The Good Internationalist
U.S. Responses to Trade-Offs in Internationalized Security Policy in the 1995 Bosnia Debate

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ABSTRACT

When representatives of the U.S. government and Congress debated military intervention in the conflict in Bosnia in 1995, they were not just talking about an American troop contribution. The dispute became a focal point for issues such as relations with the U.N. and NATO and the general desirability of multilateral peacekeeping. What elicited the strong responses were trade-offs inherent to the internationalization of security policy: security gains were measured against concerns about the national interest, democratic legitimacy, and effects on the rule of law. However, despite their role in shaping future policy these types of responses lack systematic analysis. Following a qualitative content analysis, this paper offers a response overview. I distinguish three phases in the debate and illustrate that turning points were brought on by the momentum of events in the Balkans rather than D.C. Yet, arguments seem to have developed a ‘symbolic power’ independent of their direct effect on the course of events. While the U.N. was strongly contested NATO proved to be a ‘common denominator’ with some disciplining power over internationalization’s critics. In defense of the intervention, the Clinton administration portrayed multilateralism as a useful tool. This strategy helped sell internationalization to Congress. But it also required a non-committal rhetoric which would serve opponents of international security organizations beyond 1995.
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1 INTRODUCTION

In February 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the National Security Revitalization Act (H.R. 7) and with that set off a “debate about America’s reliance on and involvement with international institutions” (Hoagland, 1995). In view of failed U.N. operations like Somalia and mission creep in Bosnia, its proponents sought to preclude U.S. troops from serving under foreign command, stressed a lack of national interest in most peacekeeping missions and demanded congressional oversight in foreign policy. The Clinton administration rejected these claims emphasizing the importance of internationalized security policy. This argument about the trade-offs of internationalization\(^1\), though initially hypothetical, gained relevance as violence in Bosnia escalated and the United States had to decide on a course of action. The ensuing dispute over an intervention in the Balkans became the focal point for issues such as U.S.-U.N. and U.S.-NATO relations and the general desirability of multilateral frameworks. Contributing American troops to a NATO mission was framed as a test of whether or not the U.S. were a ‘good internationalist’ (Steel, 1995).

In the literature, the Bosnia case has been scrutinized from different angles: amongst others the dynamics of ethnic conflict (Burg/Shoup, 2000), the discourses surrounding it (Hansen, 2006), the decision-making process in the U.S. (Daalder, 2000), the legitimation of the intervention (Western, 2005: 133-174), the issue of war powers (Hendrickson, 2002, 1998) and NATO’s performance (Kaufman, 2002). This paper focuses on the American debate about Bosnia and views it as an instance of a broader phenomenon: responses to trade-offs in internationalized security policy (Mayer, 2010). In fact, internationalization has repeatedly been the bone of contention in the United States both before and since the 1995 Bosnia debate (cf. e.g. Foot et al., 2003, Patrick/Forman, 2002, Luck, 1999). Its potential for conflict stems from its ambivalent nature. States enter into alliances hoping for an increase in security, i.e. effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility gains (Mayer/Weinlich, 2007). But alliances can turn entangling, beyond parliamentary or judicial control (Wagner, 2011, Hafner, 2005b). Ultimately, multilateral engagements might even compromise security when they require participation in missions contrary to the national interest (Deitelhoff/Geis, 2009, Barnett/Finnemore, 1999). The normative goods security, democratic legitimacy and

\(^1\) In this paper, the term “internationalization” is used as shorthand for “internationalization of security policy”. 

- / -
rule of law become partly incompatible amounting to three core trade-offs that accompany internationalization: security vs. security, security vs. rule of law and security vs. democratic legitimacy.

These trade-offs elicit responses from political, societal and judicial actors who bolster or thwart internationalization processes depending on their outlook on International Organizations (IOs). They either aim to reduce international commitments, modify them, increase their number and depth or simply maintain the status quo. Taken together, these responses constitute the push and pull any internationalization policy experiences. However, despite their crucial role in shaping future security policy the responses lack systematic analysis. To begin narrowing this gap, a research project on internationalization and privatization of security at the University of Bremen has developed a response typology which I will put to the test by using it to categorize the different responses present in the 1995 Bosnia debate.

This paper, therefore, raises the following questions: which trade-off did the actors address in their responses, which arguments were brought forth, and which goals pursued? Who were the drivers and hinderers in the debate, and who changed camps over time? From the resulting response overview, I will draw conclusions as to the dynamics of the debate and how internationalized security fared, i.e. if the concept emerged from this debate undamaged or if the 1995 exchange had consequences for future arguments about internationalization.

In the following section, I will elaborate on the trade-offs and introduce the response typology. Further, I will present the corpus of responses and the method, Qualitative Content Analysis (Mayring, 2004). Afterwards, I will give a detailed description of the Bosnia debate distinguishing three phases with differing dynamic from the Republican initiative H.R. 7 in early 1995 until Clinton’s commitment of 20,000 U.S. troops to a NATO peacekeeping mission in December. In my concluding remarks, I will attempt to weigh the power of arguments versus the power of the momentum (i.e. the development on the ground in Bosnia) with respect to the dynamics of the debate. I will conclude that turning points were mostly brought about by the events in the Balkans rather than D.C. Yet, arguments seem to have developed a ‘symbolic power’ (Sarcinelli, 2009) independent of their direct effect on the course of events. I will also infer that actors in the debate treated the U.N. and NATO differently. While the U.N. was strongly contested and its defense by administration officials always coupled with a call for reform, NATO proved to be a ‘common denominator’ with some disciplining power over internationalization’s critics. Finally, I point out questions for further research that follow from the thorough description of the Bosnia debate.

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2 AN APPROACH TO RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONALIZED SECURITY

I will first present the three trade-offs of internationalized security policy, their origin and how they manifest themselves. Then, I will introduce the typology that captures potential responses to these trade-offs, and lastly, I elaborate on my methodological approach.

2.1 The Trade-Offs

With the foundation of nation states, the provision of normative goods like security, rule of law, and welfare had become exclusive state functions. But towards the end of the 20th century, an increasing number of international and private actors eroded that monopoly. Such processes of internationalization and privatization affected the latter state functions first (Leibfried/Zürn, 2005) but ultimately reached the realm of security as well (cf. Krahmann, 2003). Ever since the end of the Cold War threats have multiplied and diversified, but so have multilateral efforts to handle them. U.N. activity has intensified, NATO is ever adapting to new challenges, and new fora and regimes have been established – all in an attempt to increase security (Wallander, 2000, Mayer/Weinlich, 2007). Through the internationalization of their security policy states seek more efficiency, effectiveness and flexibility. Deeper integration and military specialization lead to burden-sharing in areas such as intervention and peacekeeping (Biscop, 2006, Mayer, 2009). These forms of international cooperation in turn “place new stresses on [the] domestic constitutional and political system”. For example, they “[…] increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to international organizations that” – from a U.S. perspective – “lack […] openness and accountability” and therefore raise “difficult policy and legal problems” (Yoo, 2000: 361f.). The problems caused by internationalized security policy boil down to three trade-offs: ‘security vs. security’, ‘security vs. rule of law’ and ‘security vs. democratic legitimacy’ (cf. table 1).

