2011; Stephen 2012).

Globally, the democratic emerging powers need to decide how they see their relationship with the West, and how they want to relate to other emerging powers, especially authoritarian ones such as China. Their reluctance to make common cause with the West is understandable, especially since promoting democracy was used as a pretext to justify the illegal war in Iraq. But in their efforts to differentiate themselves, the democratic emerging powers have also made some troubling choices, particularly regarding their voting behaviour on human rights issues in the context of the UN or in turning a blind eye to human rights violations and anti-democratic actions in neighbouring states, in the name of south-

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50 Indonesia, for its part, never saw itself as a “Muslim democracy” and resisted the temptation of infusing its political system with religious elements, despite its large, mostly Muslim population (Sugiono 2013).
51 As mentioned, Brazil shielded Venezuela from external criticism regarding its democratic record, but never endorsed its alternative model of popular, “Bolivarian” democracy.
52 Kurlantzick (2013) recently argued that in Venezuela, Pakistan, and Taiwan trend lines point in the opposite direction, with the middle classes turning against democracy.
53 Burges (2008) argues that Brazil is already acting as a “consensual” hegemon in its region. However, as pointed out by Wolff and Wurm (2011, 86), “consensual” hegemony – in the Gramscian sense – cannot be equated with simple domination, precisely because it requires a measure of consent in order to be effective.
ern solidarity. These choices, which have sometimes blurred the line between emerging democracies and emerging autocracies, carry significant risks as well, notably that of undermining the democratic emerging powers’ claim to democratic legitimacy.\(^{54}\)

These issues are critically important since they provide an important source of legitimacy for the democratic emerging powers. Arguably, these countries are too weak to impose their leadership in their respective regions – not to mention at the global level – simply by projecting their economic or military might. As emerging economies, their capacity to provide direct material benefits to others is likewise rather limited.\(^{55}\) In these circumstances, they need to rely on other resources to ensure their legitimacy. One such resource is precisely their standing as emerging democracies, resulting in a kind of legitimacy that is rooted not just in the continuing appeal of the democratic idea as such, but also in a demonstrated capacity to better address developmental challenges and resolve internal tensions and conflicts of interests by way of democratic governance. A key difference to authoritarian development models, building and nurturing this capacity is critical for the democratic emerging powers’ ability to lead by example, and to offer assistance to others in building more democratic systems.

There is a role for others, notably Western democracy promoters, in influencing these processes, but they should not expect to be able to “outsource” democracy promotion, hoping that the democratic emerging powers will simply step in their shoes. “Naming and shamming” these countries, be it for flaws in their own democratic record or for leniency towards authoritarian governments, will likely not have much effect, either. Rather, the emphasis should lie on creating true partnerships, in which both sides would play to their own specific advantages: familiarity with local contexts and more recent experience in building democratic systems in third-world conditions in the case of the democratic emerging powers, and greater depth of democratic practice, greater and more varied expertise in supporting democracy abroad, as well as deeper pockets in the case of Western democracy promoters. Specifically, Western democracy promoters – aside from providing practical assistance in the form of financial support, training, or exchange of practical experiences – should:

- Accept that the democratic emerging powers face challenges distinct from those of Western democracy promoters. The dangers of political instability are often more immediate – ethnic struggles next door, for instance, could have strong repercussions for their own polities – and the potential damage to their economies from failed democratisation strategies beyond their borders more significant. These countries are also often in more direct systemic competition with authoritarian rivals, particularly China, and some at least – like India – need to be more conscious of their security needs. All this

\(^{54}\) Pursuing a strategy similar to China’s, essentially offering practical assistance and non-interference in domestic affairs in exchange for access to strategic resources, markets, and reciprocal political support, would mean to compete on the same terms, with uncertain outcomes given China’s deep pockets. More importantly, it would undermine one of the democratic emerging powers’ key assets, namely their status as regional leaders and representatives that have democratic legitimacy.

\(^{55}\) The democratic emerging powers have built only relatively modest external assistance programmes to date – although there are large potential benefits to be gained from further expanding regional trade and investment links. See Chin / Quadir (2012), as well as the other contributions in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs vol. 25, issue 4.
makes for a calculus of the costs and benefits of supporting democratisation that may differ from that of Western powers.

- Insist that the democratic emerging powers uphold their own democratic standards and continue their domestic democratisation processes. As just mentioned, some countries – Turkey and South Africa, in particular – may be going backwards, which is a worrying trend. No state whose own democratic credentials are in doubt can be an effective democracy supporter elsewhere.

- Not deviate from their own standards, as so often in the past. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to successful partnerships with the democratic emerging powers has been the impression that the West harbours hidden agendas and strategies and is ready to compromise its own democratic principles when larger interests are at stake (most recently in the Middle East but historically also elsewhere, such as in Latin America). Overcoming this obstacle is crucial for making good on the potential for true partnerships between democratic emerging powers and Western democracy promoters, in which each side would play to its own specific advantages, and in which both sides could benefit from their respective knowledge and experiences.
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