Bureaucratic Pluralism in Global Development

Challenges for Germany and the United States

Erik Lundsgaarde
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Abstract

A variety of governmental actors within OECD-DAC donor countries oversee funding distributed to developing countries. This paper examines the role of diverse bureaucracies within the development policy systems of Germany and the United States and highlights core questions that their international engagement presents for the future of development cooperation. The paper reviews trends in funding across bureaucracies over the last decade, provides an overview of existing mechanisms for enhancing cross-governmental consistency and analyses proposals to reform the organisational set-up of the two systems. Although the challenges presented by sector-specific bureaucracies vary across donor contexts and within particular sectors of engagement, their presence in the cooperation landscape clearly creates pressure on foreign affairs and development bureaucracies to redefine their roles in the management of international cooperation. In preparing for future challenges, these bureaucratic actors will need to clearly articulate their own geographical, thematic and coordination competences in order to determine how the expertise and other resources from varied governmental actors can be effectively combined.
Acknowledgements

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Bonn, April 2014

Erik Lundsgaarde
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>German Federal Foreign Office / Auswärtiges Amt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKM</td>
<td>German Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media / Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMAS</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs / Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMBF</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Education and Research / Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMELV</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection / Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMF</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Finance / Bundesministerium der Finanzen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMFSFJ</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry for Families, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth / Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMG</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Health / Bundesministerium für Gesundheit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMI</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of the Interior / Bundesministerium des Innern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMJ</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Justice / Bundesministerium der Justiz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMU</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety / Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMVBS</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development / Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMVg</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry of Defence / Bundesverteidigungsministerium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMWi</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy / Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development / Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Country Programmable Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DED</td>
<td>German Development Service / Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst</td>
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<td>DEG</td>
<td>Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>United States Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>United States Government Accountability Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>United States Department of Health and Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InWent</td>
<td>Capacity Building International / Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMIC</td>
<td>Lower-middle-income Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGAC</td>
<td>Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPFAR</td>
<td>President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD</td>
<td>Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMIC</td>
<td>Upper-middle-income Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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</table>
Executive summary

The internationalisation of the work of sector-specific ministries within donor countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) is one example of how the field of actors engaging in development cooperation is diversifying. This paper examines the role of varied bureaucracies as development cooperation actors within the German and US systems and identifies challenges that their engagement presents for the future of development cooperation.

A broad review of trends in the provision of official development assistance (ODA) in both donor systems indicates that, although a wide variety of bureaucratic actors oversee resources directed to developing countries, these entities individually account for a small share of aid flows in comparison to the foreign affairs and development agencies that remain at the core of both systems.

These core governmental actors have seemingly consolidated their leading positions in international cooperation in Germany and the United States over the last decade. Funding tendencies across governmental entities nevertheless reveal shifts in each system. In Germany, where project funding from ministries such as the Ministry of Food and Agriculture or the Ministry of Education and Research hints at the fragmented character of small-scale initiatives tapping into domestic expertise, the expansion of ODA funding mobilised through the Ministry for the Environment indicates the importance of climate change as an issue area requiring increased inter-ministerial collaboration. In the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services has notably expanded its global profile, underlining the potential for significant coordination challenges with respect to US global health investments – a core priority in the US system.

The phenomenon of bureaucratic pluralism draws attention to long-standing issues concerning the role definition of the governmental actors at the heart of cooperation systems. In Germany, for example, the engagement of diverse ministries in cooperation with emerging economies highlights the potential for the Federal Foreign Office to assume a more important role in coordinating the activities of varied ministries. This raises questions about the future role of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in shaping country-level coordination and influencing cross-governmental priorities. In the US context, sectoral contributions from across US government agencies similarly draw attention to the State Department’s capabilities to guide cooperation in diverse thematic areas and to the future mandate of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in a context where other governmental entities hold expertise relevant for international cooperation.

Numerous coordination mechanisms exist in both systems to promote consistency across governmental entities working internationally. In Germany, the promotion of cross-governmental coherence in engagement with developing countries is nevertheless constrained by the principle of departmental independence, the lack of overarching hierarchical coordination mechanisms within the German government and the overlapping geographical mandates of the Foreign Office and the BMZ. The lack of a clear legislative framework for engagement with developing countries and the limitations of hierarchical coordination mechanisms within the executive branch pose challenges for improving coherence in the US system. Although the US State Department is a central player in overseeing international
cooperation throughout the US system due to its substantial funding oversight and hierarchical advantage over USAID with respect to strategy formulation and budgeting, in practice there are also limitations in its ability to assert a cross-governmental coordination role at the headquarters level and in the field, in part due to the advantages in expertise that sector-specific actors maintain.

To address concerns about the current and future functionality of international cooperation systems, analysts interested in the more effective promotion of global development goals have advanced numerous organisational reform proposals. In the German context, key reform alternatives have included strengthening the coordination or functional mandates of an independent global development ministry, integrating the BMZ into the Foreign Office or strengthening the mandate of sector-specific ministries within the cooperation system. In the United States, core reform proposals have included fundamentally revising the legislative and strategic framework for international funding, elevating the position of the core development agency within the system, integrating USAID into the State Department, promoting significant organisational reforms within the State Department to strengthen its development orientation or consolidating programmes pursuing similar aims across the government on the basis of a comprehensive review of international affairs funding.

The organisational reform proposals outlined in this paper highlight core areas for reflection on the optimal organisation of international cooperation in the future. Policy-makers should first assess the need for adaptation within international cooperation systems in relation to the goals or strategic framework guiding cooperation. In adapting the organisation of cooperation, the competencies that diverse governmental actors can contribute towards achieving these goals, the coordination mechanisms needed to maintain a useful division of labour among governmental actors, and the resource requirements for bureaucracies to fulfil the functional and coordination mandates they are attributed should all be taken into consideration.

Ongoing debates on the future of foreign policy and on the content of a post-2015 sustainable development agenda provide an opportunity to define the range of governmental competencies needed to address future international cooperation challenges and to clarify the roles of different governmental actors in addressing elements of the foreign and development policy goal system. Development agencies should therefore be prepared to position themselves in discussions on the adaptation of cooperation systems, and internal competence assessments should provide a basis for this. The purpose of such assessments should be to identify the geographical, thematic, cross-sectoral and coordination competencies that reflect the accumulated expertise and unique value-added of these organisations within the broader external relations apparatus. However, a substantive assessment of the comparative advantages of various ministries in engaging in developing countries cannot be limited to a self-presentation of strengths of development agencies, given the potential advantages of other governmental entities with respect to sectoral expertise, access to diverse networks or their recourse to alternative business practices and implementation models.
1 Bureaucratic pluralism in global development: Challenges for Germany and the United States

The multidimensional character of global development has long created overlaps between development cooperation as a policy field and other elements of the external relations of OECD-DAC donor countries. Efforts to promote environmental sustainability, the stabilisation of post-conflict states and trade expansion highlight that the goal of reducing global poverty is intertwined with a variety of other objectives, and that the response to these challenges requires contributions from a multitude of public and private actors, including a diverse spectrum of governmental entities in OECD-DAC countries. Such contributions can include changes in international and domestic regulatory frameworks and the provision of financial, technical, and/or humanitarian assistance to support development efforts in partner countries.

Numerous analyses characterise development policy as a field currently experiencing fundamental adaptation pressures. The policy field’s shifting sands are considered to be a result not only of the changes in the country contexts where cooperation takes place but also the proliferation of goals of cooperation, the diversification of the actors engaging in cooperation and the multiplication of instruments used (Severino / Ray 2009; Janus / Klingebiel / Paulo 2013; Gore 2013). These trends have potential benefits such as expanding choices for partner countries and encouraging innovation, but they also imply a basic coordination challenge in ensuring that pluralism does not lead to the inefficient splintering of cooperation efforts (Davies 2011; Severino / Ray 2010; Greenhill / Prizzon / Rogerson 2013).

This paper discusses the opportunities and challenges that the involvement of diverse governmental actors as aid providers in developing countries presents for the future of development cooperation. As noted in a previous paper on this topic (Lundsgaarde 2013a), governmental entities beyond the aid and foreign affairs ministries at the core of many OECD-DAC development cooperation systems can potentially enhance cooperation efforts by mobilising expertise or expanding networks for development. Viewed more sceptically, the international engagement of sector-specific ministries may also contribute to the proliferation of development initiatives and add to the coherence challenges of policy systems that are already facing difficulties in implementing aid-effectiveness principles.

This analysis examines the issue of bureaucratic pluralism in development cooperation with reference to Germany and the United States, both of which are leading OECD-DAC bilateral donors. In 2011, the US$ 27.1 billion in ODA disbursements from the United States alone accounted for some 29 per cent of all ODA from DAC member countries, while Germany’s ODA effort (US$ 8.74 billion) represented more than 9 per cent of total DAC ODA (OECD 2013). The analysis of these cases seeks to identify key issues that the involvement of diverse ministries presents for the management of engagement with developing countries. The paper does not attempt an evaluation of the effectiveness of ministerial development contributions, but rather aims to guide reflections on the future of the organisation of international cooperation in Germany and the United States, recognising that many issues arising from the analysis will be relevant for other OECD-DAC donors as well as aid providers beyond the DAC.

Analyses of the contributions of Germany and the United States to aid fragmentation have reached different conclusions, depending on the evaluation criteria on which the
assessments are based. According to an OECD analysis, Germany and the United States contribute less than most other DAC donors to the cross-country fragmentation of aid, which is characterised by the distribution of relatively small amounts of aid across many countries (OECD 2012). This can be explained in part by the large size of their overall aid portfolios. Due to their size, however, both donors also generally engage in a comparatively high number of sectors within their partner countries and therefore increase in-country aid fragmentation (Bürcky 2011). In the Quality of Official Development Assistance assessment, Birdsall and Kharas (2010) adopt fragmentation of aid among ministries from a single donor country as an indicator of donor efforts to reduce the administrative burden on partner countries and improve aid quality. Among the 30 donors for which standardised fragmentation scores are reported, Germany was considered more fragmented than 18. The United States appeared towards the bottom of this list, with Spain, Greece and the United Nations system achieving equivalent or lower standardised scores. Although the inclusion of individual UN agencies on the list may distort these standardised scores, the ranking nevertheless suggests that Germany and the United States are among the more fragmented bilateral donors within the DAC.

To assess the implications of bureaucratic pluralism for the future of development cooperation, this paper begins by providing an overview of funding trends related to the international engagement of sector-specific ministries in both donor countries, describing the profile of varied bureaucracies as ODA providers. The second chapter examines the issue of intra-governmental coordination in development cooperation, providing an overview of existing practices to promote cooperation across ministerial lines. The third chapter reviews proposals to reform the two development cooperation systems to enhance intra-governmental cooperation. The final chapter summarises the key issues that the analysis raises for policy discussions on how to promote governmental coherence in international cooperation.

The study is primarily a desk-based analysis that draws on government documents and policy analysis available in the public domain. Background interviews with a limited number of informants in Washington, DC, and in Germany also provided input for the analysis, in particular by offering insights on the character of ministerial engagement in developing countries and on the current state of cooperation among internationally active government agencies.

The study’s point of departure is the examination of the role of diverse ministries in ODA provision and the development policy field, with which it is closely associated. ODA is primarily a reporting concept that captures concessional resource flows from governmental actors to developing countries, though some qualifying ODA contributions such as support for refugees do not constitute a cross-border resource transfer (OECD 2008b).¹ The focus on

¹ The ODA concept is an imperfect way of summarising resource flows to developing countries. To better capture the volume of resource transfers that partner countries can influence, the OECD-DAC has developed the concept of country programmable aid (CPA), which excludes ODA-eligible funding such as humanitarian assistance, debt relief, administration costs and spending on development research and education in donor countries (Benn / Rogerson / Steensen 2010). In select cases, the volume of a donor’s CPA excludes aid provided by ministries apart from the main development agency. Disaggregated data on volumes of CPA in Germany and the United States by government agency are not available through the OECD’s CPA database.
ODA provision likely underplays the global role of certain ministries, given their importance in shaping international regulatory frameworks. It also neglects the international funding role of governmental actors that support firms active in developing countries, for example in the form of export credits. Although all or part of their funding for cooperation programmes in developing countries may qualify as ODA, ministries with core competencies in domestic public policy fields may be reluctant to consider themselves as development cooperation actors, given that development cooperation is associated with a goal system and criteria for assessing effectiveness that sector-specific ministries do not necessarily share. Nevertheless, the ODA focus is considered relevant in this analysis because it provides a basis for the comparison of engagement in developing-country contexts, both among governmental actors and across donor countries.

