Understanding Regime Support in New and Old Democracies

The Role of Performance and Democratic Experience

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Abstract

This paper develops a comprehensive theory of support for democracy. Building on instrumental and culturalist approaches, the theory argues that experience with democracy conditions the extent to which economic and political performance inform support. Specifically, it argues that the extent to which economic performance informs support should decline as a democracy grows older, while the opposite should be true about political performance. These arguments are evaluated using multilevel models to analyse cross-national survey data for 21 Latin American countries. The evidence indicates that both economic and political performance inform support for democracy and that the extent to which economic performance informs support declines as a democracy grows older. Although the importance of political performance does not seem to be conditioned by democratic experience, its importance in relation to economic performance does increase as a democracy matures. The evidence also indicates that experience with democracy, and not level of economic development, is what conditions the importance of economic performance. Altogether, these results suggest that support for democracy and a civic culture that values the political goods that democracy can deliver are more likely to be a consequence of, rather than a prerequisite for, the survival and eventual consolidation of democracy.
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Abbreviations

AIC  Akaike information criterion
CTD  Commitment to democracy
GDP  Gross domestic product
LAPOP  Latin American Public Opinion Project
MLE  Maximum likelihood estimation
OLS  Ordinary least squares
PCA  Principal components analysis
PPP  Purchasing power parity
SWD  Satisfaction with democracy
US  United States
1 Introduction

Political scientists have long been preoccupied with understanding support for democracy as well as its relationship with democratic stability. Despite the numerous studies devoted to these topics, crucial controversies remain regarding what explains support. There are major differences between two theoretical paradigms. One argues that support for democracy is shaped by citizens’ instrumental assessments of regime performance: they support the regime if it satisfies their standards of performance and withdraw their support if it does not (e.g., Lipset 1959; Przeworski 1991). Within this camp, however, scholars disagree about whether the economic or the political dimensions of performance are more important in informing support; they also disagree about the extent to which these dimensions are equally important in new and old democracies.

The second camp argues that support for democracy is reflective of individuals’ values and that these, in turn, are determined by underlying levels of economic development (e.g., Inglehart 1997; Inglehart / Welzel 2005). Specifically, this camp argues that early economic development brings about secular and rational values that are associated with high levels of support for democracy. In turn, post-industrial development brings about “self-expression values” such as freedom of expression and creativity that are associated with greater dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy, but a higher level of support for democratic values and ideals. According to this camp, then, the relationship between performance and support for democracy is spurious.

Perhaps not surprisingly, empirical analysis to date has been unable to settle these controversies. Most studies have been carried out within one of these theoretical paradigms and have been more concerned with advancing their arguments rather than with confronting them with alternative explanations. The few studies that have managed to avoid this have portrayed the arguments of the two camps as inherently competing (e.g., Mishler / Rose 2001a; Anderson s. a.). Moreover, studies within the instrumental approach have been particularly concerned with examining whether specific performance criteria matter in particular contexts, rather than with exploring why these criteria matter when and where they do (e.g., Mattes / Bratton 2007). These studies have been relatively quick to accept that there are differences in the determinants of support across new and old democracies without trying to explain what underlies these differences.

In sum, scholars of support for democracy have failed to develop a comprehensive theory that can integrate existing knowledge and settle the ongoing controversies within and across the two camps. The goal of this paper is to develop and evaluate such a comprehensive theory. This theory seeks to answer the following questions: Does performance inform support or is the relationship between the two a reflection of shifts in underlying values? If performance informs support, are economic and political dimensions of performance equally important across new and old democracies? And, finally, what accounts for the differences in the determinants of support across new and old democracies?

Building on instrumental approaches, the theory contends that performance considerations do inform support for democracy: citizens evaluate performance in the provision of economic and politically desirable goods and lend their support to the regime if it delivers. Cultural approaches suggest that the criteria of performance that citizens use in their judgements may change. Along these lines, the theory contends that a regime’s capacity to
deliver economically desirable outcomes becomes less important in shaping support as a democracy grows older. In contrast, the importance of political performance should increase. The theory attributes these differences to the democratic experience of a country, and not to its level of economic development. The longer the experience with democracy, the more the political sphere becomes autonomous vis-à-vis the social and economic spheres and the citizens’ orientations become more civic (Diamond 1999, 162; Schmitter / Karl 1991, 57).

The paper evaluates these arguments by estimating multilevel models of support for democracy, using public opinion data from 21 Latin American countries. The results indicate that economic and political performance assessments shape support for democracy to the same extent in countries with no experience with democracy. The results also indicate that the importance of economic performance declines with democratic experience (and not with level of economic development), while the importance of political performance does not seem to be mediated by democratic experience. Taken together, these findings indicate that the importance of political performance relative to that of economic performance in informing support for democracy increases with democratic experience. Finally, the evidence indicates that experience with democracy, and not level of economic development, is what conditions the importance of economic performance.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section synthesizes the main theoretical developments in the study of support for democracy. The third section discusses the concept of support and develops a comprehensive theory of support for democracy. The fourth section lays out the empirical strategy for evaluating this theory, and the fifth presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes.

2 Support for democracy, old and new

According to the instrumental approach, support for democracy is based on citizens’ instrumental assessments of regime performance: they support the regime if it satisfies their standards of performance and withdraw their support if it does not. Thus, democracies that are effective at delivering valued economic and political goods to their citizens will enjoy higher levels of support than those that are unable to do so. Within this perspective, however, scholars differ on the criteria of performance that citizens use in their judgements.

A first generation of scholars focused on the socio-economic changes brought about by modernization as the driving force behind support for and the ultimate survival of democracy (e.g., Lipset 1959; Lerner 1958). Increases in living standards and educational attainment brought about by industrialization and urbanization were viewed as the material preconditions that would allow democratic legitimacy to develop. Subsequent studies moved away from modernization theory and toned down arguments about material

1 The distinction between, and characterization of, “first generation” and “second generation” theorists within the instrumental camp is borrowed from Evans and Whitefield (1995, 485–487). It is worth noting that these authors fail to fully acknowledge the cultural approach in their discussion, either as a refinement of first-generation theories or as an independent research programme.
preconditions, but still stressed that citizens’ support for democracy was ultimately contingent on economic outcomes. Accordingly, studies within this tradition analysed the effects of objective indicators of macroeconomic and social conditions as well as citizens’ evaluations of these conditions (e.g., Clarke / Dutt / Kornberg 1993; Kornberg / Clarke 1992; Weatherford 1984, 1987).