On the security front, international institutions for all their advantages also share the problems associated with large bureaucracies leading to inefficiencies (Barnett/Finnemore, 1999) and consequently, at times, unfavorable cost/benefit balances. Increasing integration and specialization coincide with increasing loss of autonomy and control over security policy. The contractual commitments add reliability, but simultaneously, bear the risk of ‘entrapment’ by entangling the member states in conflicts that might not necessarily involve their national interests (Snyder, 1997). With regard to the rule of law, the accountability of international organizations has been questioned (Hafner, 2005a, Hafner, 2005b). This pertains to e.g. the legal implications in cases of troops violating individual rights while under IO mandate (Hafner, 2008). Further, Bothe (2008) points to the problem that binding Security Council Resolutions are for the most part exempt from judicial review. Finally, the internationalization of security rais-
es the question of constitutionality (Ku, 2000). The issue of democratic legitimacy comes to the fore in a weakening of the legislative through internationalization of security policy, and as a consequence, reduced accountability. Once decisions are made on the international level, the cost of retracting on the national level raises exponentially (Wagner, 2006, 2011).

Table 1: Trade-Offs of Internationalized Security Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>vs. Security</th>
<th>vs. Rule of Law</th>
<th>vs. Democratic Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gains in effectiveness, flexibility, and efficiency; reliability through commitments</td>
<td>inefficiency; unfavorable cost/benefit; entanglement; loss of autonomy/control; lack of national interest</td>
<td>impediments to judicial control; legal uncertainty; constitutionality</td>
<td>weakening of the legislative; reduced accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 A Response Typology

Actors respond to the above-described trade-offs on a scale from vehement opposition to vigorous support and thereby influence the prospects of internationalized security (Mayer, 2010). To help systematically analyze these responses this paper presents and tests a response typology developed by a research project on internationalization and privatization of security at the University of Bremen. Loosely based on Albert Hirschman’s typology, three ideal-typical response types are distinguished: exit, voice and loyalty. Faced with a (perceived) “deterioration in performance” in this case by an IO, Hirschman (1970: 4) notes that actors can either “leave the organization” (exit option) or “express their dissatisfaction” (voice option). This paper further follows the research program of the Collaborative Research Center 597 “Transformations of the State” which reinterprets Hirschman’s concept of loyalty as a third option to capture two uncritical responses to the trade-offs: active support and tacit consent.3

These ideal types differ in intensity, in the arguments they bring forth and in the goals they pursue. In practice, few actors who are concerned about the security, democratic legitimacy and rule of law in internationalized security policy, go as far as to lobby for complete withdrawal from international organizations and in even fewer instances do administrations actually exit these multilateral arrangements making ‘exit’ a rare response type. But skeptics are very outspoken about their discontent with internationalized security. They utilize a wide array of ‘voice’-options ranging from simple requests for more transparency to passing legislation that modifies the status quo in se-

security policy. However, not all actors focus on the trade-offs’ down-side. Proponents of internationalization respond with ‘loyalty’ either defending the phenomenon (active loyalty) or at least refraining from protest (passive loyalty).

Naturally, these responses aim at different goals. At their most extreme, opponents of internationalization pursue a renationalization of security. Various forms of voice might be intended to encourage partial renationalization, or rather a transfer of authority from a global organization like the UN to a regional one like NATO (regionalization); or they might favor yet another type of modification of security policy making it more legitimate, more in line with rule of law principles, more effective etc. Proponents, finally, aim at maintaining the status quo, or even argue for further internationalization of security. The following table (no. 2) maps all response types.

Table 2: Response Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Exit</th>
<th>Voice</th>
<th>Loyalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partial, Complete</td>
<td>Request for information, protest, reform proposal, reform</td>
<td>active-passive defense, accommodation, ignorance, resignation, tacit consent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade-offs addressed</td>
<td>vs. security, vs. rule of law, vs. democratic legitimacy</td>
<td>vs. security, vs. rule of law, vs. democratic legitimacy</td>
<td>Acknowledgement/ denial; defense with security, rule of law, legitimacy argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Renationalization</td>
<td>Partial renationalization, regionalization, modification</td>
<td>Status quo, more internationalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Material & Coding Process in Qualitative Content Analysis

In order to trace the 1995 Bosnia debate, I distilled the general sequence of events from secondary literature (e.g. Hendrickson, 1998, 2002, Cimbala/Forster, 2010) and subsequently searched the online archives of the New York Times and the Washington Post for all articles published throughout 1995 containing the key word “Bosnia”. The abstracts of all matches were scanned for potentially relevant articles, i.e. articles which might report on responses to trade-offs in internationalized security policy. In the remaining texts, I singled out all paragraphs that reported any kind of a ‘response’ by an administration official, a Congress man/woman, or a public opinion leader. Comments by one of those actors were counted as responses, as well as reform proposals, votes, vetoes, speeches, letters to the President/ to Congressional leaders etc. cited in the articles. I chose responses that had been reported in either of the major newspapers to guarantee that the arguments brought forth had a chance to resonate with a broader audience. The transcripts and figures cited in the articles were cross-checked with
congressional and presidential records. The subsequent round of in-depth coding followed a content analytical approach. In an attempt to detect “underlying themes” (Bryman, 2004: 392) the method combines elements of qualitative and quantitative analyses (cf. Mayring, 2004: 266). It works with a fixed “system of categories” deduced from theory and existing literature typical for quantitative approaches (Mayring, 2004: 269). Yet unlike the automated coding process in an exclusively quantitative study, I assigned categories interpretatively (cf. Baumann, 2002: 8). The coding categories were derived from the above-described response typology. Segments that contained responses were hence categorized as follows:

- the different response types (exit, voice or loyalty),
- their form and the corresponding degree of intensity (e.g. a low intensity request for further information or a high intensity reform), and with regard to government responses: cooperativeness (‘yes’ if e.g. a congressional initiative was supported or ‘no’ if e.g. a congressional act was vetoed)
- the trade-offs addressed (security vs. security/ rule of law/ democratic legitimacy),
- the specific arguments brought forth (e.g. flexibility, unfavorable cost/benefit),
- and the goals pursued (further internationalization, modification, regionalization, or re-nationalization of security).

After a quick review of the historical context, I will give a detailed phase-by-phase account of the 1995 Bosnia debate, analyze its dynamic, the different camps, their arguments and initiatives and reveal response patterns.

3 ARGUING ABOUT INTERNATIONALIZATION IN THE 1995 BOSNIA DEBATE

By the time the U.S. debate about UN peacekeeping in general and the Bosnia situation in particular reignedited in 1995, the conflict on the ground in Yugoslavia had been simmering for four years (cf. for an overview Cimbala/Forster, 2010, Woodward, 2008, Berdal, 2004). Hostilities had first begun in the summer of 1991 after Croatia had declared independence. In September, the UN issued Resolution 713 imposing an arms embargo. Due to continued fighting, the organization authorized the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which was to establish safe areas for refugees and to lay the ground for a later settlement of the conflict. On March 3, 1992 Bosnia followed suit and declared its independence from Yugoslavia – the decision was met with aggression from the Bosnian Serbs, now a minority in a country dominated by Muslims and Croats. In May, the U.N. imposed an economic embargo (Res. 757) on Serbia and Montenegro which had been supporting the Bosnian Serbs. Providing humanitarian relief proved difficult, thus UNPROFOR was granted the use of “all necessary measures”
The Security Council further established a no-fly-zone (Res. 781). Throughout late 1992, early 1993, UNPROFOR still failed to fulfill its mandate in either Croatia or Bosnia, hence the no-fly zone was broadened to a total ‘no fly’ ban (Res. 816), enforced by NATO’s Operation Deny Flight.