2 Funding trends and international priorities of sector-specific ministries

This section contextualises the role of sector-specific ministries in the German and US ODA systems by outlining general trends in ODA provision in the two countries and tracing the distribution of ODA funding across governmental agencies over time. Following a period of aid stagnancy in the 1990s, ODA levels increased across the OECD-DAC community. Both Germany and the United States contributed to this global trend. In Germany, ODA disbursements increased 165 per cent in real terms between 2000 and 2012, reaching nearly US$ 14 billion by the end of this period. The United States registered a 235 per cent increase in the same period, moving from US$ 12.7 billion to US$ 29.9 billion (OECD 2013). Although the increasing availability of ODA funding by itself might be considered a source of actor proliferation in ODA management, available data on the distribution of ODA funding across ministries suggests that ODA systems in Germany and the United States have become more consolidated over time, as the predominance of foreign affairs and development agencies in international cooperation has been reinforced. ODA funding trends across ministries in the two countries are reviewed below.

2.1 Funding trends in German ODA

The general profile of German development cooperation has remained relatively stable over the last decade. In 2002, 125 countries received net ODA transfers from Germany; in 2011 132 countries were net ODA recipients (OECD 2013). In response to recommendations from the OECD-DAC encouraging a greater concentration in aid allocation, the BMZ has reduced its number of priority partner countries in recent years. By 2013, there were 50 countries with German bilateral cooperation programmes, compared to 57 at the time of the last DAC peer review (OECD 2010). The BMZ identifies another 29 countries as partners benefiting from thematically or regionally focused cooperation. Sub-Saharan Africa contains the largest number of priority countries and attracted the largest share of German ODA for most years between 2002 and 2011, accounting for an average of 26 per cent of German aid in this period. The average shares of aid flowing to East Asia (12 per cent),

2 See http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/laenderliste/index.html.
3 The exceptions were 2007, when large aid allocations to Iraq made the Middle East the leading region for German ODA, and 2010, when South and Central Asia received a larger ODA share.
South and Central Asia (12 per cent), the Americas (11 per cent) and the Middle East (11 per cent) suggest that the German ODA budget is evenly distributed around the globe. Nevertheless, a shift in funding towards South and Central Asia is one discernible change in German ODA funding patterns since 2009, with funding for Afghanistan and India experiencing noticeable increases.

German ODA funding has long been perceived to have a bias towards middle-income countries. Between 2002 and 2011, the share of German aid directed to lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) and upper-middle-income countries (UMICs) exceeded the DAC average, reflecting a priority in engaging with regional economic powers as well as a heavy allocation of ODA towards debt cancellation in LMICs in the middle of the decade (OECD 2010). Apart from debt cancellation, investments in social infrastructure and services as well as economic infrastructure and production were the most important areas of sectoral specialisation in the German ODA programme in this period (OECD 2013).

Table 1 provides a summary of the evolution of ODA allocations through diverse governmental channels from 2004 to 2011. The annual summary tables prepared by the BMZ that are the basis for the information presented in this table list between 19 and 22 different governmental sources of ODA funding in these years, including all current German ministries, the German parliament and the federal states, for which funding is reported collectively. Throughout the period, the BMZ and the Foreign Office were the ministries directly responsible for the largest shares of German ODA. The BMZ tables indicate that all German ministries provide funding that is classified as ODA. For the most part, the volume of funding from sector-specific ministries is nevertheless quite small. In 2011, for example, ODA funding channelled through sector-specific ministries ranged from EUR 200,000 for the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development (BMVBS) to EUR 187.6 million for the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU).

The large ODA sums directed towards debt cancellation between 2005 and 2008 may contribute to a distorted picture of the distribution of ODA resources across German ministries over time. Debt forgiveness and rescheduling are captured in the line in table 1 referring to “federal assets”, which are not attributed to a single ministry. The absence of attribution leads to an underassessment of the importance of both the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), which oversees the implementation of debt cancellation instruments, and the BMZ, which shares decision-making authority with other ministries related to these instruments. A similar story holds for the ODA funding that is a part of Germany’s contribution to the budget of the European Union (EU). While the Ministry of Finance manages this budgetary assessment, the BMZ acts as the lead ministry in influencing EU-level discussions on programming development instruments. Although both lines in the

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4 The governmental entities for which data is reported include the following ministries, for which English translations are provided in the list of abbreviations: AA, BMZ, BMU, BMBF, BMF, BMELV, BMG, BMWi, BMAS, BMI, BMVg, BMJ, BMFSFJ and BMVBS. Funding for the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit was reported prior to the ministry’s division into the BMWi and BMAS in 2005. In addition, the statistical tables make note of allocations to the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media (BKM), the German Bundestag and the Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG).

5 Following the formation of the new government in December 2013, the BMU was renamed the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB).
### Table 1: German ODA by governmental entities, 2004–2011 (in million EUR (% of total))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
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<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>4321.2</td>
<td>3632.2</td>
<td>4412.2</td>
<td>5119.2</td>
<td>5549.8</td>
<td>6065.1</td>
<td>7017.4</td>
<td>7319.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(59.9)</td>
<td>(38.9)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(51.2)</td>
<td>(50.1)</td>
<td>(63.3)</td>
<td>(64.6)</td>
<td>(65.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>278.5</td>
<td>345.3</td>
<td>359.9</td>
<td>636.1</td>
<td>782.2</td>
<td>854.5</td>
<td>792</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>(5.7)</td>
<td>(8.2)</td>
<td>(7.9)</td>
<td>(7.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU budget</td>
<td>967.3</td>
<td>1156.9</td>
<td>1087.8</td>
<td>1122.1</td>
<td>1201.9</td>
<td>1271.3</td>
<td>1335.5</td>
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<td>(13.4)</td>
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<td>(11.3)</td>
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<td>(10.9)</td>
<td>(13.3)</td>
<td>(12.3)</td>
<td>(11.1)</td>
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<td>Federal assets</td>
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<td>3175.6</td>
<td>2417</td>
<td>2187</td>
<td>2280.7</td>
<td>103.3</td>
<td>163.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.3)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(25.2)</td>
<td>(21.9)</td>
<td>(20.6)</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>(2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal states</td>
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<td>782.8</td>
<td>764.2</td>
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<td>(8.4)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(7.5)</td>
<td>(6.2)</td>
<td>(7.3)</td>
<td>(6.6)</td>
<td>(6.3)</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<td>(.7)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(1.4)</td>
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<td>DEG</td>
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<td></td>
<td>364.6</td>
<td>202.6</td>
<td>307.4</td>
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<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>339.9</td>
<td>287.1</td>
<td>555.5</td>
<td>448.6</td>
<td>262.4</td>
<td>292.1</td>
<td>314.9</td>
<td>339.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.7)</td>
<td>(3.1)</td>
<td>(5.8)</td>
<td>(4.9)</td>
<td>(2.4)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7209.5</td>
<td>9329.3</td>
<td>9599.4</td>
<td>9998.1</td>
<td>11065.8</td>
<td>9581.2</td>
<td>10861.5</td>
<td>11218.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA total</td>
<td>6064.3</td>
<td>8112.1</td>
<td>8313.4</td>
<td>8978.4</td>
<td>9328.2</td>
<td>8674.1</td>
<td>9803.9</td>
<td>10135.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl</td>
<td>.396</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>.444</td>
<td>.449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The sum of lines from governmental entities exceeds the ODA total because this table does not list return payments to the federal budget – a negative figure that cannot be attributed to a single ministry. The share of ODA by ministry was calculated on the basis of the sum of all budget lines, with the exception of return payments to the federal budget. The figures for the BMZ include resources attributed directly to the ministry as well as market instruments (Marktmittel) disbursed via the KfW Development Bank and overseen primarily by the BMZ. This table follows the BMZ in listing the DEG (an organisation that extends financing to support private investment and private sector development) as an ODA provider. The DEG is a subsidiary of the KfW Development Bank, which, like the Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), is not listed separately in the summary tables due to its role in implementing the assistance already attributed to other governmental entities. This table does not report funding from governmental entities that accounted for less than 1 per cent of German ODA in all of the years examined.

Sources: Author’s own compilation based on BMZ (2005; 2007; 2008a; 2010; 2011; 2012)

Table reflect areas of inter-ministerial cooperation, they also underline that decision-making authority in the German ODA arena is primarily vested in three core ministries: the BMZ, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Finance.

In addition to underestimating the role of the core federal ministries in overseeing ODA flows, this table likely overstates the importance of the federal states within the German development cooperation system. There are 16 federal states, which autonomously determine priorities for development funding. Because the largest share of this funding relates to the cost of hosting students from developing countries and other domestic funding such as support for development education work or development-oriented research, it does not pose a serious coordination challenge within the broader development cooperation system. Nevertheless, the small remainder of sub-national ODA funding is generally widely dispersed to a variety of projects around the world (Wiemann 2008).
Even though the BMZ accounts for a large share of the German ODA marketplace on its own, it has not been alone in contributing to the overall ODA increases over the last decade. The most significant increase in development-related funding from a line ministry in the period summarised in Table 1 came from the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Conservation and Nuclear Safety. In 2011, however, BMU-funded development work accounted for less than 2 per cent of German ODA allocations. The recent rise in international BMU funding stems from the International Climate Initiative, created in 2008 to promote climate mitigation and adaptation efforts as well as biodiversity protection. The mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions has, to date, been its most important funding priority, and the initiative has funded 347 projects in 80 partner countries.

There is variation across other ministries in the nature of funding increases over time. The volume of ODA funding flowing through the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) has noticeably increased, whereas funding distributed through the Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection (BMEFV) and the Federal Ministry of Health (BMG) has been stable. ODA attributed to the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) declined markedly from a high of EUR 26 million in 2006 to less than 4 million in 2011. Although the financial footprints of these sector-specific ministries in developing countries remain relatively small, their influence extends beyond funding issues to include shaping policy frameworks for engaging in areas linked to their sectoral mandates. Examples include the leading role of the BMG in formulating the German government’s Strategy for Global Health Policy (German Federal Government 2013) and the contribution of the BMVg in developing governmental guidelines for engagement in fragile states (AA / BMVg / BMZ 2012).

The project orientation in the BMU’s international portfolio is typical of governmental actors that disburse comparatively small sums of funding to developing countries. In addition to funding measures such as bilateral technical assistance related to their core areas of competence, numerous line ministries also have responsibilities in managing German contributions to international organisations. For example, the BMELV oversees German contributions to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, whereas the BMG oversees contributions to the World Health Organization (Schorlemmer 2009).

There is variation across line ministries with respect to the importance of bilateral versus multilateral ODA funding in their international cooperation programmes. The BMBF’s cooperation with developing countries takes place almost exclusively through bilateral channels, whereas the BMG’s ODA funding is almost exclusively multilateral (BMZ 2012). This implies that different aspects of inter-ministerial coordination are important depending on the sector and the governmental actors represented in a given arena. Assessing the level of organisational coherence in managing relations with developing countries is relevant both with reference to bilateral development cooperation – where the consistency of programmes and projects funded by the German government in partner countries should be a key concern – and in the context of multilateral development cooperation, where the effectiveness of coordination in the oversight of international organisations should be scrutinised.

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7 As a result of the change of government at the end of 2013, the consumer protection mandate of the BMELV was transferred to the Ministry of Justice. The ministry’s name was therefore shortened to Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEFV).
Even though selected line ministries have expanded international programmes, the degree of fragmentation in the German aid system related to the dispersion of funding responsibilities across ministerial lines has declined over time. The Herfindahl Index reported in Table 1 provides a basic measure of the level of bureaucratic consolidation in the German development cooperation system. Although this measure of the concentration of ministerial control may be distorted due to specificities related to funding for the EU budget and debt cancellation outlined above, the index reflects the increasing share of ODA directly controlled by the BMZ and the Foreign Office.

A large number of countries receive some funding from sector-specific ministries. In the context of the International Climate Initiative, Asia and Latin America are the leading regions attracting funding from the BMU. China is the country where the largest number of projects has been funded through this initiative (27). Within Asia, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam follow in importance. Brazil is a key partner country in Latin America, while South Africa is the most important African partner for the BMU. Cooperation with middle-income countries is similarly important for the BMBF, given that cooperation programmes build on an existing research infrastructure. In the German government’s 2008 strategy for internationalising science and research, China, India and Brazil are explicitly mentioned as countries of special interest beyond Europe (BMBF 2008). Other key non-OECD partner countries for BMBF funding include Indonesia, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. This support generally assists German research institutions in expanding their networks and engaging in pilot research projects. As the BMBF example illustrates, sector-specific cooperation with emerging economies reflects a shift towards interest-based horizontal engagement, where partners acknowledge the mutual benefits of cooperation.

In contrast to the BMU and the BMBF, the bilateral cooperation profile of the BMELV has, to date, had a more narrow geographical scope. Its technical assistance projects to support nutrition, agricultural development and consumer protection goals are considered an extension of post-Cold War projects to promote agricultural development in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Its comparatively small international cooperation portfolio continues to be concentrated in this region, with Russia and the Ukraine alone accounting for 61.8 per cent of project funding between 2008 and 2011. Projects in China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Brazil and Belarus accounted for much of the remainder.