As the so-called “Third Wave of Democratization” (Huntington 1991) unfolded, modernization theory progressively fell out of favour. Accordingly, a second generation of instrumental theorists abandoned the exclusive focus on socio-economic outcomes and examined instead the relationship between support for democracy and a variety of political factors, such as institutional arrangements (e.g., Anderson / Guillory 1997; Norris 1999b), presidential and parliamentary approval (e.g., Hetherington 1998) and corruption (e.g., della Porta 2000; Pharr 2000; Seligson 2002). Some of these more recent studies analysed performance in both the economic and the political realms (e.g., Bratton / Mattes 2001; Evans / Whitefield 1995; Mattes / Bratton 2007). Their general conclusion was that while economic performance was important in explaining support, political performance was also relevant. In fact, political factors seemed to matter more than economic factors.

According to the cultural approach, support for democracy reflects individuals’ values, which in turn shift following structural transformation processes. Early culturalists argued that democracy was possible only in societies where a civic culture was already in place (Almond / Verba, 1963). Building on modernization theory, these scholars attributed the prevalence of authoritarian regimes and the failure of democracy in underdeveloped countries to economic backwardness and to traditional institutions and values (Almond / Coleman 1960; Almond / Powell 1966). As in the case of first-generation instrumental scholars, these claims were severely questioned in the aftermath of the Third Wave.2

More recently, a number of scholars revamped the basic arguments of the cultural approach (e.g., Dalton 2000; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart / Welzel 2005). Unlike their predecessors, these scholars recognized that cultural shifts are path-dependent and thus they abandoned earlier predictions of universal cultural convergence driven by capitalist development. However, they still claimed that cultural shifts followed economic development in predictable ways. First, modernization brings about secular and rational values, which are the foundations for a political culture based on respect for rational authority. In such contexts, they argued, one would expect to observe relatively high levels of support for democracy.

In turn, post-modernization is associated with the primacy of personal choice, autonomy and creativity. This increase in “self-expression values” is associated with greater dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy, as citizens set higher standards for performance. At the same time, it is associated with a higher level of support for democratic values and ideals – or support for democracy in the abstract – as only this type of regime allows for the protection of freedom and liberties. Accordingly, post-industrial societies are populated by “critical citizens” who distrust political institutions and authorities and set increasingly higher standards of regime performance, but still place great value on democracy (Norris

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2 In particular, a number of studies successfully challenged the culturalist contention that the existence of a civic culture was a necessary condition for the emergence and subsequent consolidation of democracy (e.g., Muller / Seligson 1994; Seligson / Booth 1993).
Like their predecessors, new culturalists contended that support for democracy changed incrementally, in a process driven by the structural transformations associated with modernization and post-modernization. At the individual level, citizens’ position in the social structure conditions the extent to which they experience economic development and shift from secular-rational values to self-expression values. This shift in turn informs their judgements about democracy.

While numerous studies have found support for both the instrumental and the cultural approaches, there are still a number of unsettled debates regarding the factors that ultimately shape support for democracy. Several reasons underlie this state of affairs. First, most studies have been carried out within a single paradigm and thus have failed to examine the alternative one. And the few studies that have attempted to bridge this divide (e.g., Mishler / Rose 2001a; Anderson, s. a.) have portrayed the instrumental and cultural approaches as inherently competing. As a result, they have not explored the potential of integrating the two into a comprehensive theory of support for democracy.

Second, most studies have failed to bridge the gap between what Weatherford (1991, 52) identifies as the aggregate and the individual levels of analysis. Indeed, little is known about the effects of system-level factors on individual-level support. Furthermore, as will be discussed later in the paper, the few studies that have made progress in this direction have methodological limitations that undermine their contributions (e.g., Anderson / Guillory 1997; Bratton / Mattes 2001; Norris 1999b).

Finally, most cross-national studies have focused on explaining support for democracy in a single region of the world, such as Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, and Africa (but see Anderson, s. a.). While this strategy is in principle compatible with the development of general theory, in practice, these studies have had very idiosyncratic goals. In particular, existing studies have neglected to theorize about why causation patterns of support might differ across contexts and this has limited their ability to make progress in developing a theory of support that is sensitive to these potential differences. The following section develops such a theory, arguing that experience with democracy is crucial to understanding differences across contexts.

3 A comprehensive theory of support for democracy

The basic premise underlying the theory advanced in this paper is that performance shapes support for democracy. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that citizens will lend unconditional support to a regime that is consistently unable to deliver economic or political goods. Revisiting discussions around the concept of “regime support” helps to lay the foundation for this premise. Early conceptualizations sought to distinguish between two dimensions of support: one that is performance-based, reflective of system outputs, and another that reflects citizens’ affective bonds to the regime. In what is probably the most cited work on the topic, Easton (1975) coined the terms “specific support” and “diffuse support” to distinguish between these two dimensions:

3. According to Weatherford (1991, 52), bridging this gap would also entail studying the implications of varying levels of support on system-level outcomes, such as regime stability.
“Some types of evaluations are closely related to what the political authorities do and how they do it. Others are more fundamental in character because they are directed to basic aspects of the system. They represent more enduring bonds [...] The distinction of roughly this sort I have called ‘specific’ as against ‘diffuse’ support.” (p. 437)

Similarly, Lipset (1959) introduced a distinction between “effectiveness” and “legitimacy”. The former referred to “the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population [...] see them”; the latter, to “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society” (p. 86). At the conceptual level, then, it is possible – and arguably sensible – to establish a distinction between performance-based, instrumental and affective dimensions of regime support.

According to these early conceptualizations, variations in instrumental support did not threaten the survival of democracies as long as there was a reservoir of affective support among the citizenry. Long periods of underperformance might eventually lead to regime demise, however, by way of a gradual corrosion of such a reservoir. In contexts where reservoirs of affective support were lacking, such as in the case of new democracies, the survival of the regime was hypothesized to hinge solely on performance (Lipset 1959; Easton 1965).

