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Based on three case studies, this working paper analyzes under which circumstances states and multilateral organizations implement sanctions. In recent decades, sanctions have become a popular instrument for fighting terrorism, ending violent conflicts, improving the human rights situation and promoting democracy. Yet why are hard measures only imposed on some countries, whereas others go unpunished, leaving the civilian population to pay the price? In Myanmar, various sanctions were implemented especially by the EU and the USA. Myanmar was the first country under ILO sanctions due to the fact that its government promoted forced labour. In addition, non-state actors successfully appealed to boycott transnational companies producing in Myanmar. The opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who receives high international publicity, and numerous worldwide Burma campaigns effectively called for international sanctions. In Sudan, human rights violations in Darfur as well as during the North-South conflict were ignored by the EU and the UN for a long time. In comparison to Myanmar, NGO engagement was negligible. The UN imposed sanctions due to the involvement of the Sudanese government in Islamic terrorism, but without the objective to improve the human rights situation. The imposition of ‘smart’ sanctions by the EU ultimately did not contribute to the improvement of human rights. In South Africa various long-term sanctions were imposed, but partly implemented ineffectively. (Inter)national civil society was very active in the case of South Africa: () international public interest was influential, (2) there was a strong and effective anti-apartheid movement worldwide and (3) a strong internal opposition. The conclusion sums up that the imposition of sanctions is primarily influenced by: () the danger for international security, which stems from instability and disruption of a state, (2) the degree of public interest in a country, (3) the existence of an opposition that is based on democratic values, (4) the compatibility of sanctions with the sender’s economic interests, (5) the extent to which conflicting parties can be identified as good or bad and (6) the complexity of a conflict.

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