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8 The Herfindahl Index is typically used to measure the degree of competition or concentration in a market. The measure consists of the sum of the squared market share of the organisations that are identified in the marketplace. In this case, the index refers to the sum of squares of the share of ODA attributed to 22 entries in the BMZ summary tables on the origins of ODA funding. Two of the entry lines are collective entries, reflecting the combined sums of funding from the German federal states as well as a remainder category for funders that are not listed individually. The calculations presented here also consider the German contribution to the EU budget and measures related to debt relief labelled under “federal assets” as separate entities within the ODA marketplace, reflecting the different decision-making logics with which they are associated.

9 For more information about the international support provided by the BMBF, please see http://www.internationales-buero.de/de/785.php.

10 Russia does not qualify as an ODA recipient.
The BMZ and the Foreign Office remain the two most important ministries in the German system, due to the financial resources for cooperation with developing countries that they oversee and their mandates to promote coordination among other ministries. The exploration of ODA trends above indicates that the centrality of these ministries in international cooperation has been reinforced even as some sector-specific ministries have expanded their international engagement. The study of diverse ministries as aid providers therefore draws attention back to these focal points and emphasizes that a core challenge in the organization of development cooperation relates to the balance of responsibilities between the BMZ and the Foreign Office.

The increasing financial and political role of the Foreign Office in the ODA system in recent years has several sources. The ministry has consolidated its position as a humanitarian aid provider, integrating instruments related to short-term crisis response and transitional assistance in its portfolio (AA / BMZ 2012). To foster democratization and conflict resolution efforts, the Foreign Office extends funding to multilateral organizations and non-governmental organisations to support projects aimed at strengthening the rule of law, addressing gender-related challenges in peace-building and post-conflict rehabilitation. It also oversees funding related to cultural cooperation, including support for the Goethe-Institut in developing countries. Beyond funding, another reason for the Foreign Office’s rising importance in international cooperation relates to the prominence of emerging economies in German strategies for global engagement. Although some large countries, including China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico, still qualify as ODA recipients, a diversified German cooperation portfolio reflects not only Germany’s economic interests but also its goal to influence the way that these “shaping powers” (Gestaltungsmächte) contribute to the resolution of global governance challenges (German Federal Government 2012).

The priority attached to engagement with the “shaping powers” beyond development cooperation is leading to an adjustment of the roles of governmental entities in bilateral cooperation. These partner countries in many cases remain BMZ priority countries. Thus, wider governmental engagement vis-à-vis these countries can be understood as a progression of existing emphases within the development cooperation system rather than as a fundamental reorientation in foreign policy. German cooperation with China provides an example of this adjustment process. In 2010, the BMZ initiated a phasing-out of its cooperation portfolio with China via its decision to discontinue bilateral technical and financial assistance to the country. Although the BMZ has indicated that it will continue to engage in dialogue with China through a strategic development cooperation partnership, the drawing-down of BMZ-guided funding diminishes its role in Germany-China relations.

At the same time that development cooperation managed by the BMZ in China is coming to a close, sector-specific ministries are increasing their funding for cooperation with China. These investments may be guided by a set of priorities similar to core areas of engagement for development cooperation (promotion of peace and security; human rights and rule of law; economic development; energy and sustainability; among other goals). In addition, the

11 Information on support provided by the Foreign Office for crisis prevention and conflict resolution issues is available on the following website: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/HumanitaereHilfe/Aktuelle Artikel/130110_Leitfaden_AA_BMZ_erklaerung.html.

12 The BMZ’s description of the nature of its cooperation with China can be found at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/laender_regionen/asien/china/index.html.
availability of new forms of financing does not necessarily mean that implementation channels have changed, as, in practice, the large German implementing organisations in development cooperation (GIZ and KfW) sustain their engagement in familiar country contexts through partnerships with ministries beyond the BMZ (Binding / Kudlimay 2013). As a diverse set of ministries whose cooperation programmes follow a clear interest-based logic increase their cooperation with emerging economies, the Foreign Office has an opportunity to assume a more important role in orchestrating these ministerial activities, given its role in representing German interests abroad.

As noted above, defining the respective roles of the Foreign Office and the BMZ in managing cooperation remains a core issue in analysing broader changes in the ministerial landscape of engagement with developing countries, due to their central financial and political positions within the German ODA system. As the evaluation of Germany’s commitment to the implementation of the Paris Declaration indicated, lines of ministerial responsibility in managing relations with specific development countries have, in the past, been blurred because development cooperation programmes require the assent of the Foreign Office, even though the BMZ is considered the lead ministry in negotiating cooperation agreements with partner countries and funding for cooperation is primarily allocated through the BMZ (2008b). The ambiguity in the division of labour between the Foreign Office and the BMZ in managing development cooperation efforts at the country level has been reinforced by the limited field presence of the BMZ itself and the integration of BMZ representatives into the Foreign Service, creating a direct reporting line to the Foreign Office through the embassy. To enhance its direct participation in development cooperation management in the field, the BMZ committed to increasing its personnel assigned to embassies in partner countries in 2013 (BMZ 2013).

In summary, the fragmentation of the German development cooperation system – linked to the small sums disbursed by federal states and line ministries – occurs around the edges of a relatively consolidated system, with the BMZ at its centre. The overview of funding trends

13 The role of the Foreign Office in offering its consent for funding proposals for specific countries relates to the principle of examining the consistency of proposals from other ministries with German foreign policy objectives. This principle (in German: Prüfung der außenpolitischen Unbedenklichkeit) has a passive connotation, as the Foreign Office examines the innocuousness or non-objectability of funding proposals with respect to foreign policy. The Foreign Office’s formal role in approving country-level funding nevertheless indicates its pre-eminence in foreign affairs compared to other ministries. An evaluation of German humanitarian assistance noted, for example, that whereas the BMZ was required to consult with the Foreign Office before approving and disbursing funding in this area, the Foreign Office was not subject to a comparable requirement vis-à-vis the BMZ. Ministries are expected to share information on country-level funding decisions across ministerial lines, even if decisions are made independently (BMZ / AA 2011).

14 The limited field presence of the BMZ is related to the important role that parastatal implementing organisations play in German development cooperation. The implementing organisations have more personnel working both at headquarters and in the field than the BMZ. According to figures reported in the last DAC Peer Review of Germany, in 2009 the BMZ had 623 headquarters-based staff and 60 staff in the field. The KfW Development Bank counted 818 headquarters staff and 78 field staff in the same year. The three technical assistance organisations (GTZ, DED and InWent) that later merged to form the GIZ had a combined total of 2,785 headquarters staff and 2,514 staff in the field. In addition, the implementing organisations together employed 10,455 local staff, the vast majority of which were local hires of the GTZ (OECD 2010). The recent increases in BMZ personnel assigned to country missions have not fundamentally altered this balance.
above confirms Schorlemmer’s (2009) analysis of aid distributed among German governmental entities from 1995 to 2007, which noted that the BMZ’s pivotal role within the German development cooperation system had not yet been fundamentally challenged by the international engagement of various ministries. Whether or not the management of German development cooperation itself is challenged by the engagement of a variety of governmental entities at the margins of the system, the multiplicity of ODA funding sources within a single donor country may still compound fragmentation at the partner-country level, which creates inefficiencies related to the duplication of analytical work and a higher administrative burden for donor and partner countries alike.

While the growing international role of sector-specific ministries is far from displacing the privileged position of the BMZ in funding international cooperation in the German system, the changes taking place on the system’s margins raise questions about the comparative advantages of the BMZ as a cooperation actor in relation to other governmental actors. Perceived advantages of the BMZ include its ability to adopt a cross-sectoral perspective to confront multidimensional development challenges and its responsiveness to the interests of partner countries in formulating policy. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some country contexts, partner-country governments or individual ministries within them may themselves seek sector-specific rather than cross-sectoral cooperation. This suggests that the assessment of comparative advantage should take multiple dimensions of organisational value into consideration, as the functionality of an organisation can be evaluated in relation to both the German government’s goals and the preferences that partner countries express in cooperation relationships.

2.2 Funding trends in the United States

As the world’s largest bilateral aid provider, the United States has a global presence in development cooperation. In 2002, a total of 122 countries and territories were net US ODA recipients; in 2011, there were 133 countries that held this distinction. Although the Obama administration has promoted greater selectivity in aid allocation – implying the extension of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) allocation logic to the broader funding landscape – the US continues to provide significant development funding in varied country contexts across world regions (OECD 2011). In line with historical trends, funding priorities have followed key national security interests in the last decade. Nearly 19 per cent of US aid was directed towards the Middle East between 2002 and 2011, with the share of US aid to the region being especially high in the years immediately following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Afghanistan and Pakistan have also been major ODA recipients in recent years, and aid to South and Central Asia averaged 16 per cent of the US total between 2002 and 2011. In the same period, ODA to sub-Saharan Africa expanded in volume and as a share of the overall aid budget, accounting for 25 per cent of US ODA on average, making the continent the most important region for US development cooperation (OECD 2013).

General tendencies concerning the distribution of US ODA across income groups are consistent with DAC averages. LMICs received the largest share of US aid on average between 2002 and 2011 (33 per cent), though the share of aid to the least-developed countries has surpassed aid to LMICs since 2008 and represented 38 per cent of the US aid total in 2011. The sectoral profile of US assistance is weighted towards social infra-
Table 2: US ODA commitments by government agency, 2005–2011 (in million US$ (% of total))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.7)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>3,932</td>
<td>2,331</td>
<td>2,626</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18.3)</td>
<td>(14.7)</td>
<td>(8.4)</td>
<td>(7.6)</td>
<td>(4.4)</td>
<td>(3.9)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>3,704</td>
<td>3,113</td>
<td>3,281</td>
<td>4,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(9.7)</td>
<td>(10.7)</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
<td>(8.8)</td>
<td>(12.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>4,374</td>
<td>4,218</td>
<td>4,438</td>
<td>5,325</td>
<td>6,406</td>
<td>6,434</td>
<td>6,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.5)</td>
<td>(15.8)</td>
<td>(16.1)</td>
<td>(15.4)</td>
<td>(19.5)</td>
<td>(17.3)</td>
<td>(18.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>2,247</td>
<td>2,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.9)</td>
<td>(4.4)</td>
<td>(5.3)</td>
<td>(3.8)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6.1)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>1,837</td>
<td>3,775</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td>(6.6)</td>
<td>(10.9)</td>
<td>(4.5)</td>
<td>(4.2)</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>11,714</td>
<td>11,047</td>
<td>13,509</td>
<td>16,408</td>
<td>17,316</td>
<td>20,393</td>
<td>17,034</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(38.9)</td>
<td>(41.4)</td>
<td>(48.9)</td>
<td>(47.3)</td>
<td>(52.6)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,832</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>(9.2)</td>
<td>(3.9)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>(5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30,109</td>
<td>26,678</td>
<td>27,639</td>
<td>34,678</td>
<td>32,897</td>
<td>37,126</td>
<td>33,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl</td>
<td>.230</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.289</td>
<td>.278</td>
<td>.331</td>
<td>.347</td>
<td>.315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures on the top line of each row are in US$ millions. The numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of total US ODA allocated to each agency. The “other” category includes the following agencies, for which ODA figures were reported in the given years: Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Labour, Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, African Development Foundation, Inter-American Foundation, Peace Corps, Trade and Development Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Export-Import (EX-IM) Bank, National Science Foundation, the Open World Leadership Center Trust Fund, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, US Institute for Peace and the Federal Trade Commission. Among these agencies, only the Department of Energy (DOE), the EX-IM Bank and the Peace Corps individually accounted for more than 1 per cent of ODA during any of these years. The Herfindahl ODA concentration measure indicates the sum of squares of the market shares of all agencies for which funding was reported in a given year.

Sources: Author’s own compilation based on (USAID 2013a)

structure and services (43 per cent on average from 2002 to 2011), and the United States is also a significant humanitarian assistance provider in comparison to many other bilateral donors (15 per cent of ODA from 2002 to 2011) (OECD 2013).

A variety of governmental actors are involved in US ODA administration. The last OECD-DAC Peer Review of the United States indicated that 27 public entities had a role in aid administration (OECD 2011). This number includes entities whose ODA-related

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15 The concept of ODA is used in the United States to summarise funding flows reported to the OECD-DAC, but is not a guiding concept in budgetary allocations. The broader label of “foreign assistance”, which also encompasses export promotion support, is more commonly used within the US development policy system.

16 The Washington, DC-based think tank the Center for Global Development lists 22 US government departments and agencies in its Foreign Assistance Dashboard Tracker, designed to monitor
activities have marginal significance. In 2011, ODA attributed to diverse governmental entities ranged from US$ 1 million overseen by the Department of Homeland Security to more than US$ 17 billion overseen by USAID (USAID 2013a). As Tables 2 and 3 indicate, USAID was the largest US ODA provider from 2005 to 2011. Both USAID and the State Department benefited from expanding aid volumes, and their share of overall aid rose in this period. The progression in funding to the State Department and USAID points to a general trend towards greater bureaucratic consolidation in the US development cooperation system. Still, ODA funding implemented by the State Department and USAID combined represented less than 70 per cent of the US ODA effort in 2011.