Since then, there have been a number of important contributions to the conceptualization and measurement of political support (e.g., Citrin 1974; Craig 1993; Hibbing / Theiss-Morse 1995; Muller / Jukam 1977; Weatherford 1992). These contributions agree that no item purely measures either the instrumental or the affective dimensions of support. It is possible, however, to distinguish between items that are more reflective of each of these dimensions. Presidential and parliamentary approval measures, for example, are generally considered to be more reflective of instrumental considerations directed at authorities. In turn, “trust in government” and “satisfaction with democracy” items are generally considered to be reflective of both instrumental and affective considerations (Hetherington 1998, 791–792; Anderson / Guillory 1997, 70–71). Finally, it is generally accepted that items that gauge commitment to democracy in the abstract reflect support for the “principles of democracy as an ideal form of government” to a greater extent than assessments of its “actual practice” (Evans / Whitefield 1995, 488).

This discussion suggests that support for democracy, however measured, will inevitably reflect instrumental considerations, albeit to varying degrees. Building on instrumental approaches, the first expectation of the theory developed here is that support for democracy should be informed by performance assessments. To rule out the possibility that this relationship is spurious and reflective of underlying values, performance should inform support independently of values and socio-economic covariates, which are indicative of the extent to which individuals experience the structural transformations that result in value shifts. This first expectation is reflected in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Better performance should be associated with higher levels of support for democracy, independent of values and socio-economic covariates.

An important consideration is whether the extent to which performance shapes support differs across new democracies and their older, more consolidated counterparts. Although
there is no definitive consensus on this topic, a popular view among scholars is that support in new democracies is more contingent on performance than in old democracies. According to Mishler / Rose (1999):

“Thereas support for established democracies is relatively viscous, changing only slowly and incrementally over time, support for new democracies is potentially much more volatile. Contributing to this volatility is the likelihood that support for new regimes depends more heavily on regime performance. An established democracy benefits because citizens are socialized to support the regime from childhood. By contrast, citizens in a new democracy were socialized into a different political order. In the short term, a new regime may benefit from a degree of popular acceptance and approval resulting from the public’s rejection of the old regime. In the long term, however, support for new democracies must be performance based. Support cannot survive indefinitely unless citizens perceive its performance as providing some reasonable measure of individual and collective goods […].” (p. 79)

Moving on to specific performance criteria, when it comes to new democracies, the agreement among first-generation scholars is that support is ultimately contingent on the delivery of economic goods. According to Przeworski (1991), in such contexts, popular support for the regime as well as its ultimate survival hinge on its ability to deliver material well-being to the citizenry and all politically relevant elites. Second-generation scholars would disagree, however, and argue that the effective delivery of political goods such as the protection of rights and freedoms, effective governance, and interest representation are equally if not more important than the delivery of economic goods (Bratton / Mattes 2001; Evans / Whitefield 1995; Mattes / Bratton 2007). The study of support in older democracies offers no definite conclusions on whether it is political or economic goods that should ultimately matter (e.g., Pharr / Putnam 2000).

The theory advanced here does not seek to settle debates about whether economic or political performance is more important in absolute terms. It does, however, advance an argument regarding how and why the importance of these criteria might vary across new and old democracies. To develop these arguments, the paper builds on the cultural approach’s contention that the performance criteria that citizens use in their judgements may change depending on context.

In older democracies, the regime is more likely to be judged for its capacity to guarantee rights and protect freedoms, to represent interests, and to allow citizens to provide input to those who govern as well as hold them accountable (Inglehart / Welzel 2005). This is not to say that the provision of political goods is not important in new democracies; in fact, this type of performance should also matter and, as was already mentioned, existing empirical evidence indicates that it does. However, the importance of political performance in shaping support for democracy should increase as a democracy grows older. In contrast, in new democracies, economic concerns are usually more salient, and support for democracy is more likely to be shaped by the regime’s capacity to address them (Przeworski 1991), at least to a greater extent than in older democracies. Thus, one would expect the importance of economic performance to decline as a democracy grows older. Hence the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2.A: The effect of economic performance on support for democracy should decrease as a democracy grows older.
Hypothesis 2.B: The effect of political performance on support for democracy should increase as a democracy grows older.

The corollary of these hypotheses is that, in relative terms, regime support should become more contingent on political performance than on economic performance as a democracy grows older. Said in other words, the relative effect of political performance, defined as the ratio of the effect of political performance to the effect of economic performance, should be higher in older than in younger democracies. This expectation is reflected in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2.C: The effect of political performance relative to that of economic performance on support for democracy should increase as a democracy grows older.

Given that older democracies tend to also be more affluent (Przeworski et al. 2000), one must consider whether it is experience with democracy or level of economic development that accounts for these expected differences. Culturalists would suggest that economic development is the likely culprit. By raising living standards, economic development makes economic concerns less salient while nurturing post-materialist values. As a consequence of these processes, the importance of economic performance should decline, while individuals’ appreciation of the political goods that democracy can deliver should increase.

In contrast, this paper attributes the changes in the determinants of support across new and old democracies to democratic experience. As argued by Diamond (1999, 162) the political becomes more autonomous vis-à-vis the socio-economic the longer the experience with democracy. Indeed, it is not unrealistic to think of citizens in new democracies as being only partially tuned in to the workings of this type of regime. In such contexts, it is likely that the new regime will be expected to bring about economic growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, and so on. Democracy, however, will probably not fulfil all these expectations. Only experience with the regime can teach citizens what not to expect from democracy, while at the same time leading them to expect from it what it can deliver: the protection of political rights and freedoms, deliberation, representation of interest, and procedures to hold elected officials accountable. These arguments are consistent with the idea that a civic culture follows from democracy and not the other way around (Schmitter / Karl 1991, 57).

Hypothesis 3: Democratic experience, and not level of economic development, should condition the effects of economic and political performance on support for democracy as described by hypotheses 2.A and 2.B.

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4 For a formalization of a somewhat similar set of arguments see Svolik (2013). According to this paper, voters in new democracies have yet to learn that elections provide them with an effective way to hold governments accountable. Only after voters have accumulated enough experience with well-performing and poorly performing governments, rewarding the former and punishing the latter at the voting booth, are they able to separate the performance of the incumbent from that of the regime. It is at this stage that democracy finally becomes consolidated.
4 Empirical strategy

Evaluating the hypotheses laid out above requires a combination of individual-level and country-level data. At the individual level, it requires cross-national survey data capturing attitudes towards democracy, evaluations of economic and political performance, and other important covariates. At the country level, it requires variables measuring experience with democracy and level of economic development.

The surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2008 provide the public opinion data used in the analysis below. LAPOP studied a total of 24 countries in the Americas that year, with each survey being carried out using a national probability design. For practical reasons, 21 out of the 24 countries are considered for the analysis: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Unlike most previous research, the focus on Latin America is not motivated by a desire to explain support for democracy in that particular region. Rather, Latin America is viewed as a particular – and arguably ideal – context in which the theory just developed can be examined, given that the region comprises both young and old and poor and wealthy countries. Indeed, the number of years of continuous democracy ranges from zero in the case of Ecuador, Haiti and Venezuela to over 50 years in the case of Colombia and Costa Rica, while gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) ranges from US$ 1,173 in Haiti to US$ 15,274 in Chile.

Dependent variables

LAPOP surveys contain two items that have been widely used to measure support for democracy: the first one is the “satisfaction with democracy” (SWD) item; the second, the “commitment to democracy” (CTD) item. The SWD item asks respondents to express their overall levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works in their countries. In the LAPOP surveys, the item was worded as follows: “In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in [name of the country]?”

In turn, the CTD item prompts respondents to show their agreement with a statement about democracy being better than other forms of governments. In the LAPOP surveys, the item was worded as follows: “How much do you agree with the following statement? ‘Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.’ [Choose a number between 1 and 7, where 1 means ‘not at all’ and 7 means ‘a great deal’.]”

5 For comprehensive information about these surveys, please refer to LAPOP (2013).
6 Canada and the US are excluded from the analysis because the surveys in these countries did not capture a number of necessary demographic covariates. Belize is excluded because the regime type variable used to calculate democratic experience – the Polity2 score of the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr / Jaggers 2013) – was not available for this country.
Responses to both items are rescaled so that they range from zero to ten, with higher numbers indicating more positive attitudes toward democracy. The variables are treated as continuous. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the two dependent variables for the 21 countries included in the analysis.

Although items capturing satisfaction with democracy and commitment to democracy have been used in numerous studies, their use is not free of criticism. Canache / Mondak / Seligson (2001), for example, question the validity of the SWD on the grounds that it taps into both specific and diffuse dimensions of support and that the criteria that individuals focus on to make an assessment vary substantially across individuals and countries. In a more general critique, Rose / Mishler / Haerpfer (1998) and Mishler / Rose (2001b) question items that make direct references to “democracy” in their wording. Since democracy has different meanings for different respondents, they advocate the use of items that assess attitudes towards democracy in concrete terms and in the form of comparison with plausible regime alternatives. These are valid points to keep in mind when discussing the results, as the use of alternative measures to SWD and CTD is precluded by data availability. It is worth noting that focusing on a region with a relatively homogeneous culture and common history like Latin America might help mitigate some of the concerns about the conceptual equivalence of measures referring to democracy.

Independent variables

The first set of individual-level covariates comprises regime performance assessments. The economic performance variable combines responses to four items that ask respondents to evaluate the present state of the national economy, to evaluate the present state of their personal economic situation, whether the national economy improved in the past 12 months, and whether their personal economic situation improved in the same period. Responses to these items were adjusted to a common scale ranging from zero to ten, with higher numbers indicating more positive assessments, and then averaged. The political performance variable combines answers to three items. The items ask respondents to rate the extent to which citizens’ basic rights are protected in their country, the extent to which their country’s court system guarantees a fair trial, and the extent to which the current government fights corruption. Responses to these items were rescaled and averaged following the same procedure used in the case of economic performance.

In addition to performance assessments, several individual-level control covariates are considered. First, respondents’ levels of political tolerance and interpersonal trust are included in an effort to control for the effects of values and political culture on support. Following Seligson (2004, 31–33), the tolerance variable combines four items that ask respondents whether groups they disagree with should be allowed to vote, to demonstrate peacefully, to run for office, and to make political speeches. Answers to these items are rescaled to range from zero to ten, with higher values indicating higher levels of tolerance, and then averaged. The trust variable is constructed using an item that asks respondents to rate the degree to which people in their communities are trustworthy. Responses are also transformed to a zero-to-ten scale, with ten indicating the highest degree of trustworthiness.

The remaining individual-level covariates capture respondents’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics: gender, area of residence (urban vs. rural), age, educational
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attainment and wealth. Gender and area of residence are dichotomous variables that are “1” if the respondent is a woman and resides in a rural area, respectively. Age and educational attainment are measured in raw number of years. To measure wealth, first an asset ownership index is calculated, following Córdova (2009). The index combines 11 items that ask respondents whether they own specific household assets, using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The scores are then used to produce an ordinal variable (which is treated as continuous in the analyses) indicating the decile of the index’s distribution to which the respondent belongs. The PCA and the classification into deciles are carried out independently for each country.

Moving on to country-level covariates, experience with democracy is operationalized as the number of years that a country has been continuously democratic. To calculate this figure, countries are classified as democratic and non-democratic, using the Polity Score (or Polity2) variable of the Polity IV Project (Marshall / Gurr / Jaggers 2013). This score ranges from -10 to 10, with higher scores indicating more democratic characteristics. Following common practice (e.g., Blaydes / Kayser 2011; Brown 2000), the Polity Scores are used to produce a dichotomous measure of regime type; scores of 6 or higher are classified as democracies, while the remainder are classified as non-democracies. This score is available since independence for the 22 countries being analysed. In turn, a country’s level of economic development is operationalized by its GDP per capita (PPP) (in thousands of US dollars). This indicator is taken from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2013).

The descriptive statistics of all the independent variables are presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Table A.3 provides the wording of the items used to construct the economic and political performance assessment variables, as well as the tolerance and trust indicators.

