CTBT HOLD-OUT STATES : Why did „the longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history” still not enter into force?
Kubiak, KatarzynaDownload:
pdf-Format: Dokument 1.pdf (458 KB)
URL | https://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3237/ |
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Dokumentart: | Bericht / Forschungsbericht / Abhandlung |
Institut: | IFSH - Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik |
Schriftenreihe: | Working paper // Interdisziplinäre Forschungsgruppe Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle |
Bandnummer: | 2011, 16 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Erstellungsjahr: | 2011 |
Publikationsdatum: | 18.07.2011 |
Originalveröffentlichung: | http://www.ifsh.de/IFAR/pdf/wp_16.pdf (2011) |
SWD-Schlagwörter: | Atomare Abrüstung |
DDC-Sachgruppe: | Politik |
BK - Basisklassifikation: | 89.90 (Außenpolitik, Internationale Politik), 89.76 (Friedensforschung, Konfliktforschung), 89.77 (Rüstungspolitik) |
Sondersammelgebiete: | 3.6 Politik und Friedensforschung |
Kurzfassung auf Englisch:
Stopping nuclear proliferation is at the top of the international agenda for years. With 182 signatures and 153 ratifications most states recognize the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as substantially inhibiting further vertical nuclear proliferation and in some extend halting the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the entry into force of the treaty is in limbo due to nine hold-out states - China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States. Why do they oppose it? Are there any windows of opportunity for the CTBT? The qualitative analysis distinguishes the inter-state, intra-state and decision-maker-level arguments. It is conducted in form of nine case studies and is primarily based upon official documents. Governmental statements rarely reveal full reasons for states’ reluctance concerning the CTBT, but outline necessary conditions for its success and provide a framework to work out policy approaches aiming at the treaties entry into force. The study points at a complex interrelation of technical reasons, security related arguments, arms-control related motivations and domestic policy issues. The most important findings to grapple with are seeking regionally comprehensive solutions and closing all outstanding loopholes accompanying the treaty. India and North Korea will be the toughest parties to sign and ratify the treaty, as there is either no interest in a treaty text as negotiated or no interest in banning nuclear testing at all, respectively. According to most hold-out states nuclear weapon states bear the highest responsibility for the treaty entry into force. This Working Paper is based on a master’s thesis submitted within the postgraduate course "Master of Peace and Security Studies – M.P.S." as a joint programme of the University of Hamburg and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH). The thesis has been submitted in July 2010. The time frame, thus, focuses primarily on the debate until July 2010 and only briefly indicates on current occurrences.
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