Two key factors have contributed to this modest trend towards bureaucratic consolidation. First, the trend can be traced in part to reforms enacted in 2006 as part of the “F Process” under the administration of George W. Bush. These reforms were designed to present a strategic framework for US development cooperation programmes, streamline governmental budgetary and policy planning, and enhance coordination among government agencies.

bureaucratic implementation of US government aid transparency guidelines. See http://international.cgdev.org/page/us-foreign-assistance-dashboard-tracker. As of January 2014, only eight governmental ODA actors had published funding data on the US government’s Foreign Assistance Dashboard (http://www.foreignassistance.gov), though all agencies that receive or implement aid are expected to provide this information as the data platform develops.

Table 3: US ODA disbursements by government agency, 2005–2011 (in million US$ (% of total))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>3,838 (13.7)</td>
<td>160 (1.1)</td>
<td>-145 (-1.1)</td>
<td>-53 (-0.0)</td>
<td>-75 (-0.0)</td>
<td>94 (0.0)</td>
<td>-31 (-0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>6,033 (21.6)</td>
<td>4,222 (17.9)</td>
<td>3,385 (15.5)</td>
<td>2,601 (9.7)</td>
<td>1,681 (5.9)</td>
<td>1,492 (4.9)</td>
<td>695 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>1,464 (5.2)</td>
<td>1,759 (7.5)</td>
<td>2,304 (10.6)</td>
<td>3,305 (12.3)</td>
<td>2,811 (9.9)</td>
<td>3,118 (10.3)</td>
<td>3,560 (11.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>3,508 (12.6)</td>
<td>3,158 (13.4)</td>
<td>3,060 (14)</td>
<td>4,467 (16.6)</td>
<td>5,116 (18.1)</td>
<td>5,145 (16.9)</td>
<td>5,027 (16.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>1,189 (4.3)</td>
<td>1,174 (5)</td>
<td>1,454 (6.7)</td>
<td>1,295 (4.8)</td>
<td>1,642 (5.8)</td>
<td>2,241 (7.4)</td>
<td>2,020 (6.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>52 (0.2)</td>
<td>155 (0.6)</td>
<td>308 (1.4)</td>
<td>590 (2.3)</td>
<td>932 (3.3)</td>
<td>1,429 (4.7)</td>
<td>1,620 (5.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>10,780 (38.6)</td>
<td>10,569 (44.9)</td>
<td>10,357 (47.5)</td>
<td>13,562 (50.5)</td>
<td>15,196 (53.7)</td>
<td>15,799 (52.1)</td>
<td>15,999 (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,072 (3.8)</td>
<td>2,336 (9.9)</td>
<td>1,064 (4.9)</td>
<td>1,076 (4)</td>
<td>986 (3.5)</td>
<td>1,034 (3.4)</td>
<td>1,892 (6.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27,935</td>
<td>23,532</td>
<td>21,787</td>
<td>26,842</td>
<td>28,290</td>
<td>30,353</td>
<td>30,783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The negative figures for the USDA in select years reflect loan repayments related to USDA international programmes.

Source: Author’s own compilation based on USAID (2013a)
engaged in global development. Although the F Process consolidated authority for USAID-managed development accounts and many State Department programmes in the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance within the State Department and gave this office a mandate to foster coordination among the broad spectrum of government agencies managing development-related funding, major funding vehicles – including the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) – fell outside of the office’s purview (Nowels / Veillette 2006).

A second factor contributing to the consolidation of the development cooperation system around the State Department and USAID has been the declining role of the US Department of Defence (DOD) as an ODA provider in recent years. The DOD increased the scope of its ODA-eligible activities in connection with the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq during the George W. Bush administration. In 2005, the DOD was the second-largest US ODA provider behind USAID, administering nearly 20 per cent of US ODA (see Table 2). Though a large part of DOD development funding has related to post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction efforts, the department has engaged in a broad spectrum of development-related activities, including contributions to humanitarian relief operations and technical assistance to support security-sector reform (Patrick / Brown 2007). The DOD’s wide-ranging portfolio in part reflects the limited capabilities that other governmental actors possess in engaging in difficult country contexts (Serafino 2008).

The DOD also maintains an important role in the field of global health. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that the DOD’s budget for global health-related activities in fiscal year 2012 amounted to nearly US$ 580 million, including investments in research and development, disease surveillance, and health care and training in partner countries (Michaud / Moss / Kates 2012). As the largest bureaucracy in the United States, the DOD has capabilities to mobilise and deploy resources internationally that other externally-oriented agencies cannot match. This imbalance has raised concerns that, especially in the fragile contexts where the DOD is likely to be more active, military goals will take precedence over development objectives, and implementation lessons from development practice will be neglected (Patrick / Brown 2007). The example of the DOD underlines that bureaucracies bring power resources to the development policy arena that are independent of the level of development-related funding they oversee.

At the same time, the figures presented in Table 2 indicate that the importance of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as an aid provider has increased over the last decade. In 2011, ODA flows attributed to HHS topped US$ 4 billion, making HHS ODA comparable in scale to the overall aid budgets of Italy or Spain. Although health-related development funding benefited from congressional support even in the 1990s, when US ODA commitments declined (Lundsgaarde 2013b), the major global health initiatives introduced during the administration of George W. Bush are a primary explanation for HHS’s expanded global role. Together with USAID, HHS became a major implementer of global health-related development projects.

17 As efforts to protect the health and military readiness of US forces are a key goal of this global health funding, a large share of the expenditures included in this estimate likely do not qualify as ODA. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that the accurate estimation of DOD contributions to global health is complicated by the diversity of DOD programmes and administrative departments within the DOD that are a source of this funding (Michaud / Moss / Kates 2012; Moss / Michaud 2013).
PEPFAR, launched in 2003, and the President’s Malaria Initiative, established in 2005.\(^{18}\) Its engagement in developing countries is mainly managed through the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which focuses on improving health infrastructure, disease surveillance and training for medical professionals – an orientation distinct from the community-based health approach associated with USAID (Sessions s.a.).

One sign of the growing self-perception of HHS as an international actor was its publication of a *Global Health Strategy* in 2011. The document underlines that the department justifies an expanded global role in terms of its contribution to addressing domestic public policy objectives. Although the strategy itself is framed in global terms, the need for a partner-centred orientation and “whole of government” approaches and cooperation with the DOD and USAID in particular stress its relevance for engagement in developing-country contexts. In highlighting the value of mobilising expertise within the department to address global health problems and its capability to assume a brokering role by maintaining ties with partners such as counterparts within foreign health ministries, the Strategy outlines key elements of the department’s self-perception of its strengths as a global actor (Daulaire 2012; US Department of Health and Human Services 2011).

Many other US agencies that report funding qualifying as ODA have a comparatively small footprint in developing countries and provide funding or technical assistance directly related to their core areas of expertise. Examples include bilateral support from the US Treasury Department to assist partner countries in implementing economic reforms and support from the DOE to develop clean-energy partnerships (Lawson / Epstein 2009).

The core of the US development policy system continues to be centred on the US State Department and USAID. The creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in 2003 brought a new agency with a global development mandate into the system. Although there were initially concerns that the MCC’s creation would siphon resources away from USAID, MCC funding has remained small in comparison to USAID funding over the last decade (see Tables 2 and 3). The MCC was established to improve the business model of aid delivery by emphasising the selection of recipients on the basis of governmental performance, the support of programmes designed and implemented by partner countries, and attention to the measurement of results (Tarnoff 2013). The organisation provides an important example of how the priorities and operating methods of US bureaucracies can be shaped by the US Congress. In contrast to USAID, which has historically been hampered by congressional micromanagement linked to extensive earmarking (Lancaster 2007), the MCC’s authorising legislation permits it to adopt a more partner-driven approach to programme planning and implementation.\(^{19}\) Different legislative channels for authorising and funding US government agencies can enable some governmental actors to acquire support for their international work more easily than others. This may be viewed positively as an avenue for committing additional resources for development, or negatively as a force hindering the development of coherent strategies for international engagement.

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\(^{18}\) In the 2012 fiscal year, funding allocated through PEPFAR (including US bilateral HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis programmes, as well as US contributions to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, amounted to US$ 6.4 billion (PEPFAR s.a.).

\(^{19}\) The legislative restrictions facing varied bureaucracies in the US system should therefore be taken into consideration in assessing organisational effectiveness.
Although the State Department has a leading role in providing overall guidance on questions related to development policy goals and aid-allocation preferences, USAID has a more important role in implementation. In fiscal year 2011, the State Department was responsible for implementing some 44 per cent of the foreign economic assistance it oversaw, while another 36 per cent of this State Department funding was implemented by USAID (2013b). A key example of the division between the State Department as a provider of policy guidance and other bureaucracies as implementers of State Department programmes is the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) in the State Department, established in 2003 to oversee the implementation of PEPFAR. In addition to formulating programme strategies and promoting common procedural standards, OGAC assumes a role as a convenor and arbitrator among US government agencies involved in the implementation of HIV/AIDS programmes, among which the CDC and USAID are the most significant (US Government Accountability Office 2009b).

The importance of the US State Department in overseeing funding beyond the resources for which it holds direct implementation responsibility is captured in comparing the distribution of foreign economic assistance across government agencies (Table 4), with the summaries of ODA commitments and disbursements given in Tables 2 and 3. Foreign assistance is reported according to the agency that is allocated funding, while the US ODA figures summarised in Tables 2 and 3 reflect the role of diverse governmental actors in aid implementation. In Table 4, USAID remains the single-largest agency funded, though its relative weight in the system appears lower than in the ODA summary tables. Foreign economic assistance funded through HHS is notably lower than the level of ODA that it implements, indicating a transfer of resources from the State Department. The foreign economic assistance figures also highlight that the international roles of the US Department of Agriculture and the US Department of Energy are more important than their ODA implementation roles suggest. For the USDA, one key explanation for this is that it transfers implementation responsibility for a large component of food assistance programmes to USAID (Hanrahan 2013). The Department of Energy’s non-ODA international profile can be explained by the weight of cooperation programmes related to nuclear non-proliferation in its portfolio, where cooperation with Russia and Eastern and Central European countries holds special relevance.

These examples highlight that agency influence over cooperation programmes is not reducible to the distribution of ODA funding across agencies alone. The differences in reported funding for foreign economic assistance and ODA programmes also indicate that internationally active bureaucracies are engaged in a variety of cooperative relationships with other bureaucracies, with one agency often implementing funding allocated to another. This simple observation underlines that agencies have varied competencies that are acknowledged by other governmental actors. The individual strengths of bureaucracies can include not only their specialised expertise, but also the policy networks and external

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20 In this case, implementation can mean that funding is passed along to additional implementing entities such as multilateral organisations, foreign governments, non-profit organisations or for-profit contractors.

21 Additional discrepancies between US foreign assistance reporting and ODA reporting include the different time periods for which data is reported (ODA is reported for a calendar year; foreign assistance for the fiscal year) and the different geographical scope of reporting, as ODA is limited to assistance provided to developing countries (USAID 2013a).
Table 4: US foreign economic assistance by agency, 2001–2010 (in million US$ (% of total))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>1,976</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>2,896</td>
<td>2,541</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>4,792</td>
<td>7,137</td>
<td>4,952</td>
<td>1,837</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>2,037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>2,178</td>
<td>4,091</td>
<td>5,476</td>
<td>5,652</td>
<td>5,982</td>
<td>10,068</td>
<td>11,760</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>1,217</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>1,639</td>
<td>2,746</td>
<td>1,317</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>6,576</td>
<td>8,665</td>
<td>17,300</td>
<td>11,446</td>
<td>10,444</td>
<td>9,707</td>
<td>11,528</td>
<td>10,445</td>
<td>13,175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>781</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12,319</td>
<td>14,535</td>
<td>25,647</td>
<td>26,751</td>
<td>29,579</td>
<td>27,135</td>
<td>27,698</td>
<td>32,878</td>
<td>34,717</td>
<td>37,405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures are in US$ millions. The numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of total US foreign economic assistance allocated to the agency in a given year. Figures from the following agencies are included in the “other” category: African Development Foundation, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Department of Labour, Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Trade Commission, the Inter-American Development Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Open World Leadership Center, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Peace Corps, the Trade and Development Agency and the United States Institute for Peace.

Source: USAID (2013b)

constituencies that they have access to, or the implementation models that they are able to use (Nicholson-Crotty 2012; Wilson 1989). In the context of international cooperation, the access to a constituency within a given sector can provide support for resource mobilisation and potentially expand the array of domestic actors interested in engaging in international work. At the level of implementation within partner countries, access to sector-specific policy networks and constituencies can translate into partnerships with counterpart organisations, such as partner line ministries working within a given sector.