While the situation deteriorated with UNPROFOR personnel under attack in 1993, Washington debated the price of a prolonged mission and underlined its lack of interest in becoming involved (cf. Cimbala/Forster, 2010: 102f). High numbers of civilian deaths prompted a NATO ultimatum in February 1994. The U.S. position was inconsistent. The administration went from a ‘lift and strike’ policy, to opposing force, to supporting NATO air strikes which eventually occurred in April 1994 (cf. Cimbala/Forster, 2010: 106). Subsequently, the UN reevaluated the UNPROFOR mission. In December 1994, Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government agreed to a four month ceasefire. With the situation on the ground relatively stable, policy-makers in Washington could afford a more general debate on the desirability of US involvement in international affairs, especially in UN peacekeeping missions. Republican Congressman triggered the dispute when they introduced acts into the House and the Senate seeking to severely limit peacekeeping. Soon, however, developments on the ground in Bosnia caught up with the debate and changed its terms. The rhetorical struggle between the administration and leading Republicans as well as some Democrats lasted for most of 1995 until Clinton sent U.S. troops to the Balkans thereby put an end to the back and forth (if only temporarily). Roughly, three phases can be distinguished: in the initial stage (January – March/April), Congress drove the debate and forced the Clinton administration on the defensive. It ended with Congress folding and dropping the resolutions that had set off the debate. Once the ceasefire in Bosnia ended and fighting resumed in May, events on the ground began dictating the debate. Throughout phase II (May-July), the deteriorating situation lent itself to the government’s justification of a forceful multilateral approach including NATO air-strikes while Congress was sidelined. Beginning in July, Congress attempted to regain some control over the issue as it voted to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslim government – which Clinton vetoed arguing the move would “Americanize” the conflict. Republicans in Congress further demanded a say in sending U.S. troops to Bosnia. However, the momentum of events on the ground ultimately worked against the Congressional initiatives. Clinton presented Congress with a fait accompli when he signed off on a U.S. contribution to the international peacekeeping effort, a move that Congress did not approve of but did not repeal either thus ending phase III (July-December).
3.1 Phase 1: Congress as Driving Force

Republican Representatives in Congress set off the debate with the introduction of the ‘National Security Revitalization Act’ (H.R. 7), the ‘Peace Powers Act’ (S.5) and the ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995’ (S. 21) on January 4, 1995, in which they argued for less participation in and less funding of UN peacekeeping missions, and for a unilateral lifting of the UN arms embargo by the US. When H.R. 7 eventually passed the House on February 16th, it further fueled the debate. These developments caused the President and his senior officials to begin a public relations campaign against the proposals (Smith, 1995). The Democratic minority on the hill only played a minor role in the initial stage of the 1995 debate; it merely lent some rhetoric backing to the administration. Phase 1 ended once Congress, its driver, dropped HR. 7, S.5, and S. 21 for their slim prospects of passing the Senate and generating the required votes for overriding a likely presidential veto (Hendrickson, 2002: 82-83) and because attention quickly shifted to domestic issues (cf. Daalder, 2000: 62).

3.1.1 Congressional Responses

Following the above-presented response typology, the first phase witnessed a lot of ‘voice’ from Republicans, some ‘loyalty’ from Democrats and U.S. opinion leaders, and no ‘exit’, though the latter was threatened indirectly by the Republican initiatives.

Among the responses that fell in the voice category were the introduction of the ‘National Security Revitalization Act’ (H.R. 7), ‘Peace Powers Act’ (S.5) and the ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995’ (S. 21). All three constituted criticism of US involvement in U.N. peacekeeping. H.R. 7, for example, sought to severely limit “the subordination of American troops to foreign command in United Nations peacekeeping operations”, “strengthen […] regional institutions”, and “ensure that our participation in any future U.N. mission directly serves our national interests”. Its sponsors intended “an enhanced role [for Congress] in the foreign policy making process” (Gilman, 1995). These quotes refer to trade-offs in the realm of security and democratic legitimacy. They insinuate a lack of U.S. national interest in past U.N. missions, the rationale behind this accusation being that if foreign policy does not serve the national interest, it ultimately hurts national security. Further H.R. 7 raises the issue of foreign command which speaks directly to the fear of losing autonomy and control that is characteristic of the security trade-off. The demand for congressional oversight implies that the current practice of the administration to deal directly with the U.N. without seeking congressional approval for peacekeeping missions is lacking legitimacy. Therefore, the National Security Revitalization Act aimed at a (partial) renationalization of security

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4 This is a reoccurring issue with Congress. The debate is traced e.g. in Luck (1999: 184-89).
policy by including Congress in the decision-making process. The proposed cuts to the funding of U.N. peacekeeping in H.R. 7 would have limited the UN’s ability to act. At the same time, the sponsors call for a strengthening of regional institutions. Consequently, the initiative’s goal was also a *regionalization* of security.

S. 5 addresses the same trade-offs, security and democratic legitimacy, in similar language. Its sponsor Bob Dole sought to “impose[…] significant new limits on peacekeeping policies which have jeopardized American interests, squandered resources – and cost lives.” He too opposed “placing […] American troops under foreign command.” Finally, he stated that “no resources can be committed in New York which have not been appropriated by Congress” (Dole, 1995a). S. 21 called for lifting the U.N. arms embargo that had been in place since 1991 – unilaterally. This bill was a response to Clinton’s Bosnia policy first, but at the same time it constituted criticism of the U.N. It showed little regard for the binding character of UNSC resolutions. His act, if passed, would have established a precedent for *renationalizing* security policy decisions like the lifting of an embargo.

On February 16, the House passed HR. 7 by a vote of 241-181. Majority Leader Dick Armey commented “the nation ha[d] gone too far in the direction of globalism” (‘voice’), and fellow Republican Harold Rogers added “The U.S. is being overburdened. Congress has to be in on the operation from the outset” (as cited in: Schmitt, 1995a). Again, security concerns like the issue of burden-sharing and legitimacy concerns like the inclusion of Congress are referenced in the remarks and mirrored in the vote. However, not all responses to the administration’s Bosnia policy and U.N. peacekeeping were negative. Clinton did enjoy some support during phase one (‘loyalty’) which will be detailed in the following paragraph.

In this stage of the debate, most Democrats “rallied around the Administration’s foreign policy” (Sciolino, 1995a), so did opinion leaders and even a few Republicans. The actors ‘loyal’ to the idea of peacekeeping and the Bosnia policy turned the critics’ arguments around. Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance denied the ‘lack of national interest’-charge reminding his audience of “our common interests in a peaceful world” as promoted by the UN (as cited in: Crossette, 1995b). Highest-ranking Democrat in the House Committee on International Relations Lee Hamilton took the sting out of the material aspect of the security argument. He talked about the burden of being “the world’s policeman” and explained that “[e]ffective U.N. peacekeeping helps relieve the U.S. of this burden” (as cited in: Greenhouse, 1995a). Furthermore, he proposed an amendment to H.R. 872 that stressed the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief.
From this speaks the conviction that the constitutional authority of the President be-
stows peacekeeping decisions with sufficient legitimacy.5

Republicans were split on the issue. When the National Security Revitalization Act
was discussed, Nebraska Republican Dough Bereuter sided with Lee Hamilton (cf. Greenhouse, 1995a); and while Bob Dole pushed for a unilateral lift of the arms embar-
go, Richard Lugar (R-IN) openly opposed the bill (cf. Lippman, 1995).