Model

Until fairly recently, most studies analysing cross-national survey data were carried out either by data pooling or by performing single-country analyses first and then casually comparing the results of these analyses (Jusko / Shively 2005, 327–328). The study of support for democracy was no exception. Anderson and Guillory (1997), for example, pooled survey data from Western European countries and then analysed the effects of country-level and individual-level covariates on satisfaction with democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001) employed the casual comparison approach in their analysis of support for democracy in three African countries.8

The use of either of these strategies has major limitations, however. On the one hand, applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation techniques to pooled data has implications for the inferences one can draw about parameter estimates. Since cross-national survey data feature individuals nested in countries, the classic assumption of non-correlation between disturbances across observations is violated. Under these conditions, standard errors will no longer be accurate and any inferences drawn from them will be misleading. On the other hand, the “casual comparison” approach leads to a loss of the

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8 For an exception that employs multilevel models see Mattes / Bratton (2007).
large-N structure of the data and cannot provide estimates of the effects of country-level covariates on the dependent variable of interest (Jusko / Shively 2005, 328). Multilevel models solve these limitations by taking the clustered nature of the data into account and making use of the large-N structure of cross-national survey data.

Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, employing multilevel models is important for substantive, theoretical reasons (Steenbergen / Jones 2002, 219). First, the use of these models allows for building and testing comprehensive models by specifying predictors at multiple levels of analysis. Second, by allowing parameters to vary across units of analysis, multilevel models are sensitive to the possibility of causal heterogeneity. For these reasons, multilevel models can be of great utility in bridging the above-mentioned gap between aggregate-level and individual-level theories and analyses of support.

The following is the individual-level, or level-one, equation of a multilevel model of support for democracy. The equation expresses the level of support corresponding to individual $i$ nested in country $j$ ($SD_{ij}$) – which is measured using SWD or CTD – as a linear function of an intercept and individual-level covariates:

$$SD_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} ECPERF_{ij} + \beta_{2j} POLPERF_{ij} + \omega Z_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where $ECPERF_{ij}$ and $POLPERF_{ij}$ represent the individual’s economic and political performance assessments, respectively; $Z_{ij}$ is a vector containing individual-level control covariates; and $\epsilon_{ij}$ is a disturbance term. The subscript $j$ in the intercept and the parameters associated with economic and political performance assessments indicate that these are expected to vary across countries, the level-two units of the multilevel model. The fact that the parameter vector $\omega$ has no such subscript indicates that the effects of the control covariates are assumed to remain constant across countries.

In turn, the expectation that the effects of performance assessments would be conditioned by countries’ experience with democracy is translated in the following level-two equations:

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} YEARS_j + \nu_1$$

(2)

$$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21} YEARS_j + \nu_2$$

(3)

Equation (2) corresponds to the parameter associated with economic performance; equation (3), to the parameter associated with political performance. These equations indicate that both parameters of interest are a linear function of an intercept, the years of continuous democracy that a country has experienced ($YEARS_j$), and a disturbance term. To evaluate whether democratic experience mediates the effects of performance assessments after controlling for level of economic development ($DEV_j$), one could easily add the latter variable to equations (2) and (3).

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} YEARS_j + \gamma_{12} DEV_j + \nu_1$$

(4)

$$\beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21} YEARS_j + \gamma_{22} DEV_j + \nu_2$$

(5)
In addition, the model also considers the possibility that democratic experience shapes support independently of performance assessments. As shown in equation (6) below, the country-specific intercepts are modelled as a linear function of a common intercept, the years of continuous democracy that a country has experienced, and a disturbance term.

\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{YEARS}_j + \nu_{0j} \]  

(6)

As before, one could add a country’s level of economic development to (6) and evaluate whether this covariate has an effect on support for democracy independently of performance assessments:

\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{YEARS}_j + \gamma_{02} \text{DEV}_j + \nu_{0j} \]  

(7)

Taken together, (2), (3) and (6) comprise the level-2 portion of the model. To obtain the full multilevel model, (2), (3) and (6) are substituted into (1). After multiplying through and regrouping the following equation is obtained:

\[ SD_j = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{YEARS}_j + \gamma_{10} \text{ECPERF}_j + \gamma_{11} \text{YEARS}_j \times \text{ECPERF}_j + \gamma_{20} \text{POLPERF}_j + \gamma_{21} \text{YEARS}_j \times \text{POLPERF}_j + \omega Z_{ij} + \nu_{0j} + \nu_{1j} \text{ECPERF}_j + \nu_{2j} \text{POLPERF}_j + \epsilon_{ij} \]  

(8)

Alternatively, one could substitute (4), (5) and (7) into (1) to obtain a different model that also includes level of economic development and its interaction with economic and political performance. The corresponding equation would be:

\[ SD_j = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \text{YEARS}_j + \gamma_{02} \text{DEV}_j + \gamma_{10} \text{ECPERF}_j + \gamma_{11} \text{YEARS}_j \times \text{ECPERF}_j + \gamma_{12} \text{DEV}_j \times \text{ECPERF}_j + \gamma_{20} \text{POLPERF}_j + \gamma_{21} \text{YEARS}_j \times \text{POLPERF}_j + \gamma_{22} \text{DEV}_j \times \text{POLPERF}_j + \omega Z_{ij} + \nu_{0j} + \nu_{1j} \text{ECPERF}_j + \nu_{2j} \text{POLPERF}_j + \epsilon_{ij} \]  

(9)

The parameters of the models are estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE).\(^9\)

---

\(^9\) To implement MLE, the following assumptions about the disturbances are made: (1) E[\(\nu_{0j}\)] = E[\(\nu_{1j}\)] = E[\(\nu_{2j}\)] = E[\(\epsilon_{ij}\)] = 0; (2) Var[\(\nu_{0j}\)] = \(\tau_{00}\), Var[\(\nu_{1j}\)] = \(\tau_{11}\), Var[\(\nu_{2j}\)] = \(\tau_{22}\), Var[\(\epsilon_{ij}\)] = \(\sigma^2\); (3) Cov[\(\nu_{0j},\nu_{1j}\)] = Cov[\(\nu_{0j},\nu_{2j}\)] = Cov[\(\nu_{1j},\nu_{2j}\)] = 0; (4) covariances between level-2 disturbances (Cov[\(\nu_{0j},\nu_{1j}\)], Cov[\(\nu_{0j},\nu_{2j}\]), and Cov[\(\nu_{1j},\nu_{2j}\)]) may differ from zero; (5) the level-1 disturbance is normally distributed; and, (6) the level-2 disturbances follow a multivariate normal distribution.
5 Results and discussion

Table 1 presents the estimation results corresponding to two model specifications for the two measures of support: satisfaction with democracy (SWD) and commitment to democracy (CTD). The first specification, “No Country-Level Covariates” (Model 1 and Model 2), includes only economic and political performance assessments, individual-level controls, and a random intercept. This specification is included to initially evaluate the hypothesis about the effect of performance on support for democracy before introducing country-level covariates. The second specification, “Country-Level Covariate: Years of Democracy” (Model 3 and Model 4), adds democratic experience and its interaction with performance assessments.