As in the German case, the observation that numerous governmental actors engage in developing countries raises the question of how the comparative strengths of organisations in promoting international cooperation can be assessed. Many factors can contribute to organisational effectiveness. These factors include the area of specialisation, the available competencies of personnel, and the efficiency of administrative processes. The principles of aid effectiveness outlined in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action provide one
framework for assessing the advantages of governmental actors in promoting development goals.\textsuperscript{22}

An evaluation of US government performance in the implementation of the Paris Declaration highlighted variations among agencies in terms of organisational awareness of and commitment to aid-effectiveness principles. Examining seven key agencies engaging in developing-country contexts, the analysis identified the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Treasury Department’s Office of Technical Assistance as the government agencies whose practices were most closely aligned with Paris Declaration principles (Blue / Eriksson / Heindel 2011).\textsuperscript{23} The evaluation concluded that development contributions from the Department of Health and Human Services were also consistent with the principles. Interestingly, USAID and the State Department were both considered to have internalised aid-effectiveness principles to a more limited degree, though the explanations for their reluctant embrace of the agenda differ. The legislative restrictions USAID is subject to limit its ability to use country systems and to coordinate with other aid providers. For the State Department, it is likely that the self-perception of its mandate as being the pursuit of foreign policy rather than development goals has contributed to limited internalisation of the principles (Blue / Eriksson / Heindel 2011).\textsuperscript{24}

This review of ODA trends in the United States reveals points of commonality and difference with the German system. Consistent with the German example, the State Department and USAID continue to occupy a central place within the policy system – a position that has been strengthened in recent years in spite of the presence of numerous other government agencies as ODA providers. In the United States, however, the State Department has a more dominant role in guiding policy and overseeing funding. While the environment ministry is the most prominent bureaucracy beyond the foreign affairs and development core in Germany, HHS and the DOD are key sector-specific ODA actors in the United States, signalling that global health and security issues represent policy areas where the management of cooperation among diverse governmental entities merits further attention. As in Germany, the description of internationalisation trends among sector-specific actors ultimately leads to a discussion on the role of pivotal bureaucratic players (State and USAID) in the management of international cooperation, including reflection on the coordination role that they should assume as well as their added value in engaging in thematic areas where other bureaucratic actors hold some claim to expertise.

\textsuperscript{22} Although the aid-effectiveness principles outlined in the Paris Declaration reflect commitments made on behalf of donor governments, in practice some governmental actors may consider the principles to reflect a bias linked to the interests of the development cooperation community. Actors that were not involved in negotiating aid effectiveness agreements may not be keen to be evaluated according to the indicators of good performance suggested in the agreements.

\textsuperscript{23} The consistency of the Millennium Challenge Corporation with Paris Declaration principles reflects the influence of accepted tenets of aid effectiveness, including the importance of country ownership on the MCC business model at the time of its creation in 2003. The mandate of the Treasury Department’s Technical Assistance Programme to directly support partner-country governments explains its adherence to Paris principles (Blue / Eriksson / Heindel 2011).

\textsuperscript{24} The \textit{Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review} published in 2010 indicated that the commitment to aid-effectiveness principles in the State Department and USAID implementation of foreign assistance resources would be strengthened in the future (US State Department / USAID 2010).
3 Intra-governmental coordination in practice

The review above of general funding trends across ministerial lines indicates that many governmental actors sometimes play a substantial role in development cooperation. The engagement of diverse ministries can be attributed to a perception of value-added through the mobilisation of additional resources, the provision of sectoral expertise, the expansion of networks or the reliance on implementation channels that offer an alternative to the operating models favoured by bilateral and multilateral development agencies. This positive view of the contribution of line ministries mirrors an assertion found in broader discussions on the role of new actors in international development (Zimmermann / Smith 2011) recognising that pluralism can increase global commitments to addressing development goals and expand the choices available to partner countries. However, the diversification of the actor landscape in development cooperation – whether through the expanding cast of states funding global development efforts, the rise of private aid providers or the variety of governmental engagement within OECD-DAC donor countries – also carries a potential downside if diverse approaches lead to goal conflicts, a duplication of work and an increased administrative burden on populations that are supposed to benefit from assistance. These potential challenges were a primary motive for the commitments that donor countries undertook to improve aid effectiveness in the last decade.

This section reviews key inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms that are in place in Germany and the United States to promote consistent action in international cooperation. In both cases, channels for information exchange and cooperation among government agencies are more extensive and diverse than the examples that are provided. Coordination mechanisms can vary in terms of the specific issues or geographical contexts they address, their formality, the regularity of their use, and which governmental actors and external stakeholders participate. This analysis does not attempt a full inventory of coordination mechanisms, but even a more complete delineation of such mechanisms alone would not be able to render a judgment on their effectiveness in promoting potential synergies across government departments, limiting overlapping mandates and harmonising business practices. In spite of these limitations, the outline of key characteristics of each system’s mechanisms for orchestrating information exchange and collaboration among ministries provides a basis for identifying potential problem areas in the management of international cooperation in each country.

3.1 Inter-ministerial coordination in Germany

In the German parliamentary system of government, the composition of the executive depends on the composition of the legislature. The executive is therefore primarily responsible for agenda-setting as well as policy implementation. Although the Chancellor presides over the governmental bureaucracy and provides the general political direction for the government, the Ressortprinzip (Departmental Principle) outlined in the German constitution grants authority to ministers within the cabinet to independently manage the policy areas that they are appointed to oversee. The same principle underlines the autonomy of ministries and their non-hierarchical relationship to one another within the governmental framework. See http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/analysen/2009/richtlinienkompetenz_des_bundeskanzlers.pdf.
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cabinet. While the existence of an independent ministry dealing with development cooperation is generally considered to be an advantage for the promotion of development policy goals within the German system, the principle of non-interference across policy portfolios limits the ability of the BMZ to influence or coordinate the activities of other ministries. There has also traditionally been no overall coordinating entity for development issues within the government (OECD 1995; OECD 2002).

The policy coherence for development debate has drawn attention to potential inconsistencies across policy fields with implications for developing countries as well as the mechanisms for intra-governmental coordination designed to limit contradictions in foreign policy. As this debate gained prominence, many OECD-DAC governments introduced organisational reforms to stimulate cross-governmental exchange on the development impact of policies in diverse thematic areas. In the German context, numerous measures were introduced after 1998 to strengthen the position of the BMZ vis-à-vis other ministries in encouraging the adoption of development-friendly global policies. Reforms to promote coherence were generally procedural in character, for example relating to inter-ministerial consultation in the formulation of country strategies, the intensification of bilateral meetings between the BMZ and other ministries to discuss coherence, and the increase in opportunities by the BMZ to review legislation for its development impact (Ashoff 2005; OECD 2006). The creation of a unit within the BMZ to promote policy coherence and coordination across ministries provided an organisational innovation to encourage consistency of external action. Given the limited capacities of this small unit, however, the BMZ has largely been confined to assuming an advocacy role in relation to other ministries on development issues (Galeazzi et al. 2013). Whereas many small-scale measures have been introduced to encourage informal exchange across ministerial lines related to engagement with developing countries, hierarchical coordination mechanisms are scarcely used.

Although the limited ability of the BMZ to shape the policy agendas of other ministries in the context of promoting policy coherence for development is understandable – given differences in the underlying interest bases of governmental entities – the BMZ also faces constraints in promoting inter-ministerial coordination in the narrow field related to resource transfers to developing countries that qualify as ODA. Nevertheless, the German government has introduced measures in recent years to improve the coordination of resource flows to developing countries. In 2010, for example, an inter-ministerial contact group (the Ressortkreis Technische Zusammenarbeit und ODA-Transparenz) was created in connection with the merger of German implementing organisations in the field of technical cooperation. Guided by the BMZ through its policy planning staff and open to participation from all ministries, the committee aims to increase the transparency of resource flows from different governmental entities and to improve the common oversight of technical cooperation.

26 The 2005 DAC Peer Review of Germany (OECD 2006) suggests that the Federal Chancellery assumes a central coordinating role in German development cooperation, as its structure reflects the remainder of the federal bureaucracy in miniature. The report nevertheless also indicates that the ability of the Chancellery to perform a coordination mandate is restricted by its capacity constraints, given the small number of personnel working on development issues.
At its inception, this formalised coordination forum was expected to meet at least twice yearly and centre on information exchange. A follow-up agreement concerning the ODA coordination role of the BMZ within the federal government emphasises the importance of improved reporting on ODA activities as a basis for inter-ministerial exchange; it also suggests that coordination does not amount to joint planning or imply that the BMZ has a responsibility to steer the activities of other ministries (German Bundestag 2011; BMZ 2013). The limitations in existing inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms – with respect to their mandates and scope as a platform for common planning – highlight a contradiction in the role of the BMZ in steering relations with developing countries. Although one perceived advantage of the BMZ is its ability to promote a cross-sectoral perspective in programming cooperation instruments, this cross-sectoral mandate largely applies to the resources that the BMZ controls. Without a coordinating competence across the government, the ministry does not have the power to foster a systemic perspective for German engagement in developing countries in its entirety.

As suggested above, the Foreign Office also has a cross-governmental coordination mandate, owing to embassy oversight of country-level cooperation programmes. Its coordination role in developing-country contexts has nevertheless been more visible in areas linked to its core funding mandates. For example, the Foreign Office maintains a leadership role in the humanitarian aid arena, where a cross-governmental contact group created in 2004 meets on a bi-monthly basis to exchange information and discuss the harmonisation of approaches to crisis prevention. A 2010 assessment of the government’s action plan in this area suggested that although the contact group had contributed to strengthening joint approaches to crisis prevention, project planning related to the issue remained largely in the hands of individual ministries (German Federal Government 2010). The limited financial weight of the Foreign Office in other areas, particularly those related to peace and security promotion, has created tension with the BMZ and has provided an explanation for the Foreign Office’s restrained strategic role in shaping German engagement with developing countries in the past (Mair 2009). The Foreign Office’s growing interest in assuming a leadership role in strategy development towards certain regions, including Africa and Latin America, as well as with the “shaping powers” signals that the ministry is keen to expand its overall coordinating role in international cooperation.

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27 The ability of the BMZ to influence the approaches of other ministries likely varies according to the specific issue being addressed as well as the procedures in place to facilitate coordination in a given area. As an example, the last DAC peer review of Germany described cooperation between the BMZ and BMU within the context of the International Climate Initiative as a positive case of policy coherence for development. Cooperation in this area is based on an inter-departmental agreement that foresees early and close consultation among the ministries in shaping the overall programme and individual projects, which is complemented by other procedures to promote common positions and joint responsibility in the climate policy arena (OECD 2010).

28 The representation of German interests abroad, the promotion of external relations in areas including development policy and the coordination of the foreign-policy related activities of German public-sector institutions in the framework of the federal government’s foreign policy are among the core tasks assigned to the German Foreign Service (BMJ 2011). The last point emphasises the representational mandate of the Foreign Service for the entire government and hints that the Foreign Office’s formal cross-governmental mandate may be higher at the country-level than within inter-ministerial dialogue in Germany.
This brief overview of inter-ministerial coordination as it relates to German engagement in developing countries indicates that, although numerous small-scale mechanisms have been introduced in recent years to foster information exchange across ministerial lines, mechanisms to promote cross-governmental coherence through joint planning remain limited due to the principle of departmental independence, the lack of overarching coordination structures within the German government, and the overlapping mandates of the Foreign Office and the BMZ in guiding engagement in developing countries. The importance of the BMZ and the Foreign Office in shaping international cooperation derived from the financial resources they oversee and their role in influencing the approaches adopted by other ministries should make the clarification of their respective roles and the assessment of their individual competencies a key preoccupation in discussions on improving inter-ministerial coordination on development issues.

3.2 Inter-agency coordination in the United States

Many observers have pointed to the need for improvements in coordination among the multitude of US governmental actors engaging in the global development arena. The US development cooperation system differs from Germany’s not only due to its scale – suggesting the potential for a more diverse range of coordination challenges in international cooperation – but also due to the American system of divided government. While the President selects the heads of federal bureaucracies and many additional management appointments and provides direction for the executive agencies, the US Congress also influences the work of federal bureaucracies by setting the parameters for regulatory policy, appropriating funding and providing continuous oversight. The legislative branch can also shape the organisation and mandates of different components of the federal bureaucracy (Halperin / Clapp / Kanter 2006). Legislative authority related to global development programmes is spread across different committees in the US Congress: responsibility for food aid, contributions to multilateral development banks and bilateral development assistance is notably dispersed (Tarnoff / Lawson 2009). The complex legislative setting influencing international cooperation programmes has been widely acknowledged as a source of diffuse goals and bureaucratic procedures across the US development policy system.