Ultimately, Congress retracted. By not voting on HR. 7 and S.5 and by shelving S.
21, Congress momentarily sei zed to actively push for renationalization or at least re-
gionalization of security and thus – through their passiveness – in effect supported the
government’s position of maintaining the status quo.

3.1.2 Government Responses

The initial reaction by a U.S. government official to the Republican initiatives of Janu-
ary 1995 was somewhat sympathetic towards the critics (‘voice’). Defense Secretary
William Perry called the U.S. role in U.N. peacekeeping a “fair question[…] for de-
bate”, and while he wanted to keep the executive branch’s option “to participate in
peacekeeping operations”, he still thought “we ought to get some reduction in the per-
centage of our commitment to the U.N.” (as cited in: Dewar, 1995a). Perry’s comment
exhibits some degree of cooperativeness due to the partial concession. He joins the crit-
ics in asking for a reform to reduce U.S. contributions to peacekeeping missions. Yet
different from them, he aims at modification rather than (partial) termination of interna-
tionalized security policy. A reconciliatory response like this, however, remained the
exception.

The government began a lobbying effort in defense of U.N. peacekeeping with the
goal of defeating HR. 7. Consequently, most of the speeches, comments, letters to Con-
gress etc. showed zero to low degrees of cooperativeness. The speakers dismissed the
proposals and denied the charges they were based on. Their rhetoric strategy rested up-
on turning the Republican arguments around, maintaining that the security benefits from
multilateral peacekeeping outweighed the costs and that ‘lack of legitimacy’-claims
were unfounded.

U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright warned the House International
Relations Committee of the bill’s consequences. She feared it would lead to “budgetary
anarchy” at the United Nations making it impossible for the organization to “manage or

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5 Certain constitutional provisions invite continued debate: under the U.S. Constitution, the “executive power shall
be vested in [the] president” who is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy. Congress, however, has the
“power to declare war”. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 further postulates, the president “shall consult with
Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities”.

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sustain peace operations” (as cited in: Smith, 1995) which in turn would leave the U.S. with a stark choice between unilateral or in-action. In her reasoning, international institutions added to the flexibility of U.S. foreign policy options. Secretary of State Warren Christopher (1995a) also cautioned not to “… lose sight of our nation’s global interests or to walk away from our commitments […]”. If the U.S. were to unilaterally lift the arms embargo in Bosnia, it would “Americanize the conflict”, “undermine the authority of the Security Council” and with that weaken U.N. resolutions elsewhere. He described cooperation in international institutions as a “sensible bargain” through which the U.S. “will achieve better results at lower cost in human life and national treasure”. Christopher’s remarks reference the up-side of the security-trade-off, especially its burden-sharing aspect. He made the case that internationalized security policy increased efficiency and effectiveness lauding the status quo of U.S. engagement in international affairs. However, he stressed his instrumental understanding of international institutions: “multilateralism is a means, not an end”; according to him, organizations like NATO and the U.N. needed to be modernized and revitalized (‘voice’), and despite all international commitments the U.S. were still “prepared to act alone” when “vital interests are at stake” (Christopher, 1995a). These remarks qualify his plea for internationalized security policy. When the House Committee approved HR. 7, Albright again “urge[d] its defeat” based on a legitimacy argument by stressing it “infringe[d …] upon the constitutional powers of the presidency” (Albright, 1995a).

The week the House was set to vote on the National Security Revitalization Act, President Clinton sent two letters, the first defending American engagement, but promising U.N. reform and coordination with Congress, and the second outright denouncing HR. 7. In the more cooperative of the two letters, he admitted to flaws in U.N. peacekeeping and conceded on questions of security testifying to inefficiencies, high costs, and at times a lack of American interest served in the missions. Clinton pledged to modify current security policy. Finally, he addressed the Republican legitimacy concerns. The transformation of peacekeeping were a common task for the President and Congress. Yet, the message of the first presidential response was drowned out quickly. In the second letter, he described the bill as “an assault” on his authority as Commander in Chief, U.N. peacekeeping as “one of the best forms of burdensharing”, and finally he feared it would set the U.S. “on a collision course with some of [its] closest allies” (Clinton, 1995b). Thus ultimately, he did not yield to any of the charges.

The last two days before the vote, Christopher and Albright intensified the lobbying efforts. They spoke with members of both parties in hope of defeating the act. But despite their best efforts, the House passed HR. 7 by roll call vote 241-181 on February 16 which the government answered with a number of stirring foreign policy addresses in defense of multilateralism. Talbott (1995) made the case for U.S. involvement in the
U.N., attacking the proponents of HR. 7 for wanting to end not reform U.N. peacekeeping. To him this meant the abrogation of a 50-year-old “contract with the international community” and would “undermine global stability”. He rebutted the security arguments viral in the debate, yet granted the critics “one valid point”: the U.N. did “not always offer the perfect response”, he conceded, especially since peacekeeping could not be “effective where the swift and decisive application of military force is required”. Therefore, the U.S. will not “look to the UN to defend [its] vital interests”. The next day, Clinton followed suit. In a speech, condemning the “new isolationists”, he proclaimed America could not “walk away from its interests or its responsibilities”. To him, these “interests” lay in engagement, best practiced through the U.N. which “for all of its problems” had achieved “real progress around the world”. Unilateralism, on the other hand, would “weaken” the country (cf. Clinton, 1995c). While Clinton pleaded his case, Christopher gave a statement before Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State of the Senate Appropriations Committee. He, too, argued that for the U.S. to maintain a leadership position without over-burdening soldiers and taxpayers, the U.N. had to be engaged. Christopher praised the cost-benefit balance, stressed the contractual commitment and spoke to legitimacy concerns reminding his audience he had always “consulted closely with both parties in Congress” (Christopher, 1995b).

Table 3: Response Overview - Phase I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Congress loyalty (active &amp; passive)</th>
<th>Government loyalty, minor voice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I 01-03/04</td>
<td>Actors Dole (R), Gilman (R), Spence (R)</td>
<td>Actors Democrats, esp. Hamilton (D); Bereuter, Lugar (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver: Congress</td>
<td>Forms H.R. 7, S. 5, S. 21, criticism</td>
<td>Forms Defense, lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arguments A. Security lack of national interest, loss of autonomy</td>
<td>Arguments A. Security national interest, burden-sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Legitimacy no role for Congress</td>
<td>B. Legitimacy constitutional authority (president)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Goals regionalization, (partial) renationalization</td>
<td>Goals Status quo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 12 -
Scholars assume this vigorous government opposition to the Congressional initiatives in conjunction with relative stability of the situation in Bosnia and a Republican preference for domestic policy led Congress to drop the issue momentarily (cf. Daalder, 2000: 62).

