Transfer pricing, tax havens and global governance

Bhat, Ganapati


pdf-Format: Dokument 1.pdf (552 KB)

Bookmark bei Connotea Bookmark bei

Dokumentart: Bericht / Forschungsbericht / Abhandlung
Institut: DIE - Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper // Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
Bandnummer: 2009, 7
ISBN: 978-3-88985-455-1
Sprache: Englisch
Erstellungsjahr: 2009
Publikationsdatum: 14.08.2011
Originalveröffentlichung:$FILE/DP%207.2009.pdf (2009)
SWD-Schlagwörter: Preisbildung , Steueroase , Global Governance , Multinationales Unternehmen , Gewinnverlagerung
DDC-Sachgruppe: Politik
BK - Basisklassifikation: 89.71 (Internationale Zusammenarbeit: Allgemeines)
Sondersammelgebiete: 3.6 Politik und Friedensforschung

Kurzfassung auf Englisch:

Tax-motivated transfer pricing has attracted world attention owing to the existence of low-tax jurisdictions and the volume of the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs have many instruments for shifting profits through transfer pricing, and tax havens provide ample opportunity for this. Tax havens pose the threat of capital flight and income shifting from high-tax countries. At present, there are two ways of tackling this problem: by applying the arm’s length principle to determine the tax payable by MNCs in a particular jurisdiction or by using a formula to allocate tax payable by MNCs between countries. Based on various studies conducted so far, this paper summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of these methods in solving the problem of profit-shifting by MNCs. The predicament is truly global in nature, and no single country or group of countries can hope to resolve it. It is high time a global institution was set up to calculate MNCs’ worldwide income and to provide tax authorities with timely information.

(Anzahl Downloads)

keine Statistikdaten vorhanden

eDoc.ViFaPol ist in BASE recherchierbar:

Wir unterstützen Open Access:
Informationsplattform Open Access

zum Seitenanfang