Within the executive branch, there are numerous mechanisms to encourage greater consistency in action across government agencies. The National Security Council (NSC) sits at the apex of inter-agency coordination structures. Its potential to assume an overarching role in outlining US development policy priorities, arbitrating among agencies and coordinating policy implementation was emphasised in the Obama administration’s 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD) with a commitment to establish

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29 Another key difference relates to the implementation structure of development cooperation. In Germany, there is a concentrated implementation landscape that puts heavy reliance on the GIZ as an implementing agent for technical assistance and the KfW Development Bank as an implementing agent for financial assistance. The US implementation landscape is fragmented due to the extensive involvement of private contractors. Differences in foreign policy priorities also influence the character of coordination challenges across the two countries, as the United States has generally emphasised security concerns as a rationale for international engagement, whereas German foreign policy has traditionally emphasised economic concerns.
Given the emphasis on consensus decision-making among agencies represented in various inter-agency policy committees and sub-committees associated with the NSC, and their limited ability to compel other agencies to change policy directions in this setting, the NSC may, in practice, lack the capacities to put forward a strategy to guide the cooperation programmes of diverse agencies or to assure cross-governmental coordination on development issues (Lawson / Epstein 2009).

As in the German case, the limited ability of structures associated with the office of the executive to perform a cross-governmental coordinating function that encompasses efforts to develop common strategies and undertake joint planning efforts encourages reflection on how cross-governmental coherence and coordination can be promoted at the ministerial level. In contrast to the German case, the leading US governmental development agency, USAID, is in a clearly subordinate position to the State Department in this regard. USAID holds claim to expertise in overseeing the implementation of development projects in diverse sectors and has, under the Obama administration, undertaken an internal reform programme (USAID Forward) to strengthen its organisational competencies and capacities in order to elevate the position of USAID within the US development policy system (OECD 2011). Nevertheless, the State Department maintains a leading role in guiding US international engagement and has a coordination mandate vis-à-vis US agencies with international programmes (Whittaker et al. 2011).

The coordination mandate of the State Department takes different forms. As a result of reforms initiated under the George W. Bush administration, an Office of Foreign Assistance Resources was established in 2006 to foster strategic coherence and consolidate policy and budgetary planning across the State Department and USAID. Although the establishment of this office initially implied greater State Department control over USAID’s internal planning, under the Obama administration USAID has regained lost planning competencies.

A report prepared by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessing the experiences of the initial phase of consolidation of planning and budgetary competencies revealed several challenges in reforming the organisational structure for managing international cooperation. In addition to raising the concern that reporting benchmarks and timelines for reform implementation were insufficiently developed, the report underlined that the new office’s mandate did not yet extend to all State Department and USAID-managed programmes, much less the programmes funded by other government agencies. The report also highlighted that the State Department had not sufficiently taken into consideration the need to tailor a human resources strategy to the functional needs of the new office, drawing attention to the importance of ensuring that the desired roles, competencies and composition of the involved workforce were well-defined. Finally, the GAO report signalled that the office faced challenges in communicating its output both

30 A summary of the PPD can be accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy. Although the PPD refers to the creation of an Interagency Policy Committee, this represents a re-labelling or reaffirmation of an existing coordination forum.

31 See http://www.state.gov/f/.
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within the State / USAID apparatus and with external stakeholders (US Government Accountability Office 2009a).

The importance of improving coordination in international action across government was emphasised in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), led by the State Department. To promote “whole of government” cooperation in a variety of country contexts, the QDDR emphasises strengthening the coordination role of the State Department at the country level. To this end, the QDDR recommends reaffirming the central role of the heads of diplomatic missions in overseeing the development of country assistance strategies and increasing their involvement in headquarters-level policy-making processes (US State Department / USAID 2010). The review acknowledges that improving coordination might also result from increased selection of mission directors on the basis of their experience with inter-agency relations and the heightened reliance on other governmental agencies with relevant competencies as implementing partners. The proposal to elevate the coordination role of country mission directors does not reflect a fundamental change in the mandate of diplomatic missions; rather, it highlights that, in practice, directives from the headquarters of US agencies represented in specific countries have interfered with efforts to promote coherent country-level action (Marks / Lamb 2012).

The State Department also already assumes a coordination mandate within specific sectors where diverse governmental agencies are active. Through functional offices such as the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilisation Operations, the Office of Global Food Security, the Office of Global Health Diplomacy, and the Bureau of Energy Resources, the State Department is responsible for guiding diplomatic efforts, including participation in multilateral initiatives in these sectors and developing policy on the basis of input from other bureaucracies. These offices are still young and therefore illustrate challenges that the State Department faces in orchestrating US efforts in policy areas where its own capacities are not well-developed.

The existence of functional offices that deal with varied sectors relevant for engaging with developing countries within the lead bureaucracy for managing international relations does not erase claims that other bureaucracies might have in directing action in specific sectors on the basis of their expertise. As an example, although the Office of Global Food Security might be considered an overarching structure for coordinating the contributions of various US government agencies, in the context of the presidential Feed the Future initiative, coordination responsibilities for the programme are divided between the State Department, which focuses on engagement with multilateral initiatives, and USAID, which acts as the

32 The QDDR highlights that attention to improving inter-agency coordination is especially relevant with respect to emerging powers, regional centres of influence and countries with a large inter-agency presence (countries where US funding is likely to be more significant such as Afghanistan and Pakistan). The reinforcement of the State Department role in country-level coordination has already taken place in the Afghanistan-Pakistan context. A congressional evaluation of US foreign assistance efforts in Afghanistan conducted following the attribution of additional oversight responsibilities to the State Department concluded that while the whole-of-government approach involving the supervision of 14 governmental entities at the embassy had experienced successes, the heightened State Department role also created challenges related to the introduction of new bureaucratic processes and the diminished voice and decision-making powers of development experts on stabilisation and reconstruction issues within the country (US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2011).
lead agency in the initiative overseeing both analytical and policy inputs and the coordination of the 10 US agencies involved, including the USDA, the MCC and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, among others.33

Given the high volumes of funding dedicated to global health goals over the last decade, efforts to synchronise cross-governmental action in this domain point to core challenges in reforming the coordination infrastructure for engagement with developing countries. Expanded funding for global health has led to the creation of a series of offices anchored in the State Department to oversee international health efforts. With the creation of PEPFAR in 2003, the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator was established to provide governmental leadership on HIV/AIDS issues and supervise implementation of the initiative by numerous agencies, of which the CDC and USAID were the most important. In 2009, PEPFAR coordination was subsumed under the presidential Global Health Initiative, which aimed to unify governmental action in the field of global health more broadly. In the summer of 2012, the Global Health Initiative was dissolved and replaced by the current Office of Global Health Diplomacy.34

The State Department’s leadership and coordination role in this domain can be debated from at least two perspectives. First, because of an imbalance between health-funding increases and attention to the organisational and administrative resources needed to oversee their implementation, bureaucratic capabilities to mobilise expertise and direct implementation remained stronger in other agencies, notably within HHS and its Office of Global Health Affairs (Feldbaum 2010).35 Second, the competence of the State Department in assuming a leading role in the global health domain has been questioned. One key argument for transitioning the responsibility of the coordination of global health programmes – including the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator – to USAID is that, as an operational actor, USAID has accumulated more direct experience in implementing health financing, implying competencies related not only to an understanding of the issue area but also to knowledge on how to effectively design monitoring and accountability frameworks (Glassman / Duran 2012).

The observation that the State Department may lack the capabilities or the competencies to effectively guide and coordinate the work of other government agencies engaging in developing countries is not unique to the global health field. Although the State Department may have expertise in developing governance frameworks, it does not have, for example, the operational capacity to contribute significantly to conflict stabilisation and reconstruction efforts without support from the Department of Defence (Eastman 2012). Arguing against the further consolidation of cooperation programmes in the hands of the State Department, three former USAID administrators highlighted that the State Department’s short-term orientation and an organisational culture at odds with a

33 See http://www.feedthefuture.gov/about.
34 The demise of the Global Health Initiative is discussed in the following blog post: http://international.cgdev.org/blog/failure-launch-post-mortem-ghi-10. One proposed change linked to the creation of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy was to strengthen the role of US ambassadors in developing-country-level partnerships for health (Salaam-Blyther 2013).
35 The Office of Global Health Affairs was renamed the Office of Global Affairs in 2010, indicative of the expanding international role of the HHS (Bliss 2014).
development outlook offered reasons to limit its responsibilities in overseeing US foreign assistance programmes (Atwood / McPherson / Natsios 2008). At the same time, these authors acknowledged the long-term decline of the capabilities of USAID as an organisation as a factor that contributed to the proliferation of government agencies assuming an operational role internationally. The authors emphasised that the agency’s capabilities would need to be bolstered in order for it to effectively promote coherence within the US development policy system on its own.

Although the need to formulate coherent cross-governmental strategies for engagement in varied country contexts and to improve mechanisms for coordinating the contributions of various government agencies has been acknowledged in overarching policy documents such as the PPD and the QDDR, the challenges the US government faces in designing and operationalising coordination structures in global development remain significant. As in Germany, a key question concerns the appropriate division of labour between the State Department and agencies with a functional and operational mandate. The QDDR signalled that the pre-eminence of the State Department in guiding international cooperation should be reinforced by upgrading the role of embassies in inter-agency processes (US State Department / USAID 2010). At the same time, current offices within the State Department related to the coordination of sector-specific activities face constraints with respect to their capacities and competencies to manage issue linkages. Moving forward, whether and how to strengthen the functional competencies of the State Department in fields relevant to engagement with developing countries will represent a key area for reflection on the reform of the US development policy system.

Much of the foregoing discussion implies that organisational coherence derives from a clarification of the mandate for coordination that government agencies possess within an international cooperation system and the extent to which their organisational characteristics and resources allow them to fully exercise that mandate. Yet, greater coherence may also result from the consolidation of international programmes and the reduction of actors and initiatives to coordinate. The US tendency to establish new initiatives and implementation structures – instead of confronting underlying problems in the legislative framework influencing international cooperation – potentially leads to dispersed small-scale programmes addressing similar issues, encouraging a duplication of effort and limiting the benefits of scale. A recent proposal by the Center for Global Development to bring together US government programmes to stimulate private sector development and leverage private investments in developing countries under the roof of a strengthened Overseas Private Investment Corporation provides an example of how functional consolidation within agencies possessing a core competence in a specific area could reduce inefficiencies in international engagement (Leo / Moss / Schwanke 2013).
4 Proposals for organisational reform

Reforms to improve the coherence of systems of cooperation with developing countries can take place at multiple levels. Summarising lessons learnt from its donor peer reviews, the OECD-DAC identifies the clarification of strategic frameworks, the consolidation of governmental responsibilities for overseeing aid programmes, the limitation of sectoral and geographical priorities, and the introduction of performance-based management systems as key corridors of action to promote more effective donor engagement (OECD 2008a). Additional factors that can influence the effectiveness of cooperation programmes include the selection and design of cooperation instruments and the extent of coordination with other aid providers. Reforms at different levels within a cooperation system may be difficult to separate, as the strategic framework can, for example, influence the attribution of responsibilities among governmental actors and define principles for country-level engagement. While recognising the multi-level character of cooperation systems, this section highlights key proposals to improve organisational coherence in the management of international cooperation efforts in Germany and the United States that focus on the division of responsibilities among bureaucracies.

The question of whether and how the organisation of cooperation with developing countries should be reformed requires consideration of the underlying goal system that guides cooperation. The reform proposals outlined below mostly originate from within the development policy community. As a result, these proposals generally adopt the perspective that organisational reforms should aim to improve the ability of donor governments to effectively promote economic development and poverty reduction in partner countries. An emphasis on the promotion of environmental sustainability as a core element of a foreign policy agenda could lead to different conclusions about the appropriate division of labour among governmental actors. The interests guiding engagement have always been more diverse than the putatively altruistic motives with which development cooperation as a policy field has often been associated. The involvement of diverse ministries in international cooperation signals the need for donor governments to transparently discuss this interest complex and to define the foreign policy agenda against which efforts to improve organisational coherence can be measured.

4.1 Organisational reform proposals in Germany

The challenges that the diverse landscape of governmental actors in German development cooperation present for the effectiveness and visibility of development contributions have been acknowledged for decades. Proposals for reforming German cooperation structures have drawn attention to issues related not only to the division of ministerial responsibilities but also to the internal capacities of leading governmental actors (i.e. the BMZ) and the reorganisation of the aid implementation apparatus. The consolidation of the German implementation landscape has represented an especially important concern in recent years. Abandoning the separation of responsibilities for the implementation of financial and technical assistance between different parastatal organisations has been a recurring recommendation among policy analysts (Ashoff 2009; OECD 1995; OECD 2002; OECD 2006). The gradual consolidation of parastatal organisations delivering technical assistance – progressing notably with the merger of the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit), InWent (Capacity Building International) and DED (German Development Service) under the umbrella of the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für
international Zusammenarbeit) in 2011 – has led to some rationalisation of the implementing structures but not to a resolution of the institutional separation of financial and technical assistance.