The results for Model 1 and Model 2 provide initial support for Hypothesis 1. They indicate that economic and political performance assessments have positive and statistically significant effects on support for democracy, even after controlling for values and socio-economic covariates. The effects of both types of assessments are similar on a given measure of regime support. It is also worth noting that the effects of both types of assessments are substantially higher in the case of SWD. This is in line with the conceptual and measurement discussions of support for democracy, indicating that items gauging satisfaction with democracy should be more reflective of performance than items tapping into commitment to democracy in the abstract.

Model 3 and Model 4 evaluate whether the effects of economic and political performance assessments are conditioned by experience with democracy. Figure 1 illustrates their marginal effects on both measures of support for democracy. Panel A shows that the effect of economic performance on SWD decreases from 0.25 points in countries with no democratic experience to 0.16 points in countries with 100 years of democratic experience. In the case of CTD, the decline in the effect of economic performance is more pronounced. As shown in Panel B, the effect begins at 0.09 points in countries with no democratic experience, becoming not statistically different from zero by the time a country has experienced 64 or more years of continuous democracy. These results are in line with Hypothesis 2.A, which indicates that the effect of economic performance should decrease as a democracy grows older.

Panels C and D respectively show the marginal effects of political performance on SWD and CTD. In countries with no democratic experience, the effect of political performance on SWD is 0.24 points, while its effect on CTD is 0.08 points. The change in these effects due to democratic experience is not statistically significant. Thus, the results do not provide support for Hypothesis 2.B, which indicates that the effect of political performance should increase as a democracy grows older.
Table 1: Multilevel models of support for democracy, full sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Country-Level Covariates</th>
<th>Country-Level Covariate: Years of Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWD Model 1</td>
<td>SWD Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CTD Model 2</td>
<td>CTD Model 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Performance</td>
<td>0.2286 *** (0.0153)</td>
<td>0.2456 *** (0.0165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0625 *** (0.0134)</td>
<td>-0.0009 ** (0.0003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Democracy*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Performance</td>
<td>0.2463 *** (0.0149)</td>
<td>0.2414 *** (0.0190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0934 ** (0.0280)</td>
<td>0.0785 * (0.0361)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Performance</td>
<td>-0.0195 * (0.0082)</td>
<td>-0.0175 * (0.0077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.1554 *** (0.0176)</td>
<td>0.1520 *** (0.0170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.0588 *** (0.0117)</td>
<td>0.0588 *** (0.0115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0709 *** (0.0135)</td>
<td>0.0688 *** (0.0130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.0150 -0.0696 (0.0371)</td>
<td>0.0111 -0.0688 (0.0376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0392 (0.0375)</td>
<td>0.0375 (0.0375)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.1038 (0.0530)</td>
<td>0.1070 * (0.0519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0392 (0.0569)</td>
<td>0.0502 (0.0533)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0221 *** (0.0049)</td>
<td>-0.0216 *** (0.0049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0379 *** (0.0070)</td>
<td>0.0374 *** (0.0068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0042 *** (0.0011)</td>
<td>0.0040 *** (0.0011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0373 *** (0.0076)</td>
<td>0.0374 *** (0.0073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>-0.0003 ** (0.0001)</td>
<td>-0.0003 *** (0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Ownership</td>
<td>-0.0190 * (0.0084)</td>
<td>-0.0184 * (0.0080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0006 (0.0106)</td>
<td>0.0003 (0.0101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Democracy</td>
<td>0.0104 * (0.0043)</td>
<td>0.0059 (0.0059)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.8658 *** (0.1603)</td>
<td>2.6368 *** (0.1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.9326 *** (0.3229)</td>
<td>3.7909 *** (0.3755)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>31817 31599</td>
<td>31817 31599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>21 21</td>
<td>21 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>124774.40 135401.00</td>
<td>124692.70 135238.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* prob<0.05; ** prob<0.01; *** prob<0.001.

Note: Estimated variance components are omitted to economize space; they are presented in Table A.4 in the Appendix.

Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013).
Figure 1: Marginal effects of performance assessments

Panel A: Satisfaction with Democracy (SWD)

Panel B: Commitment to Democracy (CTD)

Panel C: Panel C: Political Perf.,Marginal Effect

Panel D: Political Perf.,Marginal Effect

Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013).
Taken together, these results regarding both economic and political performance provide support for Hypothesis 2.C regarding the relative effect of political performance. In countries with no experience with democracy, the effects of economic and political performance are similar. Because the effect of economic performance declines and that of political performance does not change as a democracy grows older, the effect of political performance relative to that of economic performance increases. This suggests that individuals increasingly focus on political goods relative to economic goods when making judgements about democracy as they gain more experience with the regime.

Table 2 presents the estimation results corresponding to additional models that examine whether it is actually level of economic development, rather than experience with democracy, that explains these results. The table presents the results corresponding to two model specifications. Model 5 and Model 6 evaluate whether democratic experience continues to condition the effects of economic performance on SWD and CTD, respectively, after controlling for economic development. To further explore whether level of economic development conditions the effects of performance on support for democracy, Model 7 and Model 8 only consider this country-level covariate, excluding democratic experience.

The results for Model 5 and Model 6 indicate that democratic experience continues to condition the effect of economic performance as expected after controlling for level of economic development. Thus, at any given level of development, the effect of economic performance on support for democracy decreases as a democracy grows older. In addition, results from Model 6 indicate that level of economic development increases the effect of economic performance on CTD at any given level of democratic experience. In the case of political performance, the results from both models indicate that neither democratic performance nor level of economic development appears to condition the effect of political performance.10

In turn, the results for Model 7 and Model 8 reveal that level of development does not condition the effects of either economic performance or political performance when democratic experience is not included in the specification. These results further undermine the culturalist claim that level of development should be what conditions the effects of performance on support for democracy. Altogether, the results from Table 2 provide support for Hypothesis 3 when it comes to economic performance: democratic experience, and not level of economic development, conditions its effect on support for democracy. The effect of political performance does not appear to be conditioned by either democratic performance or level of economic development.