The responses from this first phase of the 1995 debate on Bosnia and internationalized security policy are summarized in the table below detailing prominent actors, their initiatives, arguments and goals.

### 3.2 Phase 2: Circumstances as Driving Force

As an anonymous American policy maker remarked with regard to Bosnia, “[t]he situation on the ground ha[d] its own momentum and direction” (as cited in: Dobbs, 1995a). This momentum affected the debate in Washington when after the end of a four-month cease-fire a new wave of violence erupted. In view of the deteriorating situation in the Balkans, the Clinton administration canvased for international support for a more forceful multilateral approach to Bosnia and eventually authorized NATO air strikes in May, July and August without much opposition from Congress. Despite the conspicuous silence on the part of the Republicans (Hendrickson, 2002: 249), Clinton still faced some criticism from the hill since this stage saw less ‘loyalty’ from Democrats in Congress (cf. Daalder, 2000: 62f., Sciolino, 1995b).

Phase II culminated with the massacre of Srebrenica. Between May and July, responses on the hill to Clinton’s handling of the crisis had been rather muted, but now Congress attempted to regain control of the situation and moved forward with a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.

#### 3.2.1 Government Responses

In the beginning of May 1995, Serbian shells caused an increasing number of civilian deaths, but the U.N. could not agree on NATO air strikes – despite vehement protest by the U.S. administration. The ‘dual key’ arrangement in place at the time required both organizations to approve of the measure. Ambassador Albright spoke with senior United Nations officials to communicate her strong discontent with the indecision (cf. Crossette, 1995c). Yet in a speech she held the following week, she switched gears and defended the U.N. against congressional proposals to cut U.S. voluntary contributions to most U.N. programs. In her plea, she brought forward security and legitimacy arguments painting the United Nations as “indispensable”. She rebutted the common charge that engagement within the U.N. ultimately hurt U.S. security by underlining that a retreat from an active role in the organization would neither save costs nor lives. As reinforcement, she listed the multitude of U.N. tools for dealing with global challenges. Albright stressed that the U.N. were “[…] the only multi-purpose organization with
global legitimacy.” However, despite this show of support, she did not aim at maintaining the status quo. Because “[t]he UN still does not work as well as it should”, she called for reform to ensure the institution’s future relevance. (Albright, 1995b)

In the meantime, Bosnian forces had launched a large-scale offensive which the Bosnian Serbs had countered by seizing UN weaponry. When they refused to hand over the stolen items, NATO struck a Serb ammunition depot. Clinton welcomed the airstrikes for which according to officials his administration had lobbied heavily “to restore credibility to the UN force in Bosnia” (Mitchell, 1995a). With regard to the legitimacy argument, Clinton stated: “we, as a part of and a leader of NATO, responded to the request of the United Nations […]” (Clinton, 1995d).

The Serbs retaliated by taking UN peacekeepers hostage and continued acts of violence. A U.S. administration official spoke to fears of entanglement and indeed, the U.S. sent an aircraft carrier to the central Adriatic to be prepared for future airstrikes (Mitchell, 1995b). Later, White House press secretary Michael McCurry announced the administration had “agreed to enhance the capability and strength of UNPROFOR […] to ensure that it can carry out its mission safely and effectively, and the United States stands ready to provide appropriate support to that end.” He explained the U.S. part would have to be reexamined “if events on the ground changed” and stressed “[w]e understand what our obligations are as the leader of the alliance”. These quotes illustrate the central trait of this stage in the debate: the critical role of the momentum created by the situation in Bosnia. Further, the governmental line of argumentation shifted from listing security and legitimacy advantages of international organizations as reasons for U.S. multilateral security policy to putting contractual commitments front and center to underline the inevitability of the course. This shift also echoes from Clinton’s May 31 speech at the Air Force Academy in which he said: “We have obligations to our NATO allies” which would entail “tak[ing] part in a NATO operation to assist them in a withdrawal”. Yet he included a remark about consulting Congress and stated relief that the U.S. had not previously committed ground troops or joined the U.N. operation and was therefore not “embroiled in this conflict in Europe” (Clinton, 1995e). His announcement of assistance in a potential U.N. withdrawal was met with “a strongly negative bipartisan response” (Lippman/Devroy, 1995, cf. paragraph on non-governmental responses). Still, McCurry told the press, Clinton was “willing to take that criticism” since they had a “moral obligation […] to those who do have troops on the ground in Bosnia who might come under peril” (as cited in: Devroy/Priest, 1995a).

Bad news from the Balkans continued to arrive. An American Air Force Captain had been shot down over Bosnia. Still, Clinton was willing to “assist” an emergency extraction “after consultation with Congress” since their allies had “borne the risk for the world community” (Clinton, 1995f). Congress, however, was feeling less cooperative.
On June 8, H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act, passed the House by roll call vote. One of its amendments required to unilaterally lift the UN arms embargo. McCurry feared, this move would “in effect Americanize[… the] war” (as cited in: Mitchell, 1995c).

On June 11, Clinton and speaker of the House Newt Gingrich met for a public talk about foreign policy issues. Clinton admitted “serious disputes with the U.N. about the way it’s managed and the way certain crises are handled”. Though he again lauded the cost/benefit balance. He concluded: “as bad and as ragged as it is, the U.N. is better than nothing”, and hence he argued for strengthening the organization (Clinton, 1995g). This was also the mantra at the UN50 Charter Ceremony. There, Clinton (1995h) warned:

“[…] I say especially to the opponents of the United Nations here in the United States, turning our back on the U.N. and going it alone will lead to far more economic, political and military burdens on our people in the future […]”.

At the same time, he denied none of the critics’ charges about the U.N. being too inflexible, too slow, and wasting too many resources. But his conclusion was different from theirs. He saw the flaws as reasons to reform not retreat. Finally, Clinton added the indispensable line that “the United States must be prepared to act alone when necessary,” but qualified “we dare not ignore the benefits that coalitions bring to this nation.” The argument in favor of internationalization had become one of flexibility.

On July 11, the debate was, again, redirected by events on the ground. When Bosnian Serbs committed a massacre in Srebrenica, NATO flew more air strikes which for the U.S. part had been authorized by Clinton. This time Congress saw an opportunity to regain control of the proceedings and called the arms embargo into question again.

3.2.2 Congressional Responses

Throughout the summer of 1995, Clinton authorized NATO airstrikes without notifying Congress in advance and promised to both contribute to UNPROFOR and send U.S. troops should the allies decide to withdraw from Bosnia. Against the backdrop of the heated debate which had taken place in Washington earlier that year, non-governmental responses were now mostly ones of active or passive loyalty and only occasionally of voice.

Instead of challenging the president’s “legal authority” to authorize the airstrikes (Hendrickson, 2002: 84), Congressional leaders welcomed the May bombings, yet Dole remarked “it will take a lot more than this one NATO airstrike to convince me that the U.N. has been cured of its fecklessness and that the United States is exercising some leadership” (as cited in: Dobbs, 1995b). When McCurry hinted at supporting UNPROFOR because of “obligations” to their allies, there was little response from
Congress. Pundits explained this with the timing of “the latest Bosnia crisis” which had “[…] erupted over the long Memorial Day holiday weekend”. At the time, Congress was not in session. Senators Dole and Helms let it be known that they would back the use of U.S. troops in a UNPROFOR withdrawal if they served under NATO rather than U.N. command. However, Senator Lugar urged the government to seek congressional approval before taking action (Devroy/Atkinson, 1995). The legitimacy debate was not over.