Governmental proposals to improve organisational coherence to advance development goals have been summarised in regular OECD Peer Reviews of German development cooperation. The 1995 peer review made note of two main proposals to foster coherence: the creation of a “Development Cabinet” to offer a consensus-based inter-ministerial forum to review policies concerning engagement with developing countries, and the consolidation of ministerial responsibilities for development policy by shifting the oversight of issues such as environmental cooperation and humanitarian assistance to the BMZ (OECD 1995). Rather than emphasising the functional role of the BMZ vis-à-vis other ministries, a subsequent internal review of the ministry focused on the appropriate division of labour between the BMZ and implementing organisations. The review suggested that ministerial participation in strategy development, international policy dialogue and the promotion of coherence within the German government should be prioritised over intensive engagement in project management (OECD 1998). The 1998 peer review signalled that the internal competence assessment of the BMZ could be a building block for a more comprehensive analysis of the functionality of the entire development cooperation system. In the years that followed, development cooperation reforms continued to have a small-scale character, relating largely to reorganisation efforts within the ministry and measures introduced to facilitate cooperation among implementing organisations.

As referenced above, the rising salience of the policy coherence for development agenda enlarged the toolbox at the BMZ’s disposal to serve as an advocate for development goals within the broader external relations apparatus. Over time, measures were also introduced to improve data collection on resource flows qualifying as ODA from governmental actors beyond the BMZ and the Foreign Office (OECD 2002). Nevertheless, more than a decade later, the most recent DAC peer review of Germany noted that the BMZ still lacked the capacity to engage on the full range of questions related to its core development mandate, and therefore continued to face difficulties in shaping political debates or assuming a coordinating role vis-à-vis other ministries (OECD 2010).

The limitations in the observed ability of the BMZ to play a coordination role in relation to other German ministries, whether in terms of guiding regulatory policy or influencing the management of resource flows, has informed academic proposals on how to improve organisational coherence in engaging with developing countries. Brombacher’s (2009) analysis of organisational reform options for the German development cooperation system implies that designing an institutional set-up to effectively promote development goals should not only involve reflection on which governmental actors should be assigned a coordination responsibility but also about their capabilities to promote both coordinated government action and development objectives. One main reform proposal would involve maintaining the independent cabinet-level status of the BMZ but strengthening its coordination mandate. This coordination mandate would be assured through a supplementary cross-governmental forum that could potentially be overseen by the Federal Chancellery.36

36 Scholz and Kaul (2013) similarly propose that the appointment of a special representative for global affairs and sustainable development within the Federal Chancellery to coordinate governmental action
While the attribution of additional powers to the BMZ in Brombacher’s first reform proposal does not resolve the basic overlap in geographical competences with the Foreign Office, his second reform proposal suggests that the integration of the BMZ into the Foreign Office offers another pathway to enhance the coherence of the external relations apparatus. Referring to the experiences of progressive donor countries, including the Netherlands and Denmark, Brombacher notes that a merger of foreign affairs and development portfolios would not necessarily undermine the pursuit of a development agenda. To balance foreign policy and development interests within a reformed organisational structure, attention would need to be given to issues such as how personnel within the ministry rotate to diffuse expertise related to global development within the organisation. This reform proposal therefore involves more than the absorption of the BMZ’s resources and functional responsibilities into the Foreign Office and implies that the Foreign Office would need to embark on an internal adaptation process to fulfil its expanded mandate (Brombacher 2009).

Faust and Messner (2012) similarly take the current limitations of the BMZ in asserting a coordination role across the spectrum of activities related to engagement in developing countries as a starting point for proposing four alternative options for organising the German ministerial landscape for international cooperation in the future. Among the four reform options, two follow from the assumption that the global development agenda is becoming more expansive. The first of these reform options would consist of enlarging the functional mandate of an independent development ministry to assume responsibility for most dimensions of cooperation with non-OECD countries. A key element of this proposal would be the consolidation of international cooperation programmes in areas related to food security, climate and energy policy, and research cooperation under the roof of a “Ministry for Global Development”, thus diminishing the role of sector-specific ministries as aid providers. Several reservations can be expressed with regard to this proposal: 1) it does not resolve the basic coordination challenge between the Foreign Office and the BMZ, as the Foreign Office would maintain a universal mandate for overseeing engagement at the country level; 2) it neglects both the rationale for sector-specific engagement in international cooperation as well as the expertise that line ministries can contribute; 3) it does not explain why a new independent ministry would overcome the structural challenges that the BMZ currently faces in advancing development goals within the German government.

A second proposal outlined by Faust and Messner (2012) would involve strengthening the capacities of sector-specific ministries as international actors and integrating the BMZ’s global poverty-reduction mandate into the work programme of the Foreign Office. This proposal would imply a need to develop capacities within the Foreign Office, not only to absorb a larger cooperation portfolio but also to assume a stronger coordination role vis-à-vis would be one important element of better orchestrating the international contributions of various ministries and developing stronger joint positions in multilateral discussions concerning environmental sustainability.

37 As a third possible institutional reform option, Brombacher proposes the creation of a cabinet-level development committee – a coordination forum based on consensus decision-making among all ministries engaging in developing countries. This reform proposal assumes that there will be no shift in the attribution of responsibilities for coordination at the ministerial level and (as in other reform proposals) that the participation of diverse ministries in international cooperation will persist (Brombacher 2009).
vis sector-specific ministries that allows for joint planning and the consolidation of programmes and projects in particular areas. As Faust and Messner acknowledge, challenges related to the implementation of this proposal would include how to transfer lessons learnt from decades of development cooperation to the Foreign Office and sector-specific ministries, and how to effectively organise the linkage between domestic and internationally oriented work areas within the sector-specific ministries themselves. At the same time, this pathway for organisational reform might be advantageous because it: 1) removes the overlapping governmental coordination mandates of the Foreign Office and the BMZ; 2) recognises the expertise of sector-specific actors; and 3) attributes responsibilities for overseeing global development objectives to a powerful ministry that should be in a stronger position to influence how other ministries engage globally.

The reform of a country’s external-affairs apparatus is a complex undertaking. Although the reform proposals outlined above provide frameworks for orienting thinking on the advantages and disadvantages of different courses of action, they do not present a detailed set of recommendations on how the government should proceed with reform deliberations and the possible redesign of Germany’s foreign affairs and development policy system. The reform proposals nevertheless suggest that governmental debate on the appropriate institutional set-up to guide international cooperation in the future can be organised around four core questions: 1) What are the main elements of the goal system that determines what functions governmental actors need to perform in international cooperation? 2) What functional competencies should be assigned to which governmental actors? 3) What institutional measures are needed to promote cross-governmental coordination? 4) How can the capabilities of governmental actors be strengthened to match expectations related to the functional and coordination mandates they are attributed? These guiding questions are also relevant in considering the future organisation of international cooperation in the United States and other donor contexts.

4.2 Organisational reform proposals in the United States

Although initiatives to stimulate discussion and political momentum around the reform of the US foreign assistance system have been a recurring feature for half a century, policy review processes initiated by both the executive branch and Congress involving key stakeholder voices outside of government have often had a limited impact in promoting comprehensive organisational reform (Nowels 2007). Over the last decade, reform needs within the US system have been outlined in numerous reports, drawing attention to several common themes, including the necessity of clarifying the underlying strategic framework guiding foreign assistance flows, the importance of upgrading the civilian dimension of US foreign policy and streamlining international programmes to avoid duplication and foster coordination (Center for US Global Engagement 2009; Epstein / Weed 2009). Key elements of these reform proposals have been incorporated into draft legislation introduced in Congress in recent years (US House of Representatives 2009, 2013), which has, however, languished in the legislative process.

At least two main types of reform proposals address how to adapt the strategic framework for US global development efforts to meet current challenges. At one fundamental level, numerous analyses have promoted the revision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (HELP Commission 2007; Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network 2008). Although this
legislation was initially regularly revisited and amended to reflect shifting priorities, nearly 30 years have passed since the authorising framework has been substantively reviewed. The appropriations process has become more important in outlining aid priorities as a result, and a variety of programmes have been established through separate authorisation channels, including PEPFAR and the MCC (Rennick / Chesser 2011). In addition to clarifying the core objectives of US global engagement, advocates of such a reform suggest that revised authorising legislation is necessary to curb the proliferation of programmes, initiatives and funding channels and to define the roles and responsibilities of government agencies engaging internationally.

A second type of strategic reform involves the formulation of a comprehensive global development strategy (Center for US Global Engagement 2009; US Government Accountability Office 2009a; Oxfam America / Center for American Progress 2009; Unger 2010; Brigety / Dewan 2009). A global development strategy would, on the one hand, affirm the importance of development goals alongside other foreign policy and security objectives, and on the other hand outline a limited number of priority areas of investment. The emphasis placed on the need to develop a “comprehensive” strategy reflects the currently limited reach of core executive agencies (the State Department and USAID) in promoting a unified framework for international cooperation across the government. The 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development foresaw the establishment of a quadrennial national development strategy as one of several mechanisms to promote development policy coherence (White House 2010); however, this has not yet been institutionalised.

Because strategy development implies not only the formulation of core priorities but also the indication of how the government will organise actions to achieve them, the clarification of the strategic framework guiding US contributions to global development invariably also carries implications for the distribution of authority across government agencies. Similar to the German case, organisational reform proposals have primarily focused on the respective roles of the State Department and USAID or possible successor organisations: recommendations on how to adjust the positions of sector-specific agencies within the policy system appear as footnotes to the debate on the appropriate institutional solution to balancing diplomatic and development work within the US government.

Towards the end of the George W. Bush administration, four options for assigning bureaucratic responsibilities for US foreign assistance programmes received special attention: 1) the creation of a cabinet-level development agency; 2) the merger of the State Department and USAID; 3) the reinvention of the foreign affairs bureaucracy to accommodate a stronger development-oriented vision; and 4) the maintenance of USAID as a core development agency subordinated to the State Department, albeit with strengthened capacities to advance its development mandate (Brainard 2008).

Proponents of a cabinet-level development department have emphasised that US foreign policy is characterised by an imbalance between the use of military and civilian foreign policy instruments and that global development should be upgraded as a core pillar of foreign policy alongside defence and diplomacy. Perceived advantages of a cabinet-level department include the potential consolidation of development programmes located across government agencies, the alignment of budgetary and policy planning functions with implementation responsibilities and the creation of a focal point for governmental
coordination on development issues. The main advantage of this organisational model is considered to be the leadership role that the head of the department can play in introducing development concerns into high-level policy discussions (HELP Commission 2007; Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network 2008; Herrling / Radelet 2008). Even with the creation of a cabinet-level development department, proponents of this model recognise that some important streams of funding for cooperation with developing countries would not be included under its purview, and therefore suggest that a strengthened coordination mandate for development issues within the Executive Office of the President would be a necessary complement to this reform (Herrling / Radelet 2008; Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network 2008).

The proposal to integrate USAID into the State Department can also be viewed as a means of elevating the civilian dimension of US foreign policy and increasing the consistency of policy planning and implementation. A State Department with a stronger resource base and broader mandate would presumably be in a better position to limit the expansion of the DOD’s role as an aid provider (Epstein / Weed 2009). A further justification for a merger reflects emerging challenges in engagement with developing countries. The problem complexes in fragile states suggest a need to combine responses dealing with short-term stabilisation and long-term reconstruction. In other contexts, the broadening of the development agenda to include a variety of issues and stakeholder groups would potentially imply a role for the State Department as a network manager (HELP Commission 2007). Critics of this proposal emphasise the short-term and crisis-management orientation of the State Department, its limited reservoir of development expertise and its tendency to take decisions based on political considerations, such as maintaining support from allies, as key arguments against consolidating foreign assistance authorities in this agency (Herrling / Radelet 2008; Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network 2008).

As an attempt to offer a middle ground between the two organisational reform proposals outlined above, the majority of participants in the HELP Commission endorsed a proposal to create an International Affairs Department, which would serve as a successor to the State Department and likely retain its name. The central consideration guiding this proposal is that structural transformation would be required within the existing foreign affairs bureaucracy in order to elevate the status of development goals in US foreign policy, ensure that country-level implementation experiences inform policy planning and overcome the tension between the promotion of short-term political interests and long-term development objectives (HELP Commission 2007). The proposal highlights the value of consolidating responsibilities for regional cooperation and advocates safeguarding development competencies within the organisation by creating funding firewalls between departments dealing with political affairs and functional departments dealing with economic development issues. Its goal would be to consolidate programmes under functional headings, so that programmes housed in agencies apart from the State Department and USAID would also be folded into the new ministry. Attention to the type of training that personnel receive and the prospects for career development within the organisation would be considered necessary to shape the bureaucratic culture of the new organisation. Its

38 The HELP Commission was established by an act of Congress in 2004 to serve an advisory function in preparing proposals to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of US foreign assistance programmes. Its members were appointed by the Congress and the President.
A consolidated resource base is perceived as a way of increasing the stature of civilian aspects of foreign policy within the executive branch (HELP Commission 2007).