---

10 It is worth noting that, according to the results from Model 6, the effect of political performance on CTD is not statistically significant for any given combination of democratic experience and level of economic development. Estimations not presented here show that this effect is significant when the interaction of political performance with level of economic development is not included in the specification.
Table 2: Additional multilevel models of support for democracy, full sample

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country-Level Covariates: Years and GDP per Capita</th>
<th>Country-Level Covariate: GDP per Capita</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>SWD Model 5</td>
<td>SWD Model 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTD Model 6</td>
<td>CTD Model 8</td>
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Individual Level

<table>
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<th>Economic Performance</th>
<th>0.2137 ***</th>
<th>0.0472 *</th>
<th>0.1987 ***</th>
<th>0.0275</th>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0218)</td>
<td>(0.0237)</td>
<td>(0.0226)</td>
<td>0.0228</td>
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<td>Years of Democracy*</td>
<td>-0.0009 **</td>
<td>-0.0012 ***</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
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<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0030)</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita*</td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>0.0053 **</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
<td>0.0041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0030)</td>
<td>(0.0020)</td>
<td>(0.0030)</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Performance</td>
<td>0.2186 ***</td>
<td>0.0628 ***</td>
<td>0.2185 ***</td>
<td>0.0749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0366)</td>
<td>(0.0623)</td>
<td>(0.0357)</td>
<td>0.0616</td>
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<tr>
<td>Years of Democracy*</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita*</td>
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<td>-0.0176 *</td>
<td>0.1518 ***</td>
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<td>(0.0077)</td>
<td>(0.0170)</td>
<td>(0.0077)</td>
<td>0.0169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
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<td>0.0688 ***</td>
<td>0.0589 ***</td>
<td>0.0688 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0115)</td>
<td>(0.0131)</td>
<td>(0.0115)</td>
<td>0.0130</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.0115</td>
<td>-0.0680</td>
<td>0.0116</td>
<td>-0.0673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0378)</td>
<td>(0.0375)</td>
<td>(0.0377)</td>
<td>0.0377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.1076 *</td>
<td>0.0502</td>
<td>0.1078 *</td>
<td>0.0504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0520)</td>
<td>(0.0529)</td>
<td>(0.0522)</td>
<td>0.0526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0216 ***</td>
<td>0.0375 ***</td>
<td>-0.0217 ***</td>
<td>0.0374 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0048)</td>
<td>(0.0068)</td>
<td>(0.0048)</td>
<td>0.0069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.0373 ***</td>
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<td>(0.0011)</td>
<td>(0.0073)</td>
<td>(0.0011)</td>
<td>0.0073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>-0.0003 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0003 ***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
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<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Ownership</td>
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<td>-0.0183 *</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0080)</td>
<td>(0.0102)</td>
<td>(0.0081)</td>
<td>0.0101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country Level

| Years of Democracy    | 0.0100 * | 0.0050 |
|                       | (0.0044) | (0.0064) |
| GDP per Capita        | 0.0216 | 0.0351 | 0.0327 | 0.0403|
|                       | (0.0290) | (0.0564) | (0.0320) | 0.0545|
| Constant              | 2.4606 *** | 3.5089 *** | 2.6103 *** | 3.5833 ***|
|                       | (0.3473) | (0.4442) | (0.3372) | 0.4541|
With regard to the control variables, it is worth discussing those effects that are robust to model specification. First, tolerance has a negative and significant effect on SWD and a positive and significant effect on CTD, while trust has a positive and significant effect on both measures of support. Second, educational attainment has a negative and significant effect on SWD and a positive and significant effect on CTD. Third, age has a positive and significant effect on SWD, while its effect on CTD decreases with age itself. More specifically, the effect of age on CTD is positive and significant for the youngest individuals, becoming progressively smaller with age, and failing to statistically differ from zero after the age of 68. Fourth, the asset ownership index, a proxy for wealth, has a negative and significant effect on SWD and no statistically significant effect on CTD.

Norris’s (1999a) notion of “critical citizens” – i.e., citizens who distrust political institutions and authorities and set increasingly higher standards of regime performance while according a great value to democracy – is useful for coming to terms with the findings pertaining to tolerance and trust. While high levels of both tolerance and trust are indicative of democratic values, the first variable would be more closely related to the post-modern values that characterize critical citizens. This would explain why more tolerant individuals are less satisfied with, but more committed to, democracy. The acquisition of these post-modern values would similarly explain the results corresponding to educational attainment and wealth.\(^{11}\) With regard to age, the results indicate that support for democracy changes with the life cycle. All else equal, younger individuals are the least satisfied with and the least committed to democracy; middle-aged adults are moderately satisfied with democracy and the most committed to the regime; and the elderly are the most satisfied with democracy, but no more committed to it than middle-aged adults.

To sum up, the evidence discussed here indicates: that better economic and political performance is associated with higher levels of support for democracy, even after controlling for values and socio-economic covariates (Hypothesis 1); that the effect of economic performance on support decreases as a democracy grows older (Hypothesis 2.A); that, as a consequence of this decrease, the effect of political performance relative to that of economic performance increases as a democracy grows older (Hypothesis 2.C);

\(^{11}\) More educated individuals would have acquired post-modern values and thus set higher standards of regime performance while showing greater commitment to democracy in the abstract. Wealthier individuals would have also acquired post-modern values, albeit to a lesser extent. This would in turn make them more demanding of performance, but not more committed to democracy than less wealthy individuals.
and that democratic experience, not level of economic development, is what conditions the effects of economic performance on support (Hypothesis 3).

The evidence also provides some important insights about the measurement of support for democracy. Clearly, satisfaction with democracy and commitment to democracy measure different types of support. As discussed above, satisfaction with democracy (SWD) is more reflective of economic and political performance than commitment to democracy (CTD). And this indicates that the former item measures support at a lower level of abstraction than the latter item. Given this difference, it should not be surprising to find that higher levels of education, for example, lead citizens to be more dissatisfied with the way democracy works, but more committed to principles that the regime embodies.