The next day, when Clinton extended the commitment to send U.S. troops if needed for “a withdrawal or a reconfiguration and a strengthening of [U.N.] forces” (Clinton, 1995e), he faced bipartisan opposition (‘voice’). Except for Senator Edward Kennedy’s (D-Mass) support (‘loyalty’), “virtually no one in Congress, of either party, endorsed the president’s decision and several members were strongly critical” (Lippman/Devroy, 1995). The criticism continued for three days and hearings were scheduled. Senator John Warner (R-VA) called for caution: “I don’t want to see American lives expended in trying to solve a conflict which none of us can understand or in any way justify,” and Gingrich expressed his hope the administration would “very thoroughly consult with Congress” (Devroy/Priest, 1995a).

Leading Democrats demanded a congressional vote before sending any troops; and Republican Bereuter agreed Congress had not “signed off” on any deployment. He warned not to misinterpret the current “silence” as “acceptance” (Bereuter, 1995). He thus attempted to reframe Congress’ de facto tacit consent (‘passive loyalty’) as a tacit form of ‘voice’. Simultaneously, the House passed H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act, by roll call vote. One of its amendments required to unilaterally lift the UN arms embargo bringing this issue back on the table.

During his talk with Clinton, Gingrich expressed the view that the past 50 years of peace were achieved by a U.S. effort and the U.S.-built alliance NATO, not the UN. He called the “U.N.’s current system of command and control […] a nightmare.” But said he was “willing to take the U.N. system seriously enough to actually encourage our government to take the lead in reforming the current peacekeeping system”. These were his first reconciliatory remarks of the debate. The senator seemed to move away from his aim of renationalizing security to a modification/regionalization approach. This cooperative impulse, however, did not last. Towards the end of phase II, the tone of the debate became sharper again – to some extent this was because it coincided with the U.S. electoral campaign heating up. Dole (1995b: 9011), a contender for the Republican nomination, now accused the government of wasting resources in a “failed investment” and called the international efforts in Bosnia a “multilateral mess”.

On the eve of the 50 year anniversary celebration for the U.N., members of Congress were especially critical (‘voice’). Gilman complained about “the extensiveness of our
funds [to the U.N.]” and about “a great deal of mismanagement in the organization”. He pointed to the 17 U.N. (nation-building) missions then underway which were very cost-intensive while failing to “produce[…] much peace”. Hamilton tried to clarify the opponents’ angle saying they feared a “loss of U.S. sovereignty to the U.N.” (all as cited in: Crossette, 1995d). Therefore, this phase ended with the same counter-internationalization arguments that had been viral in the first one. But while January and February had witnessed congressional initiatives the House and even more so the Senate had been rather passive during the second phase. When over 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed in Srebrenica, Congress began to pursue lifting the arms embargo unilaterally with new vigor.

Table 4: Response Overview - Phase II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Congress voice</th>
<th>Congress loyalty (passive)</th>
<th>Government loyalty, minor voice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase II 05-07</td>
<td>Bereuter (D), Dole (R), Gilman (R), Gingrich (R), Liebermann (D), Warner (R)</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Clinton, Albright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver: Circumstances</td>
<td>Criticism</td>
<td>H.R. 1561</td>
<td>silence with regard to the authorization of NATO airstrikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arguments</td>
<td>A. Security</td>
<td>inefficiency (UN)</td>
<td>defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ineffectiveness (UN)</td>
<td>lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unfavorable cost/benefit (Bosnia)</td>
<td>authorizing NATO airstrikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Legitimacy</td>
<td>no consultation</td>
<td>UN = global legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>with Congress</td>
<td>consultation with Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>necessity of Congressional approval</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>unspecific modification</td>
<td>cost/benefit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>partial renationalization</td>
<td>burden-sharing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>flexibility</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>some inefficiencies</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>modification (reform)</td>
<td>Status quo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Phase 3: Congress vs. Circumstances/ Clinton

The last phase stretched from mid-July to December 1995. It included two major attempts by Congress to influence the course of events. The first effort was to reintroduce the Self-Defense Act which sought to unilaterally lift the U.N. arms embargo. This initiative failed due to a presidential veto. As the peace talks were running their course and Clinton committed U.S. troops, Congressmen voiced discontent but could not hinder
U.S. participation in a multilateral peacekeeping mission. Finally, leading Republicans switched sides on the matter and lent backing to Clinton’s foreign policy. Congress begrudgingly accepted the contribution and defeated all proposals limiting presidential authority as Commander in Chief. But this last phase constituted an uneven struggle. The hill was more or less presented with a *fait accompli* as to the deployment of American troops.

### 3.3.1 Congressional Responses

The congressional response to the massacre of Srebrenica was to move forward with a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. In a Senate floor speech, Dole argued: “It is time to end this farce. It is time for us to let Bosnia do what the U.N. will not do for them.” He announced a binding resolution sponsored by him and Democrat Joseph Lieberman. (Schmitt, 1995b) Thus bipartisan ‘voice’ marked the beginning of the third phase. However, Dole also showed some of the cooperative spirit that would come into play later in the year. He hinted at willingness to support the deployment of U.S. troops under conditions such as NATO command over the operation, and that the rules of engagement be acceptable for the U.S. i.e. that troops would be allowed to respond to attacks. On July 25, the Senate reconsidered the Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act. As one observer noted, the bill was “an expression of the intense frustration with the status quo” (Sciolino, 1995c). Dole (Dole, 1995c: S10621) attacked the ‘dual-key’ authorization procedure of air strikes for “seriously damaging the credibility of NATO”. He was clear about who he saw at fault: “NATO has been weakened because of its subordination to the United Nations” (S10622). As a remedy he advocated the unilateral lift. Democratic Senator Byrd agreed with his diagnosis and pleaded for “NATO [to] take over from the United Nations in Bosnia” (Byrd, 1995: S10613). The responses by Dole and Byrd both see NATO as a valid alternative to the U.N.. In terms of the response typology, their position constitutes ‘voice’ with the aim of *regionalization*.

The following day, the Self-Defense Act passed the Senate by roll call vote 69-29. 21 Democrats sided with the Republican majority. The bill’s binding character constituted a direct challenge to the President’s authority in foreign policy-making and the decision-making power of the U.N. Security Council. Yet Congress apparently was not ready to ‘exit’ the U.N. framework as was illustrated by two other proposals which passed that day. Following an initiative by Democrat Sam Nunn, the Senate insisted on a U.N. Security Council vote prior to lifting the arms embargo and in the event that the Council was blocked, Sen. William Cohen (R-Maine), proposed involving the General Assembly instead (Dewar, 1995b). The Self-Defense Act subsequently passed the House, only to be vetoed by President Clinton on August 11, 1995. Afterwards, Congress went into summer recess. When a mortar attack on Sarajevo on August 28 was
answered with swift and heavy NATO airstrikes, Dole in a spur of cooperativeness held out the prospect of postponing a Senate vote to circumvent Clinton’s veto of the Self-Defense Act (Harris/Dewar, 1995).