One alternative to the reassignment of authorities or the creation of new government entities to promote foreign policy and development goals would be the strengthening of existing elements of the foreign assistance system. Many analysts have indicated that USAID has, over time, been disempowered in its ability to promote development goals and deliver assistance effectively due to reductions in personnel and its growing reliance on private contractors, among other factors (Atwood / McPherson / Natsios 2008). Increasing the agency’s resources and easing the legislative restraints that it faces could serve to elevate USAID’s position within the government. Investing in building up the capacities of the primary development agency alone nevertheless would not guarantee that the diverse spectrum of governmental actors involved in development cooperation would align cooperation strategies with the approaches favoured by a reformed USAID or pursue coordinated action.

While the fact that many proposals for overarching organisational reforms in the US system date to the transition period between the George W. Bush administration and the Obama presidency indicates, on the one hand, that the Obama administration has taken on board core recommendations such as the need to strengthen the role of civilian power in foreign policy, it likely also reflects the recognition among many policy analysts of the political difficulties in achieving a grand redesign of the foreign assistance system.

Even in the absence of fundamental organisational reform, numerous adjustments could still be made within the system to limit programmatic redundancies and promote coherence among governmental actors providing assistance to developing countries. In this vein, researchers from the Center for American Progress and the Center for Global Development recently advanced the idea to establish an International Affairs Realignment Commission (Norris et al. 2012). The mandate of this commission would be to review programmes and projects funded through the International Affairs Budget to identify areas of duplication and opportunities for the consolidation or reduction of initiatives. In examining a spectrum of cooperation initiatives managed across government agencies, the commission would also assess the attribution of responsibilities to specific agencies and develop recommendations to improve the division of labour between them. As such, this proposal would take a thorough budgetary review as a starting point for a fundamental reassessment of the contributions of diverse agencies to development, and thus potentially gradually lead to a reorganisation of the system.
5 Conclusions and recommendations

The proposal to create an International Affairs Realignment Commission in the United States to improve the efficiency of the US international cooperation system underlines the relevance of the key questions to guide reform efforts identified in the German case in other national contexts. These questions suggest that the need for adaptation in an international cooperation system should be assessed in relation to a set of goals or strategic framework, the competencies that governmental actors can contribute towards achieving these goals, the coordination mechanisms needed to maintain a useful division of labour and the resource requirements for organisations to perform the mandates they are attributed.

As the review of ODA funding trends across government agencies in Germany and the United States indicated, the participation of diverse agencies in development cooperation has, on a broad level, not yet fundamentally challenged the leadership role of foreign affairs and development agencies in guiding cooperation programmes. This conclusion may be influenced by the system-wide perspective adopted in this paper, as the concentration of the international engagement of sector-specific ministries (e.g. the German Ministry of the Environment or the US Department of Health and Human Services) in their core fields of activity may present a more direct challenge to agencies for which individual sectors represent one of many areas of involvement (i.e. the BMZ and USAID).

The rationale for engagement from sector-specific ministries nevertheless poses a direct challenge in considering development cooperation as an autonomous policy field. Sector-specific ministries’ self-understanding of the justification for engaging in developing countries is that, in order to achieve domestic objectives, it is necessary to invest internationally. This differs from a justification for cooperation emphasising the promotion of welfare and economic development in partner countries as goals in their own right. Sector-specific ministries therefore promote mutual interests in development rather than defending an altruistic justification for engagement. In this respect, the role of sector-specific ministries as aid providers creates pressure on DAC donors to transparently define the interests guiding cooperation programmes. The clear definition of interests and priorities is a foundation for developing an external relations apparatus that reflects the balance of goals that a given country seeks to pursue.

Both the German and US development cooperation systems can be described as pluralistic, given the variety of governmental actors with an international role. This pluralism can be advantageous by promoting the mobilisation of additional resources, transferring expertise related to core competencies within domestic policy fields and enlarging the networks participating in the resolution of development challenges. These factors are referred to as potential advantages because the assessment of ministerial strengths often depends on self-presentation rather than on an evaluation of the effectiveness and value-added of cooperation programmes of diverse actors. This is true not only for sector-specific ministries but also for the foreign affairs and development agencies that remain the core players in development cooperation.

The potentially negative side of pluralism in the governmental landscape for managing cooperation programmes relates to the prospect of inconsistency in governmental action.
Consistency among governmental actors derives from the reference to shared strategies that outline government priorities and assign responsibilities for achieving specific goals, the availability of adequate mechanisms for coordination and the harmonisation of business practices across governmental entities. Although the engagement of a multitude of actors in international cooperation is often assumed to present a coordination challenge, if these actors address complementary priorities and engage with different stakeholders, the potential for inefficiencies through splintered or duplicated efforts may be limited.

The analysis of the distribution of funding across government agencies and the coordination roles performed by specific governmental actors in this paper offers a starting point for assessing coordination challenges within each system; however, the analysis of inter-ministerial interaction within specific sectors is needed to identify the magnitude of coordination challenges resulting from ministerial pluralism. In this context, it is useful to note that the distribution of responsibilities among different governmental actors is not the only potential source of coordination challenges: factors such as the underlying nature of the problem area, the institutional structures of the partner countries where cooperation programmes are implemented or the personalities of participants in policy processes may also influence coordination prospects.

In both cases examined, the challenges of improving the consistency of government-wide action have been acknowledged, and mechanisms exist to promote information-sharing across government. These mechanisms (such as the Ressortkreis Technische Zusammenarbeit und ODA-Transparenz in Germany) provide a foundation for intensifying dialogue and coordination across government. Because coordination is dependent at a basic level on a mutual awareness of international activities, improving the transparency of programmes funded by different governmental actors represents an important first step in promoting cross-governmental consistency. The commitment of the US government to increase the scope of agency reporting on foreign assistance activities to comply with domestic transparency requirements and commitments to adhere to International Aid Transparency Initiative standards signals that the government has recognised the value of establishing a common information base. It is nevertheless also clear that translating this commitment into action requires internal reforms within a host of government agencies and the dedication of additional personnel resources to the tasks of compiling data in standard formats and communicating information about programmes to other agencies (Executive Office of the President 2012).

Improving the availability of information on international programmes overseen by various government agencies is by itself not a guarantee that the information will be used to support planning efforts. In addition to examining the capacities of internationally active bureaucracies to generate and disseminate relevant information across government, individual bureaucracies also need to assess their internal capacities for uptake. This may relate not only to the availability of staff to manage interactions with other bureaucracies but also to the processes in place to facilitate information exchange within a given bureaucracy. The potential challenges outlined in this paper related to the division of responsibilities across bureaucracies may, in practice, also be replicated within individual agencies.

As noted above, it will be difficult for governments to identify solutions to improve the consistency of international engagement among different agencies without first identifying
cross-governmental priorities. Germany and the United States are currently both experiencing a period of reflection on the reorientation of foreign policy. In Germany, this reflection process is linked to the demand for a strengthened global leadership role, whereas in the United States the challenge principally relates to rebalancing the character of its global engagement by reducing the military dimension and strengthening the civilian dimension of foreign policy. Possible organisational reforms should be based on a careful review of the global challenges that governments will need to address in the future and a consideration of the functions of various governmental actors in addressing these challenges.

Although the analysis in this paper points to commonalities across the two systems with respect to core questions to guide reflection on the future organisation of international cooperation, there are also key differences in the context in which reform discussions will take place in Germany and the United States that suggest the need for different emphases moving forward. In the United States, organisational reform in development cooperation has received considerable attention both within government and in the broader development policy community over the last decade. Given the extensive problem analysis related to the strategic framework and organisational set-up of foreign assistance that has already taken place and the solutions that have already been developed in draft legislation, the absence of political will in the United States to advance organisational reforms may be a larger problem than the limited awareness of challenges related to the organisation of the foreign assistance system.

In Germany, in contrast, the analysis of the challenges presented by the participation of diverse ministries in international cooperation and implications for managing relations with developing countries has been more limited. Given unfolding discussions on the future of German foreign policy and the content of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, the current government has the opportunity to use the years ahead to define core foreign policy goals and the main priorities that the system of international cooperation will be expected to address in the future. A government-wide competence review related to international engagement would be a logical extension of these strategic deliberations. The main goal of a competence review should be to identify the strengths and limitations of diverse governmental actors in international cooperation.

Questions that reflect the challenges facing different ministries should be raised within a competence review process. First, the role and functionality of the core development actor (BMZ) merits special attention. Development-focused actors are generally assumed to have a systemic perspective that defends the interests of partner-country beneficiaries based on an awareness of country-level challenges. The quality of country-specific and sectoral expertise, cross-sectoral competencies and coordination capabilities should be included in a ministerial assessment. Second, the transferability of the domestic public policy expertise of sectoral ministries to cooperation in varied country contexts should be examined. Third, in light of the perception that the participation of diverse ministries in international cooperation pushes the foreign affairs ministry to assume a more important coordination role, the competencies of the foreign affairs bureaucracy in managing cross-sectoral policy linkages should be scrutinised. This can include the consideration of how thematic work areas are organised within the foreign ministry and which qualifications ministry personnel possess to guide cooperation programmes. A cross-governmental competence review could contribute to eliminating programmatic redundancies,
combining existing portfolios in new ways or creating new bureaucratic units in response to functional gaps.

In preparation for a competence review, individual ministries should analyse their own strengths and limitations within the broader cooperation landscape and devote internal resources to reflect strategically on their future role within the German external relations apparatus. Within the BMZ, in particular, it is important that discussions on desirable priorities for international cooperation in the future are also accompanied by reflection on the added value of the ministry as a cooperation actor, taking into consideration the geographic and thematic expertise that the ministry possesses that other governmental aid providers might not. Such a reflection process should not only contribute to positioning the BMZ in discussions on the future organisation of international cooperation but also to outlining the knowledge and skills that the ministry believes other governmental actors should learn from.

Various exercises have already been conducted within the US government in recent years to review management challenges in international cooperation. These initiatives (the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development and the QDDR) did not conclude with many concrete plans to advance organisational reform efforts. Rather than investing additional energy in system-wide reviews in the US context, it may be more productive in the near term to devote focused attention to narrower areas of concern in managing the system. The analysis in this paper suggests that because the State Department has already assumed a coordination role within sectors dealing with issues such as global health or global energy policy, it is important to examine the competencies of the State Department in guiding thematic cooperation in these sectors. As in the German case, the review of coordination capabilities of the foreign affairs bureaucracy should examine not only the character of the expertise that resides within existing coordination units but also human resource requirements in terms of staffing levels and qualifications that enable the bureaucracy to provide adequate guidance and support to other governmental actors responsible for designing and implementing programmes.

Even if ongoing internal reform processes within USAID increase the agency’s ability to shape the US agenda for engaging with developing countries, it is unlikely that it will be able to assume a coordination role vis-à-vis other government agencies that is comparable to the coordination mandate held by the State Department as the preeminent bureaucracy managing bilateral and multilateral relations. Similar to the BMZ, to position itself within future discussions on the reform of international cooperation, it is important for USAID to analyse its comparative advantages as an aid provider in relation to other government agencies and to articulate what its strengths and limitations are in terms of available expertise, access to networks and working methods.

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39 At the time of writing, an internal reorganisation of the BMZ resulting from the change in government at the end of 2013 was still underway. It is unclear whether this reorganisation reflects the kind of assessment of bureaucratic comparative advantages that this paper proposes as a useful way forward. Future organisational reforms should clarify the functional logic of a redistribution of responsibilities within the organisation and consider how reforms are linked to the functions that other governmental actors perform within the international cooperation system.
For both development agencies, the internationalisation of domestic public policy fields provides a stimulus to reflect on their unique contributions to international cooperation and their future roles in foreign affairs. The adaptation pressures suggested by the international engagement of diverse governmental actors reflect long-standing tensions in the management of relations with developing countries. These tensions include finding a balance between the promotion of donor and partner-country interests and reconciling the benefits of sector-focused cooperation with the need to link interventions across sectors to support broad development outcomes. Although development agencies have traditionally been perceived to fulfil both a mediation function for interests and to offer a cross-sectoral perspective, these organisations also face clear limitations in influencing how other governmental actors manage cooperation programmes. The dynamic governmental context of international cooperation should motivate these agencies to clearly articulate not only their accumulated achievements but also their future place in managing cooperation alongside other governmental actors.
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Annex
Annex 1:  List of interviewees

The following individuals kindly provided background information for this study. The interviewees are listed in alphabetical order and identified with their institutional affiliation at the time of the interview.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory</td>
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<td>Steven Feldstein</td>
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<td>Jim Kolbe</td>
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