6 Conclusion

This paper has developed and assessed a comprehensive theory of support for democracy. Using insights from both instrumental and cultural approaches, this theory argues that performance considerations shape support, but that the importance of these performance criteria is conditioned by democratic experience. Specifically, it argues that the importance of economic performance should decrease as a democracy grows older, while the importance of political performance should increase. These parallel processes would lead to support for democracy being increasingly shaped by political performance in relative terms. The theory attributes these differences to democratic experience, rather than to level of economic development.

The empirical analysis lends clear support for the argument that performance shapes support for democracy, with the importance of economic performance declining with democratic experience. While the importance of political performance does not seem to be conditioned by democratic experience, its importance relative to economic performance does increase as a democracy matures. The results indicate that citizens of countries with little democratic experience tend to give economic and political performance similar weight when making judgements about the regime, but that economic performance is given substantially less weight than political performance in more mature democracies. Finally, the evidence shows that experience with democracy, and not level of economic development, is what explains these differences across new and old democracies.

This paper has important implications for understanding the role that mass support for democracy might play in democratic consolidation. Citizens of new democracies tend to expect the new regime to deliver economic prosperity to the same extent as they expect it to deliver political goods. It is at this stage, then, that support for the regime can be substantially undermined by poor economic performance. Such a decline in support might signal to anti-democratic actors that they might not face strong public opposition if they were to act against the regime. If economic performance is calamitous, a sharp decline in support for democracy might even be the prelude to active mass opposition to the regime.

Democracies that are able to deliver reasonable economic performance, and weather potential storms as they grow older, will give their citizens a chance to become tuned in to the workings of the regime. As a result, they will give economic performance progressively less weight in their judgements, and mass support for democracy will become less reflective of the
regime’s economic record. In the extreme, once a democracy has matured enough, its citizens will evaluate the regime only on the basis of its political performance – that is, on the extent to which it provides political goods such as the protection of rights and freedoms, opportunities for deliberation and accountability, and effective representation. In short, this paper suggests that support for democracy and a civic culture that values the political goods that democracy can deliver are more likely to be a consequence of, rather than a prerequisite for, the survival and eventual consolidation of democracy.
Understanding regime support in new and old democracies

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Understanding regime support in new and old democracies

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Appendix
Table A 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent variables, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Satisfaction with Democracy (SWD)</th>
<th>Commitment with Democracy (CTD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
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<td>5.45</td>
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<td>5.33</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>1493</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1148</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1437</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1460</td>
<td>6.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1439</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013).

Table A 2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual Level:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Performance</td>
<td>35445</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Performance</td>
<td>35122</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>34368</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>34793</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>35483</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>35483</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>35164</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>35404</td>
<td>38.99</td>
<td>15.85</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Ownership</td>
<td>35265</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Level:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>35483</td>
<td>23.63</td>
<td>26.61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>35483</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>15.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables/Items</th>
<th>Item Wording</th>
<th>Response Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic</td>
<td>How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?</td>
<td>1-to-5, “very good,” “good,” “neither good nor bad,” “bad,” and “very bad”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Sociotropic</td>
<td>Do you think that the country’s current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?</td>
<td>1-to-3, “better,” “same,” and “worse”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pocketbook</td>
<td>How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?</td>
<td>1-to-5, “very good,” “good,” “neither good nor bad,” “bad,” and “very bad”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Pocketbook</td>
<td>Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?</td>
<td>1-to-3, “better,” “same,” and “worse”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Rights</td>
<td>To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?</td>
<td>1-to-7, with 1 meaning “Not at all” and 7 meaning “A lot”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Trial</td>
<td>To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial?</td>
<td>1-to-7, with 1 meaning “Not at all” and 7 meaning “A lot”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?</td>
<td>1-to-7, with 1 meaning “Not at all” and 7 meaning “A lot”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tolerance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to Vote</td>
<td>There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote?</td>
<td>1-to-10, with 1 meaning “Strongly disapprove” and 10 meaning “Strongly approve”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Demonstration</td>
<td>How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views?</td>
<td>1-to-10, with 1 meaning “Strongly disapprove” and 10 meaning “Strongly approve”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run for Public Office</td>
<td>Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?</td>
<td>1-to-10, with 1 meaning “Strongly disapprove” and 10 meaning “Strongly approve”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Understanding regime support in new and old democracies

### Table A 3 (continued): Wording of items used to construct independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Make Speeches</th>
<th>How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?</th>
<th>1-to-10, with 1 meaning “Strongly disapprove” and 10 meaning “Strongly approve”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong></td>
<td>Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?</td>
<td>1-to-4, “very trustworthy,” “somewhat trustworthy,” “not very trustworthy,” and “untrustworthy”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP (2013).

### Table A 4: Variance components estimates corresponding to Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Country-Level Covariates</th>
<th>Country-Level Covariate: Years of Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWD Model 1</td>
<td>SWD Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CTD Model 2</td>
<td>CTD Model 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma(Economic Perf.) )</td>
<td>0.0387 (0.0115)</td>
<td>0.0387 (0.0115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma(Political Perf.) )</td>
<td>0.0478 (0.0073)</td>
<td>0.0478 (0.0073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma(Intercept) )</td>
<td>0.5079 (0.0913)</td>
<td>0.5079 (0.0913)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6039 (0.0907)</td>
<td>0.5437 (0.0859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma(L level-1 Residual) )</td>
<td>2.2051 (0.0471)</td>
<td>2.2051 (0.0471)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.714 (0.0585)</td>
<td>2.1995 (0.0466)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.714 (0.0585)</td>
<td>2.6997 (0.0585)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All covariances between level-two disturbances are assumed to be zero.

Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013).
Table A 5: Variance Components Estimates Corresponding to Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country-Level Covariates: Years and GDP per Capita</th>
<th>Country-Level Covariate: GDP per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SWD Model 5</td>
<td>CTD Model 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>σ(Economic Perf.)</strong></td>
<td>0,0358 (0,0096)</td>
<td>0,0182 (0,0145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>σ(Political Perf.)</strong></td>
<td>0,0462 (0,0081)</td>
<td>0,1036 (0,0157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>σ(Intercept)</strong></td>
<td>0,5305 (0,0785)</td>
<td>0,7683 (0,0963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>σ(Level-1 Residual)</strong></td>
<td>2,1995 (0,0466)</td>
<td>2,6997 (0,0585)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All covariances between level-two disturbances are assumed to be zero.

Source: Own calculations using LAPOP (2013).
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