In the following month, as peace talks drew nearer, Congress debated the administration’s proposal to send peacekeeping troops to Bosnia should a settlement be reached. Those ‘loyal’ to the internationalization of security warned “[…] if we back out of the commitment now, it would be a tremendous blow to the Atlantic alliance. Ending the war in Bosnia today […] has become the key test of NATO’s effectiveness, and it has now become a key test for U.S. leadership” (Hamilton, 1995). But overall, the prospect of peace talks, prompted more ‘voice’. On November 9, the House voted 315-103 on non-binding resolution 247 to advise the President to get congressional approval before deploying U.S. troops to Bosnia (Roll Call Report Syndicate, 1995). The vote mirrored the non-cooperative atmosphere on the hill, where Dole and Gingrich said support for a Bosnia mission was “virtually nil” (as cited in: Sciolino, 1995e). Frustration grew as Republicans felt, the administration did not keep them informed (Weymouth, 1995). Hence, the House went further and passed a proposal (H.R. 2606) by Joel Hefley 243-171 determining that only specifically appropriated funds could be used for a potential deployment. This vote constituted a step towards stronger forms of ‘voice’, but it was taken primarily by Republicans. Most Democrats who had only recently voted with the Republicans on H Res. 247, had returned to the ‘loyal’ camp (Dewar/Dobbs, 1995).

Despite the fact that even at that point Senate approval was “far from certain” and ergo the odds of this resolution becoming a law were rather slim, it had a symbolic quality. It constituted an affront to the President and the allies (Weiner, 1995).

Since Congress had been in recess from the completion of the peace agreement on November 21 until November 28, it now had to debate a changed situation. A settlement had been reached and Clinton had committed to sending 20,000 U.S. troops as part of a multilateral peacekeeping force. In face of this fait accompli, Dole backtracked on previous legitimacy charges stating: “I have strong belief in the power of the president, the constitutional authority the president of the United States has and must have” (as cited in: Balz, 1995). Acknowledging inevitability, Dole (1995d) backed Clinton’s decision for the sake of the men and women in the military. He did, however, announce a resolution detailing conditions for the peacekeeping mission. Dole was supported by Senator John McCain who warned that forcing the President’s hand now would be damaging to the credibility of the United States. Also, he argued that the “stability” of NATO, history’s “most successful defensive alliance”, must not be endangered (McCain, 1995). These remarks conveyed that ultimately security concerns outweighed legitimacy concerns in this debate.
Democrats welcomed this public show of ‘active loyalty’ from the Republican leadership (Sciolino, 1995f). Yet on December 8, 201 House Members signed a one-line-letter to Clinton: “We urge you not to send ground troops to Bosnia” (as cited in: Dewar, 1995c) showing that Republicans were still split on the issue. On December 13, the debate came to a head on the Hill. Both the House and Senate voted on several proposals concerning the U.S. engagement in Bosnia. Representative Robert Dornan’s (R) H.R. 2770, would have denied funding to the U.S. peacekeeping mission, but failed narrowly 210-218. Another one, H.R. 302 by Representatives John Buyer (R) and Ike Skelton (D), passed 287-141. It voiced “serious concern and opposition” to the deployment while expressing “pride and admiration” for the troops. Finally, the House voted on H.R. 306 sponsored by Hamilton. The resolution promised unequivocal support for the armed forces, but was read by its opponents as approval of Clinton’s policy. It failed 190-237.

Meanwhile in the Senate, the resolution to cut off funding for the peacekeeping mission (H.R. 2606) was defeated by a vote of 22-77. More narrowly, the Senators defeated non-binding S.Con.Res. 35 47-52 with which the Senate would have gone on the record opposing the deployment. Dole and McCain introduced a joint resolution (S.J.Res. 44) expressing support for the U.S. troops without explicitly authorizing their deployment. Next to a list of conditions it granted the President that he “may fulfill his commitment.” This resolution passed 69-30. Overall, this phase saw considerable ‘voice’, but Congress stopped short of any strong forms. In face of the fait accompli this phase ended in reluctant ‘loyalty’.

3.3.2 Government Responses

When after the massacre of Srebrenica, the Senate pressed for a unilateral lift of the arms embargo, government officials stuck to their line that unilateral action would ‘Americanize’ the conflict. They argued in favor of a U.S. troop contribution to a multinational rescue force. Off the record, however, administration spokesmen discussed the “international community’s lack of authority”. Perry spoke to this concern when he questioned the “viability” of the U.N. mission in Bosnia (Dobbs, 1995c). As a Senate vote on S. 21 drew closer, Clinton threatened to veto the Act while Christopher and Perry attempted to win back dissenting Democrats (cf. Sciolino, 1995c). Still, the Self-Defense Act passed the Senate and went to the House where Christopher and Perry lobbied for the bill’s defeat (Devroy/Priest, 1995b). Clinton personally called Democrats to change their minds. But despite their combined efforts, the House passed S. 21 by a vote of 69-29 (Sciolino, 1995d). As previously announced, Clinton vetoed the bill on August 11. In the accompanying statement, he relied heavily on security-related arguments explaining that lifting the embargo would lead to “unilateral American
responsibility” and “create serious divisions between the United States and its key allies, with potential long-lasting damage to the NATO alliance” (Clinton, 1995i).

In response to a BSA mortar attack on Sarajevo the Clinton administration pushed for NATO airstrikes. Ultimately, the heaviest airstrikes of the war were initiated and administration officials were cited saying the U.S. had been “instrumental in persuading the United Nations and NATO to retaliate” (Greenhouse, 1995b). The government initiative indeed lent “new buoyancy” to Clinton’s Bosnia policy (Harris/Dewar, 1995). In a letter informing Congress of the measure, Clinton referred to both “relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and NATO decisions” and his “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive” and with that denied the anticipated legitimacy charges (Clinton, 1995j).

With the prospect of a peace agreement, the debate shifted to a potential contribution of U.S. troops to a peacekeeping force. Such an international undertaking once again posed the question of democratic legitimacy – concerns to which Christopher replied: “Yes, we want Congress’s approval. We’ll consult very closely with them (as cited in: Clifford, 1995). However, another statement by Christopher (1995c) put the Congress-friendly remarks into perspective. While he “would welcome and encourage a Congressional authorization of the mission”, the opposite seemed out of the question:

“If we are to ask NATO to act in Bosnia, the United States cannot fail to contribute troops to the mission. We are the bedrock, the foundation of NATO strength and resolve. [… Failing to contribute] would mean abdicating our leadership in the alliance and it would imperil the future of NATO and the stability of Europe.”

He further argued that upon the affirmative intervention decision hinged the “President’s full constitutional authority” and that it entailed fair burden-sharing. Perry (1995) underlined his point about the strategic importance of alliance maintenance. Keeping “strength and credibility of NATO” intact was portrayed as a “vital national security interest”. In fact, this point became a government mantra throughout the third phase. Bosnia was stylized as the alliance’s litmus test. In this stage of the debate, administration officials mostly avoided references to the U.N. and instead portrayed NATO as the “only organization that can meet that responsibility [of keeping the peace in Bosnia] strongly and effectively”.

In face of continued opposition especially from the House, Clinton (1995k) sent a letter to Speaker Gingrich in which he reiterated “the importance of U.S. involvement with regard to NATO”. He called Congressional support “important and desirable”, but qualified he had to “reserve [his] constitutional prerogatives in this area.” Once the peace agreement was completed, Clinton (1995l) addressed the nation in a nationally televised statement. He repeated the mantra: “When America’s partnerships
are weak and our leadership is in doubt,” he explained “it undermines our ability to secure our interests and to convince others to work with us.” On December 6, he informed Congress that the first 1,500 troops had been sent to Bosnia “in conjunction with our NATO allies” and “pursuant to [his] constitutional authority” (Clinton, 1995m). Four days later, Clinton officially requested “a Congressional expression of support for U.S. participation in a NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia” (as cited in: Dewar, 1995d). Finally on December 21, he wrote a letter to congressional leaders notifying them that 20,000 U.S. troops were en route to Bosnia. The deployment, he argued, was backed by his “constitutional authority” and “Security Council authorization” (Clinton, 1995n).

In conclusion, table no. 5 offers an overview of the responses in in the final phase of the 1995 debate on Bosnia and internationalized security policy.

**Table 5: Response Overview - Phase III**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Congress loyalty (active)</th>
<th>Government loyalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase III 07-12</td>
<td>Actors Cohen (R), Dole (R), Hamilton (D), McCain (R), Nunn (D)</td>
<td>Actors Clinton, Christopher, Perry, Albright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arguments A. Security damage to credibility of NATO, effectiveness (NATO)</td>
<td>Arguments A. Security National interest, burden-sharing, effectiveness (NATO), flexibility, alliance maintenance, stability in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Goals regionalization</td>
<td>Goals Status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Legitimacy importance of maintaining presidential credibility</td>
<td>B. Legitimacy constitutional authority, UN Security Council authorization, consultation with Congress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 * defeated in the House; ** defeated in the Senate
**CONCLUSION**

In the wake of the Republican win in the 1994 congressional elections, and a cease-fire that had rendered the situation in the Balkans relatively stable, the 1995 Bosnia debate began as a hypothetical argument over U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions. Republican Congressmen introduced several bills which aimed at a partial renationalization of security policy. Yet when the administration met these proposals with strong opposition, majorities were uncertain and domestic issues more pressing, they did not follow through on either one of these initiatives. Phase II was largely dictated by dynamics on the ground in Bosnia. A new wave of violence had the Clinton administration lobbying for a forceful multilateral approach. Throughout the summer of 1995, several rounds of NATO airstrikes were authorized without previous consultations with Congress. However, the Congressional response was muted.

Despite the fact that the issue at hand had shifted from desirability of U.N. peacekeeping in general to potential involvement in a specific conflict, responses were still framed within the context of the ongoing debate. The actors revolved around the question: “do we need to fight a war in Bosnia to prove that we are good internationalists?” (Steel, 1995) After a failed effort to unilaterally lift the arms embargo and to thwart the contribution of U.S. troops to a multilateral peacekeeping mission, Congress begrudgingly consented with Clinton’s policy.

The debate revealed that at the time the relevant “fault line” in security policy was not between isolationists and internationalists, but rather running through the internationalist camp. It divided them into multilateralists and unilateralists (Rosenfeld, 1995). The lack of ‘exit’ as a response type testifies to this observation. Multilateralists’ and unilateralists’ vastly divergent outlook on internationalized security hardly allowed for an actual debate. The two sides were seldom responsive in their line of argumentation; most statements were incompatible with the opposing side’s reasoning. Therefore, the 1995 debate remained a monologue of two rhetorically isolated camps (the administration and the opposition) instead of a dialogue. Skeptics insisted peacekeeping should be severely limited because it had “jeopardized American interests, squandered resources – and cost lives” (Gilman, 1995) which proponents rejected because such a move “[… ] would threaten the security, the interest and the values of the American people” (Clinton, 1995h). On the few occasions, someone responded to another’s concerns, the concessions proved to be a rhetorical move as e.g. the promise of ‘close consultation with Congress’ given in response to repeated ‘lack of legitimacy’ charges was never followed up on (Hendrickson, 1998).

Arguments failed to persuade, and seemingly did not determine the course of events. At turning points in the debate it was the momentum on the ground and the *fait accompli* it helped create that tipped the balance rather than a specific argument. When
Clinton authorized NATO airstrikes because a new wave of violence required a forceful international response, Congress shelved its plan to circumvent the presidential veto on the Self-Defense Act. Later Clinton committed to sending U.S. troops because the peace process was advancing. Once he had publicized this *fait accompli*, it was almost impossible for Congress to repeal. However, this is not to say that the arguments of Congressional ‘voice’ did not resonate. Despite the fact that most opposition initiatives failed and the one measure that passed both the House and the Senate was vetoed by the president, the ‘voice’ responses still seemingly held *symbolic power*. Independent of the output, the occurrence of ‘voice’ alone sent a message to the administration, the U.N. and NATO allied governments. The Clinton administration had to deal with the public relations fallout as well as with the required lobbying effort to defeat the proposals. In the press, these initiatives were framed as a “a slap in the face for President Clinton and American allies” (Weiner, 1995); and indeed, the allies, especially French President Jacques Chirac, were disconcerted about the prospect of a “unilateral American decision” (Schmitt, 1995b). On the part of the affected organization, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned: “we must avoid projecting the image that the United Nations is a subcontractor of the State Department” (as cited in: Crossette, 1995a). In order to corroborate the ‘symbolic power’ hypothesis further research will be required. Process-tracing could more firmly establish the link between *voice* and audience costs which the findings in this paper have suggested.

The debate also showcased distinct approaches to different international organizations. Broad internationalization of security as in working within a U.N. framework was much more contested than *regionalization* of security as in relying on NATO structures. This was mirrored in the debate’s dynamic. In phase I, Republicans responded primarily to the security trade-off and concluded that participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions should be severely limited. The Clinton administration came to the organization’s defense, but not without remarking how ‘bad and ragged’ it was (Clinton, 1995g) revealing ambivalence towards the U.N. As the situation on the ground developed its own momentum, focus shifted to NATO. In 1995, the ‘credibility’ of NATO still appeared to be worthy of preservation and hence government officials framed the Bosnia conflict as the litmus test for NATO. When leading Republicans like Dole and McCain switched sides from ‘voice’ to ‘loyalty’, they assumed the same line of argumentation. In internationalized security policy, NATO proved to be the ‘common denominator’ at the time. The U.N. did not generate the same disciplining power in the debate. I assume this gap has narrowed since and NATO no longer holds the same power in the U.S. security discourse. To test this hypothesis, further research would have to trace a current debate like the dispute over the 2011 Libya intervention.
In retrospect, the proponents of internationalization in the Clinton administration did IOs a disservice by relying heavily on the flexibility-argument. They referred to “[t]he option of collective action” (Clinton, 1995b), the “[…] option of acting through NATO and other coalitions” (Talbott, 1995). The UN was cast as “one of the tools […] to build […] peace” (Clinton, 1995a), and multilateralism as “a means, not an end” (Christopher, 1995a).\footnote{All italics added.} The utilitarian argument helped sell internationalization to Congress, but it required a non-committal rhetoric which would later serve opponents of international security organizations in debates such as Iraq 2003.
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